CASTLEBERRY v. CASTLEBERRY (2026)

Kelli Nicole Castleberry (Kelli) appeals the trial court's judgment partitioning the community property existing between her and her former spouse, Stephen Bryan Castleberry (Stephen). For the reasons expressed below, we amend the judgment of the trial court and affirm as amended.

I.

ISSUES

On appeal, Kelli asserts the following assignments of error:

(1) The trial court did not follow proper procedures in valuing, assigning, and dividing the assets and debts belonging to the community of acquets and gains;

(2) The trial court improperly allocated [sworn detailed descriptive list (SDDL)] items to the wrong former spouse;

(3) The trial court omitted SDDL items from its final calculations;

(4) The trial court improperly valued SDDL items;

(5) The trial court misclassified SDDL items;

(6) The trial court granted the payment of expert witness fees; and

(7) The trial court allowed electronic evidence to be introduced at trial.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kelli and Stephen were married on May 26, 2001. During the marriage, Stephen practiced surgery, and Kelli was a homemaker. The couple separated in 2017. Prior to the divorce, it was discovered that Kelli was intimately involved with another woman, Carli Karluk (Carli), on whom Kelli had spent significant sums of community funds. Kelli filed for divorce on February 20, 2018. The final divorce judgment was signed March 7, 2018, and the community regime was terminated retroactively to February 20, 2018.

On January 16, 2019, Kelli filed for partition of the community property. The parties filed a “Combined Sworn Detailed Descriptive List of Community Property” (SDDL) on September 17, 2021, listing 105 items. The trial on the partition took place for ten days over a period of eight months. On the final day of the trial, February 2, 2024, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court issued written reasons for judgment and signed a final judgment on November 14, 2024. The judgment divided the assets and liabilities of the community and ordered reimbursements to be paid between the parties. Ultimately, Kelli was ordered to pay Stephen $205,000 along with half payment of court costs and half payment of expert witness fees and special master fees.

On November 26, 2024, Kelli filed a motion for new trial. The motion was heard and denied on January 30, 2025. The judgment denying the motion was signed on February 21, 2025. On March 5, 2025, Kelli filed a notice of intent to appeal, and her appeal is now properly before this court.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The trial court is vested with great discretion in effecting a fair partition of community property.” Arterburn v. Arterburn, 15-22, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/15), 176 So.3d 1163, 1167. The trial court's classifications of property as community or separate are factual findings. Thomasee v. Thomasee, 22-159 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/12/22), 362 So.3d 797, writ denied, 23-29 (La. 3/7/23), 357 So.3d 351. These factual findings, along with the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the trial court in valuing and allocating assets and liabilities, are all reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. Id. Additionally, the trial court's findings as to whether reimbursement claims have been sufficiently established are reviewable under the manifest error standard of review. Arterburn, 176 So.3d 1163. Under the manifest error standard, in order to set aside the trial court's factual findings: “(a) the appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court; and (b) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding of the trial court is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).” Id. at 1167.

While factual findings are reviewed for manifest error, when “legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence.” Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541, pp. 6-7 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735. However, if the legal error does not affect every factual finding, “the appellate court should confine its de novo review to only those findings that have been interdicted by the error.” Banks v. Children's Hosp., 13-1481, p. 13 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/14), 156 So.3d 1263, 1272.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

IMPROPER PROCEDURES

In her first assignment of error, Kelli asserts that the trial court did not follow proper procedures in valuing, assigning, and dividing the communities assets and debts. The basis of every community partition is found in La.R.S. 9:2801. When a proceeding to partition community property is instituted, both parties are required to file a SDDL of all community property which includes “the fair market value and location of each asset, and all community liabilities.” La.R.S. 9:2801(A)(1)(a). Each party is then required to “either traverse or concur in the inclusion or exclusion of each asset and liability[,]” along with their values. La.R.S. 9:2801(A)(2). Following a trial of the traverses, the trial “court shall determine the community assets and liabilities[.]” Id.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 then goes on to detail the process of partitioning the community, stating:

(4) The court shall then partition the community in accordance with the following rules:

(a) The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties.

(b) The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.

(c) The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant. As between the spouses, the allocation of a liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. The allocation in no way affects the rights of creditors.

(d) In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct. The court may order the execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents as it deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien on either community or separate property, movable or immovable, as security.

Kelli is correct that La.R.S. 9:2801 requires that each item on the SDDL must be classified and given a value. She contends that the trial court combined items of different classifications from the combined SDDL and gave the combination one value and one classification. As an example of this, she points to the first item listed under the reimbursement claims portion of the judgment. This item is listed as “72/74/81 Chase Disney” and awards $14,575 in reimbursement from Kelli to Stephen. At first glance, it does appear that these items have been combined and given a combined value. However, upon closer inspection, it is evident that no combining took place.

The judgement is broken into distinct sections allocating community assets, community obligations/liabilities, reimbursement claims, and separate property. The item mentioned above is included in the reimbursement claims portion of the judgment. The SDDL lists item number 81 as reimbursement owed to Stephen for payments made on the Disney Rewards credit card. The value given to this item by the trial court is the same as the amount of payments Stephen claimed to have made towards the credit card. Thus, the item listed on the judgment as “72/74/81. Chase Disney” is the same as item 81 on the SDDL and has not been combined with another item. Item numbers 72 and 74 are also listed on the SDDL under the obligations section, and they are described as community credit card debts. Item 72 specifically is the same credit card for which Stephen sought payment reimbursement in item 81. It appears the trial court simply included the item number for the obligations as they were related to the reimbursement, but the actual item being assigned and valued in this portion of the judgment is item 81 the reimbursement claim.

Although the trial court did not improperly combine SDDL items as suggested by Kelli, this court has determined that the trial court did err by failing to follow the proper procedures for partitioning the community. In her brief, Kelli breaks up the process of partitioning into eight steps as established by La.R.S. 9:2801. After determining the assets and liabilities of the community, the trial court must “allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities.” La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c). In allocating assets and liabilities, the court must determine the net value of the community and ensure “each spouse receives property of an equal net value.” La.R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(b). “In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money[.]” La.R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d). This calculation is required to be completed before the computation of reimbursements. Tauzin v. Tauzin, 24-221 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/27/24), 403 So.3d 10.

After reviewing the judgment in this case, we find the trial court failed to determine the net value of the community and failed to ensure each party received one half of the net value. In the judgment, Kelli was allocated $51,588 in assets and $211,960 in liabilities while Stephen was allocated $515,456 in assets and $172,248 in liabilities. It is evident that Kelli received far less than one half of the net value of the community, and the trial court should have determined an equalizing payment to Kelli before addressing reimbursements.

Since the record is complete and contains sufficient evidence of the assets assigned to the parties, we will determine the proper equalizing payment. However, because Kelli has asserted error in the trial court's assignments and valuations, we will review the challenged values and assignments before determining the equalizing payment and addressing reimbursements.

Under her first assignment of error, Kelli objects to the trial court's allocation or valuation of several different SDDL items. Item 2 on the SDDL is a home known as the 14 Harmon Road property. Prior to the termination of the community, Stephen established Grace Phillip Land, LLC. This LLC then purchased the 14 Harmon Road property on December 14, 2017, for $246,000. The down payment for the home came from a loan against Stephen's life insurance policy which was purchased during the community. The LLC then leased the home to Kelli and Carli and eventually sold it on June 15, 2021, for $265,000. This item was not awarded in the judgment because it was an asset of Grace Phillip Land, LLC and not of the community. The profit from the sale of the property was considered in the valuation of Grace Phillip Land, LLC, a community asset. The trial court did not err in failing to allocate this SDDL item.

SDDL item 18 is listed as Louis Vuitton purses. Kelli argues that this asset should have been allocated to her with a value of $3,400. The trial court did just that. There were no errors pertaining to this item.

SDDL item 50 is a Securian Financial Individual Retirement Account in Kelli's name. This item was removed from consideration because the parties stipulated on September 18, 2023, that the item had already been valued and divided between the parties. There were no errors pertaining to this item.

SDDL item 63 is the business, Grace Phillip Land, LLC. The only asset of the business was the 14 Harmon Road property which has been sold. The judgment valued the business at $23,000 based on a purchase price of $242,000 and a sale price of $265,000. Each party was awarded half of the value of the business. After reviewing the record evidence, we find that the trial court's valuation of the business is incorrect. The purchase price of the home was $246,000. The closing documents reveal that the proceeds of the sale were $63,442. Stephen's expert witness report concluded that the value of the business was $24,967 after considering the sale proceeds along with all expenses of the business. We find that $24,967 is the correct valuation for Grace Phillip Land, LLC, and we amend the judgment to reflect this valuation.

SDDL items 64 and 65 are the Aulani and Kidani Disney Vacation clubs. Kelli argues that the values of the items were stipulated, but no allotment to a spouse was decided. This is incorrect. The judgment allocates both assets to Stephen. There were no errors pertaining to these items.

SDDL item 68 is a First Federal Bank Mortgage Loan on the 108 Orchard Street property. In the judgment, the trial court split this community obligation evenly between the parties. The property was the matrimonial domicile, and the asset was allocated in full to Stephen. Kelli argues that because the home was awarded to Stephen and he has a higher income, the entire mortgage should have been allocated to him as well. “It is well-established that the partitioning court is granted much discretion under La. R.S. 9:2801 in allocating assets and liabilities.” Webb v. Webb, 18-320, p. 8 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 321, 327.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(4)(c) provides:

In allocating assets and liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant.

After reviewing the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in allocating the mortgage equally between the parties. Although the home was allocated to Stephen, the mortgage attached to it was taken out for the benefit of both parties. Kelli enjoyed the benefits of the home as a homemaker throughout the marriage, while Stephen worked long hours as a surgeon to provide for his family. Moreover, while Kelli did not work during the marriage, the evidence shows she is now earning income through business ventures with her current wife. It is not unreasonable for the parties to share in the obligation.

SDDL item 72 is the Disney Rewards credit card. This community obligation was allocated to Kelli. On appeal, Kelli notes that the debt was paid off with a loan against a Securian life insurance policy. Unlike assets, which are valued at the time of the trial, liabilities are fixed at the time of termination of the community. La.R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(a), Pitre v. Pitre, 501 So.2d 344 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987). This item was properly classified as a community obligation, and the parties stipulated that the amount of the debt was $14,574.90 at the time of termination. Kelli and Stephen routinely used this card for their expenses, but there was ample evidence that a substantial amount of these charges was incurred by Kelli. Moreover, Kelli's liberal use of the card led to the accrual of massive debt which forced Stephen to take significant action by restructuring so that his credit would not be negatively impacted. Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the debt to Kelli.

SDDL item 74 is a Capital One GM credit card. This item was allocated to Kelli, but she argues that it should have been allocated to Stephen. The parties stipulated the value of the debt was $684.05. As previously discussed, the trial court had broad discretion in allocating the assets; however, the judgment states an amount of $681. Accordingly, we amend the judgment to give this item a value of $684 but find no error in allocation of this item to Kelli.

SDDL item 81 is Stephen's reimbursement claim for payments made on the Disney Rewards credit card listed as item 72. Stephen was awarded $14,575 in reimbursement for his payments on this card. Kelli argues that Stephen is not entitled to reimbursement because the account was paid in full by the Securian life insurance policy loan which was community property. This is inaccurate. Stephen testified that in December 2017, he discovered the couple had large amounts of debt and began a plan to restructure the debt. He proceeded to take out a $60,000 loan against his Minnesota Life/Securian insurance policy. $38,000 of that money was used to pay the down payment on the 14 Harmon Road property purchased by Grace Phillip Land, LLC. Stephen made payments of $8,000 and $22,000 on the maxed-out Chase Disney Rewards credit card. New purchases were then made on the card in the following months. At the time of termination, the card had a balance of over $14,000. In March 2018, after termination of the community, Stephen took a $20,000 loan against his life insurance policy. That money was deposited into his bank account. He then used the Disney Rewards credit card to pay off the $20,000 owed on the two Disney vacation clubs and made $20,000 in payments on the card from his bank account. In May 2018, Stephen opened two new credit card accounts to transfer the remaining Disney Rewards card balance for zero percent interest. These new credit cards were paid down using his separate funds.

After reviewing the complex debt restructuring plan, we find that while community funds from the loans were used to pay off the Disney vacation clubs, the preexisting balance of $14,575 on the Disney Rewards credit card was paid off with Stephen's separate funds through a series of balance transfers.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365 provides “[i]f separate property of a spouse has been used either during the existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.” The amount paid off on the card was stipulated as $14,575. This is the amount awarded in reimbursement to Stephen in the judgment. However, under the civil code, Stephen is only entitled to reimbursement of half the amount paid. Accordingly, we amend the judgment to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $7,288.

SDDL items 84a and 84b are Stephen's reimbursement claims for monthly payments made towards the two Disney vacation clubs, Aulani and Kidani. The trial court awarded Stephen $10,282 and $9,275 in reimbursement. These amounts are incorrect. The above figures are the amounts that were due on each account before Stephen paid the balances. Because Stephen admitted that he paid off these balances with community funds taken from his life insurance policy, he is not entitled to reimbursement for those amounts. The monthly maintenance payments for the vacation clubs were community obligations which Stephen paid with his separate funds following termination of the community regime. Thus, he is entitled to reimbursement of half of the amount paid. The bank statements in evidence showed that Stephen paid a total of $15,735 in fees for the two clubs. Accordingly, we amend the judgment to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $7,868.

SDDL item 86 is Stephen's reimbursement claim for Louis Vuitton purses which he claims were purchased by Kelli for Carli. This item, along with SDDL item 87, community funds spent by Kelli on Carli Karluk; 88, money paid directly to Carli; 89, money spent on trips with Carli; 90, money spent to pay Mazda of North Carolina; 91, cash payment to Carli from APMC account; 92, payment to Mazda of South Charlotte from APMC account; and 93, criminal embezzlement and draining of community to fund Carli, all pertain to Stephen's claim of reimbursement for community funds spent for the benefit of Carli and not the community. Much testimony was given pertaining to the use of community funds by Kelli to benefit her romantic partner, Carli.

An obligation “incurred during the existence of” the community but “not for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse” is a separate obligation. La.Civ.Code art. 2363.

If community property has been used during the existence of the community property regime or former community property has been used thereafter to satisfy a separate obligation of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.

La.Civ.Code art. 2364.

Stephen hired a forensic accountant as an expert to comb the financial records and determine the extent of transactions that were made for Carli's benefit. When presented with the transactions, Kelli ultimately admitted those expenditures were made for Carli's benefit, and therefore, not for the benefit of the community. She submitted a chart titled “Transaction Between Kelli and Carli” with a total of reimbursements owed to Stephen in the amount of $153,834.75. Kelli later added an additional amount owed to Stephen of $9,954.88 after realizing she had left out several items. Kelli argues that the total amount she spent on Carli was $163,789.63. The expert report submitted by Stephen, however, calculated the amount as $188,000 and the trial court awarded Stephen $188,000 in reimbursement for community funds spent on Carli in items 86 through 93. We do not find that the trial court erred in accepting the figures submitted by Stephen over those submitted by Kelli. However, Stephen is only entitled to half of the amount spent. Thus, we amend the judgment to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $94,000.

IMPROPER ALLOCATION

In her second assignment of error, Kelli asserts that the trial court improperly allocated SDDL items to the wrong former spouse. As previously stated, the trial court has wide latitude in assigning an asset or liability to a specific former spouse. In allocating assets and liabilities, La.R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c) provides that “[t]he court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant.” Kelli contends that several items were allocated in a manner that did not consider these factors.

SDDL item 49 is a First Federal Bank savings account ending in 0720 in the name of Kelli and Carli. The trial court divided the item equally between the parties, and awarded each former spouse $3,000. Kelli argues that item should have been allocated to her in full because Stephen's name is not on the account. This account was opened with community funds and as such is a community asset. A bank account is completely capable of being split between the parties. Considering that Kelli did not work during the marriage and most community funds were the exclusive result of Stephen's efforts, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the account equally between the parties.

SDDL item 53 is a First Federal Bank health savings account ending in 0667 in the name of Stephen. The parties stipulated the value of $5,975 for the account. The trial court split the asset evenly between the parties, granting each $2,987.50. Kelli argues that this account should be granted to Stephen as it is in his name. As above, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the account equally between the parties.

SDDL item 54 is a First Federal Bank business checking account ending in 4780 in the name of Dr. Stephen Castleberry, APMC. The parties stipulated that the value of this account is $29,749.39. The trial court divided the asset and awarded each party $14,875. Kelli argues that this should have been awarded to Stephen because the account is in his name and is attached to his business. Here we have a bank account, the nature of which is easily susceptible to equitable division. Considering the trial court's broad discretion, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the account equally between the parties.

SDDL item 55 is a First Federal Bank business checking account ending in 6401 in the name of Grace Phillip Land, LLC and Stephen. The parties stipulated that the value of this account is $916.99. The trial court then awarded $458.50 to each party. Again, Kelli argues that this account should be awarded to Stephen as it is in his name, and again, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the account equally between the parties.

SDDL item 70 is a TD Auto Finance loan on a 2013 Chevrolet Suburban. The parties stipulated the amount of $4,495.45. As with the previous items, the trial court divided the obligation evenly between the parties. Kelli argues that the trial court should have allocated the debt to her in the stipulated amount because she was granted sole ownership of the vehicle. Although courts commonly allocate a debt to the spouse who receives the asset associated with that debt, such an allocation is not required. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the debt equally between the parties.

SDDL item 78 is a reimbursement claim for payments made on an American Express Gold Delta SkyMiles credit account in Kelli's name. This credit account was the subject of much discussion during the trial because many of the transactions made were for Carli's benefit. Nonetheless, the credit account, listed as item 71 on the SDDL, was classified as a community obligation. This classification has not been appealed. Kelli sought reimbursement for payments made by her on the community debt post termination. She initially claimed payments in the amount of $27,386. The trial court noted that it would round the amount off to $27,000, and the parties stipulated that this amount was reduced by $9,000 because that amount was determined to be the amount spent on Carli and thus not a community obligation. The trial court awarded Kelli $9,000 in reimbursement for this account but also awarded Stephen $2,025.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365 provides for the reimbursement of one half the amount of separate property used by a spouse to satisfy a community obligation. The former spouse seeking reimbursement bears the burden of proof. Williams v. Williams, 07-541 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d 1234. The record contains billing and account statements showing the amounts paid by Kelli post termination. After subtracting $9,000, Kelli is credited with $18,000 in eligible payments. As she is only entitled to half that amount in reimbursement, her award of $9,000 is correct.

The trial court, however, did err in awarding Stephen $2,025 in reimbursement. Regarding the American Express credit account, there is no evidence in the record that he made any payments on this account with his separate funds. In fact, he testified that he never made any payments on this account as he did not know about it until discovery took place. The $2,025 figure is the amount of reimbursement Stephen would have been owed for community funds used to pay the debt if the account had been classified as a separate obligation of Kelli. Because the account was classified as a community debt any amount paid with community funds would not be reimbursable. Accordingly, the reimbursement of $2,025 to Stephen is reversed and stricken from the judgment.

OMITTED ITEMS

In her third assignment of error, Kelli asserts the trial court omitted SDDL items from its final calculations. She asks this court to value the following items and allocate each to the appropriate former spouse.

SDDL item 48 is a First Federal Bank checking account ending in 6526 in the name of Kelli and Carli. Kelli is correct that the trial court did not address this item in the judgment and it is not accounted for in the final calculation. The parties stipulated that the value of the asset is $4,079.68. Since the item was not properly allocated by the trial court, and considering that the account is in Kelli's name, we will amend the judgment to add this item to the final calculations and award it to Kelli in the rounded amount of $4,080.

SDDL item 49 is a First Federal Bank checking account ending in 0720 in the name of Kelli and Carli. Kelli asserts that the trial court did not address this item and it was not accounted for in the final calculation. This is incorrect. This account was valued at $6,000 and the judgment split the amount granting each party $3,000. Kelli argues that this item should be granted solely to her. As noted previously we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the account evenly between the parties.

SDDL item 67 is a Minnesota Life/Securian insurance policy in Stephen's name. Kelli asserts that the trial court listed this item but gave it no value. This is correct. The judgment lists the item as being allocated to Stephen but assigns no dollar value.

Upon termination of the community, a life insurance policy purchased with community funds during the community is “a co-owned asset subject to partition by the co-owners.” Spaht & Hargrave, supra § 3.32, at 125; La. Civ.Code art. 2336 2003); see also, T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La.1975). Under the privity principle, the policy should be awarded to the owner of the policy, with the other spouse receiving property of an equal value. Spaht & Hargrave, supra § 3.32, at 125.

Talbot v. Talbot, 03-814, pp. 19-20 (La. 12/12/03), 864 So.2d 590, 604. The value of a life insurance policy is determined as the cash surrender value of the policy.Id. In this case, the evidence establishes that the cash surrender value of the policy was $187,610.99. Thus, we amend the judgment to assign a value of $187,611 and allocate the asset to Stephen.

SDDL item 80 is a reimbursement claim by Kelli for rent paid for the 14 Harmon Road property. This property was purchased by Grace Phillip Land, LLC, a community business, two months prior to the date of termination. Kelli and Carli leased the home from the LLC for $2,000 a month. Kelli claims that she paid rent to Stephen in the amount of $60,000 for which she is seeking reimbursement. In its judgment, the trial court did not award Kelli any reimbursement for rental payments. We find no error in the trial court's decision. The 14 Harmon Road property was owned by the LLC, a separate juridical entity. To receive reimbursement, Kelli had to prove that she used her separate funds to satisfy a community obligation. Kelli signed the lease as a “single woman” and except for one month, Kelli and Carli lived in this home following termination of the community. Consequently, this lease was not an obligation of the community. The trial court did not err in finding that Kelli failed to establish that she was entitled to reimbursement for rent.

IMPROPER VALUATION

In her fourth assignment of error, Kelli assets the trial court improperly valued SDDL items. Specifically, she points to SDDL item 94b, a reimbursement claim for payments made during the marriage towards Stephen's pre-marriage student loan. The judgment awarded reimbursement to Kelli in the amount of $31,200. Kelli argues that the value assigned for the reimbursement was improper, but she does not state what the proper value should be. She notes that there are three possible figures, and she questions which one is most accurate. First, she states Stephen testified that his best estimate is that he owed $45,000 on his student loans on the date of marriage. She then states he testified that he made payments from the joint account in the monthly amount of $760 from January 5, 2015, until termination. That would be a total of thirty-eight monthly payments for a total of $28,880. Lastly, she notes that Stephen testified he made monthly payments of $760 “during the marriage.” The marriage lasted for 200 months making a total of $152,000 in student loan payments.

Kelli's argument here is nonsensical. As to the figure of $45,000, Stephen's guess as to the outstanding amount on the loans at the date of marriage is not an attempt to answer how much had been paid toward the loans during the marriage particularly since there has been no allegation that the loans had been paid off during the marriage and considering the amount of interest student loans acquire over time. As to the figure of $152,000 we have no reason to conclude that Stephen's admission to making payments “during the marriage” equates to him paying $760 a month during the entirety of the marriage. The evidence contains financial records detailing the student loan payments made during the marriage. These payments totaled $31,280. As this was a separate obligation satisfied with community funds, Kelli is entitled to reimbursement for half the amount. We amend the judgment to reflect reimbursement to Kelli in the amount of $15,640.

Stephen argues that Kelli did not preserve this issue for appeal because she did not claim it as reimbursement on the SDDL. The SDDL lists item 94b as a reimbursement owed to Stephen and states it is a student loan made by Stephen prior to marriage and paid during the marriage. This issue came up during the trial when counsel for Kelli elicited testimony regarding the loan payments. Her counsel acknowledged that 94b was listed as a reimbursement owed to Stephen but alleged that this was a typographical error and should be a reimbursement owed to Kelli. The trial court heard counsel's argument and allowed the testimony. Ultimately, the trial court awarded reimbursement to Kelli. Student loans taken out by Stephen prior to marriage are his separate obligations. La.Civ.Code art. 2363. Because community funds were used to satisfy this obligation, Kelli is entitled to a reimbursement of half of the amount. La.Civ.Code art. 2364. Because Stephen would not be entitled to any reimbursement for payments made during the marriage on his separate loans prior to the marriage, we find that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in giving credence to Kelli's typographical error argument and classifying 94b as a reimbursement claim to Kelli.

MISCLASSIFIED ITEMS

In her fifth assignment of error, Kelli asserts the trial court misclassified SDDL items. SDDL item 94 is a reimbursement claim for a donation to Mighty Acorn Foundation (Mighty Acorn). In the judgment, the trial court awarded Stephen $10,000 for this reimbursement claim. Kelli argues that this was an error because the item was a community donation and Stephen is not entitled to reimbursement. Stephen asserts that the donation to Mighty Acorn was made by Kelli alone.

Mighty Acorn is an orphanage in Kenya. Kelli testified that she and Stephen sponsored a child in the orphanage, the child's picture was kept in their home, she went to Kenya to meet the child, and donations to Mighty Acorn were used as a tax deduction. In addition to the child sponsorship, a $10,000 donation was made to Mighty Acorn in 2015.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2349 provides that a “donation of community property to a third person requires the concurrence of the spouses, but a spouse acting alone may make a usual or customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic position of the spouses at the time of the donation.” Stephen testified that donations were made solely by Kelli and he never consented to the $10,000 donation. Kelli testified that she discussed making the donation with Stephen but admits that she did not know whether they ever discussed the exact figure. This $10,000 donation was the largest donation made to Mighty Acorn. Although Stephen admits that the couple made a multitude of donations to Mighty Acorn over the years, the evidence reveals that those donations were significantly less than $10,000. Kelli testified that they had a $1,500 annual sponsorship for the child they sponsored. The annual sponsorship was eventually shifted to monthly payments. Considering the large divergence from the amount of other Mighty Acorn donations, the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that the $10,000 donation was not a usual or customary gift. As such, this donation was an unauthorized act.

Furthermore, Stephen argues that this donation was a separate obligation of Kelli as it was “not for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse.” La.Civ.Code art. 2363. Stephen is entitled to reimbursement of one half the amount of any community property used to satisfy a separate obligation of Kelli. La.Civ.Code art. 2364. He testified that he was not involved with the foundation and that it was Kelli who made the donations. When Kelli visited the child in Kenya, she was not accompanied by Stephen but made the visit with Carli instead. Moreover, Stephen testified that he had become aware of a $10,000 transaction on a bank statement and when he asked Kelli about the transaction, she told him it was a donation to Mighty Acorn. Stephen asserts that Kelli lied about where the $10,000 had gone and that $10,000 had really been wired to Carli directly from his business account. He claims that after he asked Kelli about a receipt for tax purposes, only then did she donate $10,000 to Mighty Acorn. He argues that this donation was only made to cover the fact that Kelli had sent $10,000 to Carli, the woman with whom she was having an affair, and thus did not benefit the community.

Under these circumstances, we find the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in determining the donation was a separate obligation and granting Stephen reimbursement for the $10,000 Mighty Acorn donation. However, since he is only entitled to half the value of the community property used, we amend the judgment to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $5,000 to Stephen.

EXPERT WITNESS FEES

In her sixth assignment of error, Kelli asserts the trial court erred in granting the payment of expert witness fees. The trial court ordered Kelli to pay one half of the expert witness fees to Stephen. Kelli argues that the testimony of Stephen's expert was not necessary to determine reimbursements owed to Stephen by Kelli for her expenditures for Carli because she admitted that each transaction associated with Carli was not for the community. She also argues that, because the figure used in the trial court's judgment was closer to her figure, and because it cannot be determined how much of the expert's fees were used to determine the value of the medical businesses, she should not have to pay Stephen's forensic accountant.

The trial court has wide discretion in awarding costs, including expert witness fees. Roach v. State through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 20-211 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/22/21), 329 So.3d 974, writ denied, 21-1527 (La. 1/12/22), 330 So.3d 621. The report of Stephen's forensic accountant was in fact helpful to the trier of fact. Although Kelli claims that she was forthcoming about the transactions for Carli, it was through the work of the forensic accountant that Kelli was able to realize that she had missed transactions and amend her admitted lists. Contrary to Kelli's argument, the reimbursement amount awarded by the trial court is directly in line with the figure given by the expert. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Kelli to pay one half of expert witness fees to Stephen.

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

In her final assignment of error, Kelli asserts the trial court erred by allowing electronic evidence to be introduced at trial. Stephen introduced four jump/thumb drives into evidence. Kelli objected to their introduction claiming the drives contained 1) no index as to what is contained on the drives; 2) an accumulation of years of bank/credit card statements without identifying which statements contained pertinent evidence; 3) drives that could not be opened; and 4) massive amounts of irrelevant information. She then argues that Louisiana Court of Appeal Third Circuit Local Rule 27 designates a specific profile for entering electronic evidence to avoid the problems incurred in this case. This rule provides the required format for the submission of electronic audio and video evidence, which was not utilized in the instant case.

Stephen offered three jump/thumb drives into evidence. He sought to admit electronic evidence as a cost saving measure given the voluminous documents needed for this proceeding and the trial court allowed it. We have reviewed the electronic evidence and found that all the electronic documents were relevant financial records of the parties and were all clearly labeled. The parties and the trial court utilized the drives during the trial with no issues. Louisiana courts have clear authority under La.Code Civ.P. art. 253 to permit electronic submission of evidence.

Under La.Code Evid. art. 103, it is required that a substantial right of the complaining party be affected before an evidentiary admission ruling can be the subject of complaint. Here, Kelli has failed to articulate any substantial right which has been affected by the admission of electronic evidence. The use of electronic evidence was beneficial to both parties as it significantly reduced court costs. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in allowing the admission of electronic records into evidence.

NET VALUE OF THE COMMUNITY

As stated earlier in this opinion, the trial court failed to determine the net value of the community and failed to ensure each party received one half of the net value. After amending the judgment in accordance with the rulings of this opinion, assets of the community amounted to $758,735 without consideration of the community businesses. After adding the values of the medical business and Grace Phillip Land LLC, the total amount of assets was $1,212,289. The total liabilities of the community amounted to $384,211. Accordingly, the net value of the community was $828,078. Thus, each party would have to receive $414,039 in assets for there to be an equal net distribution.

Kelli was allocated $55,668 in assets and $211,963 in liabilities. Additionally, she was credited with $214,293.50 for her half ownership in the medical business and $12,483.50 for her half of the value of Grace Phillip Land, LLC. Thus, her net portion of the distribution was $70,482. Stephen was allocated $703,067 in assets and $172,248 in liabilities. Additionally, he was credited with $214,293.50 for his half ownership in the medical business and $12,483.50 for his half of the value of Grace Phillip Land, LLC. Thus, his portion of the distribution was $757,596. Since Kelli received far less than her $414,039 share of the net value, she would be owed an equalizing payment of $343,557 before computation of the reimbursements owed in this matter.

After amending the judgment in accordance with this opinion, Stephen owes Kelli reimbursement in the amount of $24,640. This reimbursement is added to Kelli's equalizing payment of $343,557, totaling $368,197. Kelli owes Stephen reimbursement in the total amount of $191,397. We then subtract the reimbursement due to Stephen which results in a final equalizing payment of $176,800 that Stephen owes to Kelli. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the judgment ordering Kelli to pay Stephen the amount of $205,000 and amend the judgment to order Stephen to pay Kelli an equalizing payment in the amount of $176,800.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not follow the procedure required by La.R.S. 9:2801 to partition the community property. We amend the portion of the judgment assigning value to Grace Phillip Land, LLC to reflect a value of $24,967 and award each party a credit in the amount of $12,483.50. The value of SDDL item 74 is amended to $684. The portion of the judgment awarding Stephen reimbursement for item 81, the Disney Rewards credit card, is affirmed but we amend the judgment to reflect the amount of this reimbursement to be $7,288. The award of reimbursement to Stephen for item 78, American Express Gold Card, in the amount of $2,025 is reversed and stricken from the judgment. The award of reimbursement for items 84a and 84b, the Disney Vacation clubs, is amended to reflect reimbursement to Stephen in the amount of $7,868. The award of reimbursement to Stephen for items 86 through 93 is amended to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $94,000. The award of reimbursement to Stephen for item 94, Mighty Acorn donation, is amended to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $5,000. The award of reimbursement to Kelli for item 94b, Stephen's student loans, is amended to reflect reimbursement in the amount of $15,640. We also amend the judgment to allocate item 48, a checking account ending in 6526 with a value of $4,080, to Kelli, and amend to assign a value of $187,611 to item 67, Minnesota Life/Securian insurance, which was awarded to Stephen. Lastly, we reverse the portion of the judgment ordering Kelli to pay Stephen the amount of $205,000 and amend the judgment to order Stephen to pay Kelli an equalizing payment in the amount of $176,800.

All other aspects of the judgment are affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to the parties.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

WILSON, Judge.