LEWISBURG BELLEVUE WATER SYSTEM INC v. EAGLIN (2026)

The issue here is whether the trial court erred in sustaining Defendant's peremptory exception of no cause of action.

In July 2025, Plaintiff, Lewisburg-Bellevue Water System Inc. (“LBWS”), filed a Petition on Open Account against Defendant, Ignatius Eaglin (“Iggy”). Two weeks later, Iggy responded with exceptions of vagueness and lis pendens.

Thereafter, Lewisburg attempted to cure the defects of its petition by filing a First Amended and Restated Petition on Open Account. Iggy responded to that petition by filing an exception of no cause of action.

The trial of Iggy's exception of no cause of action was held on October 31, 2025. After listening to the arguments of counsel, the trial court sustained the exception and dismissed the petition. The trial court's ruling was reduced to a written final judgment signed on November 3, 2025. LBWS appealed.

On appeal, LBWS asserts the following assignment of error: “The District Court committed reversible legal error when it dismissed the entirety of the Petition of LBWS, INC., finding that LBWS, INC.’s Petition failed to state any cause of action thereunder.”

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The objections that can be raised through the peremptory exception include the exception of no cause of action. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the function and legal analysis of this exception in Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 06-1774 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641. There, the supreme court explained:

As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of action” refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. No evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of action. LSA–C.C.P. art. 931. The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.

Louisiana retains a system of fact pleading, and mere conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by facts will not set forth a cause or right of action. The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action is upon the mover. Because the exception of no cause of action raises a question of law and the district court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition, review of the district court's ruling on an exception of no cause of action is de novo. The pertinent inquiry is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiff's favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.

Id. at 646–47 (citations omitted).

In the case before us, LBWS's amended petition states in relevant part:

2.

LBWS, INC. is a private, non-profit corporation in the business of constructing, maintaining, and operating a water system to supply water for residential, commercial, domestic, livestock and/or gardening purposes.

3.

For years, Defendant was a member and customer of LBWS, INC., and Defendant's residence was connected to and received water from the water system owned, operated, and maintained by Petitioner.

4.

As a member and customer of LBWS, INC., Defendant was bound by the By-Laws and Rules & Regulations of LBWS, INC., as amended from time to time.

5.

On February 6, 2025, Defendant made verbal threats to kill, physically harm, and did, in fact, physically assault a LBWS, INC. employee who was lawfully carrying out his duties on behalf of LBWS, INC. Defendant was arrested and charged for this incident by the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Department.

6.

Given the threats of physical violence and the actual physical harm exhibited by Defendant against Petitioner and its employees and board members, LBWS, INC. took immediate action to expel Defendant as a member of LBWS, INC. and to discontinue water service to Defendant's residence.

․

18.

Pursuant to the By-Laws and Rules and regulations of LBWS, INC., the costs and damages incurred by Petitioner as a direct result of Defendant's actions “shall be paid by [Defendant]” and “shall be added to the [Defendant's] bill.”

19.

An itemization of the costs and damages incurred by Petitioner as a result of Defendant's conduct, all as described hereinabove, is further shown by the Resolution of LBWS, INC. dated March 20, 2025 ․

20.

Accordingly, Defendant is indebted unto Petitioner, LEWISBURG-BELLEVUE WATER SYSTEM, INC[.], in the full and true sum of $8,645.33, together with reasonable attorney's fees as authorized by LSA-R.S. 9:2781, judicial interest from the date of judicial demand until paid, and for all costs of these proceedings.

The damages alleged in LBWS's petition consist of $2,970.00 for emergency-water-meter-removal services, $308.25 for three LBWS employees to oversee the water-meter-removal services, $600.00 in filing fees for injunctive relief in a separate lawsuit, $4,050.00 in attorney fees from that separate lawsuit, $425.00 for work performed by three LBWS board members, $42.08 in travel expenses for those LBWS board members, and $250.00 for a security detail.

As noted earlier, LBWS styled its lawsuit against Iggy as a Petition on Open Account. So does the petition state a cause of action on an open account? The answer is no.

Louisiana's open account statute is La.R.S. 9:2781, which provides in pertinent part:

D. For the purposes of this Section ․, “open account” includes any account for which a part or all of the balance is past due, whether or not the account reflects one or more transactions and whether or not at the time of contracting the parties expected future transactions. “Open account” shall include debts incurred for professional services, including but not limited to legal and medical services.

Here, the petition alleges that LBWS operated a water system that supplied water for Iggy's residence. Thus, the only account that could possibly fit within the definition of “open account” under La.R.S. 9:2781(D) is Iggy's customer account for water services. But there is no allegation that the balance of this account was past due when those services were terminated. Stated differently, the petition does not allege that the account for water services was an open account.

Also, an essential element for an action on an open account is the existence of a contract between the parties on which the debt is based. Gulfstream Servs., Inc. v. Hot Energy Servs., Inc., 04-1223 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 907 So.2d 96, writ denied, 05-1064 (La. 6/17/05), 904 So.2d 706. Yet here, the petition does not identify any contract that governed the supply of water to Iggy's residence.

In sum, LBWS's petition fails to state a cause of action on an open account. But our analysis is not over. We now address whether the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.

To this end, LBWS argues that its petition also states a cause of action for breach of contract. We disagree. LBWS has filed suit against Iggy for damages resulting from his tortious act—his assault of an LBWS employee. This is a tort action, not a contract action. See, e.g., DePhillips v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa Par., 19-1496 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 817.

Even still, Iggy argues that the items of damage in the petition are too remote for recovery. In support, he points to Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So.2d 1151 (La.1988). There, the plaintiffs filed suit against a doctor and a hospital because Mrs. Pitre conceived a child after undergoing a tubal ligation, which was supposed to make pregnancy impossible. The child was born with severe disabilities. The plaintiffs sought, among other things, damages for the doctor's alleged negligence, including the increased costs for raising a disabled child. The supreme court dismissed that part of the plaintiffs’ suit for failure to state a cause of action.

In essence, the supreme court determined that those damages were not foreseeable consequences of the doctor's alleged negligent acts. In doing so, the court provided the following statement of law as to legal cause:

After considering the foregoing rules and policy considerations [for contractual liability], we conclude that as a general principle that the same criterion of foreseeability and risk of harm which determined whether a physician in this kind of situation was negligent in the first instance should determine the extent of his liability for that negligence; and that the doctor should not be held liable for consequences which no reasonable practitioner would expect to follow from the conduct. In accordance with the almost universal rule, however, the physician shall be liable for all resulting harm to the person caused by a negligent physical impact upon the person of the plaintiff. Likewise, in accordance with the general rule, and by analogy to our civil code articles governing contractual damages, a physician who intentionally, recklessly or in bad faith violates his legal duty shall be liable for all damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his breach of obligation.

Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).

In our case, unlike Pitre, the alleged tortious conduct is not negligence; it is an intentional tort. Thus, in our de novo review, we need not determine which damages were foreseeable.¹

In the end, LBWS has stated a cause of action against Iggy based on general tort law under La.Civ.Code art. 2315. LBWS's petition against its former member, Iggy, alleges damages to the corporation caused by Iggy's assault of a corporate employee. The trial court therefore legally erred in sustaining Iggy's exception.

DISPOSITION

For the above reasons, the trial court judgment of November 3, 2025, is reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. The costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendant, Ignatius Eaglin.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The determination of which damages are a direct consequence of the alleged assault is an issue for another day.

FITZGERALD, Judge.