STATE v. LAWRENCE (2026)

The District Attorney for Iberville Parish filed a bill of information against defendant, Quinton Lawrence, charging him with two counts of attempted second degree murder (counts one and two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1; three counts of aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm (counts three, four, and five), in violation of La. R.S. 14:37.2; and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count six), in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged by unanimous verdict on all six counts.

The district court sentenced the defendant to 35 years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each counts one and two; five years at hard labor on each counts three, four, and five; and 20 years imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count six.¹ The district court ordered all sentences would run concurrent with each other. The defendant now appeals, designating one counseled assignment of error along with numerous pro se assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

Around 6:30 p.m. on December 1, 2015, the Plaquemine City Police Department (“PPD”) responded to a shooting near Captain T.T. Harris Street and W.W. Harleaux Street. Officers spoke with Kent Buggs,² who indicated he was shot by the defendant before he returned fire upon the defendant. Four members of law enforcement went to the defendant's home to determine whether he was shot, wounded, or a barricaded suspect. The officers entered the defendant's home and spotted the defendant facing the door and armed with a gun. The defendant was given verbal commands to drop his gun, but he did not comply. Then, one of the officers fired five or six shots at the defendant. The officers secured the defendant and his weapon.

MOTION TO STAY

On February 19, 2026, while this appeal was pending, the defendant filed a pro se “Motion to Stay the Initial Collateral Appeal[.]” Therein, the defendant requested this court stay the appeal and compel the district court to provide him with the transcripts from a 2012 guilty plea to the charge of aggravated battery. This plea is the predicate offense that led to the defendant's ultimate conviction on count six, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The defendant maintains these minutes are necessary in order for him to contest the validity of the underlying conviction, which would, in his opinion, require this court to reverse the district court's denial of his pre-trial motion to quash and/or conviction and sentence on count six.

Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-1.7 states, in pertinent part:

No record of another case (or prior record in the same titled and numbered case) shall be included in the record, unless such other record has been introduced into evidence at the trial court in the case on appeal, or on writs, and such other record shall accompany the record as an exhibit.

The transcripts and minute entries requested by the defendant were not introduced into evidence in this case and are from a separate case in a different division at the 18th Judicial District Court. Accordingly, we find the defendant is not entitled to documents he requests and is therefore not entitled to a stay for supplementation of the record with same. The defendant's “Motion to Stay the Initial Collateral Appeal” is denied.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR; PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 1, 2, AND 17; SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 1, 3, 7 IN PART, AND 11

In his sole counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second degree murder (counts one and two), aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm (counts three, four, and five), and possession of firearm by a convicted felon (count six). In addition, in pro se assignment of error one, the defendant argues “this [is] a case of ‘self-defense’ under the stand your ground law[.]” In pro se assignment of error two, the defendant states, “[The case] is more so because two people [were] shooting at each other at the same time of the incident, that is in this here case at hand.” In the defendant's combined supplemental pro se assignments of error, the defendant challenges the conclusion reached by the jury based on the facts of the case.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. See State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802.

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 mandates: “[A]ssuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 389, 394, writ denied, 2022-01777 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So.3d 982.

Kent Buggs testified he knows the defendant because his grandfather married the defendant's mother. Kent lived on Captain T.T. Harris Street, and the defendant's home was directly across the street, separated by a median. Kent initially saw the defendant smoking behind a tree in the defendant's yard on the night of the shooting. Kent and his brother, D'Quincy Buggs, were sitting on the front porch of their own home. According to Kent, the defendant yelled, “Come in the road, I'll blow your f***ing head off[.]” Following the threats, Kent retrieved a bag from his vehicle containing his firearm.³

Once the defendant walked away from the tree, Kent testified that he thought “that man ain't coming over here by himself at his age and his condition alone[,] [s]o [Kent] knew that he had a weapon.”⁴ As the defendant reached the street, he reached for his firearm and started shooting. D'Quincy dove onto the porch while Kent retrieved his firearm and returned fire. After Kent returned fire, he saw the defendant fall behind Kent's vehicle. The defendant continued shooting and using the vehicle as a shield. Kent was shot in the lower back. Kent reiterated on cross-examination that he in no way started the shooting with the defendant.

D'Quincy testified he was on his porch with Kent on the night of the shooting. D'Quincy testified the defendant was initially smoking a cigarette outside the defendant's house before blurting out profanities towards Kent. The defendant crossed the street with his hands in his jacket pockets, flinching as if he was getting ready to pull something out as he stood in the road in front of the Buggs residence. D'Quincy testified the defendant told them to come in the road because he wanted to fight, but the brothers never left their porch. According to D'Quincy, the defendant was “telling people that he was gonna kill [his] brother[.]” D'Quincy testified that Kent did not have his gun on him when the defendant dared them to come into the street. D'Quincy stated he did not know where Kent got the gun, but he admitted that Kent returned fire “[a]t some point during the shooting[.]”

Karen Buggs, the victims’ mother and the defendant's step-sister, testified she was inside her home on Captain T.T. Harris Street when she heard gunshots and saw Kent run into their home. Karen noticed Kent was shot and called 911. Kent told Karen, “[The defendant] shot me.” Karen testified that the glass in front of her home was shot out. Karen testified Kent ran into the house and never went back outside. Karen testified she had never seen Kent's bag containing his firearm before and did not know if Kent kept a weapon in D'Quincy’s room.

Justin Mendoza, a former PPD officer, responded to a call about shots fired around 6:30 p.m. on the day of the shooting shortly after he “got off” for the day.⁵ Mendoza testified he was in full uniform, but he did not have his bodycam on at the time. Additional officers arrived to the scene in separate vehicles around the same time with lights and sirens. Mendoza entered the Buggs residence to make sure the victim was in stable condition, secured Kent's firearm, and then proceeded to the defendant's residence after Kent identified the defendant as the shooter. Three law enforcement officers were lined up behind Mendoza as they approached the defendant's home, and Mendoza knocked on the defendant's door.

Mendoza testified that the defendant's door “came slightly open” from him knocking, then he pushed the door open. Mendoza stated that once he opened the door, he saw the defendant holding a gun pointed at the door. The officers gave the defendant several commands to put down the weapon, and when it became clear he would not comply, Mendoza fired his weapon five or six times. Mendoza believed the officers were in the doorway long enough for the defendant to recognize that police officers were coming through his door. On cross-examination, Mendoza could not remember whether the defendant dropped his weapon after the second shot or the fifth shot. While Mendoza initially told Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) that the officers yelled “police” loudly when he knocked on the defendant's door, he later testified that statement was not truthful.

Austin Wintz, a former PPD officer, was dispatched to W.W. Harleaux Street and Marshall Street for shots fired. Wintz first went to the Buggs residence after pulling up in front of the defendant's home. According to Wintz, the officers turned off their lights and sirens halfway there and arrived with lights and sirens off. Wintz testified that he knew the defendant prior to the incident, as he previously sold the defendant a truck. Wintz testified that officers lined up in a tactical formation, crossed the street to the defendant's home, and knocked on the defendant's door.

According to Wintz, when the door swung open, the defendant was sitting on the couch and intentionally pointing a silver pistol at the officers. After the defendant was shot and fell, officers located his firearm underneath a couch. Wintz admitted he was upset after the shooting. He described it as “an adrenaline dump” and agreed that the body camera footage shows him saying “oh f***” over and over. Wintz testified he was backpedaling when Mendoza fired his weapon because he was afraid of getting shot.

PPD Officer Kelly Nicholson was also called out to the scene for shots fired. Officer Nicholson was dressed in uniform and had her bodycam on. Before going to the defendant's home, Officer Nicholson only knew the shooter/other party involved was across the street. Officer Nicholson was the third person in line to enter the defendant's home. She testified that, upon entry, she saw the defendant sitting on the couch, facing the door, and pointing a gun in the officers’ direction. After reviewing the body camera footage, Officer Nicholson testified that the officers did not identify themselves prior to entering the defendant's home. Officer Nicholson testified that it all happened very quickly. Unlike Wintz, Officer Nicholson testified that she did not see the defendant move.

Bronson Lewis, an Iberville Parish Sheriff's deputy, was paged to the scene while volunteering with the Plaquemine Fire Department. Deputy Lewis initially arrived to render first aid to the victim, but emergency personnel were already at the scene. Deputy Lewis testified that two officers asked for his help as a law enforcement officer at that point, so he grabbed his firearm, grabbed a metal plate carrier, and headed to the defendant's home. Deputy Lewis wore a Sheriff's Office t-shirt and believed he was third in the line of law enforcement approaching the defendant's door. Deputy Lewis testified he saw the defendant sitting on the couch holding a silver firearm before raising it in the officers’ direction. Deputy Lewis stated he believed the officers knocked and announced themselves loudly; however, he learned that was incorrect after watching the body camera footage.

PPD Sergeant Vic Hebert was asked by LSP to download footage of the incident from Officer Nicholson's and Wintz's body cameras. Sergeant Hebert testified neither officer had the ability to add, delete, or do anything to the camera footage. The bodycam footage was introduced into evidence and portions were played for the jury. Sergeant Hebert testified both videos were downloaded from the body camera docking station.

Melissa Farley, an LSP Crime Lab forensic scientist, analyzed the crime scene.⁶ Farley's primary function was to document the crime scene, photograph evidence as she found it, and put down photo markers to establish what evidence to take. Kent's bag that contained his firearm was photographed, but it was not collected as evidence. Farley testified she did not know if the bag had evidentiary value.

Farley testified a second time regarding her documentation of evidence at the defendant's home. Farley testified a firearm was found underneath the defendant's couch/loveseat. Farley recovered six casings similar in nature in front of the defendant's home. Farley used a crime scene sketch created by Michelle Smith to depict the two crime scenes. Farley testified that anything she documents with photographs is generally going to be memorialized in a crime scene sketch, as was done in this case.

Officer Bill Cox, a Criminal Investigator III for LSP at the time, investigated the officer-involved shooting. Officer Cox testified that under no circumstances was the defendant across the street when he fired his weapon at Kent. According to Officer Cox, he was asked to investigate the location of the shell casings four years after the shooting occurred. Officer Cox testified it was possible that the shell casing matching Kent's weapon fell and rolled up to eight feet away even if Kent remained on his porch. As to the responding officers’ conduct, Officer Cox determined “the officers exercised good judgment and proceeded properly with proper police procedures” after reviewing the body camera footage. Officer Cox noted that he could not hear the police officers announcing their presence as officers on the body camera footage; however, he attributed the failure to announce themselves to the stress of the situation.

Patrick Lane, a former forensic scientist with LSP Crime Lab, testified as an expert in firearms identification. Lane explained that forensic comparison allows investigators to analyze casings and determine the firearm from which they originated. Lane testified that the small bullet fragments collected from the victims’ front porch could have only been fired from a Ruger P89, the weapon recovered from under the defendant's couch. Lane later clarified that he did not personally test fire the firearms recovered from the crime scenes nor did he author the firearms report. However, he consulted the report, and based on his years of experience, he concurred in the results.

Probation and Parole Officer Sean Guy testified he supervised convicted felons on probation in West Baton Rouge Parish. Officer Guy testified Probation and Parole Officers are responsible for ensuring felons on probation are compliant with the conditions of their supervision, probation, or parole. According to Officer Guy, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery on June 13, 2012, and was sentenced to West Baton Rouge Detention Center Work Release for a two-year period.

LSP Investigator Ike Vavasseur interviewed the witnesses to the crime. Vavasseur learned that Kent owned a weapon that he kept in a black bag in his vehicle. Vavasseur testified that D'Quincy told him Kent was going to put his gun in his vehicle when the defendant began shooting.

Austin Wintz testified a second time regarding his personal relationship with the defendant. Wintz testified that, in addition to the time he encountered the defendant while selling him a truck, Wintz came into contact with the defendant on August 14, 2015, while Wintz was working as a police officer. Wintz stated that, on that date, the defendant claimed he had a verbal altercation with one of the Buggs brothers and that he pulled a gun on the defendant. According to Wintz, the defendant also told him he walked to the Buggs residence to confront them.

Counts One and Two: Attempted Second Degree Murder

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as a killing committed “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). To sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim and committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. See La. R.S. 14:27; La. R.S. 14:30.1. Although the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction based on “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” La. R.S. 14:30.1, attempted second degree murder, requires the specific intent to kill. See State v. Mellion, 2021-1116 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 41, 49, writ denied, 2022-00732 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 1186, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S.Ct. 319, 214 L.Ed.2d 141 (2022).

Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. See State v. Meek, 2023-0362 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/23), 379 So.3d 67, 71-72, writ denied, 2023-01639 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 703. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. See Mellion, 342 So.3d at 45.

In this case, the defendant argued he was justified in committing the crimes because he was acting in self-defense. In a non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense requires a dual inquiry: (1) an objective inquiry into whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances; and (2) a subjective inquiry into whether the force used was apparently necessary. See La. R.S. 14:19(A)(1)(a); State v. Mollerberg, 2018-0256 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18), 260 So.3d 599, 605. However, self-defense is not available to “[a] person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty ․ unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.” La. R.S. 14:21. Here, the district court charged the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession; provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that statutory law does not address the burden of proof for defenses. State v. Cheatwood, 458 So.2d 907, 910 n.4 (La. 1984). In previous cases dealing with the burden of proving or disproving a claim of self-defense in a non-homicide case, this court has analyzed the evidence under two different standards of review: (1) whether the defendant proved self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. See State v. Fair, 2024-0759 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/11/25), 417 So.3d 1166, 1175, writ denied, 2025-00933 (La. 1/21/26), 424 So.3d 1092, 1093, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S.Ct. 2791, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2026). However, La. C.Cr.P. art. 390(A), enacted by La. Acts 2024, No. 729, § 2 (eff. Aug. 1, 2024), provides: “In any criminal proceeding in which the justification of self-defense is raised pursuant to [La.] R.S. 14:19 or 20, the state shall have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Thus, the legislature has resolved the previous uncertainty in Louisiana law as to who has the burden of proving or disproving self-defense in a non-homicide case. See Fair, 417 So.3d at 1175.

The instant offense occurred prior to the effective date of La. C.Cr.P. art. 390(A). Nevertheless, this court has held La. C.Cr.P. art. 390 is procedural and therefore may be applied retroactively. See Fair, 417 So.3d at 1176. Therefore, the appropriate standard of review is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.

Kent testified that the defendant initiated the conflict when he approached the Buggs residence and threatened to blow his head off. As the defendant reached the street in front of the Buggs residence, he drew his firearm and began shooting at Kent and D'Quincy. D'Quincy testified that the defendant was cursing at Kent prior to crossing the neutral ground separating the two streets. Furthermore, D'Quincy testified that he “just got word back” that the defendant told people he was going to kill Kent.

The defendant argues Kent shot at him first; however, this claim is not supported by the evidence. Both victims testified that Kent retrieved his gun only after the defendant shot at them. In addition to the victims’ testimony, Officer Cox investigated the incident and testified that the defendant's self-defense claim was not supported by the physical evidence. Officer Cox testified no evidence supported the defendant's claims that he was not at the Buggs residence.

Furthermore, the defendant's act of fleeing the scene to his home and failing to report the crime to police are inconsistent with a theory of self-defense. See State v. Rosario-Colon, 2019-0406 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/19), 289 So.3d 126, 135, writ denied, 2019-01806 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1055, cert. denied, 590 U.S. 925, 140 S.Ct. 2727, 206 L.Ed.2d 859 (2020). Flight following an offense reasonably raises the inference of a “guilty mind.” Rosario-Colon, 289 So.3d at 135. The jury clearly found the facts and evidence did not support the defendant's claim that he shot at the Buggs brothers in self-defense. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that, based on the record before us, a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of attempted second degree murder and that the defendant was not acting in self-defense.

Counts Three, Four, and Five: Aggravated Assault upon a Peace Officer with a Firearm

At the time of the offense, La. R.S. 14:37.2 ⁷ provided that aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm is an assault committed upon a peace officer, who is acting in the course and scope of his duties, with a firearm. Therefore, in order to convict a defendant of aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm, the State must prove that the defendant, (1) with a firearm, (2) attempted to commit a battery or intentionally placed a peace officer in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery ⁸ (3) while the peace officer was acting in the course and scope of his duties. See State v. Noil, 2008-278 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/08), 997 So.2d 621, 626.

All four officers testified the defendant was facing the door and holding a gun as they entered his home. The testimony established that Mendoza gave the defendant several opportunities to drop his firearm before firing multiple shots at the defendant. Wintz testified he backpedaled after seeing the defendant, believing the defendant would shoot him. Deputy Lewis shared in Wintz's concerns, testifying he backed up to save himself from being shot.

The defendant argues he did not know the individuals entering his home without consent were police officers, and therefore, he was acting in self-defense. However, proof of the defendant's knowledge that his victim was a peace officer is not an element of La. R.S. 14:37.2.⁹ Thus, the State is not required to prove the defendant had knowledge that his victim was a peace officer to support a conviction under La. R.S. 14:37.2. Viewing the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm and that there was no error in the jury's rejection of the defendant's claim of self-defense.

Count Six: Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.1(A) makes it unlawful for any person who has been convicted of certain felonies to possess a firearm. To prove a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove: (1) the defendant's status as a convicted felon; and (2) the defendant was in possession of a firearm. State v. Loper, 2010-0582 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10), 48 So.3d 1263, 1266.

While La. R.S. 14:95.1 makes it unlawful for certain persons to possess a firearm or to carry a concealed weapon, it does not deny prior felony offenders the specific defense of justification as it is contained in La. R.S. 14:18. See State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304, 308 (La. 1985). When a felon is in imminent peril of great bodily harm, or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, he may take possession of a weapon for a period no longer than is necessary or apparently necessary to use it in self-defense, or in defense of others. Blache, 480 So.2d at 308.

The evidence at trial established that the defendant had a 2012 felony conviction for aggravated battery and that traces of his DNA were found on the firearm retrieved from the defendant's home. Nevertheless, the defendant contends he was justified in having a firearm in his possession because of the imminent threat posed by Kent and the alleged unauthorized entry by the law enforcement officials. As previously noted, the jury rejected the defendant's self-defense claims for counts one and two, attempted second degree murder, and counts three, four, and five, aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm. Thus, we find no error in the jury's determination that he similarly does not have a necessity justification for count six, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Accordingly, we find no merit to these assignments of error.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 3-6; SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 4-5

In combined pro se assignments of error, the defendant argues PPD officers unconstitutionally entered his home. The defendant filed a motion to suppress prior to trial regarding the officers’ alleged warrantless entrance into his home, which the district court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The defendant's pro se assignment of error number three argues that the officers only had a brief interaction with the victims at their residence. In pro se assignment of error number four, the defendant challenges the officer's entry into his “lawfully private home.” In pro se assignment of error number five, the defendant argues the record shows the arriving officers did not have exigent circumstances to conduct a protective sweep. In pro se assignment of error number six, the defendant argues that he did not give consent to enter his home and police did not obtain a search warrant. In the defendant's supplemental pro se assignment of error number four, he argues no probable cause existed to charge and arrest the defendant while inside his private home. In the defendant's supplemental pro se assignment of error number five, he argues the district court erred in denying his motion for illegal search and seizure.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment's protections against a warrantless search rest on whether the individual can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

A warrantless search is justified when exigent circumstances exist. Exigent circumstances are exceptional circumstances which, when coupled with probable cause, justify entry into a protected area that, without those exceptional circumstances, would be unlawful. See State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1079 (La. 1982). The United States Supreme Court defined exigent circumstances as “a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need[.]” Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001). Exigent circumstances may arise from the need to prevent the offender's escape, minimize the possibility of a violent confrontation that could cause injury to the officers and the public, and preserve evidence from destruction or concealment. State v. Brisban, 2000-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927-28.

An officer needs both probable cause to search and exigent circumstances to justify a non-consensual, warrantless intrusion into private premises. Brisban, 809 So.2d at 927. Probable cause is defined as “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” State v. Allen, 2023-0784 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/22/24), 388 So.3d 405, 409 n.3 (citing State v. Warren, 2005-2248 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1224). Probable cause for a search exists when facts within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that the place to be searched will contain the object of the search. State v. Taylor, 2015-1144 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/16), 2016 WL 562674, *5 (unpublished), writ denied, 2016-0457 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 799. To justify a warrantless search, the exigent circumstances must be known to the officers “at the time of the warrantless entry” and cannot be based on evidence discovered during the search. Warren, 949 So.2d at 1224. Thus, it is incumbent on the State to prove that the officers had probable cause to believe the defendant's home contained contraband or evidence of a crime and that they possessed this knowledge when they made entry into the home.

An exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is “the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). The “emergency exception” allows police officers to enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency assistance to a person they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of such assistance. See State v. Ludwig, 423 So.2d 1073, 1075 (La. 1982). Under this exception, police officers are permitted to enter a building without a warrant if the officers reasonably believe the building contains people in need of assistance or that the perpetrator is still on the premises. See State v. Hudson, 2015-0158 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/18/15), 2015 WL 5516100, *6 (unpublished); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S.Ct. 409, 411, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (per curiam); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Ludwig, 423 So.2d at 1075-76.

The police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. The burden of proving the entry falls within the narrow confines of the emergency exception is on the State. State v. Mooney, 2008-2105 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/8/09), 2009 WL 1272328, *3 (unpublished) (citing Ludwig, 423 So.2d at 1076).

At the time Mendoza, Wintz, Officer Nicholson, and Deputy Lewis approached the defendant's home, he had been identified as the shooter by two witnesses. The officers learned that the defendant shot at the victims and that Kent returned fire. When asked at trial if he was aware if he hit the defendant in the return fire, Kent answered “[N]o, sir.” Therefore, the officers believed that the defendant may have been wounded and/or that he was a barricaded suspect. In an effort to preserve evidence and check the well-being of the defendant, police officers entered his home without first obtaining a search and/or arrest warrant.

Based on the fact that the defendant was identified by the two victims as the shooter and the possibility that the defendant was wounded in the conflict, we find circumstances existed for a warrantless search of the defendant's home. Accordingly, we find these combined pro se assignments of error meritless.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS 7-12

In his pro se brief, the defendant lists multiple assignments of error claiming that “perjury” was used to convict him, namely, that Kent, D'Quincy, Mendoza, Wintz, Officer Nicholson, and Deputy Lewis provided false statements. The defendant further alleges that the prosecutor was aware of this alleged perjury.

The record discloses no contemporaneous objection raising claims of prosecutorial misconduct. An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence. See La. C.E. art. 103(A)(1); La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A). Accordingly, the defendant has waived any error based on this allegation by his failure to enter a contemporaneous objection. State v. Morgan, 2012-2060 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13), 119 So.3d 817, 830.

To the extent the defendant claims that the testimony was “perjury,” the jury's decision to accept the testimony of the victims rather than to accept the defendant's theory of the case is a matter of credibility, which this court will not overturn. See State v. Thompson, 2013-1805 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/14), 2014 WL 1778366, *5 (unpublished), writ denied, 2014-1336 (La. 4/2/15), 163 So.3d 790.

The defendant claims that the prosecutor knew of this alleged “perjury” and deliberately used this “false evidence or testimony” to convict him. It cannot be presumed the prosecutor has knowledge that a witness's answers are false simply because the witness may have made conflicting statements on a prior occasion. A defendant shows no error or entitlement to a new trial on this basis when the defendant fails to show that the statements at issue are actually false or that the prosecution knew they were false and acted in collusion with a witness to facilitate false testimony. Morgan, 119 So.3d at 830. Accordingly, we find these combined pro se assignments of error meritless.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 13

In pro se assignment of error number 13, the defendant, without any argument or authority in support thereof, simply states that “Investigator [William K. Cox] and the ‘District Attorneys’ had erred by trying to detest, and imply the erroneous reasons why the alleged victims ‘Kent, and D'Quincy Buggs’ [were] not in the wrong[.]” Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see State v. Newman, 2024-0231 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/13/24), 405 So.3d 980, 987, assignments of error that are not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). Statement of an assignment of error in brief in the absence of analysis or other briefing to develop an argument in support is nothing more than a listing of the assignment and does not constitute briefing of the assignment. See State v. Laue, 2020-0225 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 326 So.3d 267, 282, writ denied, 2021-01329 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So.3d 993, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 2659, 212 L.Ed.2d 612 (2022). The defendant did not include any further briefing or argument on this issue. Accordingly, pro se assignment of error number 13 is deemed abandoned.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 14; SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1

In pro se assignment of error number 14 and supplemental pro se assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the district court erred in denying his motion for change of venue and recusal of the trial court judge.

Motion to Recuse

A trial judge shall be recused when he or she “[i]s biased, prejudiced, or personally interested in the cause to such an extent that the judge would be unable to conduct a fair and impartial trial.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 671(A)(1). There is a presumption that a trial judge is impartial, and in order to obtain a recusal based on bias, prejudice, and personal interest, the party seeking recusal must establish more than conclusory allegations. Mellion, 342 So.3d at 49.

The defendant filed a motion to recuse Judge Elizabeth A. Engolio and the district attorneys due to the judge's alleged relationship with the prosecutor and the prosecutor's office. The record reflects a hearing was held by Judge Alvin Batiste on September 9, 2021, regarding Judge Engolio's relationship with the prosecutor, Scott Stassi, who testified he is not a blood relative to Judge Engolio. Following the hearing, the district court determined no valid grounds existed to recuse Judge Engolio or the District Attorney's Office. We see nothing in the record to contradict the district court's decision following the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we find this pro se assignment of error meritless.

Motion to Change Venue

The defendant also argues he suffered prejudice due to the sheriff's relationship with the District Attorney's Office along with the trial judge; the possibility for existing relationships with those within the Parish of Iberville; and the fact that the prosecutor's cousin previously represented the defendant in a civil matter.

The right to an impartial jury and a fair trial is guaranteed to every defendant. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; La. Const. art. I, § 16; see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 797(2). To effect this guarantee, the law provides for a change of venue when a defendant establishes that he or she will be unable to obtain an impartial jury or a fair trial at the place of original venue. State v. Magee, 2011-0574 (La. 9/28/12), 103 So.3d 285, 298, cert. denied, 571 U.S. 830, 134 S.Ct. 56, 187 L.Ed.2d 49 (2013). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 622 provides:

A change of venue shall be granted when the applicant proves that by reason of prejudice existing in the public mind or because of undue influence, or that for any other reason, a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained in the parish where the prosecution is pending.

In deciding whether to grant a change of venue the court shall consider whether the prejudice, the influence, or the other reasons are such that they will affect the answers of jurors on the voir dire examination or the testimony of witnesses at the trial.

The defendant bears the burden of showing actual prejudice. See Magee, 103 So.3d at 298. Whether a defendant has made the requisite showing of actual prejudice is a question addressed to the district court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an affirmative showing of error and abuse of discretion. Magee, 103 So.3d at 298; see also State v. Lee, 2005-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 133, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143, 172 L.Ed.2d 39 (2008).

The defendant filed a motion for change of venue on September 7, 2021, approximately 22 days before trial began, citing: (1) prospective jurors’ relation to the police officers involved in the conflict; (2) prospective jurors were employed with the police, the prosecutors, and the judges; (3) the judge is related to the prosecutor; (4) the police officers are related to the judge and the prosecutor; (5) the judge's prior experience with the prosecutor's office; (6) the prosecutor's prior representation of the defendant in a civil matter; and (7) the prosecutor's relationship with the defendant.

As mentioned above, the record reflects that a hearing was held on September 9, 2021, during which District Attorney Stassi testified regarding his relationship with Judge Engolio and the defendant. Yet, the district court found no grounds for recusal. Further, the defendant fails to identify any juror whose relationship with the Parish of Iberville caused prejudice against him. Based on the record before us, we find the defendant has shown no error in the district court's denial of his motion for a change of venue.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 15

In pro se assignment of error number 15, the defendant, without any argument or authority in support thereof, simply states that “the presiding ‘Judge Elizabeth [A.] Engolio,’ the ‘District Attorneys,’ and their ‘authorities’ along with their ․ accomplices had most definitely erred in implementing their miscarriage of justice, undue influences, malice, and their unconscionability against the defendant.”

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Newman, 405 So.3d at 987, assignments of error that are not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). Statement of an assignment of error in brief in the absence of analysis or other briefing to develop an argument in support is nothing more than a listing of the assignment and does not constitute briefing of the assignment. See Laue, 326 So.3d at 282. Since the defendant offered no further briefing or argument as to this issue, pro se assignment of error number 15 is deemed abandoned.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 16

In pro se assignment of error number 16, the defendant, without any argument or authority in support thereof, simply states, “the 18th Judicial District Court had most definitely erred in a prejudicial denial of denying all ‘twenty’ of the defendant as ‘Quinton Lawrence Motions[.]’ ”

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Newman, 405 So.3d at 987, assignments of error that are not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). Statement of an assignment of error in brief in the absence of analysis or other briefing to develop an argument in support is nothing more than a listing of the assignment and does not constitute briefing of the assignment. See Laue, 326 So.3d at 282. Since the defendant offered no further briefing or argument as to this issue, pro se assignment of error number 16 is deemed abandoned.

SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2

In his supplemental pro se assignment of error two, the defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash the charges because the two-year time period expired. Further, he claims the State denied his right to a speedy trial, citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 701(D)(1) and State v. Ramirez, 2007-0652 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/9/08), 976 So.2d 204, writ denied, 2008-0292 (La. 3/13/09), 5 So.3d 110.

The following timeline is reflected in the record:

• On March 17, 2016, the State filed the bill of information.

• On March 30, 2016, the defendant appeared, waived reading of the bill of information, and pled not guilty.

• On April 4, 2016, the defense filed preliminary pleadings, including a motion to suppress based on alleged unconstitutional search and seizure.

• On December 4, 2017, the matter came to court for Pre-Trial.

• On June 3, 2019, the defendant made an oral motion to enroll as co-counsel. The motion was granted, and the defendant filed a written motion to suppress the evidence and motion for illegal search and procedures in open court.

• On August 20, 2019, discovery was provided to the Indigent Defender's Office, and the defendant filed a motion to quash.

• On August 28, 2019, the district court held a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. The district court denied the motion from the bench.

• On September 3, 2019, voir dire began for trial. The district court appointed a sanity commission for the defendant at the request of the District Attorney.

• On September 4, 2019, a preliminary report regarding the defendant's competency to stand trial was read aloud by the district court. The court advised the defendant that no further proceedings would take place until the sanity commission was complete.

• On September 16, 2019, the matter came to court for special motion regarding the defendant's sanity. The district court noted that all reports concluded the defendant was competent to stand trial. Trial was scheduled to begin on October 1, 2019.

• On October 1, 2019, the trial began.

• On October 2, 2019, the defendant moved for a mistrial due to a juror possibly working on his case by virtue of employment with LSP Crime Lab. The court declared a mistrial.

• Courts were delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in March of 2020.

• On January 27, 2021, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw. The district court appointed a sanity commission for the defendant and stayed the matter. All evaluators found the defendant competent to stand trial.

• On July 22, 2021, defense counsel requested a continuance of the August 3, 2021 trial date, which the district court granted. The trial was rescheduled to begin on October 4, 2021.

• On August 25, 2021, the district court continued the case “due to COVID-19 restrictions/no transports.”

• On September 7, 2021, the defendant argued multiple pre-trial motions in open court, including his motion to change venue and motion to recuse the district court judge.

• On September 9, 2021, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to recuse Judge Engolio and the District Attorney's office. The district court denied the motions.

• On October 4, 2021, voir dire began.

• On October 6, 2021, the trial began.

• On October 8, 2021, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all six counts.

• On December 15, 2021, the defendant was sentenced.

Generally, the State has two years from the institution of prosecution to begin trial of a non-capital felony.¹⁰ See La. C.Cr.P. art. 578. That period may be enlarged as the result of suspension under La. C.Cr.P. art. 580 or interruption under La. C.Cr.P. art. 579. Article 579 provides:

A. The period of limitation established by Article 578 shall be interrupted if:

(1) The defendant at any time, with the purpose to avoid detection, apprehension, or prosecution, flees from the state, is outside the state, or is absent from his usual place of abode within the state; or

(2) The defendant cannot be tried because of insanity or because his presence for trial cannot be obtained by legal process, or for any other cause beyond the control of the state; or

(3) The defendant fails to appear at any proceeding pursuant to actual notice, proof of which appears of record.

B. The periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall commence to run anew from the date the cause of interruption no longer exists.

C. If the defendant fails to appear in court pursuant to any provision of this Article and the defendant is subsequently arrested, the periods of limitations established by Article 578 of this Code shall not commence to run anew until the defendant appears in person in open court where the case on the original charge is pending, or the district attorney prosecuting the original charge has notice of the defendant's custodial location. For the purposes of this Paragraph, “notice” shall mean either of the following:

(1) Filing in the court record by either the defendant or his counsel advising the court of his incarceration with a copy provided to the district attorney and certification of notice provided to the district attorney.

(2) Following the seventy-two hour hearing provided by Article 230.1 of this Code, actual notice of arrest is provided to the district attorney and filed in the record of the proceeding of which the warrant against the defendant was issued.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 580(A) states that “[w]hen a defendant files a motion to quash or other preliminary plea, the running of the periods of limitation established by Article 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon[.]” The prescriptive period is merely suspended until the district court rules on the filing of preliminary pleas; the relevant period is not counted, and the running of the time limit resumes when the court rules on the motions. A preliminary plea is any pleading or motion filed by the defense that has the effect of delaying trial, including properly filed motions to quash, motions to suppress, or motions for a continuance, as well as applications for discovery and bills of particulars. State v. Brooks, 2002-0792 (La. 2/14/03), 838 So.2d 778, 782 (per curiam); Smith, 2015 WL 996192 at *4. At the time of the offense, La. C.Cr.P. art. 582 stated, in pertinent part, “When a defendant obtains a new trial or there is a mistrial, the state must commence the second trial within one year from the date the new trial is granted, or the mistrial is ordered, or within the period established by Article 578, whichever is longer.”¹¹

A motion to quash is the proper vehicle to assert the time limitation for the commencement of trial has expired. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 532(7). When a defendant has brought an apparently meritorious motion to quash based on prescription, the State bears a heavy burden to demonstrate either an interruption or a suspension of time such that prescription will not have tolled. State v. Reed, 2016-1201 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 729, 731.

Based on the record before us, we agree with the district court's determination that the State demonstrated the prescriptive period did not toll. The defendant was charged by bill of information on March 17, 2016. Less than 30 days later, on April 4, 2016, the defendant filed a plethora of preliminary pleadings, including a motion to suppress, thereby suspending the prescriptive period. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 580(A). The defendant also filed a pro se motion to suppress on June 3, 2019, and a pro se motion to quash in open court on August 20, 2019. The district court ruled on the motions to suppress and motion to quash on August 28, 2019, in open court, at which time the prescriptive period began to run again. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 580(A). In March 2020, the defendant's trial was delayed due to restrictions established by the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Supreme Court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those restrictions were later lifted on April 1, 2021.¹² The defendant's trial commenced approximately six months later on October 4, 2021. Based on our review of the record, we find that the statutory time limitation established by La. C.Cr.P. art. 578 did not expire prior to filing the motion to quash or prior to the beginning of the defendant's trial due to the above-detailed periods of suspension. Accordingly, we find this pro se assignment of error meritless.

SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 6

In his supplemental pro se assignment of error number six, the defendant, without any argument or authority in support thereof, states that Judge Engolio erred in denying his motion that he filed pertaining to the inapplicability to unintentional felonies, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.4.

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Newman, 405 So.3d at 987, assignments of error that are not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). Statement of an assignment of error in brief in the absence of analysis or other briefing to develop an argument in support is nothing more than a listing of the assignment and does not constitute briefing of the assignment. See Laue, 326 So.3d at 282. Since the defendant offered no further briefing or argument as to this issue, this pro se assignment of error is deemed abandoned.

SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 7

In supplemental pro se assignment of error number seven, the defendant argues the district court erred in denying his motion pertaining to the miscellaneous offenses affecting judicial functions and public records and the misconduct and correct practice at the above case in hand.

In his motion, the defendant argued: (1) his case should be “thrown out” for his pain, harm, hurt, suffering, and harassment; (2) his life has been ruined due to neglectfulness by the police; (3) the evidence proves that Kent shot first; and (4) the facts prove the evidence was tampered with. Arguments three and four involve sufficiency of the evidence and were previously addressed above.

As for the other two arguments included in the defendant's motion, they have no basis in facts or law. Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Newman, 405 So.3d at 987, assignments of error that are not briefed on appeal are considered abandoned, Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). Statement of an assignment of error in brief in the absence of analysis or other briefing to develop an argument in support is nothing more than a listing of the assignment and does not constitute briefing of the assignment. See Laue, 326 So.3d at 282. Since the defendant offered no further briefing or argument as to these issues, the first and second argument in the defendant's supplemental pro se assignment of error number seven are deemed abandoned.

SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 8

In supplemental pro se assignment of error number eight, the defendant argues the district court prejudicially denied his motion to suppress the evidence.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. A defendant may move to suppress any evidence from use at trial on the basis that it was unconstitutionally obtained. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(A). A search and seizure conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable unless the State can affirmatively show that the warrantless search and seizure was justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Surtain, 2009-1835 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1037, 1043. Generally, if evidence was derived from an unlawful search or seizure, the proper remedy is exclusion of the evidence from trial. State v. Benjamin, 97-3065 (La. 12/1/98), 722 So.2d 988, 989. On a motion to suppress evidence on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained, the prosecution has the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized without a warrant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D).

Police testified that at the time of entry they believed the defendant was potentially wounded as a result of Kent returning fire upon the defendant after he was shot. An exception exists when police officers reasonably believe someone to be in distress and in need of such assistance. Ludwig, 423 So.2d at 1075. Since the officers believed the defendant was potentially wounded by Kent and in need of medical attention, the officers were authorized to enter into the defendant's home. Accordingly, this pro se assignment of error is meritless.

SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 9

In supplemental pro se assignment of error number nine, the defendant challenges the testimony of the State's expert witness, Patrick Lane. The defendant challenges Lane's theory or techniques, whether the theories were subject to peer review, the potential rates of error and whether the expert was aware of these rates, and whether his methodology is generally accepted in scientific cases of such a matter.

Lane, a 40-year employee of the LSP Crime Lab, was questioned on his qualifications. After the State questioned Lane, he was offered as an expert in firearms identification.¹³ The record indicates the defense made no objections regarding Lane's acceptance as an expert in firearms identification. Thereafter, the district court accepted Lane as an expert in firearms identification.

An irregularity cannot be availed of after the verdict unless it was objected to at the time of the occurrence. La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A). The contemporaneous objection rule serves two purposes: to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged irregularity so that she may cure the problem and to prevent the defendant from gambling on a favorable verdict and then resorting to an appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by an objection. State v. Lascari, 2024-0631 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/11/25), 2025 WL 1911842, *6 (unpublished), writ denied, 2025-01052 (La. 3/18/26), 427 So.3d 1238. Thus, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must state an objection contemporaneously with the occurrence of the alleged error, as well as the grounds for the objection. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); State v. McElveen, 2023-0939 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/24), 406 So.3d 429, 448, writ denied, 2025-00563 (La. 11/19/25), 420 So.3d 1188, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 146 S.Ct. 2757, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2026). Since the defendant did not contemporaneously object to Lane's qualification as an expert, he is precluded from raising this issue on appeal. Accordingly, supplemental pro se assignment of error number nine was not preserved for review.

SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 10

In supplemental pro se assignment of error ten, the defendant argues the district court denied him the right to represent himself at trial. The defendant contends the district court disregarded his clear and unequivocal request to represent himself although it found the defendant was competent to stand trial.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 13 give a defendant the right to counsel as well as the right to represent himself if the choice is “knowingly and intelligently made” and the assertion is “clear and unequivocal.” See State v. Bonit, 2005-0795 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/06), 928 So.2d 633, 637, writ denied, 2006-1211 (La. 3/16/07), 952 So.2d 688 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). Thus, an accused has the right to choose between the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. See State v. Brown, 2018-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 223, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d 596 (2022).

In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a district court may not force a lawyer upon a defendant when he insists he wants to conduct his own defense and voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed without counsel. However, the defendant must ask clearly and unequivocally to proceed pro se, and he must make his request in a timely manner. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; Bonit, 928 So.2d at 637. Furthermore, the defendant must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so the record demonstrates “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.

Faretta made clear that an accused's “technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. In State v. Santos, 99-1897 (La. 9/15/00), 770 So.2d 319 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a district court confronted with an accused's unequivocal request to represent himself need only determine whether the accused is competent to waive counsel and is “voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” Santos, 770 So.2d at 321 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541).

However, the right to self-representation is not absolute. The Supreme Court has held that a district court may terminate the right to self-representation where the defendant fails to abide by courtroom rules and/or engages in obstructionist or disruptive conduct or by abusing the dignity of the court. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46.

Prior to the defendant's first trial on August 20, 2019, the defendant clearly expressed a willingness to be assisted by counsel as established in the following colloquy:

THE COURT:

Mr. Lawrence, my question is, do you want him to represent you? And that's an important question because Mr. Hall is gonna represent you if I have ordered the Public Defender to do so, and I believe he's taken his position to do that, okay․ So ․ what would you like to do?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, I would like to have some help,--

THE COURT:

Okay.

THE DEFENDANT:

-- you know what I mean. I can't do this by myself.

Several days later, on August 28, 2019, the defendant made a motion to represent himself, arguing the public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The court engaged in a colloquy with the defendant concerning his ability to read and write and his educational level, and the court explained the defendant's rights to him. Based on the defendant's apparent misunderstanding of the burden of proof, the court explained that the public defender did not have a duty to prove his innocence. The district court ultimately granted the defendant's motion, ordered Mr. Hall of the Public Defender's Office to remain as standby counsel, and explained that Mr. Hall would sit with the defendant and answer any questions. The defendant did not object.

On October 2, 2019, the second day of the defendant's first trial, the defendant, representing himself with the assistance of Mr. Hall, made a motion for mistrial. The defendant's motion for mistrial was based on the response of a juror, Charles Becnel, who stated during voir dire that he worked for the LSP. Initially, the defendant did not challenge Becnel, and in fact, Becnel was selected as a juror. Becnel subsequently approached the judge's bailiff and indicated that he had seen the evidence in the case by virtue of his employment at the LSP Crime Lab. The district court convened a hearing for purposes of questioning Becnel further.

Becnel testified that he would have answered “yes” if the defendant asked whether he was familiar with the case. The defendant's questions during voir dire pertained to matters mostly unrelated to the prospective juror's ability to serve as a juror in the trial. The defendant's motion for mistrial was based on information allegedly withheld by Becnel; however, Becnel testified that the defendant failed to ask whether the juror was familiar with the case. The following colloquy ensued, in pertinent part, regarding Becnel's employment and the defendant's motion for mistrial:

THE COURT:

But the problem that this Court has is that we have a [pro se] defendant, and you have said and I do believe that you did not hear Mr. Becnel say that he worked for the crime lab and that he knew about this case, which is a problem with you representing yourself.

You are not able to effectively represent yourself. You are not able to effectively question jurors. You are not hearing very important things that jurors are saying, okay. It's too overwhelming for you.

MR. LAWRENCE:

Not it's not, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I also think it's very unfair to the State and it's unfair to the Court that you're taking up two months of criminal jury weeks, okay. ․ You do not have the capability to do it despite the fact that you have been found competent to proceed and able to assist in your defense, those psychiatrists did not pass on your ability to be a lawyer, okay, or to be an effective [pro se] litigant. You are not an effective [pro se] litigant in any sense of the word, okay.

The defendant ultimately conceded that he had missed Becnel's previous answer during voir dire when Becnel stated that he was familiar with the case. Nevertheless, the court declared a mistrial because the jurors were already sworn and “it's fundamentally unfair for your rights that you are missing very important things in your case.”

The district court warned the defendant on October 1, 2019, the day prior to the defendant's motion for mistrial, that causing further delays to the trial would result in him no longer being able to represent himself. Moreover, the defendant filed numerous pro se motions with the district court, causing his case to remain pending for over five years. Based on the entire record, particularly the defendant's failure to pay attention while conducting voir dire, which resulted in a mistrial, coupled with his numerous, mostly indecipherable pro se motions, demonstrate a disruption to the district court. As noted by the district court, “[I]t's very unfair to the State and it's unfair to the Court that you're taking up two months of criminal jury weeks.” We further note that the defendant did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the court's ruling denying him further self-representation. Based on the record before us, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to represent himself. Accordingly, we find this pro se assignment of error meritless.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. See State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found two patent errors.

We note the sentence on count six, convicted felon in possession of a firearm, is illegally lenient, as the district court failed to impose a mandatory fine of not less than one thousand and not more than five thousand dollars, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1(B).¹⁴ The failure to do so is harmless error as the defendant is not prejudiced in any way by the court's failure to impose the fine. State v. Price, 2005-2514 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 112, 124, writ denied, 2007-0130 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1277. Under the general provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A), an illegally lenient sentence may be corrected at any time by an appellate court on review. An appellate court is authorized to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) when the sentence does not involve the exercise of sentencing discretion by the district court. See State v. Lambert, 2011-2006 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12), 93 So.3d 771, 780, writ denied, 2012-1592 (La. 1/25/13), 105 So.3d 65. In this case, the imposition of a fine is mandatory under La. R.S. 14:95.1, but the amount of the fine is subject to the sentencing court's discretion. Additionally, we note that neither the State nor the defendant raised the error, and as such, we are not required to take any action. See Price, 952 So.2d at 124-25. For these reasons, we decline to correct the illegally lenient sentence. See Price, 952 So.2d at 125.

Moreover, the record reflects that, after the district court imposed the sentences, it failed to advise the defendant of the applicable time periods to file a motion for appeal or application for post-conviction relief. The defendant filed a timely appeal under La. C.Cr.P. art. 914; thus, the district court's failure to advise the defendant of the applicable prescriptive period for doing so is moot. See State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. As to post-conviction relief, out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

MOTION TO STAY DENIED; CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The minutes state that the sentence on count six was to be without benefit of parole or probation and are silent as to suspension of sentence. However, the sentencing transcript reveals the district court imposed the sentence on count six without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

2.   Several witnesses share the same surname; therefore, we refer to each by their first name to avoid confusion.

3.   On cross-examination, Kent admitted he gave a statement to the police the next day, December 2, 2015, but he could not remember if he told police he retrieved the firearm from D'Quincy’s room.

4.   Kent testified that the defendant was 56 years old at the time of the shooting.

5.   Mendoza testified that he is no longer an officer after a separate 2019 charge wherein he pled guilty to malfeasance in office.

6.   The record reflects the witness was first called to testify using the name Melissa Farley; however, she testified a second time under the name Melissa Goudeau. We refer to the witness as Melissa Farley to avoid confusion.

7.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:37.2 was amended by La. Acts 2016, No. 225, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2016) to remove the element that the offense be committed with a firearm.

8.   Assault is an attempt to commit a battery, or the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. La. R.S. 14:36. Aggravated assault is an assault committed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:37(A). A dangerous weapon is defined as any instrumentality, which in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm. See La. R.S. 14:2(A)(3). A firearm is an instrument used in the propulsion of shot, shell, or bullets by the action of gunpowder exploded within it. La. R.S. 14:37.4(B).

9.   Cf. La. R.S. 14:34.2(A)(1) (“Battery of a police officer is a battery committed ․ when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a police officer acting in the performance of his duty.”).

10.   “Institution of prosecution” means the finding of an indictment, or, as in this case, the filing of a bill of information, or affidavit, which is designed to serve as the basis of a trial. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 934(7); State v. Smith, 2014-1084 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/6/15), 2015 WL 996192, *3 (unpublished), writ denied, 2015-0671 (La. 3/14/16), 189 So.3d 1067.

11.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 582 was amended by La. Acts 2024, No. 207, § 1 (eff. May 23, 2024). The Article remains largely unchanged as it applies in this case.

12.   See February 11, 2021 Louisiana Supreme Court Order. The order explicitly instructed that “[n]o civil or criminal jury trial shall commence in Louisiana state court before April 1, 2021” and explained that any continuances occasioned by that directive “shall be excluded from speedy trial computations pursuant to law, including but not limited to those set forth in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure[.]”

13.   The defense stated it had no objections to Lane being qualified as a firearms identification expert.

14.   The district court is required to hold a financial hardship hearing in compliance with the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1 prior to the imposition of such a fine. We note the record does not indicate that a financial hardship hearing was held or that the mandatory fine was waived as a result of a determination that it would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents.

EDWARDS, J.