STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

Appellants, M.B. and J.G., appeal a judgment that terminated their parental rights to X.B.¹ For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 3, 2023, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report alleging neglect and abuse. A neighbor found J.B. and I.B. (seven and five years old) bound to their beds with zip ties, with the mother, M.B. passed out nearby. When law enforcement arrived at the residence they found that exact scene, and they also found X.B., who was approximately four months old, asleep underneath her passed-out mother. Law enforcement noted the home was filthy, with trash everywhere. While law enforcement was there, the father of X.B., J.G., arrived home and was questioned. The three children were removed via a verbal instanter order and placed in the custody of DCFS. M.B. and J.G. were both arrested for cruelty to juveniles. M.B. immediately bonded out of jail while J.G. remained incarcerated until November 6, 2024.

After the initial continued custody hearing, the children were maintained in the custody of DCFS pending the filing of a petition to adjudicate them children in need of care. The children were adjudicated in need of care on April 20, 2023. J.G. and M.B. both stipulated that their children were in need of care but made no admissions due to their pending criminal charges.

At disposition, I.B. and J.B. exited foster care and were returned to the custody of their biological father, D.L., who was not involved and apparently unaware of the abuse and neglect of his children at the hands of M.B. and J.G. X.B. remained in foster care and in the custody of DCFS, but was placed with J.G.’s cousin, C.A.

Case reviews and permanency hearings were held every six months. At the hearings, an opportunity to testify was provided to all parties. Following each hearing, the trial court made the same ruling: that DCFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that continuing the child in DCFS's custody was in X.B.’s best interest. Also, all case plans submitted by DCFS were approved. M.B. and J.G. never appealed any of the trial court's rulings following the permanency hearings.

DCFS noted that M.B. did make efforts to rehabilitate, attending outpatient substance abuse classes as well as parenting classes. She attended visits with X.B., became employed and obtained independent housing. She did, however, test positive for marijuana during this time. At the March 2024 permanency hearing, a case plan goal of reunification concurrent with guardianship was approved by the trial court.

Contrary to M.B.’s efforts to rehabilitate and improve herself, little effort at rehabilitation was made by J.G., who remained incarcerated until November of 2024. He did little to comply with his rehabilitation plan or maintain contact with X.B. during his incarceration, nor during the time when he was first released.

At all times during the custody proceedings, the pending criminal charges both parents faced were a concerning factor as to the stated goal of reunification. M.B. eventually entered a voluntary plea to one count of Cruelty to a Juvenile and received a sentence of fifteen years, with five years suspended and ten years committed. The other charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea. Thus, M.B.’s release date could conceivably not occur until 2034. Due to this, at the September 2024 case review hearing, DCFS proposed that in the best interest of X.B., the case plan goal of reunification concurrent with guardianship be changed to a singular goal of adoption. After receiving testimony and hearing argument, the trial court agreed. Neither M.B. or J.G. appealed the ruling of the trial court.

A permanency hearing was held in March 2025. At this point X.B. had been in foster care with C.A. for approximately two years. J.G. was released from jail in November of 2024. However, he was not visiting X.B., nor was he working his rehabilitation plan. M.B. was serving her ten-year sentence for cruelty to a juvenile. At the conclusion of the hearing, a judgment was entered maintaining the singular goal of adoption. A case review hearing was held on September 18, 2025. At the hearing, the evidence established M.B. was still incarcerated and obviously unable to provide a home for X.B. J.G. was not involved in X.B.’s life in any way, and had just at that point begun to inquire about his plan of rehabilitation but had completed nothing. Again, the trial court approved the goal of adoption as being in X.B.’s best interest. That ruling was not appealed.

In an attempt to establish permanence for X.B., DCFS had previously filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of JG and MB on August 29, 2025. That matter was set for an answer hearing to be held simultaneously with the case review hearing held on September 18, 2025. Trial was fixed for October 16, 2025. Following a trial on the matter, the trial court issued oral reasons for judgment, noting that “you're not available [M.B.]. You're just not available. And you're not available for charges connected to this case.” As to J.G., the trial court noted his failure to work his case plan and maintain significant contact with X.B., stating “you've been out a year. That's a long time. That's a third of her life. A third of her life that you for whatever reason didn't get on board to getting on this plan and all that.” Lastly, the trial court concluded that “termination of the parental rights ․ is in the best interest of [X.B.] considering the length of time the child has been in foster care and her need for safety and permanence.” A final judgment was signed terminating the parental rights of M.B. and J.G.

This appeal followed, wherein M.B. and J.G. assert the following assignments of error:

1. The juvenile court committed legal error when it terminated M.B.’s parental rights for her failure to substantially comply with her case plan.

2. The juvenile court erroneously terminated J.G.’s parental rights because DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification and there was a reasonable expectation of improvement in the near future.

3. The juvenile court erroneously terminated J.G.’s rights pursuant to the abandonment statute.

4. The juvenile court erroneously concluded that termination was in the best interest of X.B.

ANALYSIS

“Permanent termination of the legal relationship existing between natural parents and children is one of the most drastic actions the state can take against its citizens.” State in Interest of A.L.D., 18-1271, p. 4 (La. 1/30/19), 263 So.3d 860, 863; State in Interest of J.K.G., 11-908 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/11/12), 118 So.3d 10. In termination proceedings, that fundamental interest must be balanced with the interest of the child, and “the courts of this state have consistently found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent.” State ex rel. J.M., 02–2089, p. 8 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1247, 1252.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 1015 sets forth the grounds for termination of parental rights. The State need only establish one ground for termination, with such ground for termination proven by clear and convincing evidence. La.Ch.Code art. 1035(A); State in Interest of J.K.G., 118 So.3d 10. If a ground for termination is found, the court must then determine whether the termination is in the best interest of the child. La.Ch.Code art. 1039; State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So.3d 860.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 1015 sets forth eight grounds upon which parental rights may be terminated, including the following, which are at issue in this case:

(4) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility by any of the following:

․

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide significant contributions to the child's care and support for any period of six consecutive months.

(c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or communicating with him for any period of six consecutive months.

(5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in State ex rel. A.T., 06-501, p. 5 (La. 7/6/06), 936 So.2d 79, 82–83, instructed as follows:

In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find that the State has established at least one of the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. J.A., 99-2905 (La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806, 811 (citing La. Ch. C. Art. 1035(A); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). Further, even upon finding that the State has met its evidentiary burden, a court still must not terminate parental rights unless it determines that to do so is in the child's best interests. La. Ch. C. Art. 1039; State ex rel. G.J.L., 00-3278 (La. 6/29/01), 791 So.2d 80, 85.

“It is well-settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court's findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong.” State ex rel. S.M.W., [00-3277, p. 14 (La. 2/21/01), 781 So.2d 1223,] 1233 (citing In re A.J.F., 00-0948 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47, 61).

In appellants’ first assignment of error, it is asserted the trial court erred in terminating M.B.’s parental rights for her failure to substantially comply with her case plan.

As noted in appellants’ brief, after bonding out of jail, M.B. made efforts to rehabilitate herself. She was in compliance with her case plan, had gone to outpatient drug treatment and was visiting with X.B. She also, from all accounts, had attempted to develop a good relationship with C.A. However, this all changed when M.B. voluntarily pled guilty to the cruelty to juveniles charge and received a substantial jail sentence. Her full-time release date was 2034, and the earliest possible good-time release date is in 2028.

Obviously, while incarcerated M.B. has no means of supporting her child or maintaining a stable home environment for her. She simply cannot be involved in X.B.’s life in any substantial or meaningful way. She is limited to a phone call once a week. Thus, as a consequence of her own actions, M.B. cannot complete her case plan in any way, which she acknowledged in her testimony at the termination hearing:

Q. And right now you don't have stable housing, right?

A. Correct.

Q. You're not employed?

A. Correct.

Q. So any progress that you made before was wiped out when you was incarcerated?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. So as of today, you can't really say that you've completed your case plan, can you?

A. Correct.

This court, in State in the Interest of O.L.R., 13-616, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 125 So.3d 569, 573, (citations omitted), noted the following concerning a parent's incarceration relative to a termination of parental rights proceeding:

Imprisonment is not an excuse to escape parental obligations. Incarceration is not a defense to failure to support or maintain contact with one's children in a termination of parental rights case, particularly because incarceration results from one's actions.

In brief, it is argued that M.B. could conceivably be released by January of 2028, though it is acknowledged this is “provided M.B. maintains good behavior” and “requires a favorable vote from the Committee on Parole.” Thus, it is far from a certainty that M.B. would be granted early release from incarceration. It should also be noted that following her release from prison, M.B. would need to secure employment, obtain and provide a stable home environment, and complete other components of her case plan before any possibility of reunification could take place. That certainly would add a significant time period after her release from prison. Thus, it cannot be said the trial court erred in finding, due to M.B.’s incarceration, that she is unable to complete her case plan and there is “no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in [M.B.’s] condition ․ in the near future, considering the child's age and [her] need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.” La.Ch.Code art. 1015(5) (emphasis added)

The second and third assignments of error assert the trial court erred in terminating J.G.’s parental rights based on two grounds: DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification and there was a reasonable expectation of improvement in the near future; and the juvenile court erroneously terminated J.G.’s rights pursuant to the abandonment statute.

The evidence established upon his release from incarceration, J.G. did nothing to work his case plan for over a year. Although he did eventually take a parenting class and a drug class, it was well after his release from prison, and not until the termination proceeding was filed. It was not until the termination proceeding was filed that J.G. apparently became interested in his case plan. J.G. acknowledged in his testimony that he has contributed nothing in support of X.B. Most damning of all is J.G.’s admission in his testimony that since the incident that led to his arrest, he has not visited X.B. one single time, and has only made one phone call to her in two years, despite X.B. being placed with his cousin. The trial court did not err in finding the State established by clear and convincing the grounds of abandonment under La.Ch.Code art. 1015(4).

We also find no merit to the argument that there was a reasonable expectation of improvement on J.G.’s part in the near future. Louisiana Children's Code article 1036 (emphasis added) states:

D. In accordance with Article 1015(5), lack of any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's conduct in the near future may be evidenced by one or more of the following:

(1) Any physical or mental illness, mental deficiency, substance abuse, or chemical dependency that renders the parent unable or incapable of exercising parental responsibilities without exposing the child to a substantial risk of serious harm, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

(2) A pattern of repeated incarceration of the parent that has rendered the parent unable to care for the immediate and continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for extended periods of time.

(3) Any other condition or conduct that reasonably indicates that the parent is unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child, based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.

J.G.’s pattern of behavior has been very consistent. During his incarceration, he made no attempts to stay in contact with his daughter whatsoever. Since his release from incarceration, he has notably never visited his daughter and phoned her only once in two years. He spent approximately one year after his release obtaining no services or working his case plan and only began doing so once the termination proceeding was filed. Although he did make some last-minute attempts to do some things, that is countered by his complete failure to attempt to establish any relationship whatsoever with X.B. Therefore, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

With the trial court having determined that DCFS established grounds for termination under La.Ch.Code art. 1015, the trial court must also find that termination is in the best interest of the child. This encompasses appellants’ last assignment of error, wherein it is argued the trial court erred in finding termination was in the best interest of X.B.

Louisiana Children's Code article 1001 (emphasis added), provides in part:

The purpose of this Title is to protect children whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide safety and care adequate to meet their physical, emotional, and mental health needs, by providing a judicial process for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and for the certification of the child for adoption. In all proceedings, the primary concern is to secure the best interest of the child if a ground justifying termination of parental rights is proved. Termination of parental rights is to be considered the first step toward permanent placement of the child in a safe and suitable home, and if at all possible, to achieve the child's adoption.

Since X.B. was placed in the custody of DCFS, she has resided with C.A., who as noted earlier is the cousin of J.G. The record is uncontradicted that X.B. has thrived under C.A.’s care and is a happy and well-adjusted child. Although it must be noted M.B. made legitimate and sincere attempts to better herself in the months following her arrest, it simply cannot be ignored that she is and will for at least the next eighteen months be incarcerated. During that time, C.A. has provided and can reasonably be expected to provide X.B. with stability, love, and an environment where she can thrive. C.A. testified at the hearing and explained her reasons for desiring adoption of X.B. as opposed to guardianship:

Q. Okay. So I'm going to ask you the question that everybody wants to know the answer to. Why do you want to adopt the child instead of just taking guardianship of her?

A. She's been in the foster system for a very long time, and I do feel like I'm providing stability for her. I don't feel the need that – to continue to drag it out. I understand they want to be in her life. I have nothing against that. I am happy for them to be in her life, but I just find that I can provide more stability for her for the long term.

Q. Would it be fair to say that you want to eliminate the possibility of upheaval of [X.B.]?

A. Yes, ma'am.

It is also reasonable to conclude, considering her testimony and past actions, that C.A. will willingly make a place for M.B. and J.G. in X.B.’s life, should they so desire, and it is a positive situation for X.B.

In support of their argument that the trial court erred in finding the termination of parental rights and adoption was in the best interest of X.B., appellants rely on this court's prior opinion in State ex rel. P.S.T., 08-1462 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/09), 11 So.3d 565, vacated, 09–1481 (La.7/27/09), 17 So.3d 362.² In that case, a divided panel of this court reversed the trial court ’s termination of parental rights, finding that the State failed to prove that termination was in the best interest of the child. Appellants note that in P.S.T., the mother there was also incarcerated. While grounds for termination existed, the majority in P.S.T. found there was a strong bond between the child and his mother and they had even made plans to reunify when she was released from jail. In that case, the child was nine years old at the time of the termination hearing and had lived with his mother until he was four years old. It was also noted that the child had regular and frequent visits with his mother during the time she was incarcerated. The majority reversed the trial court finding “the state failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of [the mother's] parental rights is in the best interests of P.S.T.” The dissent countered that “[c]lear and convincing evidence is really a question for the trial judge, and we can only review under a manifest error standard․ Again, I must say that this court and the first circuit, in exceptional cases, have not terminated the parental rights when the parent can not provide for a child and or has not provided a reasonable plan for the care of the child. I do not find this to be an exceptional case.” Id. at 568 (Ezell, J., dissenting).

We find P.S.T. is distinguishable from the present case in several ways. The majority in P.S.T. strongly relied on the uncertainty of the foster parents commitment to adopting P.S.T., stating:

P.S.T. is doing well with foster parents and has established a bond with his mother that includes plans after her future release from jail. While we agree that this situation is not ideal, we cannot say that termination of M.R.H.’s parental rights is in the best interests of P.S.T. This is especially true in light of the uncertainty regarding the foster parents’ willingness to adopt and the concern of all the parties, including the trial court, about P.S.T.’s well-being in light of a judgment of termination.

Id. at 567 (emphasis added).

Clearly, the majority in P.S.T. strongly relied on a perceived lack of certainty as to whether the foster parents were willing to adopt. That is distinguishable from the facts before us. C.A. has demonstrated her absolute desire to adopt X.B. and has never wavered from that. Moreover, there were no concerns about X.B.’s well-being in light of a judgment of termination and adoption by C.A. Again, it was uncontradicted that X.B. was thriving with C.A. and she had at all times demonstrated her total commitment to X.B.

Further, there was a much more discernable bond established between child and parent in P.S.T. than here. The child in P.S.T. had lived with his mother for the first four years of his life and even during her incarceration the child had continued to regularly visit the mother. The majority in P.S.T. also noted the child and mother had made plans for the future when she was released. That is distinguishable from the present case. X.B. was removed from her mother's care when she was a few months old and has spent essentially her entire life in the care of C.A. Although, M.B. has made her allotted once a week call to X.B. while she has been incarcerated, it was testified that often X.B. is not interested in talking with her mother and more interested in playing (albeit not unusual behavior for a child of that age). While M.B. has made attempts to bond with her child, her situation has made that a difficult task, and clearly any bond between them is not at the level as found in P.S.T.

As to J.G., it is apparent there has been no bond established between he and X.B. as evidenced by his failure to even attempt any contact whatsoever with his daughter.

As noted earlier, in termination proceedings, the court must carefully balance the interests of the children and the interests of the parents. State ex rel. J.M., 837 So.2d 1247. While a parent has a natural fundamental interest in the continuing companionship, care, and custody of their children, the child has a profound interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term and continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care. State ex rel. L.B. v. G.B.B., 02–1715 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 918. In balancing these interests, “courts of this state have consistently found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent.” State ex rel. J.M., 837 So.2d at 1252.

In his oral reasons for judgment, the trial court focused on X.B.’s need for consistency and permanency in her life, stating “She shouldn't have to wait, she can't. She's got a life to live ․ this child deserves a life. And a life that she can be provided now.” Based upon our thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court did not manifestly err and was not clearly wrong in ruling that it was in the best interest of X.B. that the parental rights of M.B. and J.G. be terminated and that she be certified for adoption.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of M.B. and J.G. and certifying X.B. for adoption.

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Kimberly S. Smith

Dept. of Children & Fam. Serv.

1525 FAirfield Ave., Room 850

Shreveport, LA 71101

Hon. Robert Charles Owsley

City Court Judge

314 Amulet Street

Natchitoches, La 71457

Jacqueline Chevette Williams

Acadiana Legal Services Corp

134 St. Denis St.

Natchitoches, LA 71457

Jane Hogan

Attorney at Law

310 North Cherry St, Unit 1

Hammond, LA 70401

Mary K. Beaird

Attorney at Law

303 N 1st Street

Leesville, LA 71446

Nicole Holmes

Attorney at Law

2902 Centenary Blvd.

Shreveport, LA 71104

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 28, 2026

Docket Number: JAC 26-138

STATE IN THE INTEREST OF X. B.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2, we use initials throughout this opinion to protect the identity of the minor child.

2.   On writs to the supreme court, it vacated the decision of this court in light of a recent development that the mother was to be released from prison at an earlier date.

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY JUDGE