STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ESKINDER SEYIFU MEKURIA (2026)

Defendant, Eskinder Seyifu Mekuria, was convicted of Second Degree Murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence with credit for time served. For the following reasons, we reverse Defendant's conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for a new trial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2022, the State alleges that a short time after the victim, Hushiar Faris Sumo, and Defendant entered the victim's car and drove away from the Golden Nugget Casino, the victim was observed lying back in the driver's seat as though he had passed out. Shortly thereafter, the victim's vehicle crashed into a wooded area. Onlookers entered the vehicle by breaking the passenger window, and they rendered aid to the victim, the sole occupant of the car at that point. The victim had been shot, and he later succumbed to his injuries at a local hospital. On December 15, 2022, the State charged Defendant with second degree murder of Hushiar Faris Sumo, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant's trial commenced September 8, 2025, and a jury found him guilty as charged on September 11, 2025.¹ On September 21, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, alleging that the verdict was clearly contrary to the law and evidence, and contending that prejudicial error resulted from the introduction of certain evidence. Defendant's motion was denied on September 22, 2025, and three days later, he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant is before this court challenging his conviction. Defendant assigns as error:

1. When viewed under the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of Eskinder Seyifu Mekuria as the person who shot Hushiar Faris Sumo.

2. The trial court improperly commented on the evidence in the case during trial in violation of La. Code of Crim. P. art. 772, and in doing so violated Eskinder Mekuria's due process rights as the comment was directly related to Mekuria's identification as the shooter which was a contested issue in the case.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

Assignment of error one is rendered moot by our finding in assignment of error two and we are precluded from addressing whether sufficient evidence was presented to convict Defendant. Nevertheless, a summary of the evidence presented at trial regarding Defendant's identity is relevant to our finding in assignment of error two.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Defendant contends the trial court improperly commented on the evidence in violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 772. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1 as “the killing of a human being ․ when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” “[T]he State is required to prove Defendant's identity as the perpetrator.” State v. Artis, 23-348, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 375 So.3d 644, 649, writ denied, 24-12 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So.3d 631. Regarding Defendant's identity, the following testimony and evidence was presented at trial.

Lauren Clavier testified that on September 23, 2022, she was on her way to Sam's Club in Lake Charles. While Ms. Clavier was driving on L'Auberge Boulevard turning left onto Sam's Way, the vehicle in front of her began veering off the road onto the grassy area. It appeared to Ms. Clavier that the driver, who “looked limp and ․ was ․ laid back in the seat,” had passed out. His vehicle eventually crashed into a nearby wooded area. Ms. Clavier, a nurse, was concerned that the driver had a medical issue. She called 9-1-1, but authorities were already aware of the incident. As Ms. Clavier approached the scene, other people pulled the driver, Mr. Sumo, out of the car, and CPR was started.

Franklin Mouille testified that when he came upon the scene, people were unsuccessfully attempting to gain access through the passenger window to render aid to Mr. Sumo. Mr. Mouille grabbed a maul hammer from his truck, broke through the passenger window, and was able to unlock the car doors. He testified that Mr. Sumo had a very faint pulse, so he and two other people performed CPR. At some point during that time, Mr. Mouille noticed Mr. Sumo had a wound on his left side, so he used rags in an attempt to stop the bleeding. Mr. Mouille observed neither a gun nor Defendant at the scene.

Corporal Jonathan Landrum of the Lake Charles Police Department testified that when he responded to the scene, emergency medical technicians handed him a blood-covered envelope filled with a large amount of cash as well as $10,050.00 in poker chips from the Golden Nugget Casino. Corporal Landrum testified that a gun was not found in or around Mr. Sumo's car, and he saw no bullet hole in the car. On cross-examination, Corporal Landrum confirmed that he did not see Defendant, a weapon, or any shell casings at the scene.

Sergeant Chris Johnson of the Lake Charles City Police testified that he secured a search warrant for the victim's 2014 black Lexus. Inside, he found two .45 caliber unspent rounds, one in the front passenger side door compartment and the other one in the back passenger side floorboard inside a white towel.

Detective Hope Sanders of the Lake Charles Police Department testified that she went to Lake Charles Memorial Hospital to check on Mr. Sumo's status. Mr. Sumo was first stabilized, then taken to surgery. Detective Sanders was unable to obtain Mr. Sumo's clothing, but she testified that no projectile was recovered during surgery nor while chest compressions were being done at the hospital. During her investigation, Detective Sanders learned that Mr. Sumo had booked a room at the Golden Nugget for two days but had not yet checked in. The security department at the Golden Nugget provided her with footage taken by their cameras. Based on the casino's review of the camera footage, Detective Sanders was provided with Defendant's name. She was shown a clear close-up view of Defendant at a kiosk in the casino.

Through her investigation, Detective Sanders found out that a license plate reader captured Defendant's 2018 black Chevrolet SUV traveling eastbound on I-10 from Sulphur at 11:23 a.m. that day. At 12:11 p.m., the same license plate reader captured Mr. Sumo's 2014 black Lexus heading eastbound on I-10. Both vehicles were then seen arriving in the Golden Nugget parking lot, with Defendant arriving first. When Detective Sanders learned that both the victim and Defendant were at the Golden Nugget, she contacted casino surveillance, and they provided her with a video which tracked both subjects through the casino. Detective Sanders also obtained footage showing Defendant arriving in a black SUV, parking, and entering the casino. Defendant first went to a casino store and purchased three packs of cigarettes. At that time, he was wearing a long sleeve, light blue, button-down shirt; a pair of dark dress slacks; and a pair of dark dress shoes. His shirt was tucked in, and his appearance was neat. Defendant went to the baccarat area where he played, walked around, played again, and then went to the kiosk.

About an hour later, Mr. Sumo arrived at Golden Nugget Casino and went to the baccarat area. Although Detective Sanders observed the victim and Defendant near each other on several occasions in the video, there was no indication that they knew each other. There was no head nod or eye contact, and the two never sat at the same table. About two hours later, Defendant left the casino and went to the parking lot to his vehicle. He opened his driver's side door, rummaged around, and then reentered the casino with the right side of his shirt untucked. From that point on in the video surveillance, Defendant's shirt remained untucked on that side. At one point in the video, it appeared that Defendant had a bulge where his shirt was untucked. He did not return to the baccarat area but did visit the kiosk on more than one occasion. He still had no interaction with Mr. Sumo.

While Defendant was still inside the casino, Mr. Sumo left and went to his vehicle. He was talking on his phone. As Mr. Sumo walked back toward the casino, he passed Defendant under an awning, and the two stopped and shook hands. They then casually walked to the parking lot and got in Mr. Sumo's car. With Mr. Sumo driving, the two headed toward Sam's Club. Video surveillance from Sam's showed Mr. Sumo's vehicle traveling eastbound in front of Sam's, and a subject was seen walking in the same direction that the car was traveling. At this point, the subject was not identifiable, but his light-colored shirt was visible. Detective Sanders was asked for a better description of what the Sam's Club video showed and whether she saw Defendant moving through the Sam's Club parking lot. She responded:

So when you see the subject walking, it is by Mr. Sumo's car. It comes back. And as he gets closer through the front parking lot of Sam's, you can clearly see that it is Mr. Mekuria, because a long sleeve blue shirt button-down, and his shirt is untucked on the right side. So you see him walking through the parking lot and through the tire portion of Sam's, and you can see him even closer, still wearing the same clothes with the shirt untucked.

Video surveillance showed Defendant then went to Buffalo Wild Wings’ parking lot, then next door to Arby's parking lot. He then went back to Buffalo Wild Wings, where he entered the restaurant, wandered around inside, sat at a table for a short time, and then left. Two witnesses inside the restaurant, Semra Stephens and Misty Free, both Golden Nugget cocktail waitresses having a drink after work, recognized Defendant because he frequently played baccarat at the casino. They described his behavior that day as very odd as he was pacing back and forth in the parking lot. They said he was usually very calm and well-dressed, with his shirt tucked in. On that day, they described him as nervous, sweaty, and wearing a long sleeve light blue shirt which was untucked. When Ms. Stephens and Ms. Free found out a shooting had taken place, they looked up the victim on Facebook and recognized him from playing baccarat. They said they saw the victim and Defendant playing baccarat at different tables that day, and the two men did not speak.

Detective Sanders testified that after Defendant left Buffalo Wild Wings, he crossed Cagle Lane and walked back toward the Golden Nugget Casino where he was picked up on Corporal Puckett's dash cam video as he responded to Mr. Sumo's accident scene.  ² Through further video footage, Detective Sanders observed Defendant get into his vehicle and drive off. His license plate was captured by a license plate reader at 5:31 p.m. as he crossed back into Texas. Detective Sanders was asked whether she was sure of her identification of Defendant in the video footage she was provided and from which she created a photographic timeline, and she said she was positive.

Ms. Semra Stephens, one of the witnesses in Buffalo Wild Wings, testified that she saw Defendant in the restaurant and recognized him as a baccarat player. What caught her attention was that Defendant who was typically neatly dressed and calm, was “[v]ery sweaty, panicked looking, scary, back and forth pacing.” He had one side of his shirt untucked which she described as “different, and it was out of place.” She testified that she knew the victim as a baccarat player at the casino as well.

On cross-examination, Ms. Stephens testified that she passed the scene of the victim's vehicle accident on her way to Buffalo Wild Wings, but she did not see Defendant at the scene. She also did not observe a gun on Defendant at Buffalo Wild Wings. As for Defendant's behavior, Ms. Stephens acknowledged that losing money gambling could cause someone to be nervous. On redirect examination, Ms. Stephens testified that when she learned there had been a shooting, her observations of the Defendant led her to contact law enforcement.

Ms. Misty Free, a former cocktail waitress at Golden Nugget Casino, testified that she worked the baccarat area on September 23, 2022, and when she got off work at 4:00 p.m., she and some friends drove from the casino to Buffalo Wild Wings. Along the way, they passed a vehicle that had run into the trees, and there were police cars, ambulances, and a fire truck at the scene. At the restaurant, she saw Defendant, a frequent baccarat player at the casino. Ms. Free said she saw Defendant at the baccarat tables “[m]aybe one a week, or once or twice a month.” She identified Defendant in court. As she approached the restaurant, Ms. Free saw Defendant pacing back and forth in front of the building. She described him as sweaty, and appearing worried or anxious, “[s]eemed like something was going on.” Though he was normally very well-kempt, his shirt was untucked. She observed him walking in and out of the restaurant, noting that it did not appear that he was there for food or to meet anyone.

On cross-examination, Ms. Free stated that although she observed Defendant and the victim seated at the same baccarat table, she never saw the two interact. She testified that in her opinion, Defendant was not a “huge better.” On the day of the incident, she saw that the victim had a lot of money on the table. Ms. Free was asked whether she had ever seen Defendant win money while he was gambling, and she responded:

A. Not anything crazy. I mean, I usually would see black chips, maybe purple chips, which is $100 or $500 chips. In general, from a general point of view, people that gamble, right, sometimes from, based on what you are saying, you have seen a lot of people gamble, win money, I would assume, a lot of money, and you've seen a lot of people lose a lot of money. But we don't really know their backgrounds on these people, right? So what I'm getting at, is it possible that he lost a lot of money on this day, and he was just extremely nervous when you saw him at Buffalo Wild Wings?

A. I mean, yes. Anything can happen. Yes.

Ms. Free testified that she did not see Defendant on her way to Buffalo Wild Wings, and she did not see Defendant with a gun at any point.

Sergeant Kevin Hoover, the lead detective in the case, testified that in the nineteen days following the murder, Defendant did not return to the Golden Nugget Casino, though prior to that time, he had frequented the casino about every other week. Additionally, detectives noticed that every night following the murder, Defendant did not stay at the same location. He stayed at locations for only a few hours at a time. Law enforcement could not identify any place as Defendant's home; however, Detective Hoover said it was possible Defendant was primarily staying in his car because he was a driver for a limo service. Defendant was arrested in Houston, Texas, without incident. A search of Defendant's car revealed a concealed handgun license, a photograph of which was shown to the jury. The photograph showed the license expired on May 16, 2003, but this was not mentioned during trial. No gun was found in Defendant's car.

Detective Hoover confirmed that the amount of money found in the victim's car was $8,000.00 in hundred-dollar bills and $10,055.00 in casino chips. During his testimony, Detective Hoover reviewed Detective Sanders’ Power Point timeline, providing more details regarding the time that events occurred. He noted that the victim did not appear to be under duress when he and Defendant entered the victim's car. Detective Hoover testified that State's Exhibit 128 showed Defendant getting into the victim's vehicle and the two driving off. State's Exhibit 129 showed the car exiting the casino at 4:20:32 p.m. The next photograph, introduced as State's Exhibit 130 showed the victim's vehicle in front of Sam's Club at 4:23:14 p.m. State's Exhibit 132, one of the 9-1-1 calls, was made at 4:24:04 p.m. Detective Hoover testified that State's Exhibit 134 was a photograph of the vehicle accident scene taken at 4:26 p.m., showing a subject wearing similar clothing to Defendant walking toward Sam's Club. State's Exhibit 136 showed an individual in the same type of clothing walking in front of the Sam's Club tire shop at 4:29 p.m. State's Exhibit 137 was a photograph taken “in Buffalo Wild Wings and Arby's, kind of pacing back and forth.” State's Exhibit 139 showed Defendant and Ms. Stephens entering Buffalo Wild Wings. The next photograph, State's Exhibit 140, showed Defendant at a table in the restaurant, where he stayed for about two minutes. State's Exhibit 141 showed Defendant walking down nearby Cagle Lane, south of Sam's Club and north of the interstate. In State's Exhibit 142, Defendant was picked up on Sergeant Puckett's dash-cam video walking back toward the casino at 4:51 p.m. State's Exhibits 146 and 147 showed the individual getting into Defendant's vehicle and leaving.

In support of Defendant's claim that the State failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator, he points to the following facts: there was no bullet or fragment found in the victim's vehicle, there was no damage to the driver's seat or door, there was no evidence that a struggle occurred inside the vehicle, the gun was fired from beyond two feet from the victim's body, and no weapon was seen in or around the vehicle. Further, although Detective Hoover testified that Defendant was near the scene as people were rendering aid to the victim, no one saw him there, and no one saw a passenger in the vehicle as it traveled down Sam's Way. Additionally, Defendant points out that with people arriving on the scene shortly after the crash, it would be difficult for someone to exit the passenger side of the vehicle undetected. Further, no one saw Defendant with a gun, and no one saw the Defendant and victim interact that day. Finally, Defendant notes the quality of the still shots used in Detective Sanders’ slide show was insufficient to determine the identity of the person, especially considering Detective Sanders admitted that the image of the person walking east along the roadway the victim's car had traversed was too far away to identify the person.

The comment complained of by Defendant at issue occurred during Detective Hoover's testimony. When Detective Hoover identified S-69 as a photograph of Defendant at the casino kiosk machine, the following exchange ensued:

Q. S-69?

A. This is Mr. Mekuria at the kiosk machine. It is kind of like an A.T.M., and it takes facial pictures that are [unintelligible] quality.

MR. HALL:

Judge, at this time, I am asking for some identification. I am asking the jury to regard State's 69, State's 52, State's 69, and Mr. Mekuria's appearance in open court today as he sits before you. I would ask the defendant be ordered to stand and face the jury, please.

MR. VIDRINE:

I object to that, Judge. There is no need - -

MR. HALL:

In-court identification.

MR. VIDRINE:

He has clearly already been identified by a previous witness. There is no need for him to just stand up to display how he is. It is irrelevant and not needed.

THE COURT:

Mr. Hall, I don't - -

MR. HALL:

Judge, when I asked the jury to look at him, he was refusing to look at them. And if he had just looked at them, I wouldn't have asked it.

MR. VIDRINE:

He doesn't have to look anywhere, Judge. That again, doesn't make any sense, and is irrelevant.

MR. HALL:

Making an identification of somebody at his murder trial could not be more relevant.

MR. VIDRINE:

He has already been identified by Ms. Stephens.

MR. HALL:

Judge, I understand it is maybe something you have never done. I can tell you that - - I know you are not going to like me citing myself as authority but I have done this. This is an accepted practice. Identifications, back before we started, used to always be done this way.

MR. VIDRINE:

I disagree, Judge.

THE COURT:

Mr. Hall, I think if I was a little more worried about his identification, I probably would agree with you. I don't think that is really at issue in this particular case.

MR. HALL:

Okay, Judge.

THE COURT:

I would sustain the objection.

MR. HALL:

Okay, Judge. You drive, and I take your orders. We are good. I will take his resistance to my request as evidence of identification.

(emphasis added.)

The defense made no objection. In its brief, the State first focuses on the lack of a contemporaneous objection. However, if a contemporaneous objection was not required for preservation of the issue, the State argues that Defendant mischaracterized the comment as the prosecutor was simply attempting to identify Defendant as the person in the casino, not as the shooter. The fact that Defendant was in the casino was not disputed. Finally, the State contends that if error occurred, it was not reversible as the comment did not influence the jury and contribute to the verdict.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 772 provides, “The judge in the presence of the jury shall not comment upon the facts of the case, either by commenting upon or recapitulating the evidence, repeating the testimony of any witness, or giving an opinion as to what has been proved, not proved, or refuted.”

In State v. Refuge, 300 So.2d 489, 492 (La.1974), the supreme court strictly applied the contemporaneous objection rule to an alleged Article 772 violation:

The defendant's final contention is that certain remarks by the trial judge amounted to comments on the evidence prohibited by C.Cr.P. Art. 772, and that these comments constitute ‘patent error’ which this Court may notice without a bill of exceptions. We cannot consider this objection because no bills of exceptions were perfected preserving it, as required by C.Cr.P. Art. 841. By failing to object timely and to reserve a bill of exceptions, the defendant waived his right to subsequently attack the judgment on this ground. Nor does this constitute error discoverable from an inspection of the pleadings and proceedings under the jurisprudential construction of C.Cr.P. Art. 920. See State v. Palmer, 251 La. 759, 206 So.2d 485 (1968). That article permits consideration on appeal of ‘any error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and Without inspection of the evidence.’ (Emphasis supplied.) The error complained of here, if error, occurred during the taking of evidence on guilt or innocence and that evidence is not a part of the pleadings and proceedings. Therefore, any alleged comments on the evidence by the trial judge are not a part of the record for the purpose of finding ‘patent error.’

In State v. Howard, 93-74, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d 489, 493, writ denied, 94-2944 (La. 3/17/95), 651 So.2d 266, this court applied the contemporaneous objection rule but proceeded to address the merits of the issue:

Defendant alleges that the trial court commented on the evidence in violation of La.C.Cr.P. art. 772 when he remarked, “Do me a favor and be very careful with the gun” at the time the pistol was introduced into evidence. However, defense counsel failed to object to the alleged comment, and therefore waived his right to argue this assignment on appeal. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 841; State v. Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc., 412 So.2d 594, 597 (La.1982).

Even if we were to accept defendant's invitation to consider this assignment, despite his failure to raise it in the trial court, we believe that the trial judge's remark in no way implied an opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence.

In State v. Colligan, 95-880, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/7/96), 679 So.2d 184, 189–90 (alterations in original), this court reversed the defendant's conviction based on the following jury charge:

The defendant is charged with molestation of a juvenile. John W. Colligan, at the Parish of Evangeline on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993 did willfully and unlawfully violate Revised Statutes 14:81.2 relative to molestation of a juvenile in that being over the age of 17 years did commit the lewd and lascivious act of molestation upon the person of [A.F.], and in the presence of [A.F.], a child under the age of 17 years with the intent of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of himself or and/or the said child by the use of influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the child.

This court concluded:

In this case, the trial judge informed the jury that the defendant was guilty. The state contends that the judge was merely reading the bill of information to the jury, that this was clear to the jury, and that the jury was not misled. While the trial judge's action can be interpreted as the state suggests, we cannot agree that such an interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation to a jury. At no time did the trial judge inform the jury that he was only reading the bill of information to them. The jury is comprised of six ordinary people with little or no knowledge of the law or trial procedure. One cannot say that it is not prejudicial to the defendant when the trial judge informs them that the defendant is guilty. Due to his position of authority in the courtroom, the jurors would no doubt place a great deal of weight on the fact that the judge, with his vast knowledge of the law and experience in the courtroom, has just informed them that he believes the defendant to be guilty. We do not believe that the trial judge intentionally led the jurors to believe that the defendant was guilty; it was no doubt only an oversight on his part to not inform the jurors that he was reading from the bill of information. Despite his good intentions, the trial judge's charge resulted in a comment on the evidence by the presiding judge to the maximum extent imaginable. The judge in our adversary system of justice is delegated to the role of an impartial umpire. State v. Williams, 375 So.2d 1379 (La.1979).

․

We find that the trial judge's comment in this case could reasonably be inferred to express the judge's opinion as to the defendant's guilt.

Additionally, although the state has not argued it with regards to this assignment of error, we are cognizant of the fact that the defendant failed to raise this objection at the time of trial. For the same reasons stated relative to the prosecutor's remarks, we conclude that this issue is properly before us despite the defendant's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule.

Id. at 190.³

Finally, in State v. Walker, 97-1180 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98), 710 So.2d 304, this court addressed a situation in which the trial judge, in response to a jury request, read the definition of manslaughter, but then added that he did not previously provide them with the manslaughter definition because it did not fit the set of facts, although it was always available as a responsive verdict “if [they] choose to do it.” Id. at 305. This court found reversible error resulted from this violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 772:

The no-judge-comment rule is designed to safeguard the role of the jury as the sole judge of the facts on the issue of guilt or innocence. State v. Hodgeson, 305 So.2d 421 (La.1974). Thus, if the effect of a comment is to permit a reasonable inference that it expresses or implies the judge's opinion as to the defendant's innocence or guilt, this constitutes a violation of the defendant's statutory right to no-comment and thus requires reversal. State v. Green, 231 La. 1058, 93 So.2d 657 (1957). To constitute reversible error, however, the effect of the improper comment must be such as to have influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091 (La.1983).

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 814(A)(3), when a defendant is charged with second degree murder, the responsive verdicts available to the jury are: guilty (as charged), guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty. It is obvious from the jury's two specific requests for the trial court to define manslaughter, the first request in writing and the second verbalized in open court, that they wanted the definition of that offense. The trial court's comment that the definition of manslaughter did not fit the facts of the case may have influenced the jury in such a way that the defendant lost his chance of the lesser verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The jury wanted to know the definition of manslaughter and 38 minutes later its vote was unanimous for conviction of second degree murder. Believing the trial judge to be more knowledgeable in the law, the jury very likely believed that he meant what he said: that manslaughter did not fit the facts of defendant's case as a matter of fact. This was a comment on the evidence, inadvertent, probably, but nevertheless real.

The defendant did not contemporaneously object to this comment. Upon the jury's return with the verdict, but before the verdict was read, defense counsel objected to the court's comment. The trial court did not entertain the objection since it was not made at a time when the trial court could have corrected any error. This court recognizes an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule when the trial judge's remarks to the jury are extremely inflammatory and prejudicial, requiring a reversal. See State v. Colligan, 95-880 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/7/96); 679 So.2d 184.

For the foregoing reasons, we must reverse the conviction on the charge of second degree murder and remand the case for a new trial.

Id. at 305–06.

The State is required to prove Defendant's identity as the perpetrator, and Defendant's identity as the shooter was clearly at issue in this case. Contrary to the State's assertion, the judge's comment was not limited to the identification of Defendant inside the casino. Rather, the judge stated that he did not think Defendant's identity was at issue in the case. As in Colligan, we find the judge's comment was entirely accidental and only a reference to there

being no doubt that Defendant was the person in the casino. Nevertheless, we must find that this comment constitutes reversible error, despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection. For this reason, Defendant's conviction is reversed, his sentence vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial.

DECREE

Defendant's conviction is reversed and his sentence vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

CONVICTION REVERSED; SENTENCE VACATED, REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Michael Anthony Mitchell

State Public Defender, Laws

301 Main Street, Ste 700

Baton Rouge, LA 70825

Annette Fuller Roach

LAWS

P.O. BOX 6547

LAKE CHARLES,, LA 70606

Remy V. Starns

State Public Defender, LAWS

301 Main Street Ste. 700

Baton Rouge, LA 70825

Hon. Stephen C. Dwight

14th JDC District Attorney

P. O. Box 3206

Lake Charles, LA 70601

Hon. Bobby Lynn Holmes, Jr.

14Th Judicial District Court

P. O. Box 3210

Lake Charles, LA 70602

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 28, 2026

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ESKINDER SEYIFU MEKURIA

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Written polling was not requested. The record indicates that when the judge asked the jurors whether their verdict was guilty of second-degree murder, they collectively responded affirmatively. The judge stated that all twelve answered affirmatively.

2.   Corporal Brad Puckett of the Lake Charles Police Department was in and around the crime scene. His dash cam recording was introduced as State Exhibit 53.

3.   In a previous assignment of error, the defendant complained of a statement made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal argument to the jury. The State raised the defendant's failure to contemporaneously object, but this court held:Although this article sets forth what appears to be a hard and fast rule, the jurisprudence has developed limited exceptions to its application. See State v. Lee, 346 So.2d 682 (La.1977). Additionally, the supreme court has noted “that a prosecutor's prejudicial comments in closing argument may be considered by a federal court to violate federal due process guarantees even in the absence of a defense challenge or objection at trial.” Id. at 685. Using this due process reasoning, the supreme court has held that despite lack of timely objection by defense counsel to the prosecutor's closing argument, if the remarks are extremely inflammatory and prejudicial, then a reversal is required. See State v. Hayes, 364 So.2d 923 (La.1978) [quoting U.S. v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.1972) ]. Thus, despite the lack of a timely objection by defense counsel in this case, we find the issue is properly before us.Colligan, 679 So.2d at 189 (alteration in original).

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE