ERIEL RENGEL ET AL v. CLECO POWER LLC ET AL (2026)

Infinite Communications Incorporated of Florida appeals the summary judgment rendered in favor of Cleco Power, LLC. That judgment is reversed for the reasons that follow.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The underlying litigation arises from an incident in Ball, Louisiana, that occurred on September 5, 2020. Eriel Rengel and his spouse, Giselle Cerrato, were performing work at 193 Kinley Road in Ball, Louisiana, to restore telecom services to lines owned by Altice, Inc. on behalf of its wholly owned subsidiary, Suddenlink Communications. Rengel and Cerrato were employed by Dixie Normous Telecom Incorporated (Dixie), which had been hired by Raygada Communications Corporation. Raygada, in turn, had been hired by Infinite, which was contracted by Altice under an “Aerial, Underground or Building Attachment Construction/ Plant Maintenance Contract.” Altice's lines were located on utility poles owned by Cleco.

According to Rengel and Cerrato's suit, Rengel was injured while performing this work when he contacted a tree limb on which an electrical line was resting. Cerrato was present when the accident occurred and pursued claims under La.Civ.Code art. 2315.6.

Cleco filed a reconventional demand against Rengel and cross claims against Cebridge Acquisition, L.P. d/b/a Suddenlink Communications; XL Insurance America, Inc., Suddenlink's insurer; Infinite; and Raygada. Cleco also asserted a third-party demand against Dixie Normous. According to these demands, the defendants in these incidental demands violated the dictates of the Overheard Power Line Safety Act, La.R.S. 45:141–46 (the Act). Additionally, Suddenlink was alleged to have violated its agreement with Cleco, entitled “Cleco Power LLC Pole Attachment License Agreement,” under which Suddenlink was alleged to have agreed to indemnify, defend, and hold Cleco harmless and to maintain insurance that would insure Cleco.

In June 2025, Cleco filed the present motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment against Infinite. The motion asserted that Infinite, as a “person responsible for work” being performed, violated the Act by failing to give Cleco notice of the work.

In support of its motion, Cleco annexed:

Exhibit “A” Cleco Power's Amended Cross Claim, Third Party Demand and Reconventional Demand;

Exhibit “B” Suddenlink's Answer to Cleco Power's Amended Cross Claim, Third Party Demand and Reconventional Demand;

Exhibit “C” Excerpts from Eriel Rengel's Deposition (pp. 1-3; 48, 110-112; 128-130; 200-203; 226; 276);

Exhibit “D” Affidavit of Scott Fazio, dated March 25, 2024:

a. Excerpts of Infinite Communications Inc's Responses to Cleco Power LLC's Interrogatories (the discovery excerpts originally attached to Mr. Fazio's Affidavit included the “Infinite Contract”. Said contract has been omitted because said contract is already enclosed with this filing with two other Exhibits, Exhibit “L-b” and Exhibit “M-a”); and

b. Raygada Communications, Corp's October 26, 2022 Answer to Interrogatory Number 34 propounded by Cleco Power LLC;

Exhibit “E” Certified Transcript of March 25, 2024 Hearing and Sworn Testimony;

Exhibit “F” March 25, 2024 Judgment;

Exhibit “G” Court's May 24, 2024 Written Reasons for Judgment;

Exhibit “H” Affidavit of Douglas Brunson, dated April 4, 2024;

Exhibit “I” Cleco Power LLC's Answers to Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Answer to Interrogatories 8,11,12;

Exhibit “J” Suddenlink's Answers to Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Cebribdge Acquisition, L.P. D/B/A Suddenlink Communications;

Exhibit “K” Ronald A. May, P.E. Affidavit, dated June 27, 2025;

Exhibit “L” Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Infinite Communications Incorporated of Florida (“Infinite”), dated June 10, 2025; Infinite's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Infinite's List of Undisputed Material Facts, and the following Exhibits filed with said Motion:

a. Plaintiffs’ Original Petition for Damages (Exhibit A to Infinite's MSJ);

b. Aerial, Underground or Building Attachment Construction/Plant Maintenance Contract, dated September 26, 2017 (“Suddenlink-Infinite Contract”) (Exhibit C to Infinite's MSJ);

c. Contract for Cable Installation Services, dated August 31, 2020 (“Infinite- Raygada Contract”) (Exhibit D to Infinite's MSJ);

d. Contract Agreement between Raygada Communications Corp. and Dixie Normous Telecom, dated September 3, 2020 (“Raygada-Dixie Contract”) (Exhibit F to Infinite's MSJ); and

e. Plaintiffs’ First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages (Exhibit H to Infinite's MSJ).

Exhibit “M” Defendant, Infinite Communications, Inc. ’s Responses to Cleco's Third Requests for Admission, dated May 16, 2025;

a. Aerial, Underground or Building Attachment Construction/Plant Maintenance Contract, dated September 26, 2017;

Exhibit “N” Plaintiff Eriel Rengel's Answers to Interrogatories from Defendant, Infinite Communications, Inc., dated March 30, 2021, Answer to Interrogatory 12;

Exhibit “O” Response to First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Propounded to Defendant Raygada Communications, Corp., Answer to Interrogatories 24, 25, and 34;

Exhibit “P” Response to First Set of Requests for Admissions Propounded to Defendant, Raygada Communications, Corp., dated October 12, 2022;

Exhibit “Q” Excerpts from Infinite's owner and representative, Thomas McCollum's Deposition (pp. 1, 8, 9, 26-33, 94-98, i64);

Exhibit “R” Excerpts of Corporate Deposition of Raygada Communications, through corporate representative, Mirelly Hernandez (pp.1, 2, 30-31, 38-44,125);

Exhibit “S” Excerpts of Corporate Deposition of Raygada Communications, through corporate representative, Dante Raygada (pp. 1-3, 35, 40);

Exhibit “T” Defendant, Infinite Communications, Inc.’s Responses to Cleco Power's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Interrogatories 7 and 8; and

Exhibit “U” Infinite Communications, Inc.’s Response to Cleco Power's Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, Interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Request for Production No. 4.

The evidence presented in Cleco's motion shows that Infinite did not notify Cleco that work would be performed at the site of the accident. No one with Raygada notified Cleco of the work, nor did anyone with Dixie.

Infinite opposed Cleco's motion. To its opposition, Infinite attached the deposition of its owner, Thomas McCollum; Suddenlink's responses to Cleco's first set of written discovery; Infinite's responses to Cleco's third set of written discovery; and the deposition of Ronald A. May, P.E., Cleco's expert in the case.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Cleco. It found that Infinite was a “person responsible for the work” and that Rengel was not “an authorized person.” Because Cleco did not receive notice that Rengel would be working at the site, it was entitled to all damages, costs, and expenses it incurred pursuant to the Act from Infinite.

After the judgment was rendered, Infinite moved for a new trial. This motion asserted that the trial court had not considered May's deposition. May was Cleco's expert, and he indicated that Infinite was an authorized person. May's deposition was taken on July 16, 2025, and argument on Cleco's motion for summary judgment was held on August 4, 2025.

Infinite asserts in its assignments of error that the trial court erred in granting Cleco's motion for summary judgment and in failing to grant its motion for new trial.

DISCUSSION

Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo applying the same criteria used by trial courts. Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels La., Inc., 24-840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So.3d 573. The issue is whether, “[a]fter an opportunity for adequate discovery․ the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art 966(A)(3). The mover bears the burden of proof. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court, it is not required to negate all essential elements of its opponents’ claim; instead, it is only required to point out “the absence of factual support for one or more” essential elements. Id.

Pryor v. CCRR Props., LLC, 25-254, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/22/25), 423 So.3d 617, 625.

The Act has not been subjected to extensive appellate consideration. This matter presents a novel legal question. The Act provides:

No person shall, individually or through an agent or employee, perform any function or activity upon any land, building, highway, waterway, or other premises, if at any time during the performance of any function or activity it is possible that the person performing the function or activity shall move or be placed within ten feet of any high voltage overhead line, or if it is possible for any part of any tool, equipment, machinery, or material used, handled, or stored by such person to be brought within ten feet of any high voltage overhead line or conductor during the performance of such function or activity.

La.R.S. 45:142. Section 143 of the Act requires the fulfillment of certain conditions prior to commencing work within ten feet of high voltage overheard lines:

A. When any person desires to temporarily carry on any function, activity, work, or operation in closer proximity to any high voltage overhead line than permitted by this Chapter, the person or persons responsible for the work to be done shall promptly notify the owner or operator of the high voltage overhead line prior to the scheduled commencement of the work. Such notice shall be reasonable, considering the work to be done; however, the notice shall not be less than forty-eight hours prior to the scheduled commencement of the work, exclusive of holidays and weekends, except in emergency situations that include police, fire, and rescue emergencies, in which case the notice shall be made as soon as possible.

B. The work shall be performed only after satisfactory mutual arrangements have been negotiated between the owner or operator of the high voltage overhead lines and the person or persons responsible for the work to be done. The owner or operator of the lines shall initiate the agreed upon safety arrangements within three working days and shall complete the work promptly, subject to emergency weather conditions. Arrangements may include placement of temporary mechanical barriers separating and preventing contact between material, equipment, or persons and high voltage overhead lines; temporary deenergization and grounding; temporary location or raising of the lines; or by other means deemed appropriate by the owner or operator of the lines.

C. The actual expense incurred by any operator or owner of high voltage overhead lines in providing clearances established in this Section shall be paid by the person or persons responsible for the work to be done in the vicinity thereof. The owner or operator of the lines may require an estimated payment of such actual expense in advance.

Clearly, the purposes of the Act's ten-foot prohibition are to protect the utility from damage to its plant and workers in the vicinity of the plant from injury and to minimize utility outages. Louisiana Revised Statutes 45:144 imposes liability for violating the Act:

A. If a violation of this Chapter results in physical or electrical contact with any high voltage overhead line, the person violating this Chapter shall be liable to the owner or operator of the high voltage overhead line for all damages, costs, or expenses incurred by the owner or operator as a result of the contact.

B. Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be construed to alter, amend, restrict, or limit the liability of an owner or operator of the high voltage line under current law.

C. Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be construed to alter, amend, restrict, or limit the exclusive remedy provisions of R.S. 23:1032, except for the rights provided to the owner or operator of the high voltage line provided in Subsection A of this Section.

However, the Act contains exemptions, among which is the following:

The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to the construction, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance or removal of overhead electrical or communication circuits or conductors, and their supporting structures and associated equipment, of rail transportation systems, electrical generating systems, transmission or distribution systems, or communications systems by an authorized person.

La.R.S. 45:145(A).

The Act defines “authorized person”:

(1) “Authorized person” means:

(a) Employees or electrical or communication contractors or other contractors employed for the maintenance of electric lines of an electric public utility with respect to the electrical system owned or operated by such electric public utility; employees or electrical or communication contractors or other contractors employed for the maintenance of electric lines of an electric cooperative with respect to the electrical system owned or operated by such cooperative; employees or electrical or communication contractors or other contractors employed for the maintenance of electric lines of a municipality or other public entity with respect to the electrical system owned or operated by such municipality or other public entity; and the employees of a transportation system with respect to the electrical circuits of such system.

(b) Employees or electrical or communication contractors, including cable television, telephone, and other Communication utilities having pole attachment agreements with an owner or operator of high voltage overhead lines with respect to the electrical system of an owner or operator of a high voltage overhead line.

La.R.S. 45:141(1).

Was Infinite required by the Act to notify Cleco that Rengel would be working at the site? The Act's exemption is clear: its “provisions ․ shall not apply to the construction, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance or removal of overhead electrical or communication circuits or conductors ․ by an authorized person.” La.R.S. 45:145(A). An authorized person is exempt from the Act. The issue in this matter is whether Rengel was an authorized person. By the Act's plain terms, if the person performing the work is an authorized person, no notice must be given to the owner of the overhead power lines.

Whether Rengel was an authorized person pursuant to La.R.S. 45:141 presents a mixed question of law and fact, i.e., one that includes legal and factual elements. See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 140 S.Ct. 1062 (2020). A mixed question of law and fact is amenable to summary judgment when appropriate. Broussard v. Christus Health Sw. La., 24-491 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/25), 408 So.3d 1161, writ denied, 25-552 (La. 9/16/25), 416 So.3d 473. In Broussard, this court concluded that the appropriate determination is whether the facts and law reasonably support a single conclusion. Id. See also Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 22-849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467.

May was asked about the status of various parties as “authorized persons.” He noted that the definition encompasses not only the communications company with a pole attachment agreement, such as Suddenlink, but also the communications company's contractors. “[T]he Louisiana statute allows the contractors of those companies to perform that work, as an exception to the 10-foot rule.” “The work performed by Suddenlink is not subject to the requirements of the Overhead Power Line Safety Act.” However, because Rengel was not “vetted,” he was not an authorized person: “If -- if there is outside personnel that they [Suddenlink] have not vetted, that they have not approved, then all of the parties involved in that could be held as persons responsible for the work.” Thus, Cleco maintains that because Rengel was not employed by Suddenlink or Infinite, and Suddenlink did not authorize Infinite to subcontract the work to Raygada or Dixie, Rengel is not an authorized person under the Act.

There are two deficiencies in this argument. The definition of authorized persons includes employees or electrical or communications contractors having pole attachment agreements with the owner or operator of a high voltage overhead line. In no way does the Act limit “communications contractors” to those whose credentials have been verified by the party to the pole attachment agreement; rather, it provides that employees of the party to the pole attachment agreement or “communications contractors” are authorized persons. And it is quite common and necessary, particularly in the aftermath of a hurricane, for cable systems to contract restoration work to restore services in a timely manner. Indeed, May confirmed that work must be subcontracted with little or no actual oversight by the cable company.

Cleco's interpretation of the Act places conditions for status as an authorized person that are not present in the Act. The legislature could have conditioned authorized person status on qualifications. The States of Delaware and Georgia, for example, have specifically defined “qualified” employees and contractors as authorized persons under their respective analogs to the Act. See Del. Code Ann., tit. 16, § 7402B(1)(d) (1999), and Ga. Code Ann. § 46–3–37 (2025). Louisiana opted to place the burden of determining qualifications on the contracting parties.

The application of the Act to communications contractors is a novel question. We are aware of no case in which the owner or operator of overhead power lines has attempted to seek recovery under the Act against communication contractors acting on behalf of a company that had a pole attachment agreement. Rather, every case involves workers whose reason for being in proximity to the line was wholly unrelated to the communications lines. We find that the Act was intended to apply to those unrelated third parties.

The seminal case from the Louisiana Supreme Court is Moreno v. Entergy Corp., 12-97 (La. 12/4/12), 105 So.3d 40. The plaintiff in Moreno was working for a construction contractor repairing a Walgreen's store in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. He was electrocuted when metal on a scaffolding contacted a power line. He sued Entergy, who then sought indemnity from the contractors working at Walgreen's. The only issue was whether Entergy was entitled to indemnity from violators of the Act without resorting to comparative fault principles. The supreme court found that Entergy was entitled to indemnity as an element of “all damages, costs, or expenses” as that phrase is used in La.R.S. 45:144.

Similarly, in Sharp v. Morgan City, 16-1673 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/16/17), 226 So.3d 545, writ denied, 17-1557 (La. 11/17/17), 230 So.3d 216, the plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor on a construction site engaged in installing sheet metal on the exterior of a building. The metal panel came in contact with or close proximity to an overhead power line owned by the city. The plaintiff in Clardy v. Bruce Foods Corp., (W.D. La. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (2014 WL 377337), was a truck driver whose dump truck bed contacted an overhead power line while he was preparing to wash the truck bed.

The Act does not apply to communications contractors, as evidenced by its plain wording. This is reinforced by the industry custom of hiring such contractors, particularly in the event of reconstruction after a natural disaster. That is not to say that Cleco is without remedy. Those remedies, though, do not include indemnity under the Act.

CONCLUSION

Rengel was employed by Dixie, which was a contractor of Raygada, which in turn was a contractor of Infinite, a contractor of Suddenlink, which held a pole attachment agreement with Cleco. He was a communications contractor engaged in the construction, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance or removal of communication circuits or conductors or communications systems. As the employee of a communications contractor, Rengel was an authorized person. Therefore, no entity in the contractual chain was required to give Cleco notice that Rengel would be working on the Kinley Road poles on the date of the accident.

The trial court's judgment in favor of Cleco Power, LLC against Infinite Communications Incorporated of Florida is reversed. All costs of these proceedings are taxed to Cleco Power, LLC.

REVERSED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Robert A. Dunkelman

Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman

400 Texas St, #400

Shreveport, LA 71166-1786

Hon. Mary Lauve Doggett

Judge, 9th JDC

701 Murray St., Ste. 501

Alexandria, LA 71301

John Jerry Glas

Deutsch, Kerrigan

755 Magazine St.

New Orleans, LA 70130

Mark Felipe Vilar

Faircloth Melton Bash & Green

105 Yorktown Dr.

Alexandria, LA 71303

Joseph A. Devall, Jr.

Attorney at Law

400 Poydras Street, Ste 2107

New Orleans, LA 70130

Patrick R. Follette

Attorney at Law

One Galleria Blvd, Ste 1100

Metairie, LA 70001

Richard G. Duplantier, Jr.

Galloway Johnson Tompkins

701 Poydras Street, Ste 4040

New Orleans, LA 70139

Christian Brownell Bogart

Duplass APLC

433 Metairie Road, Ste 600

Metairie, LA 70005

Henry Minor Pipes, III

Pipes Miles Beckman, LLC

1100 Poydras St., #3300

New Orleans, LA 70163

Rachel G. Webre

Laborde Siegel, LLC

701 Poydras St., Ste. 4800

New Orleans, LA 70139

Aaron L. Green

Faircloth Melton Bash & Green

105 Yorktown Dr.

Alexandria, LA 71303

Megan R. Jackler

Atytorney at Law

701 Poydras Street 40th Floor

New Orleans, LA 70139

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 28, 2026

Docket Number: CA 26-76

ERIEL RENGEL, ET AL.

VERSUS

CLECO POWER, LLC, ET AL.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE