STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ANGELIQUE JESUSA SANDERS (2026)

In an amended bill of information, the State charged Defendant Angelique Jesusa Sanders with first-offense battery of a dating partner with a dangerous weapon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:34.9(C) and (O).¹

On October 23, 2024, the parties selected a twelve-person jury with no alternate. Said jury immediately began hearing evidence; on the same date, it found Defendant guilty as charged.

On March 24, 2025, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five years at hard labor, with all but fifteen days suspended. The court allowed Defendant to serve the fifteen days of incarceration in the Sabine Parish Jail on weekends, but the time was to be served within two months. Defendant was placed on supervised probation with special conditions, including prohibition from contact with the victim.

Defendant now appeals her conviction, assigning a single error.

FACTS

According to victim Avsalom Wysinger, on November 27, 2023, he was with Defendant, who was his girlfriend at the time. They spent the day together at the home of Wysinger's grandfather. At some point, Wysinger's mother called and asked him for permission to use his laptop; he agreed to let her use it but had to get it from Defendant's mother's house. Defendant and Wysinger borrowed his grandfather's truck to go get the laptop, but they began arguing along the way. When they reached their destination, Defendant unlocked the door of the house but blocked it, as she wanted to continue talking. Her hand was on the doorknob.

Wysinger wanted to get the computer, so he grabbed Defendant's hand that was on the doorknob, “got it to open the door,” “bumped shoulders,” and he entered through the doorway. As will be discussed later, there was disputed testimony regarding whether Defendant's mother told him to enter. Wysinger walked into the living room, then passed through the kitchen into Defendant's room. Defendant took the same path but armed herself with a kitchen knife along the way. She entered her room with the knife. Wysinger grabbed her and threw her onto the bed. He received cuts on his left hand and left forearm. They struggled on the bed, and he disarmed Defendant. They both got up. According to Wysinger, Defendant advanced again, this time without the knife, so he grabbed her neck with both hands and held her down on the bed. Defendant's mother yelled at him to get off Defendant, so he did.

As Wysinger left with the laptop, Defendant's mother banned him from the house and threatened to call the police. Wysinger drove alone to his grandfather's home. His grandfather noticed that Wysinger was bleeding and took him to the hospital. Wysinger received stitches, and his mother called the police.

Defendant's account of events was generally similar. However, Defendant testified that when she blocked the door to her mother's home to continue talking, Wysinger acted aggressively. She stated he clenched his fists and then forcefully pushed her into the outside wall before he entered the house. Then he swung open the door and entered the house. After a few minutes, she went into the house, entered the kitchen, and saw Wysinger standing in her room. She armed herself with a kitchen knife because he looked angry, but she testified that she threw the knife on her bed because she did not want the situation to get worse. However, as she stepped toward him, he threw her on the bed and bearhugged her from behind. According to Defendant, she then grabbed the knife and stabbed the victim to get him off her. His response was to start choking her. Wysinger did not let go and leave until Defendant's mother threatened to call the police.

Defendant's mother, the only other eyewitness to any of the pertinent events, testified in a manner generally supportive of Defendant's version of events.

As will be discussed in more detail below, the jury apparently found Wysinger more credible, as it convicted Defendant.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In her sole assignment of error, Defendant argues the evidence adduced against her by the State was insufficient to support her conviction. The analysis for insufficiency claims is well-settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Thus, the State had to prove the elements of battery of a dating partner, as set forth in La.R.S. 14:34.9, which stated in pertinent part at the time of the offense:

A. Battery of a dating partner is the intentional use of force or violence committed by one dating partner upon the person of another dating partner.

․

B․

(3) “Dating partner” means any person who is involved or has been involved in a sexual or intimate relationship with the offender characterized by the expectation of affectionate involvement independent of financial considerations, regardless of whether the person presently lives or formerly lived in the same residence with the offender. “Dating partner” shall not include a casual relationship or ordinary association between persons in a business or social context.

․

C. On a first conviction, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the offender shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more than six months. At least forty-eight hours of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence ․

․

O. Except as provided in Subsection P of this Section [serious bodily injury], if the intentional use of force or violence is committed with a dangerous weapon, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than ten years.

On appeal, Defendant does not argue that the elements of the underlying offense were not proven. Instead, she argues the State failed to negate self-defense or show she was the aggressor, arguing that she had the right to stand her ground. Defendant relies on La.R.S. 14:19; which stated, in pertinent part, at the time of the offense:

A. (1) The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable under either of the following circumstances

(a) When committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense.

(b)(i) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40) when the conflict began, against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person using the force or violence reasonably believes that the use of force or violence is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.

․

(2) The provisions of Paragraph (1) of this Section shall not apply where the force or violence results in a homicide.

B. For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of force or violence was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle, if both of the following occur:

(1) The person against whom the force or violence was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.

(2) The person who used force or violence knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.

C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using force or violence as provided for in this Section and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.

D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used force or violence in defense of his person or property had a reasonable belief that force or violence was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a forcible offense or to prevent the unlawful entry.

Defendant claims she acted in self-defense and had the right to stand her ground in the home she lived in. The State acknowledges that Defendant's brief properly describes “the stand-your-ground principle,” but argues it does not apply in the current case. Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 390(A), “In any criminal proceeding in which the justification of self-defense is raised pursuant to R.S. 14:19 or 20, the state shall have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.”²

The “Facts” section above is based on the trial testimonies of Wysinger and Defendant. As the State acknowledges, Defendant's version of events is largely congruent with Wysinger's. Key points of difference are that Wysinger claimed Defendant's mother called out permission for him to enter the house. They also differed regarding whether Defendant was armed with the knife when Wysinger threw her on the bed and bearhugged her.

The only other eyewitness was Defendant's mother, Elizabeth Esposito. She testified that on November 27, 2023, she was in her recliner “[a] little ways from the front door[ ]” when she heard Defendant and Wysinger talking on her front porch. Next, Wysinger was “flying through the house,” then Esposito heard Defendant “fidgeting in the kitchen.” She heard other noises, so she went to Defendant's room to see what was happening.

In Defendant's room, Esposito saw that Wysinger was holding Defendant down on the bed, and Defendant was holding the knife in one hand. Esposito's description of the scene was not clear, but apparently this was when the victim was holding Defendant in a bearhug from behind. Esposito's description suggested the two were lying on their sides on the bed, but again her testimony was not clear on this point.

According to Esposito, she demanded the knife, and Defendant gave it to her. However, Wysinger then got on top of Defendant and choked her. Esposito pulled on Wysinger and punched him in the calf. He responded by kicking backward, striking her. Esposito then threatened to call the police, so Wysinger got up and walked out of the room. He left the house slowly, eventually getting in the truck. Esposito thought he was waiting to see Defendant, who was still recovering from being choked.

Wysinger's mother, Sinissia Wysinger, testified, but she was not an eyewitness to the crime. She testified about her 911 call from the hospital.

Deputy Joshua Corley of the Sabine Parish Sheriff's Office testified that he responded to the call. He was with the Many Police Department at the time. At the hospital, Deputy Corley made contact with Wysinger and the treating nurse, who advised that the Wysinger's wounds were not life-threatening. Deputy Corley relayed basic information about the incident to Detective James Young and then proceeded to the crime scene. He and Detective Young arrived at about the same time. Defendant recounted a scenario similar to the one that Wysinger had described. She admitted arming herself with a steak knife. She could not identify the exact knife she used, so the deputy collected three. Also, Defendant acknowledged starting an argument with Wysinger.

Detective Young testified that he was the investigator assigned to the case. Detective Young activated his body camera at the scene. The State played the recording at trial.

In the transcription of the bodycam footage, Esposito told the officers that Wysinger choked Defendant, that she tried to pull him off Defendant, and that he kicked her. The officers acknowledged the marks on Defendant's neck. Defendant described a scenario similar to the one described in her testimony and Wysinger's. Defendant stated that she and Wysinger were arguing in the truck on the way to pick up the laptop. When they got to the house, she tried to stop him, but he pushed past her and entered. She also stated that she was in the wrong for trying to stop him. The context suggests her attempt to stop him was based on her wish to continue talking, not on any concern about his entering the house.

Defendant acknowledged arming herself with a knife, but as mentioned earlier, she could not identify the exact knife she used. The conversation was not clear, but she indicated that she stabbed Wysinger to get free of the hold he had on her. Esposito claimed Wysinger was not bleeding when he left the scene. Defendant told the officers that Wysinger got on top of her and choked her, apparently after he released the bearhug. Defendant expressed the feeling that she caused the incident by arguing with Wysinger and trying to block him at the door.

The State's photographic exhibits of the parties’ injuries are not particularly edifying, as there is no dispute that both were injured during the incident. Also, as mentioned earlier, the audio of the 911 call and the police interview at the scene were transcribed into the record. The State also introduced a text conversation between the parties in which Defendant was very apologetic about the incident. For his part, Wysinger acknowledged that he had treated Defendant poorly in the past.

Comparing the testimonies of Defendant and Wysinger in light of La.R.S 14:34.9, it is clear they were dating at the time of the offense and that Defendant inflicted violence upon Wysinger. The current question of whether Defendant may properly exercise the “stand your ground” provision of La.R.S. 14:19 involves the credibility of each of the foregoing witnesses. In Wysinger's version of events, Defendant's mother advised him to enter the home; thus, his entry was arguably not unlawful pursuant to La.R.S. 14:19(A)(1)(b)(i). As the district court observed at sentencing, the question of whether Wysinger had permission to enter the home was a point of contention in the case.

Wysinger testified that Defendant's mother told him and Defendant to come into the house. The testimonies of Defendant and her mother did not directly refute the assertion. Defendant's mother merely implied there was no such consent, as she indicated she was surprised by Wysinger's sudden entry into the home. Defendant's testimony did not address whether her mother gave the verbal consent asserted by Wysinger. However, she did contend that she blocked the door, and Wysinger pushed past her. Defendant did not indicate that she made any verbal statement or command to the victim that he not enter the home.

It was within the jury's province to believe Wysinger's testimony. State v. Hypolite, 04-1658, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1275, 1279, writ denied, 06-618 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 381. The fifth circuit succinctly stated in State v. Lassus, 24-115, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), 409 So.3d 872, 878, the elements of an unauthorized entry into a dwelling, explaining:

An unauthorized entry is an entry without consent, express or implied. State v. Rivet, 01-353 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/25/01), 798 So.2d 219, 224. In the case of a private residence, a person must have the consent of the occupant or an occupant's agent to constitute a defense to unauthorized entry. This consent must be given by a person with authority or capacity to consent. State v. Kirsch, 04-214 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/04), 880 So.2d 890, 894.

Wysinger testified he had Esposito's consent to enter the residence, and Esposito certainly had authority or capacity to give consent. The jury believed his testimony and rejected Defendant's version of the events. In order for “the stand your ground” defense to apply as argued by Defendant, the entry or attempted entry would have to have been unlawful. Given that Defendant acknowledged that the reason she and Wysinger were at the house was to retrieve the laptop, that Wysinger testified he had been a frequent visitor to the house, that he testified that Esposito authorized his entry, and Defendant's equivocal testimony to the contrary, it is not for us to question the jury's credibility decision as to its conclusion.

Additionally, once Wysinger entered the house, it is not clear that Defendant sought to make him leave. When the State cross-examined her, Defendant suggested that she thought Wysinger would leave, but she did not state that she meant to make him leave or even that she wanted him to leave. Esposito gave similar testimony that Wysinger could have easily left. Neither witness testified that Defendant armed herself and approached Wysinger with the goal of making him leave. Defendant testified that she armed herself out of fear because Wysinger looked angry. Thus, there was no explicit testimony that the Defendant was trying to force Wysinger to leave. Again, the “stand your ground” provisions are inapplicable based on the credibility determination that Wysinger had authority to enter.

In Wysinger's retelling of the pertinent events, Defendant approached him with the knife, and he responded by grabbing her, taking her down onto the bed, and disarming her. The controlling statute, La.R.S. 14:21, states: “A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.”

Defendant cites State v. Coutee, 23-1549 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 408 (per curiam), as support for her position that the “stand your ground” law overrides the aggressor doctrine and self-defense in this case. However, that argument cannot prevail in light of the jury's conclusion that Wysinger did not unlawfully enter the home. Nor do we find the argument that a co-inhabitant's consent to search is nullified by the objection of another present co-inhabitant applies to this situation, as opposed to search and seizure cases. See State v. Percy, 48,922 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 137 So.3d 184, and State v. Barabin, 13-334 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/11/13), 124 So.3d 1121 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006)). We find no case applying such in the context of “stand your ground” law. The issue has been discussed only in the context of search and seizure law, i.e., consent to search a residence. Considering that the jury did not accept Defendant's testimony as to the nature of the entry is further reason for the inapplicability of the argument.

As Defendant does not otherwise argue that the elements of the underlying offense were not proven, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's conviction of first-offense battery of a dating partner with a dangerous weapon and the sentence imposed are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Sherry Watters

LAWS

P. O. Box 58769

New Orleans, LA 70158-8769

Michael Anthony Mitchell

State Public Defender, Laws

301 Main Street, Ste 700

Baton Rouge, LA 70825

Hon. Verity Gentry

District Judge 11th JDC

PO Box 9

Many, LA 71449

Hon. Don M. Burkett

District Attorney

P. O. Box 1557

Many, LA 71449

Remy V. Starns

State Public Defender LAWS

301 Main Street Ste. 700

Baton Rouge, LA 70825

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 28, 2026

Docket Number: KA 26-183

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ANGELIQUE JESUSA SANDERS

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The amendment deleted the term “domestic abuse,” which appeared in the original bill, and added the term “of a dating partner.” Also, it substituted the designation “34.9” for “35.3.”

2.   The effective date of La.Code Crim.P. art. 390 was August 1, 2024. The crime at issue occurred on November 27, 2023, and the trial took place on October 23, 2024. Regarding the application of the article, the first circuit stated:The legislature did not express its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application of La. Code Crim. P. art. 390. Thus, as no such intent was expressed, we must classify La. Code Crim. P. art. 390 as either substantive, procedural, or interpretive. As it prescribes a method for enforcing a defendant's substantive right to assert the justification of self-defense in relation to the operation of La. R.S. 14:19 or La. R.S. 14:20 at trial, we find La. Code Crim. P. art. 390 is procedural law that may be applied retroactively.State v. Fair, 24-759, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/11/25), 417 So.3d 1166, 1176, writ denied, 25-933 (La. 1/21/26), 424 So.3d 1092, cert. denied, “__ U.S. __, 146 S.Ct. 2791 (2026).

GUY E. BRADBERRY JUDGE