STATE OF LOUISIANA v. KYM BANKS (2026)

This case is in pretrial posture. Relator, Kym Banks (“Mr. Banks”), seeks this Court's supervisory jurisdiction of the trial court's August 3, 2026 ruling denying his Motion to Quash. For the reasons that follow, we grant Relator's writ application, vacate the judgment, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

On February 24, 2026, the State (via the Attorney General's office) filed a bill of information charging Mr. Banks with one count each of: aggravated flight from an officer, a violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1 (Count One); unauthorized use of a moveable, a violation of La. R.S. 14:68.4(B) (Count Two); reckless operation of vehicle, a violation of La. R.S. 14:99 (Count Three); obstruction of justice, a violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (Count Four); possession of cocaine less than two grams, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1) (Count Five); possession with the intent to distribute marijuana with an aggregate weight of less than two-and-one-half pounds, a violation of La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(a) (Count Six); possession of tapentadol less than two grams, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1) (Count Seven); possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of La. R.S. 40:1023 (Count Eight); illegal carrying of weapons while unlawfully committing a crime of violence, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E) (Count Nine); illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E) (Count Ten); and no seatbelt, a violation of La. R.S. 32:295.1(G)(1) (Count Eleven). All charges stemmed from acts alleged to have been committed on December 30, 2025.

On June 25, 2026, Mr. Banks filed a motion to quash counts nine and ten of the bill of information on double jeopardy grounds. On June 24, 2026, the State filed an opposition.

On August 3, 2026, the trial court presided over a hearing on the motion to quash. At its conclusion, the court denied the motion “based on [its] review of the motion filed by Defense Counsel as well as the State's opposition and the current jurisprudence.”

Mr. Banks filed a notice of intent to seek writs. This timely writ application followed.

ASSIGNED ERRORS

Mr. Banks asserts in his writ application that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash. He argues that count nine, in which he is charged with illegal carrying of weapons while unlawfully committing a crime of violence, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E), subjects him to double jeopardy because he is also charged, in count one, with aggravated flight from an officer, a violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1, which he claims arose out of the same facts. Mr. Banks also asserts that count ten, in which he is charged with illegal carrying of weapons with a controlled dangerous substance, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E), subjects him to double jeopardy because he is also charged, in count seven, with possession of a controlled dangerous substance, tapentadol, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1), which he claims arose out of the same facts.

DISCUSSION

In State v. Hall, 2012-0601, pp. 1-2 (La. 6/29/12), 91 So. 3d 302, 303, the Supreme Court explained that the appropriate time to rule on a claim of double jeopardy based on evidence of multiple offenses committed during a single episode is when the evidence at trial has developed the factual context of the claim.

In Hall, the Court determined the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to quash; and the court of appeal erred in ordering an evidentiary hearing on the question as to whether the defendant could be convicted in a single proceeding for both of the crimes alleged in the bill of information.  ² Id. at p. 1, 91 So.3d at 303. In granting the State's writ application, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows:

A defendant may raise a claim of double jeopardy before trial by way of a motion to quash, La.C.Cr.P. art. 532(6), as well as after trial by way of a motion in arrest of judgment. La.C.Cr.P. art. 859(6)(“if not previously urged”). However, when a double jeopardy claim arises in the context of multiple offenses allegedly committed in a single criminal episode involving a single evidentiary nexus and charged in the same bill of information or indictment, and the state has thus made no effort to prosecute the charges seriatim, and a question arises as to whether the same evidence required to convict a defendant of one offense is also the same evidence required to convict him of the other crime, the court should defer ruling on a motion to quash until trial has fully developed the factual context of a claim that prosecution has implicated the double jeopardy prohibition of multiple punishments for the same offense. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2541, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (“While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions on the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting [a defendant] for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution.”); cf. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”). In the event that the evidence at trial supports a claim that defendant has been punished in a single proceeding twice for the same offense, the court may then take appropriate action by granting the motion to quash and vacating the conviction on the less seriously punishable offense. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 861–64, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1671–73, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (“To say that a [defendant] may be prosecuted simultaneously for violation [of separate offenses] ․ is not to say that he may be convicted and punished for two offenses․ [T]he only remedy consistent with the [legislative] intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions․ [which alone] is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense.”)(citing Hunter); State v. Dubaz, 468 So.2d 554, 556 (La.1985) (“Where multiple punishment has been erroneously imposed the proper ․ procedure is to eliminate the effect of the less severely punishable offense.”).

Id. at pp. 1-2, 91 So.3d at 303.

In a subsequent case, State v. Brooks, 2013-0540 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/18/13), 124 So. 3d 1129, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash on double jeopardy grounds and the State appealed. This Court, acknowledging Hall, stated,

Given the Supreme Court's holding in Hall, supra, we find that the district court erred in granting the motion to quash on double jeopardy grounds. On remand, the district court is instructed to defer a ruling on the double jeopardy claim until after Mr. Brooks has been convicted on both counts, assuming such convictions occur.”

Id. at 21, 124 So. 3d at 1141.

DECREE

We adopt the same ruling as the court in Brooks. We find the district court erred in denying the motion to quash on double jeopardy grounds prior to trial. Therefore, the judgment of August 3, 2026, denying Mr. Banks’ motion to quash is vacated and remanded to the trial court. On remand, the district court is instructed to defer a ruling on the double jeopardy claim until after Mr. Banks has been convicted on both counts, assuming such convictions occurs.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Mr. Banks’ writ application is granted; the judgment is vacated; and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED; AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

2.   Defendant Hall filed a motion to quash resulting from charges of one count of possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E), and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967(B)(1). See State v. Hall, 2100-0391, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/12), 85 So.3d 221, 222. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to quash and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Id.at 5, 84 So.3d at 224.

Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins