ENTERGY LOUISIANA LLC v. ROBERT FAMILY NO LLC JOHNELL SMITH OLLIE LOUISE SMITH HOWARD ANNA SMITH HOWARD JOAN MARIE MACK HILLARY SMITH SR DAHHIA SMITH JOHNSON HENRY SMITH JR BEVERLY ELIE GWENDOLYN GRAHAM TYRONE SMITH SR DONNALYN THOMAS DEQUAN SMITH MELISHIA LEWIS JOHNSON AUDREY LEWIS MCKINLEY LEWIS GEORGE LEWIS BRENDA RAVEN PAYTON IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BRENDA RAVEN PAYTON LIVING TRUST BARRY RAVEN DARRY RAVEN JERRY RAVEN SR VERONICA LEWIS AND EARL DEMPSEY PENDARVIS JR IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE EARL DEMPSEY PENDARVIS JR LIVING TRUST (2026)

Entergy Louisiana, LLC (“Entergy”) appeals the judgment of the trial court denying its petition for expropriation of personal servitude of right of use in favor of the Robert Family No. 1, L.L.C. (“Robert”) and dismissing all claims made by Entergy against Robert. For the reasons that follow, we reverse, render, and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 30, 2025, Entergy filed a petition under La. R.S. 19:1, et seq. to expropriate servitudes of right of use pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 639, et seq. to locate, construct, operate, and maintain power lines on and over the defendants’ properties, with accessory rights necessary for the exercise of the servitudes, including the rights of ingress and egress to, from, or along the property subject to the servitude across the adjoining land of the respective defendants.¹ Entergy named as defendants the owners of three separate tracts of land in Ascension Parish, which included Robert as the owner of the tract identified as LA ASC 001. Also named as defendants were the owners of LA ASC 004, Earl Dempsey Pendarvis, Jr., and The Earl Dempsey Pendarvis, Jr. Living Trust (“Pendarvis”),² and the owners of LA ASC 002, Johnell Smith, Ollie Louise Smith-Howard, Anna Smith-Howard, Joan Marie Mack, Hillary W. Smith, Sr., Dahhia Smith Johnson, Henry Smith, Jr., Beverly A. Elie, Gwendolyn Graham, Tyrone Smith, Sr., Donnalyn Thomas, Dequan Smith, Melishia Lewis Johnson, Audrey Lewis, McKinley Lewis, George Lewis, Brenda Raven Payton, in her capacity as Trustee of the Brenda Raven Payton Living Trust, Barry Raven, Darry Raven, Jerry Raven, Sr., and Veronica Lewis (the “Smith Heirs”).³

Entergy maintained that the legislature granted public utilities the authority to expropriate property, which enables Entergy to meet its obligation to provide electric service to members of the public within its service territory. See La. R.S. 19:2; La. R.S. 45:121. Particularly, Entergy averred that it must construct transmission and distribution lines in those areas of the state in which it provides service. According to Entergy, some of these transmission lines must be run over private property, requiring it to obtain required servitudes or property rights, either by agreement or through expropriation.

Particularly, Entergy alleged that it was engaged in the construction of two new 500 kilovolt (“kV”) lines from a tap into one of Entergy's existing lines, a project it referred to as Blue Hydrogen. The project was expected to provide electric power to a facility being constructed by Air Products Blue Energy, LLC (“Air Products”) in Ascension Parish. The new 500 kV lines were to be run to a newly constructed substation, identified as Audubon, and were expected to serve the future Air Products facility as well as other customers in Ascension Parish. Entergy further alleged that it chose the location for the needed servitudes to permit timely and minimally intrusive access for construction and maintenance of the transmission lines and in consideration of current land use, effects on landowners, environmental impacts, cultural resource impacts, engineering constraints, and costs. Entergy also alleged that it chose the width of the servitudes based on the requirement that it isolate its conductors from contact with other structures and vegetation, under ordinary conditions and during high winds when electrical conductors experience a “blow-out” (the side-to-side movement of conductors).

Entergy alleged that it complied with the applicable statutory requirements for obtaining servitudes and attempted in good faith to acquire the necessary servitudes by purchase from the named defendants. However, as of the date the petition was filed, none of the named defendants had agreed to accept the compensation offered.

Pertinent to the instant appeal, Robert answered the petition, denying that Entergy negotiated in good faith to acquire the servitude across its property and denying that the transmission lines were being used for a public and necessary purpose. Further responding, Robert averred, in part, that the proposed servitude was not the optimal location for the Blue Hydrogen project; the width of the proposed servitude was excessive and should be limited to 100 feet; and the ingress and egress to the proposed servitude should be restricted to the terminal ends or where a public road crosses the servitude. Robert further requested that, pursuant to La. R.S. 19:8(E), Entergy be required to present a prima facie case of the public and necessary purpose for the expropriation of Robert's property.⁴

The matter proceeded to a half-day bench trial on June 23, 2025, on the bifurcated issue of the public and necessary purpose of the proposed servitude.⁵ See La. R.S. 19:8(A)(2) and (E). The trial court took the matter under advisement and ultimately issued a judgment on January 29, 2026, denying Entergy's petition in favor of Robert, finding that, although the Blue Hydrogen project satisfied the public purpose requirement for the exercise of expropriation authority, “public necessity” was not established.⁶ Entergy appealed and assigned the following as error:

1. The trial court erred in finding that Entergy failed to attempt in good faith to reach an agreement as to compensation.

2. The trial court erred in finding that there was not a necessary purpose for expropriation.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Article I, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(A) Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.

(B)(1) Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. Except as specifically authorized by Article VI, Section 21 of this Constitution property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions: (a) for predominant use by any private person or entity; or (b) for transfer of ownership to any private person or entity.

(2) As used in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and in Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution, “public purpose” shall be limited to the following:

(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property.

(b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or more of the following objectives and uses:

․

(v) Public utilities for the benefit of the public generally.

․

(4) Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 19:2(7), Entergy, a private entity, is authorized to expropriate needed property if it is unable to reach an agreement as to compensation with the owners of property sought to be taken.⁷ See La. R.S. 19:2. Louisiana Revised Statutes 19:2(A) requires, in part, that the “expropriating authority shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement as to compensation with the owner of the property sought to be taken” prior to filing suit. When a price cannot be agreed upon with the owner, the expropriating authority, identified in La. R.S. 19:2, may expropriate needed property. See La. R.S. 19:2 and La. R.S. 19:2.2; Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rouge v. C & S Development Inc., 97-2652 (La. 7/8/98), 714 So.2d 706, 707.

At trial, the initial burden of proof rests with the expropriating authority, who must establish a prima facie case of the public and necessary purpose for the expropriation. See La. R.S. 19:8(E); see also Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2009-1629 (La. 3/16/10), 3 5 So.3d 192, 196; Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rouge, 714 So.2d at 707. Once the expropriating authority has met its burden of proof with regard to public and necessary purpose, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the expropriating authority has abused its discretion in selecting the site, i.e., the landowner must prove that the legislatively-authorized expropriator exercised its large discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. See Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rouge, 714 So.2d at 707; Red River Waterway Commission v. Fredericks, 566 So.2d 79, 83 (La. 1990), 566 So.2d 79, 83 (La. 1990).

Whether the expropriator's purpose is public and necessary is a judicial determination that will not be reversed on appeal absent manifest error. See State, Department of Transportation & Development v. Estate of Griffin, 95-1464 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/23/96), 669 So.2d 566, 570 (“The trial court's factual determinations as to the necessity or expediency of an expropriation will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of manifest error.”); see also La. R.S. 19:4 (“Expropriation cases shall be tried before the court without a jury, except that a party shall have the right to trial by jury to determine compensation.”).

Good Faith

Pursuant to La. R.S. 19:2(A), “Prior to filing an expropriation suit, an expropriating authority shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement as to compensation with the owner of the property sought to be taken and comply with all of the requirements of [La.] R.S. 19:2.2.” The statute mandates that certain actions be taken by an expropriating authority prior to filing an expropriation suit - a good faith attempt to reach an agreement as to compensation and compliance with La. R.S. 19:2.2. If these mandatory prerequisites are not met, the expropriating authority is not permitted to file suit. See Entergy Louisiana, LLC v. Mudd Family Partnership, LLC, 2026-78 (La. App. 3d Cir. 7/15/26), ____ So.3d ____, ____, 2026 WL 2035826, *7, writ denied, 2026-01018 (La. 10/21/26), ____ So.3d. ____.

An expropriation suit may be dismissed as premature if the expropriating authority has not entered into good faith negotiations with the landowner before instituting an expropriation suit. The requirement is met if there is evidence that the expropriating authority has made a bona fide effort to obtain the property by conventional agreement prior to filing suit. Dixie Electric Membership Corp. v. Watts, 268 So.2d 128, 131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).⁸ See also City of Thibodaux v. Hillman, 464 So.2d 370, 372 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (citing Dixie Pipeline Company v. Barry, 227 So.2d 1, 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ refused, 25 5 La. 145, 229 So.2d 731 (La. 1970)) (“The failure to negotiate with the landowners prior to institution of an expropriation suit subjects the suit to dismissal for prematurity.”)

The issue of prematurity is properly raised as a dilatory exception. La. Code Civ. P. art. 926(A); City of Thibodaux, 464 So.2d at 372. See Benoit v. Benoit, 2021-0865 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 341 So.3d 573, 579, writ denied, 2022-00704 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 1185 (“The objection of prematurity raises the issue of whether the judicial right of action has yet to come into existence because some prerequisite condition has not been fulfilled.”) Importantly, the dilatory exception asserting the objection of prematurity is “waived unless pleaded therein.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 926(A). Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 928(B), “the dilatory exception shall be pleaded prior to or in the answer and, prior to or along with the filing of any pleading seeking relief[.]”

In the petition, Entergy alleged that it attempted in good faith to acquire the necessary servitudes by purchase from the named defendants. While Robert timely answered the petition and denied this allegation, Robert did not file a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity. Accordingly, Robert waived its objection. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 926. Moreover, Robert's contention in the joint pre-trial stipulation that Entergy failed to negotiate “in good faith pursuant to the legal requirements prior to filing a lawsuit” could not revive its objection. Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So.2d 1007, 1018 (La. 1993) (“Once waived, the prematurity argument could not be resurrected by camouflaging it as a substantive issue.”)

With the objection to prematurity being waived, the only issue properly before the trial court was whether there was a public and necessary purpose for the expropriation at issue pursuant to La. R.S. 19:8(E). See Moreno v. Entergy Corp., 2010-2268 (La. 2/18/11), 64 So.3d 761, 762 (“A court may not raise a dilatory exception sua sponte[.]”). Therefore, the trial court's determinations in the January 29, 2026 judgment that “bona fide negotiations never occurred[,]” that “the prerequisites to suit were not satisfied,” and that “Entergy was not entitled to file an expropriation suit,” constitute legal error. Entergy's first assignment of error has merit.⁹

Necessary Purpose

In its second assignment of error, Entergy contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that the Blue Hydrogen project served a necessary purpose. See La. Const. art. 1, § 4(B)(4). The trial court determined that the project “satisfie[d] the public purpose requirement for the exercise of expropriation authority,” but found that “public necessity ha[d] not been established[.]” The trial court further concluded that “Entergy did not demonstrate that the taking, however limited, of ․ Robert's land [was] necessary for the delivery of electrical service to Entergy's customers, as the general and speculative nature of the evidence presented failed to convince [the trial court] of the public's absolute and impending reliance on the [p]roject.”

All property is held subject to the right of expropriation, when the public interest and necessity requires that it be surrendered by the owner. See La. Const, art. 1, § 4(A). Calcasieu-Cameron Hospital Service District v. Fontenot, 628 So.2d 75, 78 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-0168 (La. 3/18/94), 634 So.2d 854. An expropriating authority is entitled to take only what it needs for public purposes and will not be permitted to take more than what is reasonably sufficient and suitable for its particular need. See Griffin, 669 So.2d at 568. Expropriation laws are special and exceptional in character, in derogation of common rights, and must be strictly construed. Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 197.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 19:2(A)(7), Entergy is permitted to expropriate needed property,

for a transmission or generation project that is approved and included in a multistate regional transmission organization's [“RTO”] or independent system operator's [“ISO”] transmission expansion plan or identified by such [RTO] or [ISO] as necessary for the reliability of the electric system ․, or for generating plants, buildings, transmission lines, stations or substations, distribution lines, or other associated facilities if a majority of the electricity or steam power to be generated, transmitted, or distributed in connection with these intended facilities will be delivered to end-users located within Louisiana.

Subsection 7 further provides that “[t]he generating plants, buildings, transmission lines, stations, and substations expropriated or for which property was expropriated shall be so located, constructed, operated, and maintained as not to be dangerous to persons or property nor interfere with the use of the wires of other wire using companies or, more than is necessary, with the convenience of the landowners.”

At trial, Entergy was required to present a prima facie case of the public and necessary purpose for the expropriation of the proposed acquisition. La. R.S. 19:8(E); see Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 196; Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rouge, 714 So.2d at 707. In the context of expropriation, “necessary” refers to the necessity of the purpose for the expropriation and not the necessity for a specific location. Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 200. “The amount of land and the nature of the acreage taken must be reasonably necessary for purpose of the expropriation, but it is not necessary ‘to show actual, immediate, and impending necessity for the expropriation.’ ” Id. (quoting City of New Orleans v. Moeglich, 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675, 677 (1930)). (Emphasis added.) Further, “[i]t is sufficient, in carrying out the general plan of improvements contemplated in the near future, to show that the defendant's land will be needed for the purposes set out in the petition.” City of New Orleans, 126 So. at 677.

Once public necessity is established, the extent and location of the property to be expropriated are within the sound discretion of the body possessing the power of eminent domain, and these determinations will not be interfered with by the courts if made in good faith.¹⁰ Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 200. The criteria to be considered by the expropriator in determining the location and extent of the property to be expropriated includes factors such as costs, environmental impact, long range area planning, and safety considerations. Id.; Griffin, 669 So.2d at 568 (citing Red River Waterway Commission, 566 So.2d at 83). The expropriating agency may abuse its discretion by acting without considering and weighing the relevant factors, that is, by acting arbitrarily. Griffin, 669 So.2d at 568 (citing Red River Waterway Commission, 566 So.2d at 83).

Here, the trial court concluded in its judgment that Entergy did not demonstrate that the taking of Robert's land was necessary, and found the evidence presented was “general and speculative[.]” The trial court's judgment further stated that the evidence “failed to convince [it] of the public's absolute and impending reliance on the [p]roject.” This is not the standard required by Louisiana law and jurisprudence. As clearly stated by the Supreme Court, “it is not necessary ‘to show actual, immediate, and impending necessity for the expropriation.’ ” Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 3 5 So.3d at 200 (quoting City of New Orleans, 126 So. at 677).

After finding the project “satisfie[d] the public purpose requirement for the exercise of expropriation authority,” the trial court was to determine whether Entergy presented a prima facie case that the expropriation of the proposed acquisition was necessary. See La. R.S. 9:8(E). Specifically, the question to be resolved by the trial court was whether Entergy presented a prima facie case that the amount of land and the nature of the acreage sought to be expropriated was reasonably necessary for the purpose of the expropriation and not the necessity of a specific location. See Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 200.

The trial court held Entergy to the wrong legal standard in requiring that Entergy “convince [it] of the public's absolute and impending reliance on the [p]roject” and that Entergy show that “Robert's land [was] necessary for the delivery of electrical service to Entergy's customers[.]” Where one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 73 5. Such is the case here.

Finding that the trial court committed legal error, we review Entergy's record evidence under the de novo standard to determine whether Entergy provided sufficient evidence to show that the amount of land and the nature of the acreage sought to be expropriated was reasonably necessary for the purpose of the expropriation.

Regarding the public and necessary purpose for the expropriation, Entergy offered the testimony of Bradley Skok, the manager of Transmission Planning for Entergy. Skok testified that the Transmission Planning department annually assesses all transmission systems, encompassing all customers in the area, in accordance with governmental standards to ensure the system is “up to snuff[.]” Skok explained that the North American Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”) enacts standards that transmission owners, like Entergy, are required to follow, one of which requires Entergy to perform annual assessments, projecting the next ten years by building “ten-years’ worth of transmission planning models[.]”¹¹ Using those models with incorporated load forecasts, i.e. the projected load on the system,¹² Skok explained that an analysis is then performed to determine what shortcoming on the system could occur, including “generation retirements, generation additions, load requirements, [and] load additions[.]”

In performing the NERC-required annual assessment in 2022, which projected the next ten years, Entergy's analysis revealed a shortfall on the system, which would result in a thermal overload of the existing transmission system. In order to improve reliability for all customers, Entergy developed a corrective action plan - the Blue Hydrogen project - which would inject a higher voltage (the 500 kV line) into a lower voltage system (the underlying 230 kV system). The project also included the construction of the Audubon Substation, which would have the high-voltage 500 kV line on one side and the underlying 230 kV on the other with autotransformation between the voltages. Skok explained that the “high-voltage 500 kV system ․ steps down to [the] 230 kV system, which is kind of like a high-level ․ that goes into substations.” Skok then explained that “at those substations we step it down to our distribution system that ․ goes out and serves ․ multiple facets of customers, whether it be industrial, residential, commercial, or governmental facilities.”

Skok testified that the project would improve reliability, would provide benefits to a majority of customers, and would be needed regardless of whether the Air Products facility was built or not.¹³ Further, Skok explained that injecting a 500 kV source into the lower voltages would provide another route for the power, providing better reliability to all customers fed from Entergy's transmission systems on the east side of the Mississippi River in Ascension Parish, which could include as far as south of Baton Rouge to north of LaPlace.

When asked what would happen if the 500 kV injection point was not built, Skok stated, “The area could have less reliability or ․ have situations where we would have to do what's called ․ a load shed situation, where we would have to ․ turn lights off ․ to the area.” Skok explained that how long the lights would have to be turned off would depend on the situation - whether it was related to a large generator, a transmission line, or other factors - but it could be up to several hours during the day. On cross-examination, Skok was asked whether there were any projections as to when the current system would start to experience outages. Skok explained that the ten-year models incorporate the increased load forecasts in the applicable area, and the 2022 model projected a shortfall in the system over the next ten years, in part, due to “organic load growth,” i.e., people moving, buying houses, and customers expanding. Skok was also asked whether a 500 kV line would still be necessary (as opposed to a lower voltage) if the Air Products facility was not built. Skok responded that a 500 kV line and a similar project would still be required.

In developing the Blue Hydrogen project, Skok testified that Entergy took into consideration the location of its existing assets and identified where new and existing lines need to be tied together. Skok also testified that the project was approved by an independent organization, Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”), which is a regional transmission operator, an RTO, that oversees and operates Entergy's transmission system. According to Skok, MISO evaluated and analyzed the project and approved it as part of the “MISO Transmission Expansion Plan, 23” or “MTEP23” process.

However, in its reasons for judgment, the court stated as follows:

[N]othing in Mr. Skok's testimony led [it] to believe that the [p]roject is essential for the delivery of electrical service to Energy's customers. To the contrary, [the] Court found Mr. Skok's testimony to be quite general in nature and largely speculative. Mr. Skok offered broad assertions regarding anticipated benefits of the [p]roject, but failed to provide specific, concrete facts demonstrating the [p]roject serves a necessary purpose. His statements were couched in hypothetical and contingent language, relying on projected outcomes and assumed benefits, rather than demonstrable needs.

Moreover, Mr. Skok did not support his testimony with any extrinsic evidence - such as engineering reports, feasibility studies, financial analyses, or documentation from relevant agencies - that might have substantiated Entergy's claims or, at a minimum, grounded them in fact. Mr. Skok was the only witness Entergy put forward to testify regarding the necessary purpose requirement.

Notwithstanding, the trial court's statement otherwise, Evan Yost also testified at trial regarding the public and necessary purpose for the expropriation, as discussed further infra. While the trial court appeared to require “extrinsic evidence” to substantiate Entergy's claims, testimony alone may suffice to prove that the expropriator considered the relevant factors.¹⁴ Acadian Gas Pipeline System v. Nunley, 46,648 (La. App. 2d Cir. 11/2/11), 77 So.3d 457, 464, writ denied, 2011-2680 (La. 2/10/12), 80 So.3d 487. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeal observed, the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 200-02, analyzed and accepted the expropriating authority's senior staff right-of-way and claims agent's testimony that an alternative location for the servitude was undesirable, without mention of documentary evidence that may or may not have been used at trial. Acadian Gas Pipeline System, 77 So.3d at 464.

As Capital Project Manager for Entergy, Yost's duties included developing and maintaining scope, cost, schedule, and construction for capital projects, which are typically larger projects to construct new assets serving Entergy customers like transmission lines and substations. As the project manager for the Blue Hydrogen project, Yost testified regarding the project and its location. In choosing the route for the transmission lines and related servitudes, Yost stated that Entergy selected the most direct and least impactful route from the Audubon Substation to the existing transmission line. Yost explained the planned route was the shortest distance from the substation to the existing transmission line, which was about one mile. Also, he testified the route was the least impactful because it required the least amount of acreage, having the least amount of impact to landowners and less of an impact on any environmental concerns such as wetlands. Yost further noted that the property at issue was a wooded area.

Yost also testified that width of the servitude was 365 feet, which Yost explained was the standard servitude width and included structures, the conductor (the wires), blow-out, and a vegetation buffer. Yost explained that a width of 365 feet for the servitude was necessary for two structures next to one another with attached conductors. Yost explained the width also ensured enough room for a blowout of the conductor and to avoid it from coming into contact with the structure itself, other conductors, or the vegetation on the outside, which could cause flash fires.¹⁵ On cross-examination, Yost was asked whether other routes were considered for the location of the servitude. In response, Yost stated as follows:

In a case such as this, typically, we'll try to follow property lines, if needed, but this is such a short route. There's not that many different options to look through. So, usually, there will be ․ some discussion around that and seeing what it looks like, but picking the most direct route and being the least impactful is typically ․ the plan.

In view of the testimony and evidence, we find that Entergy presented a prima facie case that the amount of land and the nature of the acreage taken was reasonably necessary for purpose of the expropriation. See Exxon Mobil Pipeline Co., 35 So.3d at 200 (citing City of New Orleans, 126 So. at 677). We further find that the testimony of Yost and Skok demonstrated that Entergy adequately considered relevant factors such as costs, environmental impact, long range area planning, and safety considerations. Griffin, 669 So.2d at 568 (citing Red River Waterway Commission, 566 So.2d at 83).

Regarding the amount of land, approximately four acres, Yost testified that the proposed route for the transmission lines for the project was the most direct and least impactful route from the substation to the existing transmission lines. Yost explained that the property at issue was a “wooded area” that would have less of an impact to any environmental concerns such as wetlands. Further, Yost testified that the proposed route was a short distance of about one mile, requiring the least amount of acreage. Yost also explained that the width of the servitude of 365 feet was necessary, as it was the standard width for the planned 500 kV lines and required to accommodate potential blow-outs and avoid flash fires.¹⁶ Having determined that Entergy presented a prima facie case the public and necessary purpose for the expropriation of the proposed acquisition, the burden shifted to Robert to show that the expropriating authority has abused its discretion in selecting the site, i.e., Robert was required prove that Entergy exercised its large discretion arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. Recreation and Park Commission for Parish of East Baton Rouge, 714 So.2d at 707. However, in this case, Robert did not offer any evidence or testimony suggesting that Entergy acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith, and our review of the record does not support such a finding. Accordingly, we find that Entergy has the right to expropriate the personal servitude of right of use over Robert's property in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's January 29, 2026 judgment and render judgment in favor of Entergy Louisiana, LLC, granting its petition for expropriation of personal servitude of right of use. We remand this matter to the trial court for rendition of a judgment in conformity with this opinion and for further proceedings, including the determination of the amount of just compensation. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Robert Family No. 1, L.L.C.

REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It is undisputed that Entergy delivers electrical service to customers in Louisiana, including customers in Ascension Parish, through a system of transmission lines that carry electricity from the generating plants across long distances to substations and distribution lines, carrying electricity from substations to end-use customers. Entergy, therefore, is an “electric public utility” as defined in La. R.S. 45:121, as it furnishes electric service within this state.

2.   Pendarvis failed to timely respond to the petition, and Entergy obtained an ex parte order prohibiting Pendarvis from participating at the bifurcated trial on the public and necessary purpose, with the compensation trial to be set at a later date. See La. R.S. 19:7 (“Failure of the defendant in any [expropriation] suit to timely file any answer, exceptions, or other responsive pleadings constitutes a waiver by the defendant of all defenses to the suit except claims for compensation.”)

3.   A curator ad hoc was appointed to represent some of the Smith Heirs believed to be deceased, including Melisha Lewis Johnson, Audrey Lewis, George Lewis, and McKinley Lewis. The remaining heirs were represented by separate counsel.Prior to trial, Entergy voluntarily dismissed Joan Marie Mack, Dahhia Smith Johnson, McKinley Lewis, Veronica Lewis, and Brenda Raven Payton, in her capacity as Trustee of the Brenda Raven Payton Living Trust.

4.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 19:8(E) was added by 2012 La. Acts, No. 702, § 1 and provides, “Absent an express stipulation by the parties, the plaintiff shall present a prima facie case of the public and necessary purpose of the proposed acquisition.”

5.   According to the trial court's reasons for judgment, Robert stood as the only defendant to contest the issues Entergy sought to prove. In the joint pre-trial stipulation submitted to the trial court, the Smith Heirs did not stipulate to the public need for the proposed servitude, but stated that they did not intend to present any witnesses or exhibits at trial. Counsel for the Smith Heirs appeared at trial. The curator ad hoc on behalf of George Lewis, McKinley Lewis, Audrey Lewis, and Melishia Lewis Johnson appeared at the beginning of trial and waived her presence.

6.   After the appeal was lodged, this court issued an interim order, identifying deficiencies in the original judgment dated July 28, 2025. Particularly, the judgment denied and dismissed Entergy's petition but lacked decretal language identifying the name of the parties in whose favor relief was awarded in a case involving multiple defendants. Thereafter, the record was supplemented with an amended judgment, dated January 29, 2026, remedying the identified deficiencies. We hereinafter refer only to the January 29, 2026 judgment.

7.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 19:2(7) provides that property located in Louisiana may be expropriated exclusively by an electric public utility, like Entergy, for certain projects.

8.   The pronouncement made in Dixie Electric Membership Corp. was made pursuant to the jurisprudential line stemming from the Supreme Court case of Calcasieu & Southern Ry. Co. v. Witte, 224 La. 1091, 1099, 71 So.2d 854, 856-57(1954), which adopted the trial court's opinion as its own. The Supreme Court determined that La. R.S. 19:2, then providing, “Where a price cannot be agreed upon with the owner․[,]” and former La. Civ. Code art. 2627, then providing, “If the owner of a thing necessary for the general use, refuses to yield it, or demands an exorbitant price, he may be divested of the property by authority of law[,]” required that a bona fide attempt be made to negotiate with the landowner before filing an expropriation suit. With nothing to show whether the expropriating authority negotiated with the landowner prior to filing suit, the trial court maintained the exception of prematurity, and the Supreme Court affirmed.It appears the legislature codified the jurisprudence through 2012 La. Acts, No. 702, § 1. The introductory paragraph of La. R.S. 19:2, which previously stated, “Where a price cannot be agreed upon with the owner, any of the following may expropriate property[,]” was amended to state as follows:Prior to filing an expropriation suit, an expropriating authority shall attempt in good faith to reach an agreement as to compensation with the owner of the property sought to be taken and comply with all of the requirements of R.S. 19:2.2. If unable to reach an agreement with the owner as to compensation, any of the following may expropriate needed property: ․

9.   Moreover, the evidence and testimony in this case established that Entergy made a bona fide effort to obtain the servitude by conventional agreement. Entergy, through its right-of-way acquisition agent, contacted Robert and ultimately sent a final offer letter packet containing Entergy's basis for exercising expropriation rights, the terms of the servitude agreement, the amount of compensation, and Entergy's explanation of the compensation offered. The testimony and evidence at trial did not show that Robert either objected to the amount of compensation or issued a counteroffer. Rather, Robert objected to the terms of the servitude. Entergy and Robert were in active negotiations regarding the language of the servitude agreement. Notably, Entergy agreed to limit access to the servitude to the terminal ends, but rejected Robert's proposed strict liability language. Entergy modified the standard servitude agreement and attempted to contact Robert's attorney “numerous times[.]” but as Robert's attorney stated during his questioning of the agent, “Yeah, ․ we just came to an impasse.” See Barry, 227 So.2d at 5 (“There is no requirement that negotiations be conducted to a conclusion[.]”).

10.   We note that here “good faith” specifically refers to whether the expropriating authority exercised good faith in determining the extent and location of the property to be expropriated, which is separate from the requirement in La. R.S. 19:2 that an expropriating authority attempt in good faith to reach an agreement with the owner of the property prior to filing suit.

11.   NERC's authority comes from the Federal Electric Reliability Council (“FERC”), a federal agency.

12.   According to Skok, the load forecasts were prepared by a different department.

13.   On cross examination, Skok testified that the Air Products facility, if actually constructed, would have an electrical load requirement of 485 megawatts at its peak. Counsel for Robert asked if Skok was aware that the Air Products facility was not projected to be built until 2028 or 2029, and Skok testified that he did not have exact “in-service date” of this load addition but that it was in the ten-year plan.

14.   We note that Entergy offered the following four exhibits at trial: Entergy 1 - a map showing the route of the proposed transmission lines; Entergy 2 - final offer letters; Entergy 3 - email dated June 26, 2024, and attached letter from counsel for Robert to Pete Graffagnino regarding the proposed Entergy servitude; and Entergy 4 - email chain dated August 1, 2024, between the right-of-way acquisition agent and counsel for Robert regarding the terms of the servitude.

15.   As noted supra, a blowout is the movement of conductors back and forth. The conductors are specifically designed to move to avoid snapping in a wind event and are designed to withstand winds of up to 150 miles per hour.

16.   Additionally, Skok testified that higher voltage 500 kV lines as opposed to 230 kV lines were needed for this project based on the analysis of the NERC-required annual assessments, as the projected load forecasts showed increases due to organic load growth in the area and shortfalls in the system. He testified that the 500 kV lines would be required based on the annual assessments even if the Air Products facility was not built.

HESTER, J.