BARRETT v. AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY (2026)

In this action for the recovery of damages sustained in a rear-end collision, Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's judgments that sustained a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription in favor of Defendants, which dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims, and that denied Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial. At issue on appeal is which date constituted acknowledgement sufficient to interrupt prescription—the date an insurer mailed a check representing an unconditional payment to a third-party property damage claimant versus the date the third-party claimant received the check. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The accident at issue occurred on March 1, 2023, when the 2019 Kia Forte owned and operated by Jennieve Barrett, with Natalya Barrett as a guest passenger, was rear ended by a 2006 Toyota 4Runner owned and operated by Christina L. Fisher.¹ American National Property and Casualty Company (“American National”) insured Ms. Fisher's vehicle on the date of the accident.²

Ms. Fisher and American National (“Defendants”) did not contest liability for the rear-end collision. American National prepared an estimate of $2,717.59 for the repair cost of Ms. Barrett's vehicle.

On March 3, 2023, American National issued and mailed a check for $2,717.59 to Ms. Barrett. On March 8, 2023, Ms. Barrett received and deposited the check into her bank account.

Thereafter, Ms. Barrett, individually and on behalf of Natalya Barrett (“Plaintiffs”), filed suit against Defendants. Plaintiffs alleged the rear-end collision caused them personal injuries, property damage, and other losses.

On March 5, 2024, Plaintiffs fax-filed ³ their petition for damages. Plaintiffs paid the fax-filing fee on March 8, 2024, and delivered an original copy of the petition to the St. Tammany Parish Clerk of Court's Office.

Thereafter, Defendants filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription.⁴ Defendants argued that Plaintiffs claimed injuries and damages resulting from the rear-end collision that occurred on March 1, 2023. Defendants contended that Plaintiffs had one year to file suit, on or before Friday, March 1, 2024; however, Plaintiffs did not file suit until Tuesday, March 5, 2024. Therefore, Defendants averred that Plaintiffs’ petition for damages was prescribed on its face and that Plaintiffs had the burden to show that their claims were not prescribed.

Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ exception of prescription. Plaintiffs contended that an unconditional payment of a property damage claim constitutes an acknowledgement sufficient to interrupt prescription. Plaintiffs contended that an unconditional payment occurred on March 8, 2023, when Ms. Barrett received and deposited the check for $2,717.59 into her account. Plaintiffs therefore argued they had one year to file suit against Defendants—on or before March 8, 2024. Plaintiffs contended that their claims were not prescribed because they filed suit on March 5, 2024.

In reply, Defendants agreed that an unconditional payment of a property damage claim constitutes an acknowledgement sufficient to interrupt prescription. Defendants argued, however, that the unconditional payment in this case occurred on March 3, 2023, the date American National issued and mailed the check for $2,717.59 to Ms. Barrett. Defendants therefore contended that Plaintiffs had one year from March 3, 2023 to file suit—on or before March 4, 2024.⁵ Because Plaintiffs filed suit on March 5, 2024, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs’ claims were prescribed.

Following a hearing, the trial court sustained Defendants’ exception of prescription. The trial court signed a judgment on July 8, 2024, in accordance with its oral ruling. Thereafter, Plaintiffs timely filed a motion for new trial, which Defendants opposed. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial and signed a judgment in accordance therewith on October 30, 2024.

Plaintiffs now appeal the July 8, 2024 judgment sustaining Defendants’ exception of prescription, as well as the October 30, 2024 judgment denying Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.⁶

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Exception of Prescription

The standard of review of a judgment pertaining to an exception of prescription turns on whether evidence is introduced at the hearing of the exception. Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, L.L.C., 2021-00061 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 368, 373. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 931 expressly allows “evidence [to] be introduced to support or controvert [a peremptory exception] pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.” If no evidence is submitted at the hearing, the exception must be decided upon the facts alleged in the petition with all of the allegations accepted as true. In that case, the reviewing court is simply assessing whether the trial court was legally correct in its finding. Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 373.

When evidence is introduced at the hearing, a court need not accept the allegations of the petition as true, and the lower court decisions are to be reviewed under a manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 373. A caveat to this rule is that, even when evidence is introduced, when there is no dispute regarding material facts, the reviewing court is to apply a de novo standard of review and give no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Mitchell, 333 So.3d at 373. In the instant matter, the parties introduced evidence at the hearing. However, the parties do not disagree on the underlying facts of the instant case; therefore, the de novo standard applies.

Furthermore, the issue of acknowledgment is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Demma v. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, 2008-2810 (La. 6/26/09), 15 So.3d 95, 100 n.4 (citing Dufrene v. Morgan Equipment Rental, Inc., 98-1582 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1000, 1005). However, where there is no dispute as to the dispositive facts the issue can be decided as a matter of law and the review is de novo. Demma, 15 So.3d at 100 n.4 (citing Kevin Associates, L.L.C. v. Crawford, 2003-0211 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 34, 43).

Motion for New Trial

The denial of a motion for new trial is an interlocutory and non-appealable judgment. Jackson v. Wise, 2017-1062 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/13/18), 249 So.3d 845, 849, writ denied, 2018-0785 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So.3d 914. However, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory rulings prejudicial to him, such as the denial of a motion for new trial, in addition to the review of the final judgment. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Dean Flores Real Estate, LLC, 2020-1087 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/12/21), 326 So.3d 292, 296. In addition to appealing the trial court's July 8, 2024 judgment sustaining the exception of prescription, Ms. Barrett also appealed the October 30, 2024 judgment denying her motion for new trial.

The standard of review of a denial of a motion for new trial, whether on peremptory or discretionary grounds, is that of abuse of discretion. A new trial shall be granted when the judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence. La. C.C.P. art. 1972; Dean Flores, 326 So.3d at 296.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in sustaining Defendants’ exception of prescription. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that an interruption of prescription occurred on March 3, 2023, the date American National mailed the property damage check to Ms. Barrett.

Prescription begins to run from the date of the loss. See La. C.C. art. 3454. Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, which was in effect at the time the accident at issue occurred, provides that the prescriptive period for personal injury actions is one year from the day the injury or damage is sustained.⁷ The parties do not dispute that a one-year liberative prescription applies to Plaintiffs’ claims.

The exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the peremptory exception; however, if the action is prescribed on its face, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the action has not prescribed. Bailey v. Loewe, 2019-0915 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/3/20), 310 So.3d 746, 748. In the case sub judice, the accident occurred on March 1, 2023. Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants on March 5, 2024. On its face, Plaintiffs’ claims were filed more than one year after the date of the accident. Thus, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs to show that the action was not prescribed.

The jurisprudence recognizes three theories upon which a plaintiff may rely to establish that prescription has not run: suspension, interruption, and renunciation. Demma, 15 So.3d at 98 (citing Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624, 628 (La. 1992)). Prescription that has commenced to accrue, but that has not yet run, may be interrupted “when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe.” La. C.C. art. 3464; Demma, 15 So.3d at 98. If prescription is interrupted by acknowledgment, the time that has run is not counted, and prescription commences to run anew from the last day of interruption. La. C.C. art. 3466; Demma, 15 So.3d at 98.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892 establishes a number of specific duties owed by an insurer to its insured, to third-party claimants (such as Plaintiffs), or both, and provides penalties for an insurer's breach of those duties. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892 explicitly applies to third-party claims, but requires only a written offer to settle.⁸ An insurer may, but has no duty to, make an unconditional payment to a third party under the statute. Mallett v. McNeal, 2005-2289 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1254, 1263. When satisfactory proof of loss has been made and the insured or third party has made a showing that the insurer will be liable for some general damages, the insurer tenders the reasonable amount that is due unconditionally, not in settlement of the case, but to show good faith and the insurer's compliance with its contractual duties. Combetta v. Ordoyne, 2004-2347 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/06), 934 So.2d 836, 843, writ denied, 2006-1353 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 389.

An acknowledgment is a simple admission of liability resulting in the interruption of prescription that has commenced to run, but not accrued. La. C.C. art. 3464; Demma, 15 So.3d at 98 (citing Lima, 595 So.2d at 634). An unconditional payment on an obligation, as opposed to a settlement payment, has long been recognized as an acknowledgment. Bryan v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 2025-00443 (La. 3/6/26), 429 So.3d 249, 254. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that in the context of a third-party property damage claim, “an unconditional payment of a property damage claim constitutes an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription.” Bryan, 429 So.3d at 254 (citing Mallett v. McNeal, 2005-2289 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1254, 1263). The Louisiana Supreme Court extended its holding to claims made pursuant to uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance policies. Bryan, 429 So.3d at 254 (citing Demma, 15 So.3d at 105).

Here, the check issued by American National to Ms. Barrett constituted an unconditional payment of a third-party's property damage claim. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Barrett accepted the check subject to any conditions, released American National or Ms. Fisher from any further obligations, or signed a document evidencing a settlement. See, e.g., Mallett, 939 So.2d at 1263.

The parties stipulated that American National's unconditional payment constituted an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription. The parties disagree, however, as to the date of the acknowledgement/interruption, i.e., the date the payment occurred. Plaintiffs contend that the payment occurred on March 8, 2023, when Ms. Barrett received the check. Defendants argue that the payment occurred on March 3, 2023, the date American National mailed the check to Ms. Barrett. If the interruption occurred on March 8, 2023, then Plaintiffs had until March 8, 2024, to file suit. If the interruption occurred on March 3, 2023, then Plaintiffs had until March 4, 2024, to file suit.⁹ Here, Plaintiffs filed suit on March 5, 2024.

As discussed above, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Mallett held that an unconditional payment of a property damage claim to a third party constitutes an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription. Mallett, 939 So.2d at 1256. In Demma, the Louisiana Supreme Court extended that holding to unconditional payments of third-party property damage claims made pursuant to uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance policies. Demma, 15 So.3d at 105. However, neither Mallett nor Demma directly addresses on what date the unconditional payment occurs—when an insurer mails a check for payment to a third-party property damage claimant, or, when a third-party claimant receives a check for payment.

This Court has, however, addressed the issue of which date constitutes the date an unconditional payment occurs for the purposes of La. R.S. 22:1892 in Schexnaildre v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 2015-0272 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/15), 184 So.3d 108, and Harris v. Imperial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 2020-1323 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/21/21), 328 So.3d 1208, writ denied, 2021-01282 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So.3d 994. This Court held that where an insurer places “a check in the mail, with sufficient postage and properly addressed,” this constitutes “payment” under La. R.S. 22:1892. Schexnaildre, 184 So.3d at 115;¹⁰ Harris, 328 So.3d at 1220.¹¹ Accordingly, when American National mailed the check to Ms. Barrett on March 3, 2023, the mailing of the check constituted “payment” for the purposes of La. R.S. 22:1892 and therefore, an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt prescription. As a result, Plaintiffs had until March 4, 2024 to file suit.¹² Plaintiffs, however, did not file suit until March 5, 2024. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are prescribed. We therefore affirm the trial court's July 8, 2024 judgment sustaining Defendants’ exception of prescription and dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants. For the same reasons, we affirm the trial court's October 30, 2024 judgment denying Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.

DECREE

We affirm the trial court's July 8, 2024 judgment that sustained the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription filed by Defendants, American National Property and Casualty Company and Christina L. Fisher, and which dismissed all claims asserted by Plaintiffs, Jennieve Barrett, individually and on behalf of Natalya Barrett, against Defendants.

We also affirm the trial court's October 30, 2024 judgment that denied the motion for new trial filed by Plaintiffs, Jennieve Barrett, individually and on behalf of Natalya Barrett.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiffs, Jennieve Barrett, individually and on behalf of Natalya Barrett

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.

I concur in the majority's conclusion that prescription was interrupted by acknowledgment when American National mailed the check for the repair cost of Ms. Barrett's vehicle and that Ms. Barrett's claims are therefore prescribed because suit was filed more than one year later. However, I write separately because I would resolve the issue under La. C.C. art. 3464 and the jurisprudence governing interruption of prescription by acknowledgment generally, rather than La. R.S. 22:1892, which is a broad statute that governs an insurer's obligations to timely adjust and pay claims and establishes differing duties owed to insureds and third-party claimants. Accordingly, while I agree with the result reached by the majority, I would omit the analysis concerning La. R.S. 22:1892.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties were traveling westbound on Florida Street at its intersection with N. Causeway Boulevard in St. Tammany Parish.

2.   The record on appeal does not contain a copy of American National's liability policy insuring Ms. Fisher's 2006 Toyota 4Runner.

3.   As of January 1, 2026, parties may no longer fax-file documents in civil actions to the clerk of court. See La. R.S. 13:850(A).

4.   For ease of reference, we hereinafter refer to the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription as an “exception of prescription.”

5.   One year from March 3, 2023, was Sunday, March 3, 2024, which was a legal holiday in the State of Louisiana. See La. R.S. 1:55. Therefore, the one-year prescriptive period ran until March 4, 2024, the following Monday. See La. C.C.P. art. 5059.

6.   Ms. Barrett filed a motion for devolutive appeal on October 30, 2024. The trial court signed the order of appeal on November 4, 2024, notice of which was transmitted by the clerk of court to the parties on November 20, 2024.

7.   Act 423 of the 2024 Louisiana Regular Legislative Session repealed La. C.C. art. 3492, replacing it with La. C.C. art. 3493.1. Act 423 changed the prescriptive period for delictual actions from one year to two years. However, Act 423 has prospective effect only for events occurring after July 1, 2024. The relevant events in this case occurred between March 2023 and March 2024. Thus, Ms. Barrett's claims are subject to the one-year prescriptive period in former La. C.C. art. 3492. See 2024 La. Acts No. 423, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2024).

8.   Since the relevant events of this case occurred, between March 2023 and March 2024, the Legislature has amended La. R.S. 22:1892; however, those amendments do not change the analysis herein regarding what date constitutes the date an unconditional payment occurs for purposes of a third party property damage claim under La. R.S. 22:1892. See 2023 La. Acts No. 290, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2023); 2024 La. Acts No. 3, § 1 (eff. July 1, 2024); 2024 La. Acts No. 625, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2024); 2024 La. Acts No. 757, § 1 (eff. July 1, 2024); and 2025 La. Acts No. 500, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2025).

9.   See Footnote 5, supra.

10.   The Schexnaildre court found that an underinsured motorist carrier's (the insurer) placement of a check for pick up by mailing company, which then deposited the check in the U.S. mail on the thirtieth day after receiving satisfactory proofs of loss, was “payment” under La. R.S. 22:1892 (requiring an insurer to pay a claim within thirty days after receiving satisfactory proofs of loss). The Schexnaildre court held, 184 So.3d at 115:The mailing date is under the control of the responsible insurer and, therefore, provides a predictable termination point to the claim-review process. Conversely, the delivery date is subject to a number of variables beyond the control of the insurer and is not as easily ascertainable in advance. Furthermore, by placing a check in the U.S. mail properly addressed to the insured and bearing adequate postage, the insurer relinquishes possession and control over the check and is no longer “opposing” that undisputed portion of the claim.

11.   The Harris court held that Schexnaildre was not limited to the mailing of in-state payments. The Harris court opined: “To the contrary, the reasoning for the ‘mailbox rule’ is to create a uniform 30-day period for an insurer to consider a claim before payment is required. Thus, again applying a strict construction of La. R.S. 22:1892, we conclude the trial court properly applied the mailbox rule in this case.” Harris, 328 So.3d at 1220.

12.   See Footnote 5, supra.

EDWARDS, J.

Miller, J. concurs with reasons.