LAFAYETTE CENTRE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. THE CITY OF LAFAYETTE LAFAYETTE BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-134

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on October 28, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

LAFAYETTE CENTRE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT D/B/A DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

VERSUS

THE CITY OF LAFAYETTE (LAFAYETTE BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT)

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NUMBER 20257538, DIVISION J HONORABLE JOHN D. TRAHAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE

VHK

SDW

GEB

Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-134

LAFAYETTE CENTRE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT D/B/A DOWNTOWN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

VERSUS

THE CITY OF LAFAYETTE (LAFAYETTE BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT)

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NUMBER 20257538, DIVISION J HONORABLE JOHN D. TRAHAN, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE

Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Lester J. Gauthier, Jr. LAW OFFICES OF LESTER J. GAUTHIER Post Office Box 3371 Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 (337) 264-1783 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Lafayette Centre Development District d/b/a Downtown Development Authority

Daniel J. Gauthier GAUTHIER & GRANGER, LLC 1118 Jefferson Street Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (337) 534-8026 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: The City of Lafayette (Lafayette Board of Zoning Adjustment)

WILSON, Judge.

Plaintiff, Lafayette Centre Development District d/b/a Downtown Development Authority (DDA), appeals the trial court's dismissal of its petition seeking to overturn a decision by the City of Lafayette through the Lafayette Board of Zoning Adjustment (BOZA). For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of BOZA's exception of no right of action and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

ISSUES

DDA asserts the following assignments of error:

A. The trial judge committed reversible error in granting the City of Lafayette BOZA'S exception of no right of action by interpreting the meaning of an “aggrieved” party differently from the interpretation of that term by courts throughout the State of Louisiana.

B. The trial judge committed reversible error by considering the City of Lafayette BOZA's exception no right of action without the full record of Lafayette BOZA meeting [sic].

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Appellate review of a trial court's decision on an exception of no right of action is typically de novo because the peremptory exception of no right of action raises a question of law.” Christian D. Chesson, PLC v. Gandy, 25-57, pp. 17–18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/13/25), 419 So.3d 814, 827, writ denied, 25-1389 (La. 1/21/26), 424 So.3d 1100. In this case, however, since evidence and testimony were introduced at the hearing on the exception, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard. Id.

III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

DDA was created by Act 194 of the 1983 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, as amended in 1994. That Act specifically states that:

The legislature hereby finds and declares that it is necessary for the public health, safety, and welfare of the city of Lafayette that the property value deterioration in the principal area or areas of the city of Lafayette known generally as the Central Business District be halted and that the cause of such deterioration be halted since the Central Business District is the center of commercial, civic, and cultural activities of the metropolitan area.

1983 La. Acts No. 194, § 1. The Act goes on to define the geographic area of the DDA. Kevin Blanchard (Blanchard) is the current Chief Executive Officer of DDA.

ACTP Rentals, LLC (ACTP) was renovating an existing building at 444 Jefferson Street in downtown Lafayette to house a four-story apartment complex with the first floor being parking for the tenants. The instant dispute arises out of an October 9, 2025 decision by BOZA granting five variances ¹ to ACTP, relative to that project.

On November 6, 2025, DDA filed suit seeking to overturn BOZA's decision and alleging that it was “improvidently and illegally granted, and was thus arbitrary and capricious[ ]” because it was based on materially false representations made by Clifton Guidry, on behalf of ACTP, regarding DDA's stance on the variances. Attached to the petition were the notice of the grant of variances, an affidavit from Blanchard, an unofficial partial transcript from BOZA's October 9, 2025 meeting, and various email correspondence.

In response to the petition, BOZA filed a motion to strike the exhibits to the petition because they were outside the record considered by BOZA in granting the variances. BOZA also filed a peremptory exception of no right of action, alleging that “DDA does not qualify as an ‘aggrieved party’ sufficient to confer standing upon DDA to bring this appeal.”

The exception came for hearing on January 20, 2026. Blanchard testified that DDA is a political subdivision of the State that is funded by a property tax millage paid by every property owner inside the DDA's boundaries. A map showing the boundaries was introduced into evidence. Blanchard testified that 444 Jefferson is within those boundaries and that DDA owned a building, known as the Sans Souci Building, at 219 East Vermilion Street,² which is also within those boundaries. The Lafayette Development Code 8913 was also introduced into evidence. The recording and transcript of the October 9, 2025 BOZA meeting was introduced into evidence as was the site plan for 444 Jefferson.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the exception and stated:

There's been no showing that the Sans Souci building is affected one way or the other by the zoning variance at 444 Jefferson.

․

․ If I'm sitting in Orleans, you win. But I'm not, I'm in Lafayette, which is in the Third Circuit. And, look, do I like the - - do I like what happened, you know? That if the facts as you allege them, that the Board of Zoning Adjustment was mislead about whether or not DDA approved the zoning variance and they maybe made their decision based on their misapprehension [sic] of the facts because Mr. Guidry didn't tell them the truth, I don't like that. Sorry about it, but I'm bound by the Third Circuit jurisprudence on the issue.

․

․ Well, I mean the remedy would be to ask BOZA to reconsider it. Because I just - - I'm not permitted to grant standing to DDA based on the applicable law in this Circuit.

A judgment granting the exception of no cause of action in favor of BOZA and dismissing the appeal filed by DDA was signed on February 2, 2026. The judgment further denied the motion to strike as moot. DDA appealed.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 681 provides that “an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts.” The peremptory exception of no right of action, then, is used “to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit” and “assumes that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person[.]” La. Paddlewheels v. La. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n, 94-2015, pp. 4–5 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 885, 888.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:4727(E)(1) states:

Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision by the board of adjustment of any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality, may present to the district court of the parish or city in which the property affected is located a petition, duly verified, setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds of the illegality. The petition shall be presented to the court within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board.

BOZA argues that even though this statute does not define “aggrieved party” or “property affected,” it requires two things: (1) “one must be ‘aggrieved’ by BOZA's decision,” and (2) “one must have ‘property affected’ by it.” BOZA asserts that DDA has no standing to contest this particular action by BOZA because it has not shown that property owned by DDA has been affected by the decision or that it has suffered any damage as a result of the decision. BOZA relies on this court's opinion in Bass Custom Signs, LLC v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 14-131 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/14), 149 So.3d 965, writ denied, 14-2364 (La. 2/6/15), 158 So.3d 820. That case involved a sign company that contracted with a landowner/business to modify the business’ sign and obtain the necessary zoning permits for the signage. The application for permit was denied. This court held that the sign company was not an aggrieved party and lacked standing to appeal the denial of the permit. This court recognized that La.R.S. 33:4727 did not define “person aggrieved” and looked to the common law for guidance: “Generally, two elements are required. The plaintiff must show some interest in land affected by the zoning and the plaintiff must allege specific pecuniary damage.” Id. at 967, quoting Douglas W. Kmiec and Katherine Kmiec Turner, 2 Zoning & Planning Deskbook § 7.8 (2d ed. 2013). This court went on to explain:

Zoning ordinances are in derogation of the right of landowners to the unrestricted use of their property. Palm-Air Civic Ass'n v. Syncor Int'l, 97-1485 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 258. Clearly, a landowner aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment has standing to appeal that judgment. In this case, the landowner has [sic] affected has not appealed. Because zoning laws further the purpose of protecting the value of neighboring property, owners of neighboring property and neighborhood associations have been granted standing. See, e.g., State, ex rel. Maple Area Residents, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, (La.App. 4 Cir.1978), 365 So.2d 891.

The res nova issue before us is whether a contractor prevented from performing a contract because of the decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment has standing to bring the suit. We find that it does not. We interpret the term “a person aggrieved” to require that the person have a proprietary interest in immovable property subject to the zoning ordinance or variance at issue, or in immovable property affected by the ordinance or variance, in order to challenge a decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment in district court. Under the scheme of zoning legislation in place in Lafayette, Bass Custom Signs is not “a person aggrieved” of the decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment. It may be impacted by the landowner's decision not to modify the sign so that is [sic] consistent with the zoning ordinances now in place, but that does not confer standing to challenge the decision of the Board of Zoning Adjustment in the courts.

Id. at 967–68. Justice Genovese dissented and pointed out that La.R.S. 33:4727(E)(1) does not “state or require that an aggrieved person must have a ‘proprietary interest’ in order to challenge a zoning decision.” Id. at 968.

While the language in Bass seems to support the trial court's ruling, we do not find that Bass requires that result. Bass leaves room to confer standing on DDA in the case at bar by recognizing that a party that has “a proprietary interest” “in immovable property affected by the ordinance or variance[ ]” is “ ‘a person aggrieved[.]’ ” Id. In any event, Bass is factually distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case was not the owner of the property affected by the zoning board's decision, and the property owners did not join in the appeal of the decision. However, in this case, DDA does own property in the area subject to the ordinances from which the variances were sought. We rely instead on the fourth circuit's decisions in Gebre v. City of New Orleans, 14-904 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/7/15), 177 So.3d 723, and Carrollton/Riverbend Neighborhood Association v. City of New Orleans ex rel. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 11-1737 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/27/12) (unpublished opinion) for guidance.

In ruling that a neighborhood association had standing to seek judicial review of a zoning board's issuance of a restoration permit, Gebre relied on Carrollton/Riverbend Neighborhood Association, 11-1737, pp. 3–6 (second, fourth, fifth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth alteration in original), wherein the court explained the difference between standing to seek injunctive relief and standing to seek judicial review of a zoning board decision as follows:

Of note, in Curran [v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 580 So.2d 417 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991)], this Court noted that “[t]he Zoning Ordinance protects adjacent property owners and neighbors by requiring the property owner to carry the burden of meeting the statutory standards.” Curran, 580 So.2d at 419.

Similarly, in Joubert [v. City of New Orleans Office of Safety & Permits, 09-601 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/13/10), 30 So.3d 186], we noted that “[t]he neighbors ․ want the city's zoning law ordinances enforced.” Joubert, 2009–0601, p. 9, 30 So.3d at 192.

Conversely, Robinson cited this Court's recent opinion in Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents and Associates, Inc. v. Hotel Royal, L.L.C., 2009–0641 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/3/10), 55 So.3d 1, reh'g granted, (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/5/11), in support of its argument that plaintiffs have no right of action. In that case, the plaintiffs, the Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents and Associates, Inc. (VCPORA) and French Quarter Citizens for the Preservation of Residential Quality, Inc. (FQC), filed a petition for declaratory judgment and for a preliminary and permanent injunction. Id., p. 1, 55 So.3d at 6. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated local zoning ordinances. Id. On rehearing, this Court affirmed the trial court's sustaining of an exception of no right of action. Id., p. 12, 55 So.3d at 12.

․

The plaintiffs’ petition alleged that the defendants’ expansion of their hotel property threatened the “architectural, historical, cultural and aesthetic integrity, and values of the Vieux Carre” and “will create additional traffic resulting in congestion, noise, and other activities destructive to the French Quarter.” Id., p. 3, 55 So.3d at 6–7. In applying the first prong, this Court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm that is present or probable for the future. This Court found that the allegations that the defendants’ alleged zoning violations would threaten the values of the Vieux Carre to be subjective and not susceptible to measurement. Further, this Court found that the “hypothetical possibility of increased congestion and noise as a result of the alleged zoning violations also does not rise [to] the level of ‘present or probable future harm.’ ” Id., p. 4, 55 So.3d at 7. Additionally, the Court noted that the VCPORA and FQC failed to demonstrate clear, direct economic injury. Id. Thus, this Court held that the VCPORA and FQC lacked standing to enjoin alleged violations of city zoning ordinances. Id., p. 12, 55 So.3d at 12.

․

In this case, Robinson alleged that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate harm that is present or probable for the future. Robinson argued that the plaintiffs only allege harm to the neighborhood as a whole. Robinson stated that the plaintiffs failed to allege and prove that they suffered any actual harm as a result of the BZA waivers. Thus, Robinson alleges that the plaintiffs lack a real and actual interest in this case.

Nevertheless, the procedural posture of this case differs from the Hotel Royal case and the Yokum [v. Nicholas S. Karno, II, Inc., 2010–1239 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/1/11), 66 So.3d 1240] case. Herein, the plaintiffs seek review of the decision of the BZA pursuant to statute and ordinance. Pursuant to La. R.S. 33:4727(E)(1), “any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision by the board of adjustment ․ may present to the district court ․ a petition ․ setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole or in part, specifying the grounds for the illegality.” (Emphasis supplied.). [sic]

․

Unlike Hotel Royal and Yokum, which involved injunctions to prevent the violations of applicable zoning ordinances, this case involves judicial review of a decision of the BZA granting a variance to zoning ordinances. The right to judicial review of a BZA decision to grant a variance is provided by statute and ordinance. Nothing in Hotel Royal and Yokum implies intent to overturn years of jurisprudence allowing neighbors and neighborhood associations to seek judicial review of a BZA decision to grant a variance to zoning ordinances. See also Northwest St. Tammany Civic Ass'n v. St. Tammany Parish, unpub., 2011–0461 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/11), 2011 WL 5410169; Mid City Neighborhood Organization v. City of New Orleans ex rel. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 2000–1904 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/29/01), 798 So.2d 1024; and French Quarter Citizens for the Preservation of Residential Quality, Inc., v. New Orleans City Planning Commission, 99–2154 (La.4/12/00), 763 So.2d 17.

As we noted in Curran, zoning ordinances protect adjacent property owners and neighbors. Curran, 580 So.2d at 419. A variance to zoning ordinances erases that protection, causing aggrievement. The plaintiffs herein were only required to allege that the BZA acted illegally and specify the grounds for the illegality. One such ground is that the BZA failed to consider a subjective element, the effect on the essential character of the neighborhood. A second ground is that the BZA failed to consider another subjective element, whether the variance will impair adequate light. There is no requirement in the statute or the ordinances that the neighbors or neighborhood association demonstrate a clear, direct economic injury to secure judicial review of a BZA decision.

The plaintiffs’ original petition alleged that the Board failed to determine, or improperly determined, that Robinson would suffer a hardship without a variance. These allegations, as well as those included in the amended petition, established that the plaintiffs, adjacent property owners and neighbors, belong to the class of persons to whom the law grants a cause of action pursuant to La. R.S. 33:4727(E)(1) and New Orleans CZO 14.11.

Assuming, as we must, that the petition states a valid cause of action, we find that DDA has standing as a “person aggrieved” under La.R.S. 33:4727(E)(1) based on the evidence showing that it owns property within the area that is subject to the ordinances at issue.³ DDA is a party that the zoning ordinances are in place to protect, and “[a] variance to zoning ordinances erases that protection, causing aggrievement.” Carrollton/Riverbend, 11-1737 at p. 5. Consequently, the trial court committed manifest error in sustaining the exception of no right of action and dismissing DDA's lawsuit. Having made this determination, we pretermit discussion of DDA's claim that the trial court erred in considering the exception without the full record of the October 9, 2025 BOZA meeting.

V.

CONCLUSION

We find that Lafayette Centre Development District d/b/a Downtown Development Authority has a right of action because it is an “aggrieved party,” under La.R.S. 33:4727(E)(1), with standing to appeal the grant of the variances at issue herein. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment granting the exception of no right of action in favor the City of Lafayette (Lafayette Board of Zoning Adjustment) and overrule the exception. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendant/Appellee, the City of Lafayette in the amount of $1,267.47. La.R.S. 13:5112(A).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The notice of grant of variance lists the following variances: (1) required front setback for a walkway; (2) building footprint to exceed ninety percent of lot area; (3) minimum glazing requirement; and (4) glass transparency requirement; (5) minimum walkway width on an “A” street from eight feet to seven feet.

2.   The act of cash sale for this property was introduced into evidence.

3.   While BOZA argues that the property owned by DDA is outside the two-hundred-foot radius required to receive notice of BOZA's meeting, we do not find that to be dispositive of the issue. In Cupit v. City of New Orleans ex rel. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 12-1708 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/17/13), 120 So.3d 862, the fourth circuit found that homeowners in the same neighborhood had standing to appeal the Board of Zoning Adjustments’ reinstatement of a supplemental permit to a homeowner, allowing Macaluso Realty to restore its property as a two-family home rather than a single family home. The City argued that the homeowners lacked standing because they failed to prove they suffered any actual harm from the decision, but the fourth circuit disagreed. One of the plaintiffs owned property adjacent to the subject property, but the proximity of the other plaintiffs was not discussed.