BEAL HEBERT LLC v. SHIRA ANGELLE (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-146

BEAL & HEBERT, LLC

VERSUS

SHIRA ANGELLE

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on October 28, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NUMBER 20231734, DIVISION J HONORABLE KRISTIAN D. EARLES, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE

Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

VHK

SDW

GEB

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-146

BEAL & HEBERT, LLC

VERSUS

SHIRA ANGELLE

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NUMBER 20231734, DIVISION J HONORABLE KRISTIAN D. EARLES, DISTRICT JUDGE

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON JUDGE

Court composed of Van H. Kyzar, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

Shira Angelle In Proper Person 104 Acomb Drive Lafayette, Louisiana 70508 (337) 849-4054 Kenneth P. Hebert BEAL & HEBERT, LLC 210 Heymann Boulevard Lafayette, Louisiana 70503 (337) 991-6263 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Beal & Hebert, LLC

James Klock Attorney at Law Post Office Box 3944 Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 (337) 443-2933 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Beal & Hebert, LLC

WILSON, Judge.

Plaintiff, the law firm of Beal & Hebert, LLC (Beal & Hebert) filed suit to recover the attorney's fees and costs allegedly owed to it under a contingency fee and representation agreement with Defendant, Shira Angelle (Ms. Angelle), relative to a dispute concerning the community property partition following her divorce. Defendant appealed the trial court's award of $90,000.00, plus interest and all costs of the litigation, to Beal & Hebert. Beal & Hebert answered the appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce the contingency fee agreement. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's finding that the continency fee provision of the representation agreement is invalid. Accordingly, we render judgment in favor of Beal & Hebert in the amount of $149,924.98, plus costs and expenses in the amount of $3,417.60. We affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment that grants a $4,385.31 credit to Ms. Angelle and authorizes the transfer of that money out of Beal & Hebert's IOLTA account to its operating account. We also affirm the trial court's tacit denial of Ms. Angelle's claims in reconvention.

I.

ISSUES

Ms. Angelle asserts the following eight assignments of error:

1. The trial court committed legal error by awarding compensation in equity after expressly finding that no enforceable contract existed due to a lack of meeting of the minds between the parties. Under La. Civil Code Art. 2033 attorney fees cannot be awarded absent a valid contractual agreement.

2. The trial court committed manifest error and abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees based upon billing records that contained material inconsistencies, confliction [sic] fee amounts, duplicate time entries, and unreliable documentation, as reflected in the trial record.

3. The trial court committed manifest error by relying upon testimony that Appellant was uncooperative and untrustworthy where recorded communications and documentary evidence directly contradicted such testimony.

4. The trial court erred in permitting and relying upon prejudicial character testimony from a subpoenaed attorney unrelated to the fee dispute, which improperly influenced the court's credibility determinations and was contradicted by objective evidence.

5. The trial court committed legal error by awarding equitable compensation that resulted in unjust enrichment to Appellee and financial impoverishment to Appellant in violation of Louisiana Civil Code article 2298.

6. The trial court abused its discretion by assessing court costs against Appellant despite evidence that the trial proceedings were unnecessarily prolonged, increasing attorney fees and financial burden through circumstances not caused by Appellant.

7. The trial court committed reversible legal error by rendering judgment without addressing Defendant-Appellant's Reconventional Demand, thereby failing to dispose of all claims properly before the court.

8. The trial court committed legal error by awarding attorney fees on equitable grounds after finding the contingency agreement unenforceable, while disregarding trial testimony establishing an undisclosed fee-sharing arrangement involving an independent contractor attorney compensated through a percentage of fees, contrary to Rule 1.5 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.

Beal & Hebert answered the appeal to assert the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in failing to enforce the contingency fee provision.

2. The trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney fees, and the award should be increased.

3. The trial court erred in failing to award costs and expenses in the amount of $3,417.60.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[T]he interpretation of unambiguous contractual provisions is a matter of law, which we review under the de novo standard.” Landis Const. Co., LLC v. St. Bernard Par., 14-96, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/22/14), 151 So.3d 959, 963, writ denied, 14-2451 (La. 2/13/15), 159 So.3d 467. “[T]he determination of whether a contract is clear or is ambiguous is also a question of law.” Id. “However, if a court determines as a matter of law that a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic (parol) evidence may be used to determine the true intent of the parties, and determining the intent of the parties becomes, in part, a question of fact.” Carter v. BRMAP, 591 So.2d 1184, 1188 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991).

“Appellate review of factual determinations of the trial court is conducted pursuant to the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, which precludes setting aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly wrong in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Chandler Groceries, Inc. v. Ali, 22-63, pp. 16–17 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/28/22), 348 So.3d 904, 913, writ denied, 22-1611 (La. 1/11/23), 352 So.3d 985. Under this standard of review, we must give “great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). However, this court can find manifest error “[w]here documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story[.]” Id. at 844–45.

III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Angelle married Dennis Joseph Angelle (Mr. Angelle) on November 19, 2005, and they were divorced by judgment dated August 25, 2014. During the divorce proceedings, Ms. Angelle was represented by an attorney who was later elected to the bench before the community property partition was completed. Ms. Angelle retained Beal & Hernandez, LLP,¹ on December 29, 2020, under an hourly fee agreement. The representation allegedly transitioned from an hourly fee agreement to a contingency fee agreement on November 5, 2021, with the signing of a new representation agreement. Prior to signing the contingency fee agreement, Ms. Angelle had paid $9,000.00 in retainer deposits.

The community property partition involved issues of business valuation, reimbursement claims, and asset classification. Beal & Hebert allege that they worked diligently over nearly two years before reaching a comprehensive settlement agreement with Ms. Angelle's former spouse on November 29, 2022.² A joint stipulation was signed by Mr. and Ms. Angelle on January 11, 2023. The settlement was favorable to Ms. Angelle.

Beal & Hebert prepared an accounting that reflected the full value of its recovery at $297,412.00, but they allegedly agreed to reduce their fee to $159,511.00. Beal & Hebert alleged that when it became evident that Ms. Angelle did not intend to pay any amount for their services, the firm withdrew as counsel, filed an attorneys’ lien on her house, and filed a petition for breach of contract.³ Ms. Angelle filed an answer and reconventional demand, seeking damages for “wrongful issuance of lien off an unreasonable [sic] and damages associated with impairment of property” and “for money held by Defendant [sic].” Beal & Hebert answered the reconventional demand and asserted several affirmative defenses thereto.

The matter was stayed pending submission to arbitration on May 14, 2024. Attempts to arbitrate the matter proved unsuccessful, and the matter proceeded to a four-day bench trial on September 2. 2025.⁴ On September 23, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of Beal & Hebert in the amount of $90,000.00, plus judicial interest from April 4, 2023, subject to a credit of $4,385.31 held in the firm's trust account. All costs of the litigation were assessed to Ms. Angelle. Ms. Angelle appealed, and as indicated above, Beal & Hebert answered the appeal seeking an increase in the amount awarded.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The Contingency Fee Agreement

“Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law. Contracts must be performed in good faith.” La.Civ.Code art. 1983. We must interpret a contract in accordance with “the common intent of the parties.” La.Civ.Code art. 2045. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La.Civ.Code art. 2046. However, if there is no meeting of the minds, there can be no contract. La.Civ.Code art. 1927.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:218(A) provides, in pertinent part, that:

By written contract signed by his client, an attorney at law may acquire as his fee an interest in the subject matter of a suit, proposed suit, or claim in the assertion, prosecution, or defense of which he is employed, whether the claim or suit be for money or for property. Such interest shall be a special privilege to take rank as a first privilege thereon, superior to all other privileges and security interests under Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial laws.

“Louisiana courts have long approved of the contingent fee contract to compensate attorneys.” O'Rourke v. Cairns, 95-3054, p. 4 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 697, 700.

We first address the answer to appeal and the argument that the trial court erred in finding that the contingency fee provision was unenforceable because if we find that the agreement was valid, then Ms. Angelle's assignments of error numbered one through five and eight are moot.

At the close of the case, the trial court ruled as follows:

I find that there was no meeting of the minds on the ․ one third of the amount recovered language. And what amount of recovery meant. Therefore, I have to go on equity. And the only evidence that was presented was billing․ [T]here's no doubt they're owed money. They did work for you[,] and the best way I can find to do this is by using the previous amount of $250.00 per hour. I've gone through the hourly reports[,] and I believe that $90,000 would recover [sic] the plaintiff in this amount for the work product in ․ representing you in this case. In that $90,000, I did give you credit for the $9,000 you already paid. And assess the defendant with the court costs in this matter.

The relevant portion of the Attorney-Client Fee and Representation Agreement signed by Ms. Angelle and Mr. Beal in November of 2021, reads as follows:

Attorney's Fees

Client agrees to pay Law of Office of Lance Beal, LLC for Attorney's Fees, a percentage of any settlement or recovery obtained in the above referenced matter. Client understands that if no recovery is made, Client shall not be responsible for Attorney Fees. Client understands and agrees that regardless of whether Attorney is able to obtain recovery in this matter, Client agrees to pay all costs and expenses as set forth in the Cost and Expenses Section. In the event of recovery, costs and expenses shall be paid out of my share of the recovery. Attorney fees are set upon the following percentage of any settlement/judgment recovered before the deduction of costs and expenses as set forth in the Cost and Expenses section herein:

․

b. 33% of any settlement obtained after the suit is filed but before the start of trial;

․

Cost and Expenses

Client understands and agrees that in addition to the Attorney's fees provided within the “Attorney's Fees” section, Client shall be responsible for all costs and expenses incurred by Attorney in connection with Client's case. Client shall reimburse Attorney for all Costs and Expenses incurred after Attorney has provided Client a receipt. Costs and Expenses may include, but shall not be limited to, the postage and shipping costs, facsimile costs, deposition fees, subpoena costs, expert witness fees, investigation costs, court costs, service fees, and travel expenses.

․

Modification by Subsequent Agreement

This agreement may be modified by subsequent written agreement signed by both our firm and Client, or an oral agreement only to the extent that the Parties carry it out.

During the hearing, Ms. Angelle testified as follows:

MR. MOITY:

Could you tell us how it came about, the contingency contract. In your own words. Now, let's start with the date. Do you remember when you spoke to him?

MS. ANGELLE:

On November 3rd.

MR. MOITY:

Okay. Was that via telephone or in person?

MS. ANGELLE:

In person.

MR. MOITY:

Okay. Well tell us how that conversation went.

MS. ANGELLE:

I had went in for a scheduled meeting with Heather. And I was told I needed to pay, it was time for me to pay more money. And he told me that -- he offered me a contingency, telling me that my case could possibly go on another two years, five years, possibly ten years. And instead of him having to ask me for money every few months, that we could enter into the contingency[,] and he would charge me a percentage on anything above -- anything that he was able to get me above what was already mine. And he specifically said, not, you know, the house and the insurance check was not a part of that.

MR. MOITY:

Why did he say that?

MS. ANGELLE:

I mean that was specifically asked.

This testimony, however, is contradicted by testimonies of Mr. Beal, Kenneth P. Hebert (Mr. Hebert), and Dwazendra Smith (Dr. Smith), the attorney representing Mr. Angelle in the community property matter, as well as the documentary evidence. Mr. Beal testified that it was made very clear that the firm would get paid from the insurance check so that “nothing would come out of her pocket at that point.” Mr. Hebert testified that Ms. Angelle knew “that a majority of that $191,000 check would go towards paying her fee.”

Dr. Smith testified that one of the primary areas of contention in the community property partition was the $191,725.65 insurance check for flood damage to the community home. Dr. Smith further testified that before Mr. Beal began representing Ms. Angelle, Mr. Angelle had offered to settle for $95,862.83 of this check, to split the equity in the home, to receive a payment of $100,000.00 for RSA Industries, LLC (RSA), a community trucking business, and to have Ms. Angelle assume the remaining balance of a tax debt, as well some other conditions. The settlement ultimately reached in the community property matter resulted in Ms. Angelle getting the full amount of the insurance check, full ownership of the community home, full ownership of two businesses ⁵ without having to make any payment to Mr. Angelle, and $20,000.00 in child support arrears.

On January 11, 2023, Ms. Angelle signed an “Affidavit and Third Party Authorization,” stating:

That the above named parties have reached a community property settlement agreement wherein DENNIS JOSEPH ANGELLE has agreed to transfer and convey all of his interest in and to the one hundred ninety-one thousand seven hundred twenty-five dollars and 65/100ths ($191,725.65) flood loss related funds to SHIRA LYNN CROCHET ANGELLE.

That Appearer herein expressly authorizes Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, to communicate with her attorneys regarding these loss funds, namely Lance Beal and Heather Key of the law office of Beal & Hebert, LLC, in Lafayette, Louisiana.

That Appearer herein expressly authorizes and requests that Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, release the funds in the amount of one hundred ninety-one thousand seven hundred twenty-five dollars and 65/100ths ($191,725.65), in claim [ ], made payable to “Beal & Hebert, LLC, and Shira Angelle”, and mail those funds via overnight service to: [Beal & Hebert, LLC.]

We note that despite these instructions, the check was sent directly to Ms. Angelle and deposited by her.

While Beal & Hebert acknowledge that the agreement does not specifically define the term “recovery,” in this case, the record does not support either the trial court's implicit finding that the term “recovery” is ambiguous or its conclusion that Ms. Angelle did not understand what “recovery” meant or included. “The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning.” La.Civ.Code art. 2047.

Mr. Beal testified as follows:

MR. MOITY:

Okay. Now, where in this contract does it say recovered would be defined? Is there any definition in this contract to say what recovery is?

MR. BEAL:

I would say yes. Any settlement or recovery obtained. I mean recovery is a very -- anything you get in addition to what you have. I mean it's a recovery.

․

MR. MOITY:

Okay. So the answer to the question is recovered is not defined in the contract.

MR. BEAL:

I think recovered speaks for itself.

․

MR. MOITY:

․ But is the definition -- did you define in the contract what recovery is?

MR. BEAL:

No.

MR. MOITY:

Okay. There's no discussion of what would be called a base of recovery. Right?

MR. BEAL:

A base of recovery? I mean a base of recovery is you start off at zero, and anything above that. So, if you recover a hundred dollars, it's a hundred dollars is the recovery.

In Southern Shipbuilding Corporation v. Richardson, 363 So.2d 1329, 1333 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1978), the client argued that the contingency fee agreement “was vague and ambiguous and that there was no ‘meeting of the minds,’ ” where it did not make “clear that ‘recovery’ meant recovery by settlement as well as recovery after trial.” The fourth circuit upheld the validity of the contract because “it [was] clear from the testimony that all parties understood the substance of the agreement[ ]” and that they “understood that the one-third-of-recovery fee would apply in case of settlement,” even though the client did not think a settlement was possible. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and ultimately affirmed the fourth circuit's ruling. S. Shipbuilding Corp. v. Richardson, 372 So.2d 1188 (La.1979). The court specifically noted that it agreed with the fourth circuit's “finding that despite whatever ambiguity there may have been in the letter which contained the contingency fee contract, Mrs. Richardson understood the substance of the agreement.” Id. at 1189 n.3.

Considering Ms. Angelle's testimony and the testimonies of Mr. Beal, Mr. Hebert, and Dr. Smith, along with the record evidence, we conclude unequivocally that the contingency fee agreement is valid and that the trial court erred in finding otherwise. The insurance check and the community home, as well as the two businesses, were the very things that Ms. Angelle sought to obtain in the community property partition, i.e., her recovery. Furthermore, the contingency fee agreement's statement that the fee is to be “33% of any settlement obtained after the suit is filed but before the start of trial[ ]” (emphasis added) defines “recovery” in this context as the “settlement obtained,” which is how the final accounting prepared by Beal & Hebert determined the amount of the fee.

According to the full accounting dated March 8, 2023, Beal & Hebert calculated the contingency fee due as $191,145.74, which represented thirty-three percent of the total asset value of $579,229.51. The assets included were one half of the total equity in the community home ($170,711.08); the insurance check in the amount of $191,725.65; a $20,000.00 payment from Mr. Angelle for arrearages; and $196,792.78 in total values of movable property and other property relinquished by Mr. Angelle. Then, $4,918.85 ⁶ in costs were added. The final accounting also recognized a court cost refund of $352.25; a $4,000.00 payment from Mr. Angelle per the stipulated judgment; and that Ms. Angelle was to seek reimbursement from Mr. Angelle in the amount of $4,152.00 for court costs as defined in the stipulated judgment. Thus, according to the final accounting, if Beal & Hebert kept the entire insurance check, Ms. Angelle would still owe them $4,338.94. Mr. Beal testified that Beal & Hebert agreed to reduce the fee to around $150,000.00 so that Ms. Angelle could retain a portion of the insurance proceeds. Mr. Hebert testified to the same. Therefore, we render judgment in favor of Beal & Hebert in the amount of $149,924.98, subject to a $4,385.31 credit.

Court Costs

The trial court's judgment assessed “all court costs of this litigation” against Ms. Angelle. She argues that this was an abuse of discretion because the “trial proceedings were unnecessarily prolonged, increasing attorney fees and financial burden through circumstances not caused by [her].” Beal & Hebert, on the other hand, argue that this portion of the judgment should be affirmed.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 provides, in pertinent part, that “the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable.” And “[i]t is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion in the assessment of court costs.” Davis v. Sonnier, 96-515, p. 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96), 682 So.2d 910, 920.

Here, we find no support in the record for Ms. Angelle's contentions. It was a little over two years from the date of filing of the petition to the date of trial. Part of the delay was due to submitting the matter to arbitration following Ms. Angelle's reconventional demand; and, as acknowledged in Beal & Hebert's petition, the representation agreement did contain an arbitration clause. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's assessment of costs against Ms. Angelle and affirm that portion of the judgment.

Ms. Angelle's Reconventional Demand

In her reconventional demand, Ms. Angelle sought to recover damages for wrongful issuance of a lien and to recover money held by Beal & Hebert. Her reconventional demand does not specify how much or what money she alleges was held by Beal & Hebert.⁷ In her brief to this court, Ms. Angelle argues that despite the facts that the reconventional demand was properly before the court and that evidence existed, the trial court's written judgment contains no ruling and is entirely silent as to its disposition. She acknowledges that silence in a judgment may be deemed a rejection of the claim ⁸ but argues that, in this case, the judgment is legally deficient and constitutes reversible error because the failure to expressly adjudicate the claim “prevents meaningful appellate review.”

We find no merit to this assignment of error. Ms. Angelle does not argue that she was prevented from presenting her claim. We also note that while Beal & Hebert prepared the final judgment, the Rule 9.5 Certificate indicated that Ms. Angelle's attorney was provided with a copy of the judgment and documented his opposition as follows:

Defendant would like the following language included in the Judgment: “The contract between the litigants dated November 3, 2021[,] is unenforceable. Therefore the Court does use equity as a basis for its ruling.”

It appears that Ms. Angelle's attorney did not request that the denial of the reconventional demand be included in the judgment.

We do not find that meaningful appellate review of the denial of her reconventional demand results from the silence of the judgment. We agree with Beal & Hebert's assertion that “[t]he propriety of the Firm's fee, upon which the lien was based, was fully litigated at trial. Thus, the trial court's silence on Ms. Angelle's reconventional demand is deemed a tacit rejection[.]” Ms. Angelle, however, does not present any argument to this court as to any error in the denial of her claims in reconvention. Therefore, the trial court's tacit denial of her claims is affirmed.

V.

CONCLUSION

Having found no ambiguity in the meaning of the term “recovery,” we reverse the trial court's findings that there was not a meeting of the minds and that the continency fee provision of the representation agreement is invalid. Accordingly, we render judgment in favor of Beal & Hebert in the amount of $149,924.98, plus costs and expenses in the amount of $3,417.60. We affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment that grants a $4,385.31 credit to Ms. Angelle and authorizes the transfer of that money out of Beal & Hebert's IOLTA account to its operating account. We further affirm the trial court's tacit denial of Ms. Angelle's claims in reconvention. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendant/Appellant, Shira Angelle.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Beal & Hernandez, LLP dissolved, and Lance Beal (Mr. Beal) continued representing Angelle through The Law Office of Lance Beal, which subsequently became Beal & Hebert.

2.   A stipulated judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement was signed on January 17, 2023.

3.   A default judgment against Ms. Angelle was signed on June 2, 2023, however, that judgment was stricken by judgment signed on August 22, 2023.

4.   At trial, Michael Moity represented Ms. Angelle, but he withdrew as her counsel of record by order signed on October 2, 2025, and she proceeded with this appeal in proper person.

5.   The second business was Power Max Transportation, LLC (Power Max). Power Max was allegedly formed by Ms. Angelle after the termination of the community; however, Mr. Angelle alleged that it was a shell company created to avoid having to split the business from RSA as part of the community. Chris Rainey, the CPA hired by Mr. Angelle, testified at this trial that RSA was valued at $263,739.00 and that Power Max was valued at $38,878.00.

6.   This amount was reduced to $3,417.60 due to Ms. Angelle directly paying one expert.

7.   Ms. Angelle did pay Beal & Hebert $9,000.00 (in two payments) as a retainer for work done before the contingency fee agreement was signed.

8.   See Guillot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 12-888 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/15/13), 113 So.3d 507, writ denied, 13-1401 (La. 9/27/13), 123 So.3d 725.