STATE v. DORSEY (2026)

Relator—the State of Louisiana (the “State”)—seeks review of the district court's September 16, 2026 ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress statements. After considering the writ and the applicable law, we grant the State's writ; reverse in part the district court's September 16, 2026 ruling;¹ and remand.

Procedural background

On February 19, 2026, the State filed a bill of information charging Rachelle Dorsey (“Ms. Dorsey”), with obstruction of justice, in violation of La. R.S.14:130.1, and illegal use of a weapon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:94(F). Thereafter, Ms. Dorsey filed a motion to suppress statements. Following two motion hearings, the district court issued its September 16, 2026 ruling, finding no probable cause and granting the motion to suppress statements.

In its ruling, the district court, as requested by Ms. Dorsey, suppressed two statements that Ms. Dorsey made to New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) officers—her statement to Sergeant Charles Love (“Sgt. Love”) at the scene where Ms. Dorsey had been shot, and her statement to Detective Colleen Formanek (“Det. Formanek”) at the hospital. Because the State challenges the suppression of only the statement to Sgt. Love, we limit our analysis to that statement.

Factual background 2

On June 10, 2025,³ Sgt. Love, who had twenty-one years of NOPD experience, participated in an aggravated battery by shooting investigation. He was the supervisor at the scene—the apartment complex where the shooting occurred. During the on-scene investigation, he spoke with several people, including Ms. Dorsey. At that stage of the investigation, Sgt. Love testified that “Ms. Dorsey was the victim. She [had been] shot.”

When Sgt. Love arrived in the parking lot of the apartment complex, a person at the scene told him that the two people involved were “shooting at each other.” At that time, Ms. Dorsey was not in the vicinity. Thereafter, Sgt. Love and fire department personnel proceeded up the stairs to Ms. Dorsey's apartment. When Sgt. Love first came into contact with Ms. Dorsey, she was exiting her apartment. She was not in handcuffs. She was suffering from a gunshot wound to her shoulder. A bench was placed at the threshold of Ms. Dorsey's apartment door for her to sit on while she waited for Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”) personnel.

Sgt. Love's first question to Ms. Dorsey was whether the perpetrator was her boyfriend and whether he lived in the apartment. Ms. Dorsey's reply was lengthy and unresponsive. Ms. Dorsey said that the person who shot her said—“give me your phone, give me your phone”—and she said—“no, no”—she told him “why [do] you keep f_ _ king with me, I just did a report on you.” Continuing, Ms. Dorsey said that she went downstairs, asking people to come up to witness what was happening, but they did not want to come. Thereafter, she said that the shooter “started aiming a gun at me and I ran.” At that point in the questioning, a female wearing an EMS shirt interrupted Ms. Dorsey and told her hello.

After the interruption, Sgt. Love asked Ms. Dorsey whether “[the man who shot her] ha[d] a key”; Ms. Dorsey replied, “no.” Sgt. Love next asked Ms. Dorsey if she knew where the man lived; she again replied, “no.” Medical personnel then led Ms. Dorsey down the stairs away from her apartment. She still was not in handcuffs; no police officers escorted her down the stairs. Once Ms. Dorsey was placed on a gurney and rolled away by medical personnel, she ceased to make any further statements. The body-cam video shows that Ms. Dorsey was not placed in handcuffs; her hands were folded on her stomach. On cross-examination, Sgt. Love confirmed that he did not Mirandize Ms. Love, explaining: “We don't normally Mirandize victims.”⁴

Standard of review and governing law

A district court's ruling on a motion to suppress “ ‘presents a mixed question of law and fact.’ ” State v. Hill, 25-0316, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 418 So.3d 1119, 1127 (quoting State v. Debose, 24-0217, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/24), 390 So.3d 971, 977). Accordingly, an appellate court reviews “the underlying facts for an abuse of discretion ‘but reviews conclusions to be drawn from those facts de novo.’ ” Hill, 25-0316, p. 11, 418 So.3d at 1127 (quoting Debose, 24-0217, p. 7, 390 So.3d at 977). But, when the facts are undisputed, “the appellate court need only ‘consider whether the trial court came to the proper legal determination under the undisputed facts.’ ” Id. (citing Debose, supra). Given the facts here are undisputed, we apply a de novo standard of review in this matter.

By statute, “[t]he State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant when the legality of a statement is placed at issue by a motion to suppress evidence.” State v. Noehl, 24-01224, p. 6 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 360, 364 (citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D)).

Discussion

In its writ application, the State argues that the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress Ms. Dorsey's statement to Sgt. Love. The State contends that Ms. Dorsey was not in custody the entire time that Sgt. Love questioned her and, thus, Miranda warnings were not required. In support of its position, the State cites the jurisprudence recognizing that “Miranda warnings are not required when officers conduct preliminary, non-custodial, on-the-scene questioning to determine whether a crime has been committed, unless the accused is subjected to arrest or a significant restraint short of formal arrest.” State v. Shirley, 08-2106, p. 8 (La. 5/5/09), 10 So.3d 224, 229.

Ms. Dorsey counters that a reasonable person in her position would not believe he or she was free to leave and, thus, she was in custody. She points out that from the officers’ arrival on the scene until she was moved to the ambulance, several officers followed her around. She also points out that even after being interrupted by EMS, Sgt. Love continued asking her questions unrelated to her injury or where the perpetrator who shot her could be located. Moreover, she emphasizes that Sgt. Love questioned her after he was told she also had shot a gun.

“Miranda only applies if three conditions are met: (1) the defendant is in ‘custody’ or significantly deprived of freedom, (2) there is an ‘interrogation,’ and (3) the interrogation is conducted by a ‘law enforcement officer’ or someone acting as their agent.” State v. Bernard, 09-1178, p. 5 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1025, 1029. Here, the narrow issue is whether the first condition was met—whether Ms. Dorsey was in custody or significantly deprived of freedom. The standard applied in making that determination, as Ms. Dorsey correctly contends, is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe he or she was free to leave. Summarizing this standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Noehl observed:

[W]hether a person has been deprived of his or her “freedom of action in any significant way” (per Miranda) or “detained” (per La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13) is to be determined by the objective circumstances of the interaction between law enforcement and the accused. The only relevant inquiry is “how a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.” Berkeme [v. McCarty], 468 U.S. [420], 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138 [, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)]. Moreover, the “subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned” have no place in a court's determination as to whether the suspect should have received Miranda warnings. Stansbury [v. California], 511 U.S. [318], 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526[, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)].

24-01224, p. 12, 413 So.3d at 368.⁵

As this Court recently observed, in making the custody determination, “courts review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including any circumstance that would have affected how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave, but ignoring the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” State v. Atkins, 25-0186, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/25), 414 So.3d 1154, 1160 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court in Atkins outlined the following five relevant factors to be considered in making the totality-of the-circumstances determination of whether a person is in custody so as to trigger Miranda:

(1) the location of the questioning;

(2) its duration;

(3) statements made during the interview;

(4) the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning; and

(5) the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.

Id. (reformatted and citation omitted).

Applying those factors, we conclude, as the State contends, that the totality of the circumstances establishes that Ms. Dorsey was not in custody when Sgt. Love questioned her. First, the questioning took place on site; Ms. Dorsey was sitting on a bench outside the threshold of her apartment when Sgt. Love interviewed her. Second, the duration of the interview was brief, lasting less than five minutes. Third, in her statements, Ms. Dorsey neither implicated herself in the shooting, nor was asked about any role she may have played in the incident. Sgt. Love's questioning was focused on acquiring information concerning the location of the individual who shot Ms. Dorsey. Fourth, at no point during the questioning was Ms. Dorsey placed in restraints. Finally, Ms. Dorsey was transported away from where the questioning took place by medical personnel, who escorted her down the stairs, away from her apartment. No restraints were placed on Ms. Dorsey when she was placed on a gurney for transport to the hospital.

Moreover, Sgt. Love's body-cam video depicts that Ms. Dorsey was not in the vicinity when Sgt. Love was told that Ms. Dorsey may have been a participant in the shooting. Nor was Ms. Dorsey present when Sgt. Love conveyed this information to other officers. Any subjective belief that Sgt. Love may have harbored when he questioned Ms. Dorsey regarding her culpability was not conveyed to her and is not a relevant factor to be considered in the custody determination. Noehl, supra.

Summarizing, the circumstances surrounding Sgt. Love's interview do not support Ms. Dorsey's contention that she was in custody when Sgt. Love questioned her. Because she was not in “custody,” Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress Ms. Dorsey's statement to Sgt. Love.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the State's writ application; reverse the district court's September 16, 2026 ruling to the extent it granted Ms. Dorsey's motion to suppress her statement to Sgt. Love; and remand.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We reverse in part because the State in its writ application challenges the suppression of only one of the two statements that the district court suppressed.

3.   At one point in Sgt. Love's testimony, the date of the incident is referred to as June 12. But Sgt. Love's body cam video is dated June 10. Likewise, Det. Formanek refers in her testimony at the motions hearing to the date of the incident as June 10. We, thus, use June 10.

4.   See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that a person questioned by the police after being “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” must first “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed”).

5.   In Noehl, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether parents of an infant being treated for life-threatening injuries were in custody when questioned by police at the hospital. The Court concluded that “[t]hese circumstances do not rise to the level of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere’ that could result in making self-incriminating statements, which would trigger Miranda warnings, nor do they rise to the level of detainment contemplated in Louisiana Constitution Article 1, Section 13.” Noehl, 24-01224, p. 13, 413 So.3d at 369.

Judge Rosemary Ledet