STATE OF LOUISIANA v. SA DAVIAN GEORGE (2026)

VHK

SDW

GEB

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Hon. D. Jason Meche

District Judge

P. O. Box 868

Opelousas, LA 70571

Chad Patrick Pitre

District Attorney 27th JDC

P.O. Box 1968

Opelousas, LA 70571

Kathleen E. Ryan

27TH JDC ADA St Landry

P. O. Box 1968

Opelousas, La 70571

Remy V. Starns

State Public Defender, LAWS

301 Main Street Ste. 700

Baton Rouge, LA 70825

Corrie R. Gallien

Gallien Law, PLLC

1030 Lafayette Str. Ste. 12

Lafayette, LA 70501

Sa'Davian M. George

17544 Tunica Trace

DHawk 4/1 Cell #7

Angola, La 70712

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 28, 2026

Docket Number: KA 26-182

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

SA'DAVIAN M. GEORGE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-182

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

SA'DAVIAN M. GEORGE

APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NUMBER 23-K-00857-D HONORABLE D. JASON MECHE, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE

Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Rémy Voisin Starns State Public Defender LOUISIANA APPEALS & WRIT SERVICE (LAWS) OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 301 Main Street, Suite 700 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825 (225) 219-9305 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Sa'Davian M. George

Corrie R. Gallien Appellate Counsel LOUISIANA APPEALS & WRIT SERVICE (LAWS) OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 1030 Lafayette St., Ste. 12 Lafayette, Louisiana 70501 (337) 761-1585 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Sa'Davian M. George

Chad Pitre District Attorney Kathleen E. Ryan Assistant District Attorney TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Post Office Drawer 1968 Opelousas, Louisiana 70571 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

WILSON, Judge.

Defendant, Sa'Davian M. George, was convicted of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Mr. George to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Mr. George now seeks review of his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm Mr. George's conviction, amend his sentence to delete the denial of parole eligibility, and affirm as amended.

I.

ISSUES

On appeal, Mr. George asserts the following assignments of error:

(1) The trial court erred in admitting [Mr. George's] alleged inculpatory statement obtained by Warden Doucet; in violation of [Mr. George's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel; where [Mr. George] was formally charged; represented by counsel for at least five months; and the statement was the product of elicitation by a State agent who initiated the encounter; discussed the pending criminal charge; and made an inducing statement directly prior to the alleged confession.

(2) Under La.[Code Crim.P.] art. 894.1, the trial judges must state for the record the considerations taken and the factual basis for imposing a certain sentence on a defendant. Here, there was no pre-sentence investigation and the trial judge did not list any [Article] 894.1 factors. The sentence imposed fails to show that the trial court gave due consideration to the Article 894.1 guidelines. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a life sentence. As a result, said sentence should be vacated.

(3) A sentence which falls within the statutory limits is excessive when the penalty is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. Additionally, under Louisiana jurisprudence, maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious offenses and the worst offender. Here, [Mr. George] was sentenced to life in prison, for [first] degree murder, a crime that occurred when he was 17 years old. Thus, the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive sentence, which should be vacated.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 27, 2023, Roderick Aaron, Jr. was murdered in an assault by drive-by shooting in Opelousas, Louisiana. On April 27, 2023, Mr. George was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of first degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30, for Mr. Aaron's murder. Mr. George was seventeen years old at the time of the offense. Prior to trial, the State filed a Motion in Limine to Determine the Free and Voluntary Nature of Defendant's Statements, seeking a pretrial ruling on statements made to Lieutenant Brandon Harris and to Warden James Doucet. The pretrial hearing was held on October 21, 2025, and the trial court ruled that Mr. George's statements to Warden Doucet were freely and voluntarily made. Defense counsel sought supervisory review. On December 4, 2025, this court granted, in part, and denied, in part, a pre-trial writ application filed by Mr. George regarding the voluntariness of his statements to law enforcement. State v. George, 25-700 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/4/25) (unpublished writ ruling).

After a four-day trial, Mr. George was convicted on December 11, 2025, of first degree murder. Thereafter, on January 30, 2026, Mr. George was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. No post-verdict motions were filed. On January 30, 2026, Mr. George filed a Notice of Appeal, which was granted on February 3, 2026. Mr. George is now before this court asserting three assignments of error.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is one error patent involving the sentence imposed. Because that error is raised in assignment of error number 3, it will be discussed in conjunction with that assignment of error.

INCULPATORY STATEMENT

In his first assignment of error, Mr. George asserts the trial court erred in admitting his allegedly inculpatory statement to Warden Doucet. Mr. George contends the statement was made in violation of his right to counsel, “where [Mr. George] was formally charged; represented by counsel for at least five months; and the statement was the product of elicitation by a State agent who initiated the encounter; discussed the pending criminal charge; and made an inducing statement directly prior to the alleged confession.”

On September 30, 2025, the State filed a Motion in Limine to Determine Free and Voluntary Nature of Defendant's Statement. The State sought a hearing on the voluntariness of two statements made by Mr. George:

1) [Mr. George's] statements made to Lt. Harris on April 10, 2023[,] at the Opelousas Police Department Special Operations Division in the presence of [his] mother, Savanna George, after being properly advised of his rights. The statements were audio and video recorded.

2) [Mr. George's] statements made to Warden James Doucet at the St. Landry Parish Jail on April 14, 2023.

At a hearing held on October 21, 2025, the trial court took under advisement its ruling as to the voluntariness of the first statement made by Mr. George on April 10, 2023. As for the second statement made to Warden Doucet on April 14, 2023, the trial court found the statement was made freely and voluntarily. Mr. George objected to the trial court's ruling and sought review by filing a pre-trial writ application in this court. Mr. George asserted that the trial court erred in finding his alleged confession to Warden Doucet was freely and voluntarily made, without any Miranda warning ¹ . He claimed his statement to Warden Doucet was made out of fear of being charged with murder and should have been preceded by advisement of his Miranda rights by the warden. On December 4, 2025, this court (Judges Kyzar and Bradberry) issued the following ruling:

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED, IN PART, AND RELIEF DENIED, IN PART: We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's October 21, 2025 finding that Defendant's initial statement to Warden Doucet on April 14, 2023, that he “did it” was freely and voluntarily made. Thus, we deny relief as to that statement.

However, Warden Doucet immediately followed Defendant's admission with a question that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. At the October 21, 2025 hearing, Warden Doucet testified that after Defendant said he “did it,” the warden asked Defendant why he used a “Glock .40 caliber to do the shooting.” In his written statement, Warden Doucet stated that after Defendant said he “did it,” the warden asked Defendant “if he said that he shot Lil Rod.” According to the written statement, Warden Doucet subsequently asked other questions to which Defendant responded. Since these questions were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses, the trial court erred in finding Defendant's responses to these questions were freely and voluntarily made. Accordingly, we grant Defendant relief and suppress all remarks made by Defendant after Defendant said he “did it.”

George, 25-700.

Judge Davis dissented, stating that he “would grant the writ and find the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Defendant's statement to Warden Doucet.” Id.

On appeal, Mr. George notes that he gave notice of his intent to seek writs as to the admissibility of his statement to Warden Doucet but states “there is no indication that a writ application was subsequently filed.” The State, however, asserts that this court's pre-trial decision operates as law of the case on appeal, “binding the court to its prior determination absent a showing that the ruling was patently erroneous and produced an unjust result in light of the full trial record.”

Law of the Case Doctrine

As this court explained in State v. Dickerson, 14-170, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/14), 140 So.3d 904, 909, writ denied, 14-1466 (La. 3/13/15), 161 So.3d 638:

Under the “law of the case” doctrine, prior decisions of the appellate court are considered binding and may not be reconsidered on appeal absent clear error. Juneau v. State, 06-1653 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 956 So.2d 728, writ denied, 07-1177 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.2d 1004; State v. Molineux, 11-275 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/19/11), 76 So.3d 617, writ denied, 11-2556 (La. 3/30/12), 85 So.3d 117. “[T]he [law of the case] doctrine is discretionary and should not be applied where it would effectuate an obvious injustice or where the former appellate decision was clearly erroneous.” Juneau, 956 So.2d at 733 (quoting Trans La. Gas Co. v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 96-1477 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/9/97), 693 So.2d 893, 896) (alternations in original).

Further, in State v. Dugas, 21-85, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/11/22), 2022 WL 1487006 (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 22-947 (La. 9/7/22), 345 So.3d 426, it was noted, “[T]his court has continued to apply the doctrine as a discretionary tool of judicial economy ․ The present case provides another illustration of the need for the use of the doctrine in some form.” We further note this court's decision in Dugas is supported by the supreme court's statement in Day v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325, 330–31, 256 So.2d 105, 107 (1971), “Nevertheless, the law-of-the-case principle is applied merely as a discretionary guide: Argument is barred where there is merely doubt as to the correctness of the former ruling, but not in cases of palpable former error or so mechanically as to accomplish manifest injustice.”

After reviewing the arguments put forth by Defendant relating to the circumstances surrounding his arrest and all evidence seized as a result thereof, we find no error in the prior decision of this court and find no manifest injustice will occur by relying on the ruling in Defendant's writ. We, therefore, decline to revisit the ruling on the motion to suppress.

State v. Tucker, 22-735, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/23), 368 So.3d 187, 193 (alterations in original).

As discussed previously, Mr. George does not address this court's prior writ ruling in his brief, believing that no such writ application was submitted. Thus, there is no argument from Mr. George regarding this court's pre-trial ruling. In another case, this court stated the following about a defendant's failure to mention the pretrial writ ruling:

Defendant presents no new or original argument for why this court should change its prior ruling; indeed, Defendant does not mention the emergency writ in this case at all. Given Defendant's failure to present anything new beyond the fact that he proffered testimony into the record, the law of the case doctrine applies and this court's prior ruling stands.

State v. Bartie, 22-401, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/23), 358 So.3d 266, 272.

Likewise, considering Mr. George's failure to mention the pre-trial writ ruling and, thus, failure to present any argument as to why the pre-trial writ ruling should change, this court finds that the “law of the case” doctrine applies in this case. Accordingly, we find that the pre-trial writ ruling finding that Mr. George's statement to Warden Doucet was freely and voluntarily made, is the law of the case. At trial, the State complied precisely with the writ ruling and presented only the admissible portion of Warden Doucet's interaction with Mr. George. The jury heard only what this court had determined was admissible. Consequently, this assignment lacks merit.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his remaining assignments of error, Mr. George challenges the mandatory life sentence imposed. In Assignment of Error No. 2, Mr. George contends the trial court failed to give due consideration to the factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and failed to set forth any mitigating factors. Such factors should have been stated for the record, Mr. George argues, considering the trial court's failure to order a presentence investigation report.

In Assignment of Error No. 3, Mr. George focuses more on the trial court's failure to allow him to receive parole eligibility but also makes assertions regarding the appropriateness of a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence. Mr. George further contends that “[a] seventeen-year-old first offender is not the worst offender; [thus,] the maximum sentence is not warranted.” Because the arguments in both assignments of error are intertwined, we will discuss them together.

In response, the State contends the trial court expressly stated that it had reviewed La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and the sentencing guidelines. Additionally, the State asserts that Mr. George's personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, and employment), his prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and likelihood of rehabilitation were all developed through trial testimony, which the trial court observed. Furthermore, the State contends that the mandatory nature of the sentence renders any alleged deficiency in consideration of the Article 894.1 factors harmless. Finally, the State notes that no objection was made after the sentence was rendered.

Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court asked Mr. George if he had anything to argue, and defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” The trial court stated:

THE COURT: Okay. The court is going to note for the record, I just want to say this that it's a little bit tricky, there are several other open docket numbers that are pending before me. Because of that I'm not going to comment much on or not going to make any comments about the current sentence. It is a mandatory sentence as required by Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30. And then like I said, I do - - I would like to have a little pretrial conference with counsel regarding the open dockets before we leave.

But in this matter, a jury, after significant deliberation, unanimously found Sa'Davion George guilty of the first degree murder of Roderick Aaron, Jr., by assault by drive-by shooting in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute Title 14, Section 30 on December 11, 2025. Sentence was set for today January 30th and I'm ready to proceed with sentencing if everyone else is.

MR. VIDAL [(defense counsel)]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. George, would you stand please? Mr. George for the first degree murder of Roderick Aaron, Jr., on March 27, 2023, I hereby sentence you to life imprisonment at hard labor and without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. That is a mandatory sentence in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statute Title 14, Section 30. However, the court has reviewed Article 894.1 and all of the sentencing guidelines. I do think it would be an appropriate sentence regardless of the minimum mandatory in light of the facts and circumstances presented at the trial of this matter. That will be the sentence.

․

MS. RYAN [(the prosecutor)]: Your Honor, I'd also like to note that [La.R.S.] 15:574.4 is also applicable in this case because of the defendant's age.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. VIDAL: Correct.

THE COURT: And again, at this point there are other pending cases that I think it's best that I just not comment on any kind of issues under that statute at this time.

To begin, we note that Mr. George failed to object to the sentence imposed and failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to reconsider sentence.

․

B. The motion shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based.

․

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

Neither defense counsel nor Mr. George requested a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence, objected to the sentence imposed, or filed a motion to reconsider sentence. Therefore, Mr. George is relegated to a bare excessiveness review. State v. Bernard, 25-731 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/20/26), 435 So.3d 292.

In State v. Monic, 24-80, pp. 22–23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/25/24), 394 So.3d 381, 396–97, writ denied, 24-1282 (La. 1/28/25), 399 So.3d 415, this court stated the following regarding a mandatory life sentence for second degree murder:

In her final assignment of error, Defendant argues that she was entitled to have the trial court rule on the unconstitutional excessiveness of a life sentence for this offense. She urges that the trial court made no effort to set forth any basis for the sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Whether a sentence is constitutionally excessive is determined by considering whether the sentence is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. La. Const. art. I, § 20; State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); 977 [sic] State v. Lindsey, 50,324 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 189 So. 3d 1104. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.

It is within the legislature's prerogative to determine the length of the sentence imposed for the crimes classified as felonies, and the courts are charged with applying these punishments unless they are found to be unconstitutional. State v. Barrett, 51,921 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 164, writ denied, 18-0744 (La. 2/18/19), 265 So. 3d 770. Accordingly, the decision to assess mandatory life sentences is also within the prerogative of the legislature. Id.

Downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence may occur in rare circumstances if the defendant rebuts the presumption of constitutionality by showing clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional, namely, that he is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the offender and the circumstances of the case. State v. Chandler, 41,063 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/8/06), 939 So. 2d 574, writ denied, 06-2554 (La. 5/11/07), 955 So. 2d 1277, citing Dorthey, supra, and State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672. The “rare circumstances” in which a mandated sentence can be altered are even less likely in the case of a life sentence chosen by the legislature for a single crime, such as aggravated rape or second degree murder. State v. Chandler, supra. In such crimes, unlike the mandatory minimum sentence under the habitual offender law, the “tailoring” of the sentence by the legislature was for life because the culpability of offenders and the gravity of the offenses are so great. Id.

Likewise, where there is a mandatory sentence, there is no need for the trial court to justify, under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, a sentence that it is legally required to impose. State v. Barrett, supra. It would be an exercise in futility for the trial court to discuss the factors enumerated in that article when the court has no discretion in sentencing the defendant. State v. Robinson, 47,437 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12), 106 So. 3d 1028, writ denied, 12-2658 (La. 5/17/13), 117 So. 3d 918.

State v. Nabors, 53,357, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 295 So.3d 974, 976–77, writ denied, 20-709 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 527.

Given the law applicable to the review of mandatory life sentences for second degree murder, we find that Defendant failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality by showing clear and convincing evidence that she is exceptional, namely, that she is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the offender, and the circumstances of the case. She did not negate the presumptive constitutionality of the legislature's considered decision to impose this sentence for the most serious of offenses. The trial court was not required to justify the imposition of this mandatory sentence although it did affirmatively state on the record that it saw no reason not to impose the life sentence given these facts. That was entirely within its authority and discretion under these circumstances. Accordingly, Defendant's assignment of error lacks merit.

In this case, Mr. George did not assert in the trial court that he is exceptional by arguing for a downward departure at sentencing. Although his brief states that “[h]is situation is one of the ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases that require a downward departure[,]” Mr. George merely argues that he was seventeen at the time of the offense and had no prior adult felony convictions.

Despite the mandatory sentence, Mr. George claims the trial court should have considered the Article 894.1 guidelines and his circumstances to determine the appropriateness of a downward departure. Mr. George cites State v. Ladd, 14-1611, p. 1 (La. 3/27/15), 164 So.3d 184, 184 (per curiam), wherein the supreme court stated:

Writ granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the sentence imposed by the trial court is vacated. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1(C). “The court shall state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.”

Mr. George asserts that his “sentence should be vacated and remanded per Ladd.”

Although the supreme court's per curiam does not reveal anything about the facts of the case, the fourth circuit's opinion following the remand reveals that Ladd's sentence concerned a mandatory minimum sentence under the habitual offender law. State v. Ladd, 15-772 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/13/16), 192 So.3d 235, writ denied, 16-915 (La. 5/1/17), 220 So.3d 742. Thus, unlike Mr. George, Ladd was not facing a mandatory sentence.

As previously noted, if the sentence is mandatory “there is no need for the trial court to justify, under [La.Code Crim.P.] art. 894.1, a sentence that it is legally required to impose.” State v. Robinson, 47,437, p. 13 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12), 106 So.3d 1028, 1036, writ denied, 12-2658 (La. 5/17/13), 117 So.3d 918. “It would be an exercise in futility for the trial court to discuss the factors enumerated in [La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1] when the court has no discretion in sentencing the defendant.” Id. at 1036–37. Furthermore, the trial court in this case stated that it “reviewed Article 894.1 and all of the sentencing guidelines.” Moreover, Mr. George failed to raise any issue in the trial court regarding the trial court's alleged failure to consider the Article 894.1 factors.

Miller v. Alabama and Parole Eligibility

Mr. George asserts that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), requires the trial court to consider a juvenile's youth and propensity to change when imposing a life sentence. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Id. at 465. Mr. George's date of birth was August 23, 2005; thus, he was a few months shy of his eighteenth birthday when the offense was committed on March 27, 2023.

As will be discussed below, Miller's holding impacts Mr. George's parole eligibility. Although Mr. George asserts that Miller should also be considered in regard to a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736 (2016), clarified that Miller's focus was on the parole eligibility of child offenders, not the imposition of the life sentence:

Giving Miller retroactive effect, moreover, does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–10–301(c) (2013) (juvenile homicide offenders eligible for parole after 25 years). Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

If Miller required the special characteristics of juvenile offenders to be considered in determining whether a life sentence should be imposed, the remedy would have been resentencing rather than simply a hearing to determine parole eligibility.

In State v. Shelvin, 22-54, pp. 8–9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/18/22), 340 So.3d 1268, 1272, this court found the trial court did not need to consider Shelvin's request for a downward departure when resentencing him pursuant to Miller and Montgomery:

In his concurrence in State v. Montgomery, 13-1163, p. 1 (La. 6/28/16), 194 So.3d 606, 610, Justice Crichton wrote: “Eligibility vel non is the sole question to be answered in a Miller hearing.” In State v. Comeaux, 17-682 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/15/18), 239 So.3d 920, writ denied, 18-428 (La. 1/14/19), 261 So.3d 783, after citing various cases that stated there was no consideration of whether there should be a downward departure from the mandatory sentence of life at a Miller hearing, this court concluded the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure. See also State v. Terrick, 18-102 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/29/18), 254 So.3d 1246, writ denied, 18-532 (La. 1/14/19), 260 So.3d 1217; State v. Clemons, 53,248 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So.3d 1165, writ denied, 20-407 (La. 7/31/20), 300 So.3d 399.

․

The case is remanded for the imposition of sentence. On remand, the trial court is instructed that it need not consider Defendant's request for a downward departure when imposing sentence.

The Supreme Court's holding in Miller does not require the trial court to consider a downward departure from a life sentence. Thus, Mr. George's reliance on Miller alone does not satisfy his burden of proving he is entitled to a downward departure. Furthermore, the trial court in the present case stated that he believed the sentence is “an appropriate sentence regardless of the minimum mandatory in light of the facts and circumstances presented at the trial of this matter.” Thus, Mr. George failed to present any argument for a downward departure in the trial court, and his argument on appeal fails to prove a downward departure was justified. Accordingly, the mandatory life sentence was not excessive in this case.

The question of Mr. George's parole eligibility, however, must be addressed. “In Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles unconstitutional and required ‘that a sentencer follow a certain process – considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics – before imposing’ a life without parole sentence.” State v. Craig, 25-24, pp. 1–2 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So.3d 952, 954. The Louisiana Supreme Court described the process enacted in Louisiana:

In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that require all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that in Miller v. Alabama it had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law and that the Constitution requires state courts to give retroactive effect to that rule on collateral review.

To implement Miller and Montgomery, the Louisiana legislature enacted La. C.Cr.P. art. 878.1 and amended La. R.S. 15:574.4. Article 878.1 originally required district courts to conduct a hearing “[i]n any case where an offender is to be sentenced to life imprisonment for a conviction of first degree murder (R.S. 14:30) or second degree murder (R.S. 14:30.1) where the offender was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offense ․ to determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 15:574.4(E).” Subsection 15:574.4(E), added by 2013 La. Acts, No. 239, provided the conditions under which persons serving life sentences for first or second degree murder committed under the age of eighteen could become parole eligible. On remand from the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana, we directed lower courts to conduct parole eligibility hearings for pre-Miller juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility using these enactments. State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 6/28/16), 194 So.3d 606.

The legislature continued to refine these provisions. The legislature confined the scope of Subsection 15:574.4(E) to the context of first degree murder and added Subsection 15:574.4(F) to govern persons (under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offense) serving a sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction for second degree murder. See 2017 La. Acts, No. 277. In addition, Subsections 15:574.4(E) and (F) only apply when an indictment is on or after August 1, 2017․

As with offenders similarly situated to the applicant, Article 878.1 afforded the State an opportunity to timely file a notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility, which would then be followed by a hearing conducted in accordance with the article.

State v. Pilcher, 21-1226, pp. 1–3 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So.3d 358, 359–60 (alterations in original) (per curiam).

Mr. George asserts the trial court erred in failing to specify when he would be eligible for parole. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.4(E)(1) states, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except as provided in Subsection G of this Section, any person serving a sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of first degree murder (R.S. 14:30) who was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offense and whose indictment for the offense is on or after August 1, 2017, shall be eligible for parole consideration pursuant to the provisions of this Subsection if a judicial determination has been made that the person is entitled to parole eligibility pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 878.1(A) and all of the following conditions have been met[.]

Several conditions are listed, including that the defendant has already served twenty-five years of his sentence.

Although La.R.S. 15:574.4(E) states that a judicial determination of parole eligibility must be made pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 878.1(A) (emphasis added), Article 878.1 now provides, in pertinent part:

If an offender is indicted on or after August 1, 2017, for the crime of first degree murder (R.S. 14:30) where the offender was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offense, the district attorney may file a notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole within one hundred eighty days after the indictment. If the district attorney timely files the notice of intent, a hearing shall be conducted after conviction and prior to sentencing to determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility. If the court determines that the sentence shall be imposed with parole eligibility, the offender shall be eligible for parole pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 15:574.4(E). If the district attorney fails to timely file the notice of intent, the sentence shall be imposed with parole eligibility and the offender shall be eligible for parole pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 15:574.4(E) without the need of a judicial determination pursuant to the provisions of this Article. If the court determines that the sentence shall be imposed without parole eligibility, the offender shall not be eligible for parole.

There is no indication in the record that the district attorney in the present case filed a notice of intent to seek a life sentence without parole eligibility. Thus, according to Article 878.1, Mr. George's sentence should have been imposed with parole eligibility without the need for a judicial determination. The trial court, however, imposed his life sentence without benefit of parole. When the State noted that La.R.S. 15:574.4 was applicable because of Mr. George's age, the trial court replied, “Right[,]” but did not change the sentence. Although the trial court seemingly agreed with the State when the State noted that Mr. George was eligible for parole, the trial court did not change its imposition of the sentence without benefit of parole. Thus, Mr. George received an illegal sentence that must be corrected.

In a similar situation, the first circuit stated the following:

It is apparent from a thorough review of the record that the trial court's intent was to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor with the benefit of parole after serving at least twenty-five years. Such a sentence would be in compliance with the mandates of Miller [v. Alabama], [567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)], La. R.S. 15:574.4, and La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1. However, regardless of the trial court's intent, the record reflects that the defendant was illegally sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole.

An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review. La. Code Crim. P. art. 882; see also State v. Crosby, 54,539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So.3d 458, 465 (declining to vacate and remand for resentencing and instead amending sentence to life imprisonment with the benefit of parole where juvenile was illegally sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole after pleading guilty to second degree murder); State v. Clark, 2020-167 (La App. 5th Cir. 11/18/20), 306 So.3d 619, 638-40, writ denied, 2020-01459 (La. 2/17/21), 310 So.3d 1150 (amending sentence to include parole eligibility after twenty-five years where defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense and was illegally sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for thirty-five years). Because an appellate court may correct an illegal sentence at any time, we find that the defendant is not entitled to have his sentence vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 882. Rather, we amend the defendant's sentence to life imprisonment at hard labor with the benefit of parole, pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 882 and La. R.S. 15:574.4(G).

For the foregoing reasons, Dkerian Thompson's conviction of the second degree murder of Christopher Franklin is affirmed, but the sentence is amended to reflect life imprisonment with the benefit of parole consideration after serving twenty-five years, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:574.4(G). Further, the Department of Corrections is ordered to revise the defendant's master prison record to reflect that his sentence is no longer without benefit of parole and, in accordance with the criteria in La. R.S. 15:574.4, to reflect an eligibility date for consideration by the Board of Parole once the conditions contained therein are met.

State v. Thompson, 22-314, pp. 19–20 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/10/23) (unpublished opinion) (2023 WL 142384).

Finally, in State v. Bell, 25-36 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/17/25) (unpublished opinion) (2025 WL 2658642), this court corrected a life without parole sentence on a non-homicide offender by amending Bell's sentence to delete the restriction on parole eligibility. Additionally, this court directed “the Department of Corrections to revise [Bell's] prison master in accordance with La.R.S. 15:574.4(D) to reflect that his sentence is no longer without benefit of parole.” Id. at 7–8.

Considering the above cases, we amend Mr. George's sentence to delete the denial of parole eligibility. Additionally, we direct the Department of Corrections to revise Mr. George's prison master in accordance with La.R.S. 15:574.4(E) to reflect that his sentence is no longer without benefit of parole. Mr. George's sentence is affirmed as amended.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. George's conviction is affirmed. The sentence is amended to delete the denial of parole eligibility, and the Department of Corrections is instructed to revise Mr. George's prison master in accordance with La.R.S. 15:574.4(E) to reflect that his sentence is no longer without benefit of parole. Mr. George's sentence is affirmed as amended.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE