STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BOKIO JOHNSON (2026)

Defendant-Appellant, Bokio Johnson (“Defendant”), appeals his convictions and sentences received for manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and obstruction of justice. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and remand the matter to the trial court for a ruling on his motion to reconsider sentences, reserving Defendant the right to appeal his sentences thereafter.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 26, 2022, the State filed an indictment charging Defendant with one count each of second degree murder; attempted second degree murder; and obstruction of justice, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1; 14:(27)30.1; and 14:130.1, respectively. On June 2, 2022, Defendant appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty to the charges. The following day, the State filed notice to seek the firearm sentencing enhancement, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3.

On June 14, 2024, the State filed notice of its intent to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts, specifically, that he had followed the victim home from the courthouse on multiple occasions. During a pre-trial hearing, Defendant orally objected to the State's notice, arguing that following the victim home should not be classified as a “prior bad act.” The trial court granted the State's notice, finding the evidence admissible.

Trial began on June 18, 2024, and on June 21, 2024, the jury returned unanimous verdicts finding Defendant guilty of the responsive verdicts of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter and guilty as charged of obstruction of justice. The jury also unanimously found that Defendant committed the offenses in counts one and two with a firearm and caused bodily injury.

On April 23, 2025, Defendant filed motions for a new trial; a post-verdict judgment of acquittal; and for a downward departure. The motions came before the trial court on April 25, 2025. Thereafter, the trial court denied the motions for a new trial and for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal and took the matter of a downward departure under advisement.

On May 16, 2025, the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction (count one); twenty years imprisonment for the attempted manslaughter conviction (count two); and twenty years imprisonment for the obstruction of justice conviction (count three). Noting that the jury had also found that Defendant committed the offenses while discharging a firearm and causing bodily harm on counts one and two, the trial court ordered fifteen years of each of the sentences imposed on counts one and two be served without the benefit of parole, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3(D) and (G), with all sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court also denied Defendant's motion for a downward departure.

This appeal followed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Natalia Carter testified that she worked as the custodian of records for the Orleans Parish Communications District and she authenticated the 911 phone calls placed on March 23, 2022, in this case as well as the corresponding incident recall reports. The State introduced the exhibits and played the 911 calls for the jury.

A review of the recorded 911 calls reveals that at least six callers reported that a woman had fallen out of a vehicle and that she had been shot in the back. Some callers reported that the suspect was driving a white Acura or Altima and had driven up to the victim's vehicle at the intersection and fired multiple gunshots therein, then fled the scene.

Juliette Dauterive (“Ms. Dauterive”) testified that on the day of the incident, she was stopped at a red light on Gentilly Boulevard when she heard several gunshots. She stated that she observed a woman in a sedan that was stopped directly in front of her “go bailing out of her door onto the neutral ground.” Ms. Dauterive testified that the “car rolled away․and hit the curb on the other side and stopped.” She noted that “the passenger in the car never moved.” Although Ms. Dauterive could not discern the direction from which the gunshots were fired, she did “remember a car coming up really fast on the right-hand side -a car or truck or something, big vehicle.” Ms. Dauterive testified that she rolled down her window and asked the woman on the ground if she was okay, and the woman responded that she had been shot and asked for help. Ms. Dauterive then called 911.

Ms. Dauterive testified that she continued driving and observed “a big black truck [ ] racing up to [her] left and ran the red light and took Elysian Fields toward the river very fast.” She stated that she was unsure whether the truck was the same vehicle she had observed upon hearing the gunshots. She noted that she had not expected the vehicle to come from behind her because it had fled directly after the shooting.

On cross-examination, Ms. Dauterive testified that she had returned to the scene to tell the investigating officers what she had witnessed but did not recall receiving any follow-up phone calls from a detective. She also stated that she heard eight gunshots.

NOPD Officer Michael Christian (“Off. Christian”) testified that he responded to the shooting on March 23, 2022. Off. Christian testified that he was wearing a body camera at the time and the State introduced the video footage. The video was played for the jury while Off. Christian narrated. He stated that when he arrived at the scene, he observed shell casings in the street and a deceased male seated inside a white vehicle that had bullet holes in the window. Off. Christian testified that other than securing the crime scene, he had no other involvement in the investigation.

On cross-examination, Off. Christian testified that no witnesses at the scene were able to provide the identity of the shooter.

Dr. Erin O'Sullivan (“Dr. O'Sullivan”), a forensic pathologist at the Orleans Parish Coroner's Office, was qualified as an expert by the trial court in the field of forensic pathology. Dr. O'Sullivan testified that she conducted the autopsy on the victim in this case, Hollis Carter (herein referred to as “the victim” or “Carter”), who suffered “eight gunshot wounds of the head, neck, shoulders, trunk, and left thigh.”¹ Specifically, Dr. O'Sullivan stated the bullets that entered the victim's head and neck, fragmented and perforated his brain; two bullets entered and exited the victim's left shoulder; three bullets entered the right side of his chest and perforated his ribs, his heart, and his left lung; and one bullet entered and exited his left thigh. Multiple bullet and jacket fragments were recovered from the wounds and submitted to law enforcement. Dr. O'Sullivan testified that the “overall trajectory of the gunshot wounds was right to left.” She said that the victim could have been shot by someone in a vehicle located to his right.

On cross-examination, Dr. O'Sullivan testified that she did not determine the identity of the shooter.

NOPD Homicide Detective Jameson Diesburg (“Det. Diesburg”) testified that he assisted the lead detective in this case, Det. Brittany Kimbrough, in the investigation and “was assigned the role of documenting the collection of evidence․found on the scene.” Upon his arrival at the scene, Det. Deisburg observed “spent rifle casings” in the “westbound lanes of Chef Menteur Highway” near the intersection and a “white car that was pulled off to the side of the road a little further up.” Det. Diesburg identified and described photographs of the crime scene, which the State introduced into evidence.

Det. Diesburg identified the victim in the photographs of the crime scene, who was seated in the passenger seat of the white vehicle on the curb; the driver's seat was empty. He described multiple bullet holes in the passenger-side window and noted that the driver's-side rear window was also shattered. Det. Diesburg testified that he located a total of twelve casings, all of which were “.223-caliber rifle casings.” He also identified a nearby car wash and coffee shop in the photographs.

On cross-examination, Det. Diesburg confirmed that his participation in the investigation of this case was limited to supervising the collection of evidence. He stated that he was not involved in determining the perpetrator's identity.

Jay Lewis (“Mr. Lewis”), testified that on March 23, 2022, he was working in New Orleans as a paramedic with Acadian Ambulance and responded to the scene in this case. Upon his arrival, Mr. Lewis observed a woman lying in the road who had already been treated with “an occlusive dressing on her back on one of the gunshot wounds.”² His medical report identified the victim as Tokeiwa Johnson and reflected that he transported her to University Hospital. Mr. Lewis testified that he had observed multiple gunshot wounds “up and down her back.”

Mr. Lewis testified on cross-examination that he played no role in determining the identification of the shooter.

Former NOPD Homicide Detective Christopher Puccio (“Det. Puccio”) testified that he assisted in the investigation and was “delegated to get video surveillance from a nearby car wash and then also interview any witnesses that were on scene.” He testified that he interviewed Ms. Dauterive and Crystal Fincher. He also observed surveillance footage from the car wash that depicted an “unknown truck” which pulled up to the victim's stopped vehicle “and opened fire and then sped off down Chef.” The State introduced the footage and played it for the jury.

The video ³ shows a black truck drive up next to the passenger side of a white car at a red light. The driver of the black truck then shoots at the white vehicle and drives off. The driver of the white car can be observed crawling out of the vehicle and to the median. The white vehicle continued to roll down the street.

On cross-examination, Det. Puccio testified that other than interviewing witnesses and collecting the surveillance footage, he had no further involvement in this case.

NOPD Homicide Detective Matthew Riffle (“Det. Riffle”) testified that he assisted in executing a search warrant for Defendant's residence in this case. Although Det. Riffle was not wearing a body camera at the time, he authenticated video footage of the search taken from another officer's body-worn camera who was also present during the search. The State introduced the footage and played it for the jury (without audio) while Det. Riffle narrated the events depicted therein.

Det. Riffle testified that he recovered an Android cell phone from one of the two bedrooms located in Defendant's residence along with a loaded, Taurus .45 caliber handgun and seven boxes of ammunition located in a dresser drawer.⁴ Det. Riffle also located several pill bottles on the table in the bedroom bearing Defendant's name, as well as a photograph of Defendant's deceased son. Det. Riffle testified that he also located a “Panther Arms” 5.56 mm rifle box in the closet in the primary bedroom and a rifle magazine on the living room table. Det. Riffle stated that none of the ammunition recovered from the drawer in the bedroom could have been fired from a 5.56 mm rifle.

On cross-examination, Det. Riffle admitted that he did not locate any .223 caliber ammunition during the search of Defendant's residence. He also clarified that he neither authored nor applied for the search warrant, he merely assisted in executing the search. Det. Riffle testified that he did not know how many other people lived in the residence, or which bedroom, specifically, belonged to Defendant. He also admitted that he did not locate the rifle that was originally contained in the box. Det. Riffle testified that a 5.56 mm rifle can fire .223-caliber rounds.

NOPD Homicide Detective Walter Edmond (“Det. Edmond”) testified that he was the lead investigator assigned to a double homicide that occurred on March 28, 2021, in which Carter had been indicted for the murders of Breyiana Brown (“Ms. Brown”) and Caleb Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”). Det. Edmond explained that Ms. Brown and Mr. Johnson were the children of Defendant in the instant case. He stated that case had not yet gone to trial, but Carter had recently been released on bail and was scheduled to appear in court for a hearing the morning that he was shot inside his vehicle. Det. Edmond testified that Carter had confessed during an interview that he had shot Ms. Brown and Mr. Johnson in self-defense “because he felt like they were going to hit him with their car.”

Kenneth Leary (“Mr. Leary”) testified that he worked for the NOPD crime lab's Firearms Examination Unit. The parties stipulated Mr. Leary was an expert in firearms analysis. He testified that 5.56 mm bullets and .223 caliber bullets are both “in the .22 caliber class category,” which is the only class of ammunition a 5.56 mm rifle capable of firing. Mr. Leary testified that he examined the spent casings recovered from the crime scene and concluded that they were all fired from “the same .223 or 5.56-millimeter rifle.” He also testified that he “was able to determine that one of the projectiles recovered during the autopsy of [the victim] was consistent with .22-caliber class ammunition.” He noted that the other fragments and/or projectiles recovered from the victim's body were “too badly damaged to determine a caliber class” or to match to a particular weapon.

On cross-examination, Mr. Leary conceded that he could not determine whether the casings recovered from the crime scene had been fired from the rifle that was originally contained in the rifle box recovered from Defendant's residence. He also admitted that he could not conclude that the casings had even been fired from a 5.56 mm rifle. Mr. Leary explained that other types of firearms are also capable of firing .223 caliber ammunition, including “a homemade gun with no serial number.”

Michael Tuircuit (“Mr. Tuircuit”) testified that he lived in St. Charles Parish and knew Defendant because he was the “lead electrician working on [his] residence” after it was damaged in Hurricane Ida. Mr. Tuircuit testified that Defendant drove a pickup truck and had arrived at his residence on March 23, 2022, around 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. He also recalled that two other electricians arrived at some point to work with Defendant.

On cross-examination, Mr. Tuircuit stated that he did not know the sequence in which the electricians had arrived at his residence that day, nor whether they all departed together or in separate vehicles. He admitted he was “not absolutely sure” Defendant was driving a pickup truck that day because he had observed multiple construction vehicles arriving and departing from his residence.

NOPD Homicide Detective Jamaane Roy (“Det. Roy”) testified that he assisted Det. Kimbrough in conducting a recorded interview of Defendant after he was issued Miranda warnings. The State introduced Defendant's interview and played it for the jury.

In the interview, Det. Roy and Det. Kimbrough explained to Defendant that electronic license plate readers captured his license plate on the vehicle the perpetrator was driving and that the police possessed surveillance footage depicting the shooter driving Defendant's vehicle at the scene. Defendant, however, denied being present at the scene and refused to agree that the truck shown in the surveillance footage at the scene was his vehicle. Defendant maintained that he was either working at his job in LaPlace or on his way there at the time of the shooting, and that nobody else had access to his vehicle.⁵

Det. Roy testified that the interview was terminated after Defendant requested a lawyer.

On cross-examination, Det. Roy testified that Det. Kimbrough no longer worked for the NOPD. He also stated that his interview with Defendant occurred from around 2:00 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. Det. Roy said he became frustrated at one point because Defendant “ha[d] not given any definitive answers.” Det. Roy confirmed that he had repeatedly explained to Defendant that he “had video of [Defendant's] registered vehicle on the scene of a homicide and [h]e had snapped pictures of his license plate from the LPR [license plate reader].” He also asked Defendant several times if it was not Defendant driving, “who was in the [truck]?” Det. Roy conceded that he had not interviewed Defendant's coworkers to corroborate his whereabouts the morning of the shooting.

John Ward (“Mr. Ward”) testified that he worked as an NOPD Crime Lab technician and assisted Det. Kimbrough in the processing of a black pickup truck at police headquarters on March 28, 2022. He stated that he swabbed parts of the truck interior for DNA.

On cross-examination, Mr. Ward testified that he took DNA samples from “the front driver's side door; the steering wheel; and the gearshift.” He stated that he was not asked to collect any fingerprints or test for gunshot residue anywhere in the vehicle. Mr. Ward denied finding any casings inside the vehicle or any blood spatter on the driver's side door.

NOPD Officer Cody O'Dell (“Off. O'Dell”) testified that he was assigned to the Special Operations Division and assisted with the arrest of Defendant on March 25, 2022. After he secured Defendant in handcuffs, Off. O'Dell conducted a search of his person and located in his side cargo pocket “a charged pistol magazine containing live [.45 caliber] rounds.” He also seized Ford car keys from Defendant's front pants pocket.

On cross-examination, Officer O'Dell agreed that he was not involved in determining the identity of the perpetrator in this case. He conceded that he collected .45 caliber rounds from Defendant, not .223 caliber rounds.

Former NOPD Homicide Detective Miles Guirreri (“Det. Guirreri”) testified that he assisted in the investigation in this case and was tasked with locating surveillance footage that recorded the route of the shooter's vehicle as it drove to the crime scene. He said the Defendant lived in Algiers ⁶ and that another officer obtained video footage from a Ring doorbell camera across the street from Defendant's residence.⁷ He also testified that he was present during the search of Defendant's residence and observed a truck “basically parked around the corner from where the house was.” He stated the truck contained in the Ring footage was similar to the truck that he observed executing the search warrant.

On cross-examination, Det. Guirreri said the Ring camera footage is time stamped 6:39 a.m., March 23, 2022, and depicts the truck “sitting stationary.” He admitted that he could not determine from the Ring footage what time the truck departed from the residence nor who was driving. He also stated that he was not involved in determining the identity of the perpetrator.

On redirect, Det. Guirreri testified that the Ring cameras are motion activated and that it records when the homeowner enters or exits their home.

Tomica Newman (“Ms. Newman”), the deceased victim's aunt, testified that on the morning of March 23, 2022, she received a call from the victim, and he asked if she was still planning on attending his court hearing and she replied that she would meet him there. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Newman received another phone call from an unknown caller who stated that her sister, Tokeiwa, had been shot. She then received a Facetime call revealing that Tokeiwa was lying on the ground repeating that her “baby” was in the car. Ms. Newman testified that she informed her mother and her other nephew of the shooting, then drove from her residence to the scene.

Ms. Newman testified that she arrived at the scene and observed her nephew slumped over in the vehicle, deceased. She remained at the scene until she learned that Tokeiwa had been taken to University Hospital where she subsequently relocated. Ms. Newman testified that Det. Kimbrough met with her and showed her a photograph depicting a black pickup truck. Ms. Newman identified the truck as “[t]he same truck [Defendant] drives every time at the courthouse․he sat outside the courthouse in his truck if he wasn't in[side].” Ms. Newman said she was familiar with Defendant because he was the father of the two people the victim was accused of killing and had been present during the victim's court appearances.⁸ She identified Defendant in open court. Ms. Newman also suggested that on one occasion, Defendant had attempted to intimidate the victim, stating Defendant “looked [the victim] up and down” and left the courtroom. Ms. Newman testified that Tokeiwa had consistently identified Defendant as the person who shot her.

On cross-examination, after Ms. Newman's memory was refreshed by her recorded conversation with Det. Kimbrough, she admitted that she had previously indicated that two people had been following her from the courthouse, although she maintained at trial that Defendant was the only person following her.

On redirect examination, the State introduced the recorded conversation between Ms. Newman and Det. Kimbrough and played it for the jury.⁹ Ms. Newman stated that when she spoke to Det. Kimbrough her “mind was all over the place” due to the stress from the shooting and the aftermath. However, Ms. Newman did not explain why she had identified an additional person following her and the victim from the courthouse.

NOPD investigative analyst Charles Dionne (“Mr. Dionne”) was qualified by the trial court as an expert in the field of “interpreting, analyzing, and mapping of call detail records.” Mr. Dionne testified that he analyzed T-Mobile phone location data extracted from Defendant's cell phone between 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on the day of the shooting. He explained that he could not determine the precise coordinates of the phone's location or the identity of the person in possession of the phone but could track the general area of the phone's location. Mr. Dionne testified that between 8:00 and 8:20 a.m., Defendant's phone appeared to be “leaving the Westbank.” He continued, “It looks like it's crossing the Crescent City bridge, going to U.S. 90 and then heading towards the Gentilly area, most likely along I-10.” Mr. Dionne testified that the last known location of Defendant's phone before the shooting was in the Gentilly area at 8:17 a.m. Between 8:20 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., the phone registered no location data. Mr. Dionne noted, however, that several incoming calls in that timeframe were “forwarded to voicemail because the phone was turned off ․ or in airplane mode.”

Mr. Dionne testified that the phone began registering location data again at 9:02 am, “about thirteen minutes after the incident occurred,” and it was located “in the Metairie area around I-10 and the Veterans exit, roughly; between Clearview and the Kenner line.” From 9:00 to 9:30 a.m., the phone “keeps heading west, seemingly along I-10․going from Metairie/Kenner all the way to St. John Parish on the way to LaPlace.”

On cross-examination, Mr. Dionne testified that Det. Kimbrough did not ask him to track the phone's location prior to 8:00 a.m., so he did not know the phone's location at 6:00 a.m. He also explained that he could only provide the general area of the device within a range of several blocks to a mile, as phones usually connect to the tower that provides the best signal rather than necessarily connecting to the closest working tower. Mr. Dionne also admitted that he did not know the precise route the phone traveled from the Westbank to the Gentilly area; he only provided his opinion of the most likely route based on the data points he analyzed.

Tokeiwa Newman,¹⁰ (“Tokeiwa”) testified that on the morning of March 23, 2022, she drove her three young children to the bus stop between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., then returned to her residence at 4022 Prentiss Avenue in Gentilly, where her deceased son/victim also lived. The victim reminded her that he had a court proceeding that morning, which Tokeiwa explained was for pending murder charges filed the previous year. Tokeiwa testified that she drove the victim to the courthouse using the same route she always drove, from Chef Menteur Highway to Gentilly, then to the courthouse on Broad Street. However, when she stopped in the left lane at the “first red light on Chef,” a black truck abruptly stopped in the lane next to her on the right, which caught her attention. She said she recognized Defendant (as the father of the victims in the murder charges her son was facing) in the driver's seat and wondered why he was in her neighborhood. The victim told her, “Ma, go!” then she saw the passenger window shatter and the victim's “head go down,” and realized that she had been shot.

Tokeiwa testified that as she tried to escape, she observed Defendant “inside the car ․ just shooting me, shooting me. [The victim] was already down.” She stated that she jumped out of her vehicle while sustaining gunshot wounds. She estimated that she was shot five to six times. Tokiewa then watched her vehicle roll down the street with the victim inside while Defendant fled the scene. She remained on the curb of the neutral ground until help arrived shortly thereafter. She learned that the victim was deceased after she awoke from surgery. Tokeiwa testified that she was certain Defendant was the shooter, stating, “And he know (sic). He saw me and I saw him.”

Tokeiwa testified that she had no memory of providing a recorded statement to police at the hospital, although she recognized her voice on the recording the State presented. The State introduced the recording of her interview with Det. Kimbrough and played it for the jury.

In her recorded statement, Tokeiwa did not identify Defendant as the shooter. She recalled stopping at the red light, then stated that a “car just came,” and that was all she knew. She also told Det. Kimbrough that she watched her vehicle roll down the street with the victim inside, but she did not know what happened to him after that.

Tokeiwa testified that she remained in the hospital for nearly two weeks and then had to return shortly thereafter because her wounds became infected. She also said she underwent a hysterectomy due to the gunshot wounds to her abdomen. Tokeiwa testified that she told her sister, among others, that Defendant was the perpetrator. She explained that she knew him as “Caleb's daddy,” and stated that she had seen him on multiple occasions during the victim's court appearances. Tokeiwa testified that she also recognized Defendant's truck because she had seen him sitting in his truck outside the courthouse several times.

On cross-examination, Tokeiwa testified that she instantly recognized Defendant as the driver in the truck that stopped beside her at the red light and wondered why he was there. Defendant introduced body camera footage from an officer present at the scene and played it for the jury.

A review of the body camera video footage reveals that Tokeiwa did not identify Defendant as the perpetrator when the officer asked who shot her, stating instead that she was “unable to talk.” Additionally, Tokeiwa did not correct any of the bystanders who described the shooter's vehicle as a white Altima or Acura.

Tokeiwa conceded that she did not identify Defendant as the shooter on the body camera footage. She also admitted that she had spoken to Det. Kimbrough at a later date, but had not identified Defendant then either, explaining that Defendant had already been arrested by that time.

On redirect examination, Tokeiwa stated that she was certain that Defendant was the person who shot her and the victim.

The State then introduced “real-time crime camera footage recovered from the crime camera at Press and Stephen Girard Avenue” at approximately 8:50 a.m. the day of the shooting and played it for the jury. A review of the footage reveals a black, Ford pickup truck traveling through the intersection with a license plate that reads W841260.

The State also presented video footage from two other locations, which showed a black truck traveling behind a white sedan the morning of the incident near the scene of the crime.¹¹ The videos were played for the jury.

The parties then stipulated that “a black Ford 2004 pickup truck with the license plate W841260, with the VIN number 1FTPW14564FA02847” is owned and registered to Defendant.¹²

The State also entered into a stipulation regarding the videos obtained from Home Depot, showing Defendant in the store between 6:22 a.m. and 6:29 a.m., and subsequently in the parking lot.¹³ The State then introduced the Home Depot footage and played it for the jury.¹⁴

Defendant introduced a receipt from Home Depot showing the items he purchased on March 23, 2022, at 6:29 a.m.

DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record reveals two errors patent. One with regard to the sentences imposed and another as to Defendant's motion to reconsider sentences.

Firstly, a review of the record reveals that the court minutes do not accurately reflect the sentences the trial court imposed. The court minutes indicate that the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years imprisonment on count two (attempted manslaughter), but then provide that the first fifteen years of the thirty-year sentence shall be served without the benefit of parole. However, a review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court imposed a twenty-year sentence of imprisonment, with the first fifteen years to be served without the benefit of parole for count two.

Generally, where a conflict exists between a minute entry and a transcript, the transcript controls. State v. Jackson, 2008-0286, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/29/09), 11 So.3d 524 (citing State v. Hall, 1999-2887, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/4/00), 775 So.2d 52, 63). Thus, the sentence set forth by the trial court in the hearing transcript prevails. However, as discussed herein, because the matter will be remanded due to the failure of the trial court to rule on the motion to reconsider sentencing, no corrective action is required.

The second error patent, which Defendant also raises as his Assignment of Error No. 6, is that the record does not reflect that the trial court ruled on Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. See State v. Pernell, 2013-0180, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/13), 127 So.3d 18, 29, (finding it was an error patent when the trial court failed to rule upon a motion to reconsider).

“This Court has repeatedly held that it is procedurally incorrect to review a defendant's sentence prior to the trial court's ruling on a motion to reconsider sentence.” State v. Jones, 2015-0839, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/15), 184 So.3d 822, 824 (citing State v. Foster, 2002-0256, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/11/02), 828 So.2d 72, 74; State v. Ferrand, 2003-1746 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/14/04), 866 So.2d 322; State v. Allen, 99-2579 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/24/01), 781 So.2d 88). However, “[t]he trial court's failure to rule on the motion to reconsider sentence does not preclude appellate review of the defendant's conviction.” Id. Nevertheless, “[b]ecause the pending motion to reconsider makes appellate review of the sentence premature” this Court must “remand the matter to the trial court for a ruling on the motion to reconsider sentence.”

The record provides that Defendant filed his motion to reconsider on May 16, 2025, the same day that the trial court imposed Defendant's sentences. However, there is no indication that the trial court had ruled on the motion. As such, we remand the case to the trial court for a ruling on Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, reserving Defendant the right to appeal his sentence once the trial court has ruled on his motion.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

Defendant first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. Specifically, Defendant argues that the jury should have rejected Tokeiwa's identification of him as the person who shot both her and the deceased victim because she did not identify him as the perpetrator either in her initial statement to police at the scene or at the hospital following her surgery.

The United Supreme Court provided the standard for review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979):

․the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Emphasis in original).

“Under the Jackson standard, the rational credibility determinations of the trier of fact are not to be second guessed by a reviewing court.” State v. Williams, 2011-0414 p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So.3d 759, 771.

Conflicting statements as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency. State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 1244 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989). Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Id. A trier of fact's determination as to the credibility of a witness is a question of fact entitled to great weight, and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938 (La. 1984).

State v. Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306. “The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. The finder of fact must determine, from facts gleaned from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence, considering the relative strength and weakness of each inference and finding, whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 745, 753; State v. Rose, 2005-0396, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/07), 955 So.2d 270, 272.

It is also well settled that “it is not the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” State v. Richards, 2011-0349, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/11), 78 So.3d 864, 869 (citing State v. Cummings, 668 So.2d 1132 (La. 1996)). “Upon review of the record as a whole, if rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence must be adopted.” State v. Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/19), 272 So.3d 94, 97 (citing State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988)).

In this case, Defendant does not dispute that a manslaughter and an attempted manslaughter occurred, but he asserts that the State failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator of these offenses.

“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court has held that ‘when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the [S]tate is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification.’ ” State v. Butler, 2024-0061, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/24), 407 So.3d 744, 751 (quoting State v. Neal, 2000-0674, p. 11 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 658). Further, “[a] positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id.

Here, Tokeiwa, the surviving victim and eyewitness to the shooting, identified Defendant as the shooter at trial. She testified that she knew Defendant because he was the father of two deceased children that her son, the other victim in this case, had been charged with killing. Tokeiwa testified that she had seen Defendant at all her son's court appearances as well as observing him sitting inside of his black pickup truck outside the courthouse on several occasions. Tokeiwa was thus familiar with Defendant and his vehicle. She also testified that she looked at him when he pulled his truck beside her at the red light and opened fire.

While Defendant correctly notes that Tokeiwa did not identify him as the shooter during her conversation with the officer at the scene after she was shot or at the hospital when she awoke from surgery, her identification of Defendant and his vehicle was corroborated by other evidence introduced at trial.

For example, the State presented surveillance footage of a black truck, which provided a clear image of Defendant's license plate, traveling near the crime scene and near the time of the shooting. Surveillance footage taken from the car wash near the scene also depicted a vehicle resembling Defendant's pickup truck pulling up to the victim's vehicle at the red light and showed the driver repeatedly fire a gun through the window. The spent casings recovered from the crime scene were compatible with a 5.56 mm rifle and detectives located an empty 5.56 mm rifle box inside Defendant's residence. Further, the location of Defendant's cell phone registered in Gentilly near the victims’ residence just prior to being powered off at 8:17 a.m. and did not register again until it was powered on about thirteen minutes after the shooting.

Moreover, the evaluation of Tokeiwa's credibility and the decision to accept her identification of Defendant as the perpetrator is within the sound discretion of the factfinder. Considering the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found that Defendant fired the shots that killed the victim and caused great bodily injury to Tokeiwa. There is thus sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

Defendant next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he committed the crime of obstruction of justice because there was no evidence that he possessed the specific intent to distort a police investigation when he removed the weapon from the crime scene.

La. R.S. 14:130.1 defines obstruction of justice, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section:

(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding.

La. R.S. 14:130.1 further provides that “[t]ampering with evidence shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance ․ at the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any law enforcement investigation.”

In addition to proving that the defendant removed evidence from the crime scene, “the State must also prove that such removal was done with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation.” State v. LaBranch, 2025-0718, p. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/26), ___So.3d ___, 2026 WL 2491172 (citing State v. Scott, 2023-0022, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 54, writ denied¸2023-01317 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707, and writ denied, 2023-01318 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 707).

Specific intent is defined as the “state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the [defendant] actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Whether the defendant possessed specific intent to obstruct justice “need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant.” State v. Bethley, 2022-0849, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1156 (quoting State v. Harvey, 2021-0730, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/25/22), 345 So.3d 1043, 1050). “Nothing beyond ‘movement’ of the evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by the requisite intent and knowledge.” State v. Powell, 2015-0218, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So.3d 721, 728 (citing State v. Jones, 2007-1052, p. 10 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So.2d at 101).

Defendant argues that the jury's finding that he possessed the requisite specific intent to distort the investigation by fleeing the crime scene with the murder weapon is contradicted by his failure to remove and/or destroy the shell casings ejected from his rifle; the surveillance footage that captured the offense; and the witnesses to the shooting.

Notably, this Court in Scott, 2023-0022, pp. 16-17, 372 So.3d at 55, held that even if the State had proved that the defendant fled the scene with the murder weapon, any inference that the defendant possessed specific intent to distort the investigation based on that evidence alone was “contradicted by the fact that he left behind shell casings․video surveillance․and witnesses.”

Subsequent to Scott, however, “this Court re-examined the issue in State v. Alexander, 2023-0540, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/24), 401 So.3d 105, 115-16.” State v. White, 2024-0385, p. 24 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), --- So. 3d ---, ---, 2025 WL 1415587, at *13. In Alexander, in affirming an obstruction of justice conviction, this Court distinguished Scott, noting that the defendant engaged in other acts to impede or distort the investigation. Alexander, 2023-0540, p. 17, 401 So. 3d at 115 (“Scott notwithstanding, the [S]tate presented additional evidence of obstruction”). The Fourth Circuit found that in addition to removing a murder weapon from the scene of the crime, the prosecution showed that the defendant deleted the record of a single phone call, which would have revealed that he called a taxicab “requesting to be transported to the area [of the crime scene shortly before] the murder occurred.” Id. As such, the Court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction for obstruction of justice.

Here, in addition to removing the gun from the scene, there was evidence that Defendant lied about his whereabouts to authorities around the time of the shooting. Defendant told police in his interview that he drove straight from the Home Depot on the Westbank to LaPlace at 8:00 a.m., then drove back to the Westbank to pick up his co-worker between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. However, the jury heard testimony from Mr. Dionne that Defendant's cell phone was leaving the Westbank and heading toward the Gentilly area between 8:00 a.m. and 8:17 a.m., when it stopped registering location data completely (likely due to being powered off), contradicting Defendant's purported alibi. Further, there was Defendant's truck rapidly approaching the red light (during the time the phone was not registering data), stopping next to the victims’ vehicle, firing multiple rounds, and then speeding away.

We find that a rational juror could have found that Defendant intended to distort the investigation by the removal of the firearm and by making false statements to the police. See State v. Bethley, 22-0849, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1156 (finding that “a rational trier of fact could find that [the] defendant fled the scene of the crime with the firearm and obstructed justice by tampering with the evidence” when the firearm was never located or recovered by the police and when the defendant was questioned about the whereabouts of the firearm at trial, and he responded evasively to the question, never providing a direct answer); State v. Duckett, 2019-0319, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/18/19), 288 So. 3d 167, 175-76 (in addressing an alleged error in admitting the mother of the victim's testimony at trial, the appellate court noted there was “ample evidence” to support a conviction for obstruction of justice where the defendant disposed of cellphone that could connect him to a shooting and there was evidence showing the defendant attempted to obstruct a police investigation by lying and attempting to assign blame to someone else). As such, there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant's obstruction of justice conviction. This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts in violation of La. C.E. 404(B). Specifically, Defendant argues that evidence that he “followed [the victim] Hollis Carter home from his court appearances” should have been excluded as the State failed to prove that Defendant actually committed the alleged bad acts.

A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Taylor, 2016-1124, p. 18 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 296 (citations omitted); State v. Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 309, 316; State v. Copelin, 2016-0264, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 990, 1002.

La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1)(a) provides, in part:

B. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts; creative or artistic expression. (1)(a) Except as provided in Article 412 or as otherwise provided by law, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.

At the outset, it should be noted that the State's notice was premised on the anticipated testimony from both Ms. Newman and Tokeiwa that Defendant had followed the victim from the courthouse to his residence. The State also indicated that it did not classify Defendant's actions as “crimes” or “bad acts” necessarily but nevertheless filed the notice “out of an abundance of caution.”

Defendant's objection to the State's notice was based on his assertion that his actions “should not be considered” a “bad act in itself.” The defense argued, “[t]he idea that [Defendant] would be going to court when they were going to court is just information that may be presented, but I don't think it should be considered as a 404 action because there's no prior bad act.”

The trial court appeared to have agreed with both the State and Defendant. The trial court stated: “[t]he Court tends to agree with the defense, that these are not, you know, your classic prior bad acts.” It then noted that the State filed the notice “in an abundance of caution because they do seek to get that testimony during trial,” and ultimately ruled that the evidence need not be excluded. Thus, while the trial court's ruling appears averse to Defendant, it also appears that the trial court agreed with Defendant that the act of following the victim home did not qualify as prior bad acts, crimes, or wrongs, as that contemplated by La. C.E. 404(B).

Defendant nevertheless argues on appeal that the trial court erred in declining to exclude the evidence because (1) the State's notice was untimely; (2) the State failed to prove that Defendant actually committed the acts; (3) the State failed to provide a specific evidentiary basis for the introduction of the evidence; and (4) the trial court failed to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the evidence was more probative than prejudicial.

However, Defendant did not raise these arguments before the trial court in support of his objection to the State's notice and thus we do not consider these arguments for the first time on appeal. See State v. Revish, 2019-01732, pp. 6-7 (La. 10/20/20), 340 So.3d 864, 868-69 (“[t]he general rule is that appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”).

Moreover, Defendant concedes in his appellant brief that neither Ms. Newman nor Tokeiwa (nor any other trial witness) provided trial testimony specifically revealing that Defendant had followed the victim home from the courthouse prior to the murder.¹⁵ Accordingly, the jury never actually heard any evidence of the alleged prior bad acts. As such, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce hearsay testimony during trial. Specifically, the Defendant claims the trial court allowed Det. Guirreri to testify as to the statements Det. Kimbrough made while canvassing for surveillance footage over his hearsay objection.

The transcript provides:

[Counsel for the State] Q. And what was the other occasion or occasions in which you canvassed the neighborhood, looking for surveillance footage which might assist on this investigation? [Det. Guirreri] A. Yes, sir. So outside of that canvass that day in the neighborhood, Detective Kimbrough informed our unit or squad that

[Defense Counsel] MR. KENNEDY: Objection. Hearsay.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: -- that she needed help with canvassing the neighborhood where the suspect she had developed lived in. And we relocated to that area and canvassed that area for video.

La. C.E. art. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

Moreover, “[h]earsay rules do not prohibit testimony elicited to explain a police officer's course of investigation. State v. Caston, 2023-0539, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/24/25), 414 So.3d 705, 714, writ denied, 2025-00384 (La. 5/29/25), 410 So.3d 148, and cert. denied, 146 S.Ct. 1483, 223 L.Ed.2d 527 (2026) (citing State v. Edwards, 2021-0494, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/22), 336 So.3d 479, 490). “Testimony of a police officer may encompass information provided by another individual without constituting hearsay, if it is offered to explain the course of the police investigation and the steps leading to the [d]efendant's arrest.” Id. (quoting Edwards, 2021-0494, p. 18, 336 So.3d at 490).

Here, Det. Guirreri's testimony that Det. Kimbrough told his police unit she needed assistance canvassing the neighborhood does not constitute inadmissible hearsay, as it was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, the fact that Det. Kimbrough needed help canvassing the neighborhood was introduced to explain the course of the police investigation, as Det. Guirreri testified that his assignment was to canvas the neighborhood.

Further, in any event, the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Edwards, 2021-0494, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/22), 336 So.3d 479, 490 (citing State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1332 (La. 1990)). “[H]armless error exists when the guilty verdict actually rendered was ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” State v. Thomassie, 2016-0370, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/16), 206 So.3d 311, 317-18 (quoting State v. Higginbotham, 11-0564, p. 3 (La. 5/6/11), 60 So.3d 621, 623)).

Det. Guirreri's testimony that Det. Kimbrough told him she needed help canvassing the neighborhood played no role in establishing Defendant's guilt. As such, the verdicts in this case were surely unattributable to the objected-to testimony. This assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in declining the jury's request to review Defendant's recorded police interview during deliberations pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 793 because he “waived the protection of Article 793 by consenting to the playback of his statement.”

La. C.Cr.P art. 793 provides, in part:

A. Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Article, a juror must rely upon his memory in reaching a verdict. He shall not be permitted to refer to notes or to have access to any written evidence. Testimony shall not be repeated to the jury. Upon the request of a juror and in the discretion of the court, the jury may take with it or have sent to it any object or document received in evidence when a physical examination thereof is required to enable the jury to arrive at a verdict.

B. A juror shall be permitted to take notes when agreement to granting such permission has been made between the defendant and the state in open court but not within the presence of the jury. The court shall provide the needed writing implements. Jurors may, but need not, take notes and such notes may be used during the jury's deliberations but shall not be preserved for review on appeal. The trial judge shall ensure the confidentiality of the notes during the course of trial and the jury's deliberation and shall cause the notes to be destroyed immediately upon return of the verdict.

A review of the record shows that the jury initially requested to review “certain parts” of Defendant's recorded police interview, “specifically his recollection of the day.” While the State had no objection, Defendant stated, “I'm going to ask that it's played in full. Unfortunately, it's a long one, but they asked to hear it and his statement is all about his whereabouts.” The trial court responded that the jury had a “right to say, ‘We've heard enough,’ ” and Defendant agreed. The trial court initially stated that it would permit the jury to review Defendant's recorded police interview to the extent needed. However, after playing the interview for less than one minute, the trial court interrupted the video and held a bench conference that was not transcribed. The trial court then stated on the record:

[A]t this time, the court is not going to be playing the testimony or the audio-taped statement in this case. You're going to have to rely on your memories of what you saw and heard when this was played initially. This is not a visual document; it's something that's tantamount to testimony. The court's not going to grant the request to hear this audio-taped statement. You will have to rely on your memories of that.

Once the jury resumed deliberations, Defendant stated, “Your Honor, if we could also put on the record the question from the jury about reading the statement and -- did you say that on the record? I think you did.” The trial court responded:

I kind of did, but we can perfect it. I did—prior to the jury coming down, the state and defense both agreed to play the statement, only the defense saying they wanted it played in its entirety, which I agreed with. However, upon the start of the tape, the court feels that replaying state's exhibit thirty-three -- that is the defendant's interview -- is tantamount to repeating testimony in some ways for the jury, whether the jury could draw any inculpatory statements out of that statement, it would, this court feels, be contrary to a fairness doctrine for the defense to allow the entire statement to be played again for the jury, as they must rely on their memories. It's, in the court's opinion, different than watching a photograph or a film that could be allowed into the jury room. So, the court stopped the playing of the statement.

The State argues in its appellee brief that Defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review because he did not lodge an express objection on the record.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) provides:

An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence. A bill of exceptions to rulings or orders is unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor.

A contemporaneous objection is required for two purposes: (1) to put the trial court on notice of the alleged irregularity or error, so that the trial judge can cure the error, and (2) to prevent a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by objection. See State v. Lanclos, 2007-0082, p. 6 (La. 4/8/08), 980 So.2d 643, 648; State v. Le, 2017-0164, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/18), 243 So.3d 637, 656.

Here, although the discussion that occurred during the bench conference is unknown, the record suggests that both parties made “known to the court the action which [they desired] the court to take, or of [their] objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor” pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A). Thus, while Defendant did not expressly object on the record, arguably, the issue was sufficiently preserved for appellate review.

Nevertheless, Defendant is not entitled to substantive relief. In this case, the trial court relied on La. C.Cr.P. art. 793(A), cited above, as the basis for her decision not to replay Defendant's recorded police interview for the jury during deliberations. Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 793(A), “a juror must rely upon his memory in reaching a verdict” and “[t]estimony shall not be repeated to the jury.” However, upon a juror's request and at the court's discretion, the jury may take or receive any object or document admitted into evidence if physically examining it is necessary to reach a verdict. Id.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “[s]ubject to the explicit restrictions imposed by [La. C.Cr.P. art 793], and by our jurisprudential rule precluding the use of a defendant's confession in any form in the course of jury deliberations, a trial court has sound discretion in permitting the jury's review of properly-admitted evidentiary exhibits during its deliberations, including audiotapes and videotapes.” State v. Brooks, 2001-0785, p. 4, (La. 1/14/03), 838 So.2d 725, 728. It has also held that “it is permissible for the jury to view videotapes properly admitted into evidence [that depict] crimes as they happen [as they] are neither testimony nor written evidence.” State v. Baham, 2013-0058, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/14), 151 So.3d 698, 704-05 (citing Brooks¸2001-0785, pp. 3-5, 838 So.2d at 727-29).

While not binding on this Court, the Fifth Circuit in State v. Hart, 467 So.2d 1366, 1367 (La. Ct. App. 1985), addressed the trial court's denial of the jury's request to replay a portion of several taped statements the defendant made to police. After deliberations began, the jury asked to replay the tapes because some jurors had not been able to hear the statements made therein. The trial court declined the request. On appeal, the defendant claimed he was entitled to a new trial because “some of the jurors did not actually hear several taped statements played during the trial.” Hart, 467 So. 2d at 1366.¹⁶ The Hart Court indicated the jury's request ran “afoul” to La. C.Cr.P. art. 793, emphasizing that “[t]estimony shall not be repeated to the jury.” Id. at 1367. The Fifth Circuit then indicated that the trial court's refusal to replay the statements was proper. Id. The Hart Court stated: “When the tapes were played in the instant case, none of the jurors complained about not being able to hear what was being said. Had the trial judge permitted the tapes to be replayed once the jury's deliberations started, he would have fallen into error.” Id. at 1367.

More recently, in State v. Henderson, 2025-0097, pp. 20-22, La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/25), --- So.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 3763924, at *10-12, the jury requested to view several exhibits during deliberations, including video footage of the defendant's statement to an investigator wherein he admitted that he had attacked one of the victims and had taken her credit card. The defense objected on the grounds that the statement “would allow the jury to give undue weight to that limited portion of the testimony.” Id., p. 20, 2025 WL 3763924 at *10. The trial court “ultimately concluded that the videotaped evidence did not constitute a confession” and allowed the jury to view the exhibit in the courtroom. This Court found that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view the videotaped statements to the investigator as the nature of defendant's statements “qualifie[d] as a confession,” and therefore violated La. C.Cr.P. art. 793. Id., p. 23, 2025 WL 3763924 at *12. The Court, however, ultimately found the error harmless. Id.

In this case, similar to Hart, the trial court denied the jury's request to view Defendant's statement to police on the grounds that it was tantamount to testimony and could not therefore be repeated to the jury pursuant to La. Cr.C.P. art. 793(A). While Defendant did not necessarily confess any involvement in the shooting to the police, as in Henderson, his statements arguably inculpated him at trial when the State introduced contradictory evidence.  ¹⁷

Nevertheless, any error on the part of the trial court in this regard is harmless.¹⁸ See State v. Johnson, 1997-1519, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/99), 726 So.2d 1126, 1134 (addressing the prohibition under La. C.Cr.P. art. 793 and finding that a trial court's violation of La. C.Cr.P. art. 793 is subject to a harmless error analysis). Given the evidence before the jury, we find that Defendant's convictions were surely unattributable to this purported error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to rule on his timely filed motion to reconsider sentence. The State agrees but claims such error is harmless.

We addressed this issue in the error patent section of the opinion, and as stated above, we remand the matter to the trial court to rule on Defendant's motion to reconsider.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7

As his final assignment of error, Defendant claims his sentences are constitutionally excessive. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to give due weight to the mitigating factors in imposing Defendant's sentences and “focused primarily on the aggravating factors” listed in the sentencing guidelines.

However, the trial court's failure to rule on Defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence renders review of Defendant's sentences premature. See State v. Augustine, 2013-0164, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/13), 131 So.3d 109, 116 (the failure of a trial court to rule on a motion to reconsider sentence requires that the case be remanded for a ruling and that appellate review of a defendant's sentence be deferred); see also State v. Boyd, 2000-0274, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/19/00), 775 So. 2d 463, 465 (holding it was “not procedurally correct to review a defendant's sentence for excessiveness” when the trial court has not ruled on the motion to reconsider sentence). Thus, as discussed above, the case is remanded so that the trial court may rule on Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, reserving to Defendant the right to appeal his sentence (and the excessiveness thereof) thereafter.

DECREE

For the above stated reasons, we affirm the convictions and remand the matter to the trial court for a ruling on his motion to reconsider sentence, reserving Defendant the right to appeal his sentences thereafter.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dr. Sullivan did not identify a single fatal gunshot wound, stating instead that “all of the gunshot wounds together are what caused the [victim's] death.”

2.   Mr. Lewis described an occlusive dressing as a “Vaseline-type gauze that is applied for sucking chest wounds [which] seals the chest cavity.”

3.   The video displays a timestamp of 7:49 a.m., however, that timestamp appears to be erroneous, as both parties indicate in their briefs that the shooting occurred at approximately 8:50 a.m.

4.   Among the boxes of ammunition were a box of Armscorp .380 caliber bullets; a box of Magtech .380 caliber bullets; three boxes of PPU .380 bullets; and a box of Remington .45 caliber bullets.

5.   Specifically, Defendant stated that he had woken up at about 4:30 a.m. then left his house to obtain building materials at Home Depot around 6:30 am. Thereafter, he stated that he drove to his job in LaPlace and arrived shortly after 8:00 a.m., then left sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. to pick up his coworker. They then drove to another construction job in New Orleans East, then returned to the job in LaPlace until around 4:30 p.m.

6.   Det. Guirreri stated at trial that Defendant lived in Timber Oaks, however, Defendant's brief indicates that Defendant lived in Tall Timbers.

7.   The State introduced the residential surveillance footage into evidence and played it for the jury. However, this exhibit is not contained in the appellate record.

8.   On redirect, she also said that she had spoken to Defendant at one of the court appearances.

9.   A review of the recorded interview reveals that Ms. Newman provided Det. Kimbrough the same information to which she testified at trial, except that she identified two men (rather than just Defendant), who had followed her and the victim on three occasions after the victim's court hearings. She identified Defendant, specifically, and described a “short guy” who she thought was “one of the brothers.” Ms. Newman also stated that she observed Defendant sitting in his black pickup truck on multiple occasions by the courthouse.

10.   Because Tokeiwa Newman's sister Tomeka Newman is referenced herein as Ms. Newman, Tokeiwa, the surviving victim, will be referred to by her first name for clarity.

11.   Specifically, the State offered footage from a “New Orleans school zone camera [ ] located at Press Street and Mirabeau Street” recorded between 8:44 a.m. and 8:54 a.m. A review of the footage reveals a white sedan traveling in the left lane while a black pickup truck traveled in the right lane slightly behind the sedan. Additionally, the State presented “surveillance footage recovered from Pontilly Coffee, located at 4000 Chef Menteur Highway, from March 23, 2022” at about 7:50 a.m. A review of the exhibit reveals a white sedan driving down the street followed several seconds later by a black pickup truck.

12.   Counsel for the State said:[I]f the custodian of record from the Office of Motor Vehicle were to testify, they would certify that the registration documents in State's exhibit 49 are true and accurate records maintained in their office; that document registration and ownership of a Ford—a black Ford 2004 pickup truck with the license plate W841260, with the VIN number 1FTPW14564FA02847; that that vehicle was owned and registered to [Defendant], 5306 Forest Park Lane, New Orleans, Louisiana.The registration documents, however, are not contained in the record.

13.   The stipulation provided:On Tuesday, April 12, 2022, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Detective Kimbrough obtained a search warrant for video from the Home Depot located at 62 Westbank Expressway, Gretna, Louisiana, 7053. The warrant was reviewed by Detective Sergeant Melanie Dillon and signed by Commissioner Albert Thibodeaux. A copy of the warrant has been made a part of this homicide case file.On Wednesday, April 13, 2022, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Detective Brittany Kimbrough relocated to the Home Depot [in Gretna] to obtain video around the time of Wednesday March 23, 2022, when [Defendant] stated he was in the store. Detective Kimbrough obtained the video, which revealed the following:On Wednesday, March 23, 2022, at approximately 6:22 a.m., [Defendant] enters the store. [He] walks around for several minutes, shopping. At approximately 6:29 [a.m., Defendant] checks out at the register and exits the store. [Defendant] can be seen getting into a dark-colored sedan in the parking lot. Due to the outside camera quality and the quality of light and make, model or plate cannot be seen.

14.   A review of the footage corroborates the State's description provided in the stipulation, apart from the footage depicting the exterior parking lot of the Home Depot, which could not be viewed. The State also introduced the search warrant affidavit for the Home Depot surveillance footage and the return for the search warrant.

15.   As outlined in the summary of the trial testimony, there was some testimony that Defendant (and possibly another individual) had followed the victim and Tokeiwa near the courthouse but none specifically stating that Defendant had followed them to their residence.

16.   The record reveals that the defendant “did not present a defense, relying instead on assertions of self-defense contained in the tapes.” Hart, 467 So. 2d at 1367.

17.   In Defendant's statement to police, as noted above, although Defendant denied he was present at the scene of the shooting, and maintained that he was driving his vehicle alone at the time of the shooting; that nobody else possessed his vehicle that day; and provided a timeline of his whereabouts; these statements were contradicted by his cell phone location data and video footage capturing his license plate.

18.   Although Defendant claims that his consent to playing his statement for the jury operates as a waiver of La. Cr.C.P. art. 793, Defendant cites to no authority holding that such a waiver would require the trial court to play the video footage for the jury during deliberations.

Judge Karen K. Herman