ERIEL RENGEL ET AL v. CLECO POWER LLC ET AL (2026)

Cebridge Acquisition, L.P., d/b/a Suddenlink Communications ¹ , appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of Cleco Power, LLC, which found Suddenlink liable to Cleco for damages under the Louisiana Overhead Power Line Safety Act (the Act), La.R.S. 45:141–46. Suddenlink also asserts that its cross-motion for summary judgment should be granted. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and render.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

In the aftermath of Hurricane Laura, crews were working to restore Suddenlink's cable lines in Ball, Louisiana. One of those crews was provided by Dixie Normous Telecom Incorporated (Dixie), a company owned by Eriel Rengel. On September 5, 2020, Rengel's crew was restoring lines at 193 Kinley Road in Ball when Rengel allegedly received a shock that resulted in significant injuries. Rengel's wife, Giselle Cerrato, was working with him and allegedly witnessed the incident.

Rengel sued Cleco for damages, and Cerrato joined the suit to recover Lejeune damages pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2315.6. Cleco asserted cross claims and reconventional demands under the Act against Suddenlink, Infinite Communications Incorporated of Florida, Raygada Communications Corporation, Dixie, and Rengel. Cleco asserts that because it was not notified by the parties that Rengel would be working at the site, they collectively and individually violated the Act, thus entitling Cleco to indemnity against Rengel's and Cerrato's claims for damages. Suddenlink contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding notice to Cleco because representatives of the companies were in frequent contact and discussed areas that Cleco had cleared for Suddenlink to work.

Infinite was a direct contractor of Suddenlink under an “Aerial, Underground or Building Attachment Construction/Plant Maintenance Contract.” Infinite contracted some of the work to Raygada, which in turn contracted with Dixie. Cleco asserts that this arrangement violated the terms of Infinite's contract with Suddenlink.

Cleco argues that because Suddenlink did not authorize Dixie or Rengel to work at the Kinley Road site, Rengel was not an authorized person under the Act. Suddenlink, on the other hand, argues that Dixie was a communication contractor; thus, it and Rengel were authorized persons.

Suddenlink and Cleco filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that Rengel was not an authorized person under the Act, that Suddenlink was responsible for the work, and that Cleco was not notified of the work. Thus, Cleco is entitled to full indemnity against Rengel's and Cerrato's claims.

DISCUSSION

We addressed Cleco's motion for summary judgment obtained against Infinite in Rengel v. Cleco Power, LLC, 26-76 (La.App. 3 Cir. __/__/26), ___ So.3d ___. The same issues are present in this matter except that Suddenlink is more attenuated in the contractual chain from Rengel than Infinite. Nonetheless, we reach the same conclusion about application of the Act to this matter.

Suddenlink and Cleco had a pole attachment agreement. In the aftermath of Hurricane Laura, a number of contractors were hired to restore Suddenlink's communications services. As we discussed in Rengel, ___ So.3d ___, this is a common practice in the industry.

The Act exempts “authorized persons” engaged in various work involving overhead communications circuits:

The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to the construction, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance or removal of overhead electrical or communication circuits or conductors, and their supporting structures and associated equipment, of rail transportation systems, electrical generating systems, transmission or distribution systems, or communications systems by an authorized person.

La.R.S. 45:145(A). “Authorized person” is defined in pertinent part as:

(a) Employees or electrical or communication contractors, including cable television, telephone, and other communication utilities having pole attachment agreements with an owner or operator of high voltage overhead lines with respect to the electrical system of an owner or operator of a high voltage overhead line.

La.R.S. 45:141(1). The exemption in Section 145 focuses on whether the person doing the work is an authorized person. Therefore, the question is whether Rengel was an authorized person. We conclude that because he was a communication contractor for Suddenlink—albeit not directly contracted—Rengel was an authorized person.

In opposition to Cleco's motion for summary judgment, Suddenlink offered by reference the deposition of Dr. John Arthur Palmer, who holds a Ph.D. in electric power engineering. Dr. Palmer indicated that it is not common to de-energize overhead power lines when communications crews are working on communications lines; such work can generally be performed safely without de-energizing or shielding the lines. The Act simply does not envision application to any contractor working to restore the lines of a communications company with a pole attachment agreement.

Cleco argues that even though Suddenlink allegedly did not know of Dixie or Rengel's existence, Suddenlink was supposed to inform it that Rengel was working on the communication lines. In other words, because someone was working on Suddenlink's communications lines that Suddenlink did not know about, Suddenlink was obligated to notify Cleco. Cleco does not explain how this should have been effected. This illustrates one of the problems with Cleco's interpretation of the Act; it would impose liability on those who have no knowledge of who is working on their communication lines.

Cleco also points out that the Act uses the term “subcontractor” when addressing certain activities exempted from the Act. See La.R.S. 45:145(D). Thus, Cleco argues, the legislature understood the difference between a “contractor” and a “subcontractor” and chose to use both terms in the Act; had the legislature intended to exempt “subcontractors” in La.R.S. 45:145(A), it would have used the term. We disagree.

Subsection (D) provides:

The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to the employees, contractors, or subcontractors of chemical, petrochemical, natural gas and liquid pipelines, gas processing, refining, pulp and paper, and wood products manufacturing facilities when such persons are engaged in activities relating to the operation, maintenance, or expansion of such manufacturing facilities.

Subsection (A), on the other hand, exempts “authorized persons” engaged in the listed activities involving communications systems. Outside of Subsection (D), the Act does not address the activities of individuals engaged in the petroleum or wood products manufacturing industries. The legislature chose in Subsection (A) to simply exempt “authorized persons;” having made that choice, the legislature was not required to address “contractors,” “subcontractors,” “subcontractors of subcontractors,” etc. It referenced the definition in La.R.S. 45:141 without the need to address the issue of whether subcontractors were included in the exemption. That is determined by the definition in Section 141.

“Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” La.R.S. 1:3. “When the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” La.R.S. 1:4. We find no ambiguity in the legislature's use of the term “contractor.” In the context of the relationship between overhead power line owners and communications providers and in light of prevailing practices in the industry, it is clear that the exemption contained in La.R.S. 45:145 applies to all contractors of communication providers with pole attachment agreements when engaged in the “construction, reconstruction, operation, and maintenance or removal of ․ communication circuits or conductors, and their supporting structures and associated equipment, of․ communications systems[.]”

As we understand the common and approved usage, a “contractor” is a party to a contract. A “subcontractor” is simply a contractor of a contractor. Not all contractors are subcontractors, but all subcontractors are contractors.

Dixie, Rengel's employer, was a communications contractor of Suddenlink engaged in such work. It is particularly true in the aftermath of a natural disaster that communications service providers such as Suddenlink are required to engage large numbers of contractors if their services are to be restored in a timely manner. This is a common practice, and it is a practice that the Act was not intended to impede.

The judgment in favor of Cleco Power, LLC, against Cebridge Acquisition, L.P., d/b/a Suddenlink Communications, is reversed. We grant Cebridge Acquisition, L.P., d/b/a Suddenlink Communications’ motion for summary judgment against Cleco Power, LLC, and hold that Cebridge Acquisition, L.P., d/b/a Suddenlink Communications, is not liable to Cleco Power, LLC, under the Louisiana Overhead Power Line Safety Act. All other causes of action available to Cleco Power, LLC, are reserved herein. All costs of this appeal are taxed to Cleco Power, LLC.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Robert A. Dunkelman

Pettiette, Armand, Dunkelman

400 Texas St, #400

Shreveport, LA 71166-1786

Hon. Mary Lauve Doggett

Judge, 9th JDC

701 Murray St., Ste. 501

Alexandria, LA 71301

John Jerry Glas

Deutsch, Kerrigan

755 Magazine St.

New Orleans, LA 70130

Mark Felipe Vilar

Faircloth Melton Bash & Green

105 Yorktown Dr.

Alexandria, LA 71303

Joseph A. Devall, Jr.

Attorney at Law

400 Poydras Street, Ste 2107

New Orleans, LA 70130

Patrick R. Follette

Attorney at Law

One Galleria Blvd, Ste 1100

Metairie, LA 70001

Richard G. Duplantier, Jr.

Galloway Johnson Tompkins

701 Poydras Street, Ste 4040

New Orleans, LA 70139

Christian Brownell Bogart

Duplass APLC

433 Metairie Road, Ste 600

Metairie, LA 70005

Henry Minor Pipes, III

Pipes Miles Beckman, LLC

1100 Poydras St., #3300

New Orleans, LA 70163

Rachel G. Webre

Laborde Siegel, LLC

701 Poydras St., Ste. 4800

New Orleans, LA 70139

Aaron L. Green

Faircloth Melton Bash & Green

105 Yorktown Dr.

Alexandria, LA 71303

Cavett Feazel

Attorney at Law

400 Texas Street Suite 400

Shreveport, LA 71101

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 28, 2026

Docket Number: CA 26-247

ERIEL RENGEL, ET AL.

VERSUS

CLECO POWER, LLC, ET AL.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-247

ERIEL RENGEL, ET AL.

VERSUS

CLECO POWER, LLC, ET AL.

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on October 28, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 269,362 HONORABLE MARY LAUVE DOGGETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE

SJC

WLS

CD

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Wilbur L. Stiles, and Clayton Davis, Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Due to the corporate structure of Appellant, we will refer to Altice, Inc., Cebridge Acquisitions, and Suddenlink as “Suddenlink.”

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE