CHARLES SENEGAL v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICES INC (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-192

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on November 4, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

CHARLES SENEGAL

VERSUS

ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICES, INC.

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20223897 HONORABLE THOMAS J. FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE

EAP

CGF

LJT

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judges.

REVERSED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-192

CHARLES SENEGAL

VERSUS

ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICES, INC.

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20223897 HONORABLE THOMAS J. FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judges.

REVERSED.

M. Candice Hattan

(A Professional Law Corporation)

Post Office Drawer 91850

Lafayette, LA 70509

(337) 234-0431

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

Charles Senegal

Mark R. Pharr, III

Jacques M. Migues

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith

3861 Ambassador Caffrey Parkway, Suite 300

Lafayette, LA 70503

(337) 735-1760

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:

Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc.

PICKETT, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff filed suit to recover damages for injuries he suffered when an ambulance made a U-turn and collided with his car. The ambulance company filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the ambulance company and dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed.

FACTS

On May 2, 2022, Charles Senegal was driving on Johnston Street in Lafayette when he was involved in an accident with an ambulance owned and operated by Acadian Ambulance Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Acadian”). The accident occurred when the ambulance driver, Jason Morgan, swerved from his lane of travel and made a left U-turn when responding to an emergency and collided with Mr. Senegal's vehicle. Mr. Senegal was traveling in his own lane of travel in the same direction as the ambulance when the ambulance collided with his vehicle. The collision propelled Mr. Senegal's vehicle across two lanes of oncoming traffic. Mr. Senegal's vehicle was a total loss, and he suffered personal injuries as a result of the collision. Acadian compensated Mr. Senegal for the loss of his vehicle, and he filed suit against Acadian to recover damages for his personal injuries.

Acadian answered Mr. Senegal's suit and asserted that pursuant to La.R.S. 32:24, it is entitled to qualified immunity because the accident occurred when Mr. Morgan was responding to an emergency and had activated the ambulance's lights and siren prior to the collision. It further asserted that pursuant to La.R.S. 32:24, it cannot be held liable for Mr. Senegal's claims in the absence of gross negligence, which it expressly denied. Thereafter, on August 7, 2025, Acadian filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, under La.R.S. 32:24, the driver of an emergency vehicle can be held liable only if his conduct amounts to reckless disregard for the safety of others and that Mr. Morgan's actions prior to the accident satisfied the requirements of La.R.S. 32:24 and did not constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable to Mr. Senegal.

When Acadian's motion was called for hearing, Mr. Senegal's attorney was not present in court and had not filed a brief opposing the motion. The trial court determined that the service requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1313 were met. Acadian's rule to show cause to have its motion for summary judgment set for trial includes the following which appears after the trial court's September 25, 2025, signed order setting the hearing: “All Parties will be served according to Article 1313(c) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure․ CERTIFIED COPY MAILED October 01, 2025 KL.” Court personnel contacted the attorney's office, and the attorney's secretary presented a brief opposing Acadian's motion to the trial court. The record indicates that when the secretary appeared in court with the opposition brief, the trial court was on recess. The secretary left the brief with the trial court's law clerk.

Upon returning from the recess, the trial court proceeded with the hearing. Counsel for Acadian argued:

[O]ur Summary Judgment is based on the fact that the plaintiff can not show that defendant the Acadian driver acted with reckless disregard which is required under Louisiana Revised Statute 32:24. In order for 32:24 to be applicable number one the ambulance driver needs to be responding to the emergenc[y] which he clearly was he was responding to a call for service in which the patient was having chest pains and having trouble breathing[.] [H]e also in order to expeditiously respond he performed a U-turn on Johnston Street and number three both his lights and siren were in operation approximately four seconds before the instant occurred as such a gross negligence analysis should be considered in this manner, Your Honor.

The trial court immediately granted the motion for summary judgment, stating:

Okay, well considering that an opposition has not been timely filed the Court is going to go ahead and grant your Motion for Summary Judgment[.] [A]s is the policy of this Court you are to prepare the Judgment and submit it. You need to send it to, [Mr. Senegal's attorney] I am sure she is gonna call us when she gets it but it needs to be circulated.

After receiving the judgment granting Acadian's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Senegal's attorney filed a motion for new trial and/or to reconsider the motion for summary judgment. In the motions, Mr. Senegal's attorney explained she had been hospitalized on August 27, 2025, due to a medical emergency, and had undergone two cardiac surgical procedures on September 9, 2025. She further explained that after being released from the hospital on October 7, 2025, she was released to her home with nursing care for rehabilitation. The attorney attached a statement by her surgeon to the motion verifying her explanation and further stating that the orders for nursing care and rehabilitation remained in effect as of the date of the statement, November 24, 2025. There is no indication in the record that the trial court reviewed the motion to reconsider.

After the trial court denied his motion for new trial and/or to reconsider Acadian's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Senegal filed this appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mr. Senegal assigns the following errors with the trial court's judgment:

1) The [trial court] failed to articulate, either orally or in writing, a single uncontradicted material fact over which reasonable minds could not differ, and failed to make any finding to show that it held mover to its burden of proving each and every essential element necessary to show strict compliance with the requisites of both summary proceedings and [La.R.S.] 32:24.

2) The [trial court] failed to give any consideration to the uncontroverted testimony of Chavo Eglin-Acadian's own employee-who observed Jacob Morgan's actions first hand, and whose deposition was offered by Acadian in support of its motion. Rather, it appears that the [trial court] relied upon unsupported arguments raised in brief without evidentiary support therefore.

3) Alternatively, under the unique and unforeseen circumstances presented in this case, the [trial court] erred in failing to reconsider its harsh and extraordinary ruling that resulted in the dismissal of plaintiff's claim through no fault of his own.

4) Whether the record before this Court supports a summary finding that reasonable minds could not disagree on any material fact necessary to establish that Acadian met its burden as a matter of law to complete immunity from suit under LSAR.S. 32:24.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 governs the summary judgment procedure. Article 966(A)(2) provides that the summary judgment procedure is favored and that courts must construe Article 966 to accomplish its purpose of “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969.” Section 966(A)(3) further provides that the “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Our supreme court further explained in Larson v. XYZ Insurance Co., 16-745, pp. 6-7 (La. 5/3/17), 226 So.3d 412, 416:

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's favor. A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate.

On motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains with the movant.

Affirmative Defense

Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:24 states:

A. The driver or rider of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, but subject to the conditions herein stated.

B. The driver or rider of an authorized emergency vehicle may do any of the following:

(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this Chapter.

(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation.

(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property.

(4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions.

C. The exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle or bicycle is making use of audible or visual signals, including the use of a peace officer cycle rider's whistle, sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.

D. The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver or rider of an authorized vehicle from the duty to drive or ride with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver or rider from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.

On appeal, in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review the evidence de novo applying the same criteria that trial courts apply when determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. Larson, 226 So.3d 412.

In Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522, pp. 6-7 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, 180, the supreme court addressed the requirements of La.R.S. 32:24, explaining:

La.Rev.Stat. 32:24(D) sets out two standards of care for an emergency vehicle driver depending on the circumstances of the case. If, and only if, an emergency vehicle driver's actions fit into subsections A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat. 32:24, will an emergency vehicle driver be held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. On the other hand, if the emergency vehicle driver's conduct does not fit subsections A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat. 32:24, such driver's actions will be gauged by a standard of “due care.”

“Due care” is synonymous with ordinary negligence. “Reckless disregard,” however, connotes conduct more severe than negligent behavior. “Reckless disregard” is, in effect, “gross negligence.” Gross negligence has been defined by this court as “the want of even slight care and diligence. It is the want of that diligence which even careless men are accustomed to exercise.” State v. Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So.2d 917 (1942). “Reckless disregard” or “gross negligence” is the standard to be applied if the emergency vehicle driver's actions fit La.Rev.Stat. 32:24(A) through La.Rev.Stat. 32:24(C). Otherwise, the standard is ordinary negligence.

Thus, if the provisions of subsections A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat. 32:24 apply to the accident or incident in question, then the driver will be held liable only for his conduct which constitutes reckless disregard for the safety of others.

Whether an emergency vehicle driver's conduct “should be gauged by a ‘reckless disregard’ or ‘ordinary negligence’ standard of care is a question” for the trier of fact. Price v. Valenti, 13-822, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/9/14), 140 So.3d 121, 124, writ denied, 14-978 (La. 8/25/14), 147 So.3d 1120.

Acadian attached the deposition of its employee Chavo Eglin, a supervisor of drivers for Acadian, to its motion for summary judgment. Mr. Eglin rides in the ambulance with drivers providing guidance as to the protocol and requirements Acadian expects them to follow for the safety of their patients and the public. Acadian also attached a video captured by the ambulance's dashcam as the accident occurred. Mr. Eglin testified that when notified to report to a call, the driver of an Acadian ambulance “should look and see what other people are doing, and then respond appropriately.” Nevertheless, the evidence establishes Mr. Morgan did not do so before the accident occurred. Mr. Eglin reviewed portions of the dashcam video during his deposition. When asked what Mr. Morgan did when he activated the red lights and siren, Mr. Eglin acknowledged that Mr. Morgan checked his rear-view mirror but did not turn around and look for vehicles near him on the roadway. Instead, Mr. Morgan began making his U-turn.

When asked if Mr. Morgan activated his turn signal before beginning the U-turn, Mr. Eglin looked at the dashcam video and stated “it doesn't look like it. I can't tell for sure.” Again, while reviewing the dashcam video, Mr. Eglin acknowledged that within “about” two seconds of the ambulance's red lights being turned on, Mr. Senegal's car was at the front bumper of the ambulance. Mr. Eglin testified he never saw Mr. Morgan look behind the ambulance which is required by Acadian because the ambulance has a blind spot. Mr. Eglin acknowledged he stated in a report to Acadian that when Mr. Morgan began making his U-turn he informed Mr. Morgan he did not need to make a U-turn but could turn into a vacant parking lot adjacent to the accident site and turn around instead of making a U-turn. However, by the time he completed his statement, the accident had occurred. Mr. Eglin also agreed that when Mr. Morgan “hit the button for the lights and sirens, he was commencing his turn[.]”

Importantly, Mr. Eglin denied having any information that would contradict Mr. Senegal's description of how the accident occurred. Moreover, he agreed he never suggested Mr. Senegal was trying to get around the ambulance when Mr. Morgan made his U-turn as asserted by Acadian to the trial court.

In his statement to Acadian, Mr. Morgan reported he did not see Mr. Senegal's car because it was in his blind spot. The police officer who investigated the accident identified Mr. Morgan's “careless operation” and being “inattentive” as factors contributing to the accident, but he did not issue a ticket to Mr. Morgan.

Acadian also attached Mr. Senegal's deposition to its motion for summary judgment. Mr. Senegal testified he was driving 45 miles per hour when the accident occurred and his car, a Nissan Altima, was parallel to the ambulance when the ambulance turned into it. He explained the ambulance hit the entire right side of his car and knocked him into the oncoming lanes of traffic. Mr. Senegal denied seeing a turn signal, hearing a siren, or seeing the ambulance's red lights before the ambulance turned into his car. He explained he did not honk his horn before being hit because the ambulance turned into him in a split second.

Contrary to Acadian's arguments, its own evidence establishes a trier of fact could conclude that an issue of material fact exists as to whether Mr. Morgan's making a U-turn under the facts herein constitute ordinary negligence or gross negligence. This conclusion is based on these unrefuted facts: 1) Mr. Morgan started his U-turn when he activated the siren and lights; 2) the ambulance has a blind spot; 3) Mr. Morgan made his U-turn without checking the ambulance's blind spot; 4) Mr. Morgan could have exited his lane of travel into a vacant parking adjacent to the accident site and turned around without concern for other vehicles, then reentered Johnston Street; and 5) no evidence suggests Mr. Senegal was speeding when the accident occurred, as argued by Acadian. For these reasons, the trial court's judgment is reversed.

Trial Court's Reasons for Ruling

Mr. Senegal points out the trial court did not state on the record or in writing any factual reasons for granting Acadian's motion as required by La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(4). Indeed, based on this court's review of the record, one could conclude the trial court granted summary judgment because Mr. Senegal did not file his opposition timely. Nevertheless, appellate courts must review summary judgments de novo. Accordingly, while the trial court's failure to adhere to the mandates of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(4) may have delayed justice for Mr. Senegal, it has not caused him irreparable harm.

CONCLUSION

The trial court's judgment dismissing Charles Senegal's claims against Ambulance Services, Inc. is reversed. All costs associated with the motion for summary judgment and this appeal are assessed to Acadian Ambulance Services, Inc.

REVERSED.