MELANCON v. NORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY LLC (2026)

In this personal injury suit arising from plaintiff's participation in a marine safety and survival skills course facilitated by defendants, plaintiff and defendants appeal the trial court's judgment which granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claims against defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 14, 2023, plaintiff, Jack Melancon, attended a marine safety and survival skills course for commercial fishermen conducted by defendant, Alaska Marine Safety Education Association.¹ The course took place in Houma, Louisiana, and was taught by Michael Lawson, a United States Coast Guard approved instructor. As part of the daylong course, a safety drill was held which required attendees to enter a life raft from a swimming pool. Mr. Melancon participated in the drill, during which he was allegedly injured.

Mr. Melancon filed a petition for damages on February 16, 2024, naming Alaska Marine Safety Education Association, its insurer, Northfield Insurance Company (collectively “AMSEA”), and Platinum Hospitality Group, LLC ² as defendants. In the petition, Mr. Melancon alleged that during the safety drill, he was “ordered” by an AMSEA instructor, later identified as Mr. Lawson, to enter a life boat despite communicating to the instructor that he was physically unable to perform the drill. Mr. Melancon further alleged that as a result of performing the drill, he sustained physical injuries and that AMSEA was vicariously liable for its employee's negligence.

After AMSEA and its insurer filed separate answers to the petition, they jointly filed a motion for summary judgment on November 18, 2024, seeking dismissal of Mr. Melancon's claims on the following bases: (1) that there is no evidence to support Mr. Melancon's claims that AMSEA was negligent, or that said negligence caused his injuries, and (2) that Mr. Lawson, the instructor, was an independent contractor and had never been an employee of AMSEA. In support of the motion, AMSEA attached as exhibits the affidavits of Mr. Lawson and Jerry Dzugan, the former executive director of AMSEA.³ AMSEA also timely filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental exhibit to the motion for summary judgment with the affidavit of Leann Cyr, the current executive director of AMSEA. That motion was not opposed by Mr. Melancon and was granted by the trial court.

Mr. Melancon filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2025, and attached his deposition and the deposition of Mr. Dzugan.⁴ As to the vicarious liability issue, Mr. Melancon argued AMSEA could not prove Mr. Lawson was an independent contractor because the consulting agreement was signed after the incident. Further, Mr. Melancon argued that whether Mr. Lawson was an independent contractor is a question of fact and there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the level of supervision and control AMSEA maintained over Mr. Lawson that precluded summary judgment. As to the negligence claims, Mr. Melancon argued that numerous genuine issues of material fact remained so as to preclude the granting of AMSEA's motion for summary judgment.

On May 22, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on AMSEA's motion for summary judgment. On June 3, 2025, the trial court signed a written judgment granting AMSEA's motion for summary judgment as to the negligence claim, finding “the record contains competent admissible evidence in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment that Michael [Lawson] was not the cause-in-fact or legal cause of the injury and that Plaintiff Jack Melancon has failed in his burden of proof to submit competent admissible evidence of all elements upon which he bears the burden of proof at trial, including negligence and/or causation.” However, the trial court denied AMSEA's motion for summary judgment as to the independent contractor relationship, finding that “the record does not contain competent admissible evidence in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment that Michael Lawson is and has been an independent contractor with AMSEA.” The trial court also sustained Mr. Melancon's objection to exhibits B-2, the contract governing the March 2023 course at issue herein, and B-4, a liability waiver signed by Mr. Melancon, which are attached to Mr. Lawson's affidavit. Therefore, the trial court did not consider those exhibits in connection with the summary judgment.

Mr. Melancon and AMSEA each timely appealed the June 3, 2025 judgment. Mr. Melancon appeals the portion of the judgment granting AMSEA's motion for summary judgment insofar as it dismisses Mr. Melancon's claims based on negligence, and AMSEA appeals the portion of the judgment insofar as it denies its motion for summary judgment based on the independent contractor relationship and sustains Mr. Melancon's objection to exhibits B-2 and B-4. AMSEA also filed an answer to Mr. Melancon's appeal raising the same issues as in its cross-appeal and seeking damages, including attorneys’ fees, for Mr. Melancon's frivolous appeal.

While the denial of a motion for a summary judgment is generally not appealable, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, an appellee may seek review of all adverse interlocutory rulings by filing an answer to the appeal. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2133; see also Wilson v. Two SD, LLC, 2015-0959 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/15) 186 So.3d 103, 113. Accordingly, AMSEA may seek review of the denial of its motion for summary judgment on the alternative grounds set forth within its answer, as discussed below. See Wilson, 186 So.3d at 113.

LAW

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that governs the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Cope v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and A&M College, 2025-0034 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/4/25), 418 So.3d 1035, 1039. That is, after an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof rests with the mover. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). When the mover makes a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present factual support, through the use of proper documentary evidence attached to its opposition, which establishes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); Boudreaux v. Coco, 2021-1009 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/28/22), 342 So.3d 354, 359. If the adverse party fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted. Id.

A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Johnson v. Knight, 2023-1267 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/14/24), 391 So.3d 1126, 1129. Material facts are those that potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bass, 2024-1300 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/4/25), 419 So.3d 370, 375-76. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Williams v. Nautilus Insurance Company, 2025-1043 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/17/26), 2026 WL 1045165, *6, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––.

As to evidentiary issues, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court's ruling on an objection to a document filed in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is raised by a party in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum in accordance with LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2). McKay v. Hospital Service District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 2023-1244 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/11/24), 405 So.3d 869, 875.

Relevant law herein concerns, in pertinent part, the vicarious liability of an independent contractor. Pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 2320, “Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” The concept established by this article is called “vicarious liability.” Mize v. Van Meter, M.D. & Associates, 2007-0616 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/19/07), 973 So.2d 947, 949, writ denied, 2008-0260 (La. 3/24/08), 977 So.2d 960. However, a principal is generally not liable for the tortious acts an independent contractor commits in the course of performing its contractual duties. Stonetrust Commercial Insurance Company v. TBT Contracting, Inc. of LA, 2022-0971 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 366 So.3d 585, 589. The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor status is a factual determination to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. A court should consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an employer-employee relationship exists or whether it is an instance where the individual has independent contractor status. Boudreaux, 342 So.3d at 362. The burden of proof lies with the party seeking to establish an employer-employee relationship. Hillman v. Comm-Care, Inc., 2001-1140 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 1157, 1163.

It is well settled, as stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 262 La. 102, 117, 262 So.2d 385, 390 (La. 1972), that “the term independent contractor connotes a freedom of action and choice with respect to the undertaking in question and a legal responsibility on the part of the contractor in case the agreement is not fulfilled in accordance with its covenants.” In Hickman, as in the case herein, at issue was whether a worker was an independent contractor or an employee, and the supreme court stated that the court should consider whether: (1) there is a valid contract between the parties; (2) the work being done is of an independent nature such that the contractor may employ non-exclusive means in accomplishing it; (3) the contract calls for specific piecework as a unit to be done according to the independent contractor's own methods, without being subject to the control and direction of the principal, except as to the result of the services to be rendered; (4) there is a specific price for the overall undertaking agreed upon; and (5) the duration of the work is for a specific time and not subject to termination or discontinuance at the will of either side without a corresponding liability for its breach. Tower Credit, Inc. v. Carpenter, 2001-2875 (La. 9/4/02), 825 So.2d 1125, 1129.

EVIDENTIARY RULING

The trial court excluded AMSEA's exhibit B-2, the employment contract governing the marine safety and survival skills course at issue (March 2023 contract) and adopted the arguments raised in Mr. Melancon's brief. Therein, Mr. Melancon argued that March 15, 2023 is listed as the date the contract was made and as the date Mr. Lawson signed said contract. Therefore, according to Mr. Melancon, the contract was not yet in effect on March 14, 2023, the day of the course. Thus, Mr. Melancon asserted that the March 2023 contract is not relevant evidence to show Mr. Lawson's independent contractor status at the time of Mr. Melancon's injury.

In response, AMSEA contends the trial court erred in sustaining Mr. Melancon's objection to exhibit B-2 and in failing to consider the March 2023 contract as summary judgment evidence. AMSEA argues that it signed the contract on March 10, 2023, and the contract necessarily had to be in place prior to the course being taught based upon its terms, including arrangements for the course location and the specific course to be taught, which would have been agreed to days before the course took place.

In this regard, Mr. Dzugan, AMSEA's former executive director, explained during his deposition that AMSEA and Mr. Lawson would reach an agreement on course logistics, location, and details days before Mr. Lawson would teach the course. The record also reflects that Mr. Lawson resides in Florida; therefore, he would have been required to make arrangements in advance in order to be present in Louisiana and prepared to teach this particular course on March 14, 2023.

No one disputes that Mr. Lawson taught the course at issue herein on March 14, 2023, and that he did so on behalf of AMSEA. Further, there was mutual consent between AMSEA and Mr. Lawson, as required for a valid contract, and acceptance of the contract by Mr. Lawson was evidenced by performance of the teaching duties outlined in the agreement. See Okuarume v. Southern University of New Orleans, 2017-0897 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/25/18), 245 So.3d 1260, 1264, writ denied, 2018-0880 (La. 9/28/18), 252 So.3d 927. AMSEA's March 10, 2023 signature on the contract, Mr. Lawson's affidavit, and Mr. Dzugan's deposition testimony show that the agreement between Mr. Lawson and AMSEA was reached on March 10, 2023, without which the course would have never proceeded on March 14, 2023. Furthermore, Mr. Lawson's March 2023 consulting agreement with AMSEA is authenticated in Mr. Lawson's affidavit as the consulting agreement he signed. See Velocity Investments, LLC v. Pasqua, 2022-0626 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/10/2023), 361 So.3d 23, 30. Therefore, we find exhibit B-2 to be relevant competent evidence under LSA-C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967 and find that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining Mr. Melancon's objection to said contract.⁵

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

As set forth above and in its answer, AMSEA sought summary judgment, in part, on the basis that it was not liable for the actions of Mr. Lawson insofar as he was an independent contractor, not an employee of AMSEA. However, in opposition, Mr. Melancon claimed that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on this issue. Based on the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, we now analyze the details of the working arrangement herein using the factors prescribed in Hickman to determine whether an independent contractor relationship existed between AMSEA and Mr. Lawson.

Regarding the first requirement under Hickman, the existence of a valid contract, Mr. Lawson attested that he taught the course on the date in question “via his AMSEA consulting contract ․ that provides he is not an employee of AMSEA.” Ms. Cyr, AMSEA's current executive director, explained in her affidavit that Mr. Lawson's independent contractor relationship with AMSEA dated back to at least 2016. Ms. Cyr stated that “[e]very single time Michael Lawson taught an AMSEA course he executed a consulting agreement with AMSEA and signed as an independent contractor of AMSEA.” Previous consulting agreements between AMSEA and Mr. Lawson, dating from courses in October 2022, January 2023, and March 2023, were attached to Ms. Cyr's affidavit. Ms. Cyr explained that the “[t]he consulting agreement has been the same agreement from 2016 through present day 2025[.]” A review of these consulting agreements alongside the March 2023 contract reveals that all are essentially identical. They are all referred to as a “[c]onsulting [a]greement,” contain an introductory paragraph stating “[t]he consultant is an independent contractor,” and were signed by Mr. Lawson as “the consultant.” Additionally, Mr. Dzugan explained that all contract instructors used the same consulting agreement and the few instructors who did work directly for AMSEA as employees did not use the consulting agreement as they “are not contract.” AMSEA further provided evidence through Ms. Cyr's affidavit that AMSEA has only seven employees in its Alaska offices and marine safety classes taught outside of Alaska are “predominately taught by independent contractors like Michael Lawson.” Based on the evidence submitted, we find that AMSEA established the terms of the agreement existing between AMSEA and Mr. Lawson. Although Mr. Lawson's signature does not appear on the contract as of March 14th, when the class commenced, the contract had been signed by AMSEA on March 10th and Mr. Lawson clearly accepted the terms of the contract prior to teaching the course.

The second and third Hickman factors are generally discussed together and refer to the methods used to complete the project, the non-exclusiveness of those methods, and the degree of control exercised by the principal. Boudreaux, 342 So.3d at 365. In other words, to determine whether someone is an independent contractor, one must look at his degree of control over the work. Id. In an independent contractor arrangement, the principal has the ability to oversee the results of the contractor's work, and the principal in no way influences the manner in which the contractor does the work. Id. Conversely, an employer has a great amount of control over an employee's work, such as the nature of the task and where it is to be performed. Id. In determining the right of control, courts have also examined the contract between the two parties. See Jones v. Angelette, 2005-0597 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/21/05), 921 So.2d 1017, 1020.

The deposition testimony of Mr. Dzugan, along with language in the consulting agreements, provide the primary sources of evidence presented in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment regarding the degree of control retained by AMSEA. Based upon portions of Mr. Dzugan's testimony, Mr. Melancon argues that AMSEA retained the right to control the manner and means of instruction through “prescribing mandatory curriculum and safety guidelines,” controlling the “structure and content” of the course, “setting certification requirements and testing standards,” and “maintaining authority over attendance and evaluation.” However, Mr. Dzugan's testimony shows that while AMSEA may have guidelines concerning courses, the guidelines are “more of a guide” to help an instructor on his or her approach. Mr. Dzugan stated that the guide is “not a protocol” and “not a hard and fast” standard.

Additionally, testimony in the record establishes that Mr. Lawson was able to decide when and where he taught a course. Ms. Cyr attested that classes taught by Mr. Lawson varied by year as he could “choose whether and when to teach a course on his schedule.” Mr. Dzugan provided that the course location was sometimes determined by AMSEA and sometimes selected by the consultant, but that the consultants “do a lot of picking when and where.” Based upon the arguments and our de novo review of the record, it is apparent that although a teaching guide exists, AMSEA does not retain a significant degree of control over the manner in which each course is taught by an individual instructor, including Mr. Lawson.

The fourth Hickman factor considers whether there was a specific price for the overall undertaking. In this matter, the consulting agreements in the record show that Mr. Lawson was paid a fee for each AMSEA course taught and that the fee varied. Additionally, attached to Ms. Cyr's affidavit and referenced therein are seven 1099 forms from 2016 to 2023, reflecting that Mr. Lawson made as little as $1,012.70 or $2,811.00 in 2016 and 2020, respectively, or as much as $12,918.00 in 2023 teaching AMSEA courses.⁶ The record thus demonstrates that Mr. Lawson was paid a specific price each time he undertook to teach an AMSEA course, including on the day in question.

The fifth Hickman factor considers whether the duration of the work was for a specific time and not subject to termination or discontinuance at the will of either side without corresponding liability for breach. It is clear from the record that AMSEA contracted with Mr. Lawson on a per-class basis and each agreement was for the duration of the class itself, with termination of each individual contract at the conclusion of each class.

As noted above, the determination as to independent contractor status under Hickman is made on a case-by-case basis and is based on the totality of the circumstances. For example, in Course v. Fox Wolff Construction, 2008-0058 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/27/08), 987 So.2d 277, 280, writ denied, 2008-1396 (La. 9/26/08), 992 So.2d 992, the supreme court found that a truck driver was an independent contractor rather than an employee where he was paid on a job-by-job basis; was paid only for the work he did; was given locations but determined the route; could choose the jobs he wanted to do; received no benefits or vacation time; and was issued a 1099 form, not a W-2 form.

Furthermore, in Vine v. Teachers Retirement System of Louisiana, 2019-0106 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/19/19), 292 So.3d 116, the court held that a school counselor was an independent contractor, as opposed to an employee, where he was issued 1099 forms; referred to himself as an independent contractor; worked part-time; stated that his work was administratively, but not professionally, supervised; was told which students to assess or counsel; was required to coordinate his work with other school personnel; was expected to attend certain meetings; had the freedom to set the days of the week he would work; was expected to maintain a schedule once it was set; provided written reports in requested formats; was required to comply with regulations and supervision to an extent; and was told specifics as to what subjects to broach or not broach with students.

In this case, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Lawson taught an average of five courses per year for AMSEA and did so via a consulting agreement, which outlined the course he would teach, the fee he would be paid, and the duration of the contract. AMSEA issued Mr. Lawson 1099s, not W-2s, and AMSEA did not provide any fringe benefits to Mr. Lawson. Further, no evidence was offered that any other benefits were paid to or on behalf of Mr. Lawson, as would be done for an employee. Mr. Lawson was free to select when and where he taught a particular course, and was free to determine the manner in which the course was taught. AMSEA did not exercise significant control over Mr. Lawson and Mr. Lawson was allowed to employ non-exclusive means to accomplish the contract. The agreement between the parties provided for a set fee for work performed, and was not subject to termination at the will of either party as it specified a certain course to be taught on a certain date.

Therefore, AMSEA made a prima facie showing that its motion for summary judgment based on Mr. Lawson's independent contractor relationship with AMSEA should be granted. The burden then shifted to Mr. Melancon as the non-moving party to present factual support which establishes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Mr. Melancon did not meet his burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Lawson was an independent contractor for AMSEA. Accordingly, finding no vicarious liability on the part of AMSEA, we find that the motion for summary judgment dismissing Mr. Melancon's claims was properly granted. Having addressed the merits of AMSEA's arguments raised in its answer, we need not address AMSEA's cross-appeal raising the same issues. Moreover, because we do not find Mr. Melancon's appeal to be frivolous, we deny AMSEA's request for damages, including attorneys’ fees.⁷

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's June 3, 2025 judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Alaska Marine Safety Education Association and Northfield Insurance Company, and dismissing Jack Melancon's claims against them. Costs of the appeal are assessed to Jack Melancon.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Alaska Marine Safety Education Association is a non-profit corporation domiciled in Sitka, Alaska.

2.   Mr. Melancon advises the court in his appellant brief that he “reached a settlement with Platinum Hospitality Group[, LLC] and has resolved his claims against this Defendant.”

3.   AMSEA also attached the affidavits of Martha Lawson, Trung Tran, and Quang Tran; Plaintiff's original petition; Mr. Lawson's curriculum vitae; a consulting agreement for the course at issue; a hotel receipt for Mr. Lawson's stay in Louisiana during the course at issue; a course roster and reporting form including the names of all attendees of the course in question; completed Evaluation Guidelines for AMSEA Onboard Drill Instructor; a course sign-in sheet with all course attendees’ signatures for the course at issue; twelve course evaluation forms from attendees for the course at issue; and an AMSEA Assumption of Risk and Waiver and Release form signed by Mr. Melancon to its motion for summary judgment.

4.   Mr. Melancon also attached the original petition; declaration of George Rau; certain photographs; Plaintiff's objections and responses to interrogatories; a business card from Mr. Lawson; the affidavit of Michael R. Null; Safety Practice Guidelines; an AMSEA Investigation Report; and Evaluation Guidelines for AMSEA Onboard Drill Instructor to his opposition to AMSEA's motion for summary judgment. However, these documents are not relevant to our analysis.

5.   We do not address the trial court's exclusion of AMSEA's exhibit B-4, as it is immaterial to our decision herein.

6.   Ms. Cyr attested that she was unable to locate the 1099 form issued to Mr. Lawson for 2022, but attested that he was issued a 1099 form in 2022 as well.

7.   Further, given our ruling herein, we pretermit the issues raised in Mr. Melancon's appeal.

McCLENDON, C.J.