STATE v. TAYLOR (2026)

Deidra Marie Taylor was charged with theft of $1,000.00 or more but less than $5,000.00, in violation of La.R.S. 14:67(B)(3). She pled guilty. She was sentenced to four (4) years at hard labor with credit for time served.

FACTS

The State recited the following statement of facts at Taylor's guilty plea:

On or about the dates stated in the Bill of Information the State would intend to prove that the co-defendants Ms. Taylor and Mr. Taylor -- the co-defendant is Kenneth Taylor -- entered into Lowe's through the Lawn and Garden Center. They took six bathroom heater fans and walked out of the center without paying. On a separate date they went in through the lumber department and went in and took a twenty-one inch mower also without paying. Both are seen entering and exiting together and so Ms. Taylor would have been very well aware that they hadn't paid for the merchandise they walked out with. She is on surveillance with the items being pushed out [of] the store that were never paid for.

After accepting Taylor's guilty plea, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and a certified criminal history. The trial court allowed Taylor to remain out on bond until her sentencing date. The State said it would not file a habitual offender bill if Taylor showed up on her sentencing date.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. We find one error patent.

At her guilty plea proceeding, Taylor was advised:

The law requires that I tell you that there is a two year limitation to file for post conviction relief if you think any State or Federal Constitutional right has been violated you have two years within which to file what is called an Application for Post Conviction Relief. That's if you think a Federal, State or Constitutional right has been violated you have to outline what you think was done wrong and file it with the Clerk of Court in writing in Iberia Parish. I will review that to see if there is any merit to it. If you fail to file within two years you loose [sic] the right to file. That two year period starts thirty days after today's date.

At sentencing, the court advised:

You have two years within which to file for Post Conviction Relief. If you think any State or Federal or Constitutional Right has been violated you have two years to complain about it. Failure to complain about it within that two year period means you loose [sic] your right to complian [sic] about it. That's all.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8(A) states in pertinent part, “No application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922.” (emphasis added). Because the trial court advised Taylor that the two-year period for filing post-conviction relief began thirty days after sentencing, Taylor should be notified of the correct deadline for filing post-conviction relief.

In State v. Cheatham, 25-629 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/25/26), 433 So.3d 157, this court agreed with other circuits to allow their opinions to serve as notice to the defendant of the correct time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief. We do so in this opinion.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In her sole assignment of error, Taylor argues that maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders. Taylor asserts that despite a well-documented history of multiple medical disabilities, she was sentenced within the higher sentencing range for a non-violent offense, and as such her sentence is excessive. Although Taylor has seven prior felony convictions, she argues for a lesser sentence due to her frail medical condition, history of drug use, new residence and living situation, and that she was beaten by her ex-husband and forced to steal for him.

The State argues that this is Taylor's eighth felony conviction. The State also notes that the trial court considered Taylor's various medical ailments, the nature of the offense, and that Taylor avoided another felony charge and a habitual offender sentence by pleading guilty.

At Taylor's sentencing, counsel lodged only a general objection to the ruling. Taylor did not move to reconsider the sentence. This court may still review Taylor's excessive sentence claim, but in such cases only as a bare claim of excessiveness. State v. Breaux, 17-406, (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/17), 232 So.3d 675, writ denied, 17-1967 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1309).

When the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of one thousand dollars or more, but less than a value of five thousand dollars, the offender shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or may be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or both.

La.R.S. 14:67(B)(3).

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00)00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261 (first alteration in original).

At Defendant's sentencing hearing, the State presented no rebuttal and rested on the pre-sentence investigation report. The following then occurred:

THE COURT:

Okay. All right. The Court finds that there is not a whole lot of mitigating circumstances other than the health of the Defendant, but that has still not stopped her from stealing. And she's got seven prior felony convictions. The Court finds that there is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation that the Defendant will commit another crime. The Defendant is in need of correctional treatment and/or a custodial environment that can best be provided by a commitment to an institution and a lesser sentence would de[pr]ecate the seriousness of the offense. Therefore, the Court finds that based on the plea of guilty to theft of $1,000 to $5,000 in violation of 14:67. In docket number 25-0757 I sentence Ms. Deidra Taylor to four years at hard labor. For the purposes of that sentence you are remanded to the Sheriff of Iberia Parish. Ma'am you are going to stop stealing.

THE DEFENDANT:

I did stop.

THE COURT:

That's all.

The trial court clearly considered the nature of the crime and Taylor's background. Taylor did not provide a comparison of sentences for similar crimes, but we find State v. Clark, 56,697 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/17/25), 425 So.3d 964, compelling. In Clark, the defendant pled guilty to theft of merchandise valued between $1,000 and $5,000 after he and a co-defendant stole equipment from Lowe's, collectively valued at $3,655. At sentencing, the trial court was provided with information about the defendant's sickle cell anemia and the defendant's strong family ties to the area.

Noting the defendant's extensive criminal history, including convictions for aggravated battery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon among others that made this the defendant's seventh felony conviction, the trial court found there was an undue risk that the defendant would commit another crime if given a suspended sentence. The defendant was sentenced to four years at hard labor, to run consecutively to any other sentence. The second circuit affirmed, noting “[defendant's] criminal history is extensive including multiple felony convictions, and there is no indication probationary treatment has effectively deterred him from criminal behavior when offered previously.” Id. at 968.

As in Clark, Taylor has an extensive criminal record with twenty-one known arrests in addition to her seven prior felonies. At Taylor's plea hearing, the State asserted that Taylor owed Lowe's $6,522, and Taylor did not contest the allegation. Before Taylor's plea, the trial court noted that Taylor received a benefit from the plea since the value of her theft was over $5,000.

Theft over $5,000 carries a sentence of up to ten years. La.R.S. 14:67(B)(2). Because Taylor was an eighth felony offender, under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b), she was subject to a twenty year sentence had the State prosecuted her as a habitual offender. The State also noted that it dismissed an additional charge in exchange for Taylor's guilty plea. Taylor received only four years in exchange for her plea. We find that Taylor's sentence is not constitutionally excessive.

Given the facts and law noted above, nothing about Taylor's four-year sentence shocks our sense of justice or makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals. This sentence is individualized to this offender. We find that the trial court did not abuse its great discretion.

DECREE

Taylor's conviction and sentence are affirmed. Taylor is advised in this opinion of the time period for filing an application for post-conviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

CLAYTON DAVIS, JUDGE