STATE v. DAVIS (2026)

Defendant, Larry J. Davis, appeals his convictions for second degree murder, obstruction of justice, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of stolen things with a value less than $1,000.00, and armed robbery with a firearm.

BACKGROUND

On June 22, 2023, an Orleans Parish Grand Jury indicted Larry J. Davis on (1) one count of second-degree murder with a firearm pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1 for the murder of Carneal Knapper; (2) one count of illegal possession of stolen things, less than $1,000 pursuant to La. R.S. 14:69(B)(4); (3) one count of obstruction of justice, relative to a second degree murder investigation, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:130.1; (4) two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to La. R.S. 14:95.1. After pleading not guilty to all counts and motion hearings, the state added a seventh count to the bill of indictment for armed robbery with a firearm pursuant to La. R.S. 14:64.3. Mr. Davis filed notice that he would be pursuing a justification defense at trial. He also filed a motion for a special jury instruction as to the defense of necessity relative to the charge of La. R.S. 14:95.1, which was granted by the trial court.

Trial commenced on February 4, 2025.¹ The state presented the testimony of Detective Riffle, forensic pathologist Dr. Erin Sullivan, NOPD Crime Lab firearms examiner Kenneth Leary, Mr. Knapper's aunt Denise Robinson, Ms. Van Buren, and Caroline Dobrez. Mr. Davis testified in his own defense. On February 7, 2025, following a four-day trial, the defendant was found guilty of second degree murder (one count), obstruction of justice (one count), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (two counts) and armed robbery (one count).

On April 22, 2025, the defendant filed motions for new trial; for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and for downward departure. On April 23, 2025, the trial court denied the motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On April 24, 2025, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a downward departure and on the same day, the trial court sentenced the defendant as follows: life imprisonment for second degree murder; thirty years at hard labor for obstruction of justice; twenty years at hard labor for possession of a firearm by a felon; and thirty years at hard labor for armed robbery with an additional five years imposed for the firearms enhancement. All sentences were ordered to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence with the exception of the sentence for obstruction of justice. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently with credit for time served. On May 9, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence which the trial court denied.

On May 15, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for appeal and to appoint appellate counsel, which the trial court granted. On appeal, Mr. Davis raises the following assignments of error: (1) “The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for all charges[;]” (2) “The State's special armed robbery jury instruction was not pertinent nor supported by the evidence in the case. The armed robbery conviction was attributable to the erroneous charge, mandating reversal[;]” (3) “The firearms retrieved from the residences of the appellant and co-defendant were not admissible under 404(B) or res gestae, caused the jury to infer the appellant's guilt, and were highly prejudicial while lacking any probative value, warranting reversal of the convictions[;]” (4) “The co-defendant's statement was admissible as an exception to hearsay as a statement against interest requiring its admission, and excluding the statement violated the appellant's Louisiana and United States constitutional right to present a defense[;]” and (5) “The State's argument that [defendant] was committing the uncharged crime of possession of a firearm in a school or firearm free zone was prejudicial error. The improper argument impermissibly influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict.”

The witnesses’ testimony and the camera footage from the restaurant, Willie Mae's digital video recorder and an Airbnb's Ring camera at the scene as well as one that was located across the street served to establish the events surrounding Mr. Knapper's death. On March 28, 2023, near Willie Mae's Scotch House restaurant in the 800 block of North Toni Street in New Orleans, Carneal Knapper and his girlfriend, Lanika Van Buren, rented an Airbnb to celebrate Ms. Van Buren's birthday. Around 5:15 p.m., they exited the Airbnb and walked toward Ms. Van Buren's gray Audi sedan which was parked alongside the street. Mr. Knapper had a black backpack, which he laid on top of a nearby trash container, so that he and Ms. Van Buren could take some photos together before going to dinner. Both then entered the car and drove off, forgetting Mr. Knapper's backpack on top of the trash container.

Several minutes later, Allen Wilson exited Willie Mae's back door and approached a Nissan Rogue parked on the street directly behind where Ms. Van Buren's Audi had been parked. He noticed Mr. Knapper's backpack and rummaged through it. Mr. Wilson then took the backpack and placed it inside the Nissan's front passenger compartment after showing it to his co-worker Sully Simmons and a manager. Ms. Simmons then got into the driver's seat of the Nissan while Mr. Wilson and the manager went back inside Willie Mae's. Thereafter, Larry Davis exited Willie Mae's and joined Ms. Simmons in the Nissan for several minutes before he exited the vehicle and re-entered Willie Mae's at approximately 5:51 p.m.

At approximately 5:58 p.m., Mr. Knapper and Ms. Van Buren returned to the scene to retrieve Mr. Knapper's backpack. Ms. Van Buren remained inside the vehicle. After an unsuccessful attempt at locating the backpack, Mr. Knapper got back inside the vehicle, and he and Ms. Van Buren drove off again before returning shortly thereafter. Mr. Knapper parked in the middle of the street and got out of the Audi and began searching for the backpack once more. He approached Ms. Simmons, who was still sitting in the driver's seat of the Nissan, and asked her if she had seen his backpack; she said she had not. He then noticed a jar of marijuana, which he recognized as his own, inside the Nissan. He told Ms. Simmons that the jar had been inside of his backpack and that she must know the whereabouts of the backpack. She denied having any such knowledge and gave the jar to Ms. Van Buren.

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Davis emerged from Willie Mae's. They both also denied having any knowledge regarding Mr. Knapper's backpack. Mr. Knapper said to them: “Dog, if y'all don't have the bag, how y'all got my jar?” and he informed them that he was not leaving until his backpack was returned. The situation escalated. At one point, Mr. Davis went around to the trunk of the Nissan and appeared to be looking for something. Simultaneously, Mr. Knapper removed two firearms from his waistband and flashed them momentarily, barrels pointed downward, in front of Mr. Wilson, before tucking both firearms back into his waistband. Mr. Davis then returned, armed with a firearm, while Mr. Wilson went to the trunk of the Nissan.

Mr. Knapper and Mr. Davis continued to argue. Mr. Knapper approached Mr. Davis and got within about two feet of him and then took six steps backward. At that point, Mr. Davis raised his firearm and fired seven shots at Mr. Knapper. All seven shots hit Mr. Knapper and he fell to the street. After several seconds, Mr. Davis took three steps forward toward Mr. Knapper and fired two more shots into Mr. Knapper's lifeless body. Mr. Davis approached Mr. Knapper's body and kicked away one of Mr. Knapper's firearms. The shooting took place at approximately 6:08 p.m.

Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilson, who was also now armed, paced around the scene momentarily before retreating to Mr. Wilson's Nissan. Mr. Wilson got into the driver's seat, while Mr. Davis ran back into the street and, using his shirt, picked up the firearm he had kicked away from Mr. Knapper's body. He then approached Mr. Knapper's body and, again using his shirt, took Mr. Knapper's second firearm. Mr. Davis then got into the passenger seat of the Nissan and Mr. Wilson drove off. Thereafter, a passerby on the street saw Mr. Knapper's body and called 911; the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.

On May 8, 2023, Mr. Davis was arrested at his residence at 2412 Annunciation Street. On May 16, 2023, Mr. Wilson was arrested at his residence at 4817 North Villere Street.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record does not reveal any errors patent.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number 1

First, appellant complains “[t]he evidence was insufficient to uphold the convictions.” When assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2784, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B) (“A post verdict judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty.”). This review must include the whole record, as a rational fact finder does. State v. Gibson, 2015-0682, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772, 780 (citing State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988)).

It is not the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. State v. Johnson, 619 So.2d 1102 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993) (citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La. 1986)); see also State v. Gibson, 2015-0682, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772, 780 (“[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence[.]” (quoting State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992))). Credibility determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the evidence, fall soundly within the province of the fact finder. State v. Brumfield, 1993-2404, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/15/94), 639 So.2d 312, 316.

Second Degree Murder

Defendant asserts he “reasonably believed he and his friends were in imminent danger of being shot by [the victim]” and the killing was justified on that basis. La. R.S. 14:30.1 defines second-degree murder, in relevant part, as “the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.”

Under La. R.S. 14:18, “[t]he fact that an offender's conduct is justifiable, although otherwise criminal, shall constitute a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct [under certain circumstances].” In State v. Scott, 2023-0022, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 52, this Court set forth the law in cases in which the accused raises a justification defense, as follows:

A homicide is justifiable “[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). “In a homicide case in which the defendant asserts he acted in self-defense, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” State v. Kirk, 2011-1218, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So. 3d 934, 939-40 (citing State v. Taylor, 2003-1834, p. 7 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 58, 63).

However, the defense of justification is unavailable to an offender “who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty․unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.” La. R.S. 14:21; State v. Abbott, 2017-0016, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/14/17), 222 So.3d 847, 857.

Recently, in State v. Hayes, 2024-0820, p. 26 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/25), 2025 WL 3640526 at *12, ––– So. 3d ––––, this Court affirmed the defendant's manslaughter conviction, finding the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant was the aggressor in a confrontation with the victim and thus, the justification of self-defense was not available:

Because the state presented evidence that the victim had retreated from the altercation with his wife, and the physical evidence shows that the victim was shot once in his side while standing, then seven times in the back from an angle consistent with the victim's photographed position lying over his driver's seat, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found that defendant's claim that he was in imminent danger of being killed was unreasonable, and that killing the victim was not necessary to prevent whatever harm defendant believed that he faced.

The defendant testified that when he finished his shift and returned outside, the victim asked him if it was his vehicle and told him he was going to take it. He explained “[the victim] [was] telling me somebody got his bag [sic], if he don't get that bag, he taking [sic] the car.” The defendant saw the victim's gun when he “grabbed his gun” from inside his pants. In response, the defendant “piped down” because the victim “gots [sic] the advantage.”

The defendant searched for the bag in the vehicle which belonged to the co-defendant but did not find it. As everyone was arguing about the bag, Ms. Van Buren encouraged the victim to leave. The defendant continued to look for the bag “because I can hear him making more threats.” The defendant testified he could see the victim pull out two guns. The defendant admitted he “stumbled upon” a weapon which “made me step out with confidence.” The defendant testified that the victim was “still agitated” and was “advancing on me.” He described the dispute:

And I keep telling him, we don't got [sic] the bag, I looked for you. We about to go. And then he was like, ‘Y'all got my bag.’ And I was like, ‘We don't got your fucking bag.’ And he flashed out. It was like — no, his girlfriend was like was, he just -- his girlfriend was like, ‘he just wants the bag and we can go.’ And I was like, ‘We don't got the fucking [sic] bag.’ And then he flashed out because I cursed while I was talking to her, and said, ‘Don't fucking [sic] disrespect her.’ You'll see me tell him, ‘Hey, Man, I'm not disrespecting her.’

Next, the defendant testified that the victim reached for his gun. The defendant stated “I just -- my life on the line. I didn't think about it. I just sporadically burst. I just shot.” The defendant testified the victim “managed to get the gun out [and] he tried to draw.” Additionally, the defendant testified they were in a “dangerous area” and claimed the victim told them “if he starts shooting, people that he know [sic] from in the area are going to start shooting.”

The State sets forth three reasons that the defendant's claim of self-defense is not justified (1) the victim's movements prior to the shooting “suggest retreat;” (2) “the quantity and timing of the shots;” and (3) the defendant's movement before and after the shooting “suggest anticipation and recalcitrance.” The state described the victim as taking multiple steps backward immediately prior to the shooting and that the firearms were not in the victim's hands when defendant fired the shots. The State maintains that defendant had knowledge that his friends possessed [the victim's] backpack and were actively withholding it from [the victim], and he undoubtedly saw the backpack while he sat inside the Nissan.” Because defendant knew the location of the (stolen) bag, the state argues he qualified as the aggressor and precludes him from claiming self-defense.

Here, defendant readily admits to shooting the victim; however, he testified that he feared for his life. As in Hayes, the victim was shot at least seven times at very close range. The distance and total number of bullets along with the defendant's testimony that he could “step out with confidence” after he “stumbled upon” a firearm indicate he had an advantage over the victim and was not in imminent danger. On the other hand, the defendant points to the victim brandishing two firearms from his waistband prior to the shooting. Still, the firearms were not visible at the time of the shooting and were previously pointed towards the ground in the video footage. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from the victim's girlfriend and viewed multiple angles of surveillance footage depicting the dispute which escalated into the shooting, then reasonably concluded that the defendant was not acting in defense of himself or others.

The jury also may have doubted the defendant's testimony claiming he did not know where the bag was located while on the other hand admitting he had sat in the front seat of the vehicle with Ms. Simmons prior to the dispute. The jury also weighed conflicting testimony and accounts of the events leading up to the shooting, such as Ms. Simmons’ claim that she did not know where the bag was, when the video evidence depicted her and the co-defendant relocating the bag into the vehicle. This inconsistent statement then casts doubt on her claim that the victim was threatening to kill the defendant and the others, thus reducing her overall credibility. Additional testimony from the neighbor who witnessed the dispute preceding the shooting but “ducked down” when she heard shots verify the brevity of the dispute along with the vast escalation of the conflict over a missing bag.

Ultimately, the jury rationally accepted multiple witnesses’ testimony and video evidence over the defendant's testimony that he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger.

Obstruction of Justice

Addressing the obstruction of justice conviction, the defendant asserts he “believed he needed to flee with the weapons for his own safety” and “he committed no other acts that could be construed as an intent to impede or distort an investigation.” La. R.S. 14:130.1 defines obstruction of justice, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section:

(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding.

La. R.S. 14:130.1 further provides that “[t]ampering with evidence shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance ․ at the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any law enforcement investigation.” “ ‘Specific intent [to commit obstruction of justice] need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant.’ ” State v. Bethley, 2022-0849, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d 1148, 1156 (quoting State v. Harvey, 2021-0730, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/25/22), 345 So.3d 1043, 1050).

This Court has consistently upheld convictions in which the defendants have taken another action to destroy or tamper with evidence. For example, in State v. Alexander, 2023-0540, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/23/24), 401 So.3d 105, 115, writ denied, 2024-00665 (La. 12/11/24), 396 So.3d 968, and cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 2780 (2025), this Court found “additional evidence of obstruction” (beyond the missing murder weapon) when the defendant deleted the record of a phone call to a taxi company on the night of the murder. The defendant had traveled by taxi to a family member's house near where the victim was staying and ultimately killed. This Court held that deleting the phone record was sufficient to prove an intent to destroy evidence, despite that the defendant later confessed to the police to taking the taxi to the area. Id. at 116. More recently, this Court upheld an obstruction of justice conviction in State v. Brisco, 2025-0230, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/20/26), ––– So.3d ––––, 2026 WL 145531 in which defendant “removed [the victim]’s car and the gun from the scene of the crime;” cleaned the car; and “thr[e]w a suitcase containing his bloody clothes and the gun he used to shoot [the victim] into the Mississippi River.” In both Alexander and Brisco, the defendants took additional steps to destroy evidence, thus clearly indicating their specific intent as required to uphold an obstruction of justice conviction.

Here, the murder weapon was never located. The defendant immediately fled the crime scene after the shooting. Additionally, the defendant took additional steps to alter the crime scene before fleeing with the co-defendant by removing two firearms from the victim as he lay on the ground after the shooting. As depicted in S-19, the defendant first kicked the firearms away from the victim, then returned moments later using his shirt to remove the weapons. The victim's guns were never recovered. The defendant's actions removing the firearms distorted the investigation by altering the crime scene. Considering the missing murder weapon and the extra steps that the defendant took to remove other objects, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the obstruction of justice conviction.

Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon

La. R.S. 14:95.1 provides “[i]t is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of ․ a crime of violence ․ to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon.” This Court has held “[t]o convict a defendant of possession of a firearm, the State must prove: (1) possession of a firearm; (2) conviction of an enumerated felony; (3) absence of the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and (4) general intent to commit the offense.” State v. Powell, 2015-0218, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15) 179 So.3d 721, 727; see also State v. Beaulieu, 2012-0735 p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/7/13) 122 So.3d 1050, 1060; State v. Ball, 99–0428, p. 3 (La. 11/30/99), 756 So.2d 275, 277.

Here, the defendant again does not dispute the elements of this crime, but rather pleads justification. While a defendant may claim justification for any crime, see La. R.S. 14:18(6), the jury did not believe the defendant or others were in imminent danger, necessary to justify second degree murder as discussed above. Even when a defendant successfully claims self-defense to avert a murder conviction, the jury may find the illegal possession of a firearm exceeded what was necessary. For example, in State v. Sanchell, 2011-1672, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/12), 103 So.3d 677, 681, this Court held “the jury's finding his use justified necessarily requires the jury to also find his possession justified is without merit if the possession lasted longer than the time when he was acting in self-defense.”

Here, defendant was seen leaving the crime scene in possession of three firearms while the fatally-injured victim lay bleeding on the ground. The jury also reasonably rejected the defendant's claim that he was in imminent danger based merely on the neighborhood and the prospect of the victim's (unseen) acquaintances following him after hearing gunshots.

Armed Robbery

La. R.S. 14:64 provides “[a]rmed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” Additionally, “[w]hen the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the crime of armed robbery is a firearm, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for an additional period of five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:64.3. Armed robbery is a general intent crime. State v. Smith, 2007-2028, p. 10 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 291, 298. The state is required to establish the following elements: “(1) the taking, (2) of anything of value, (3) from a person or in the immediate control of another, (4) by the use of force or intimidation, (5) while armed with a dangerous weapon.” State v. Robinson, 2011-0066, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/11), 81 So. 3d 90, 95 (quotations removed).

The defendant disputes whether he possessed the requisite intent to rob the victim and if he used force or intimidation after the victim had already been shot and was incapacitated. Specifically, the defendant argues “[t]his was not a case where an armed robbery commenced and resulted in someone getting killed.” The defendant also denies that shooting the victim and then taking the victim's firearms was a “continuous transaction.”

In response, the state argues “the timing of the use of intimidation or force is immaterial to the determination of the existence of said use.” See State v. Goodley, 2001-0077, p. 10 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 478, 484 and State v. Clarkson, 2011-933, p. 17 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/7/12), 86 So.3d 804, 815. The state further argues the defendant robbed the victim by taking his firearms after the shooting. Notably, the state does not allege the defendant took the victim's bag since his knowledge of this bag was disputed throughout the trial. As established during Det. Riffle's testimony, the defendant did not take other objects, such as his watch, from the victim. Thus, the armed robbery charge is limited to the defendant taking the victim's firearms.

The state's narrative that the defendant shot the victim as part of a continuous armed robbery is incongruent with the narrative it presented when seeking the second degree murder and obstruction of justice convictions. Specifically, the state successfully established the defendant did not act in self-defense when he shot the victim. Further, the video evidence depicted the defendant altered the crime scene when he took the victim's firearms. The defendant also admits to both actions during his testimony. The state's witness, Ms. Van Buren, was not aware the victim had multiple firearms and did not allege the defendant sought to deprive the victim of this property either before or during his shooting.

While the state presented appropriate theories to convict the defendant of second degree murder and obstruction of justice, the theory behind the armed robbery charge does not fit the facts presented. Simply put, the facts and law discussed above do not support a finding that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery. Accordingly, we reverse the armed robbery conviction.

In summary, applying Jackson v. Virginia and viewing the evidence in light of the state, the jury reasonably concluded the state proved the second degree murder, obstruction of justice and illegal possession of a firearm by a felon charges beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the state's evidence did not prove the elements required for an armed robbery conviction.

Assignment of Error Number 2

Second, the defendant complains “[t]he trial court erred in granting the State's special jury instruction” regarding the armed robbery charge. However, considering that we are reversing the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, this assignment of error is now moot.

Assignment of Error Number 3

Third, the defendant complains “[t]he trial court erred in allowing admission of the firearms retrieved.” The defendant asserts these “extraneous and unconnected” firearms had “no evidentiary value whatsoever” and were not relevant to the case at hand. Furthermore, the defendant argues the introduction of this evidence was “not harmless” in a case where “the only issue was whether the current offenses were justified.” The defendant objected to this ruling, thus preserving this issue on appeal.

In response, the state asserts “the other firearms underscore the willingness with which [the defendant] possessed firearms despite being legally prohibited from doing so.” Additionally, the state notes the evidence was relevant to both the illegal possession and obstruction of justice charges since the murder weapon and the victim's guns were never found which is “telling that he took some action to make them disappear.” Alternatively, the state suggests even if more prejudicial than probative, “it is highly improbable that the admission of the other firearms was attributable in any significant way to the verdicts actually rendered.” Finally, the state notes “[t]he prosecutor only made a single mention of the guns during closing arguments.”

A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Taylor, 2016-1124, p. 18 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 296 (citations omitted); State v. Wright, 2011-0141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 309, 316; State v. Copelin, 2016-0264, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 990, 1002.

Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 404(B)(1)(a) provides pertinently:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.

Generally, evidence of other crimes, or bad acts committed by a defendant is inadmissible at trial due to the risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. La. C.E. art. 404 B(1); State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 128 (La. 1973).

The Louisiana Supreme Court noted in State v. Taylor, 2016-1124, p. 12 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 292, that “even when the other crimes evidence is offered for a purpose allowed under Article 404(B)(1), the evidence must have substantial relevance independent from showing defendant's general criminal character and thus is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant's defense.” Additionally, “where the element of intent is regarded as an essential ingredient of the crime charged, it is proper to admit proof of similar but disconnected crimes to show the intent with which the act charged was committed.” State v. Clanton, 2019-0316, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/6/19), 285 So.3d 31, citing Taylor, 16-1124, p. 16, 217 So.3d at 294-95.

In this case, three firearms were found after the defendant and co-defendant's arrests. All were different calibers than the murder weapon and are collectively referred to as the “other firearms.” This 404(B) evidence indicates the defendant's propensity to own firearms, despite being a convicted felon who is precluded from possessing dangerous weapons, as relevant to the La. R.S. 14:95.1 charges. Additionally, regarding the obstruction of justice charge, the state emphasized the defendant left the crime scene with multiple firearms but may have taken “some action to make them disappear” such as exchanging for the weapons found at the defendant and co-defendant's residences after their arrests.

The introduction of this evidence was more probative than prejudicial for the illegal possession and obstruction of justice charges. In any event, the erroneous admission of evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Copelin, 2016-0264, pp. 22-23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 990, 1005-06. “It is well-settled law that an error in the admission of other crimes evidence is subject to the harmless error rule.” State v. Hunter. 2022-0743, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/6/23), 371 So.3d 108, 115, citing State v. Brown, 2018-1999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 236. In State v. Thomassie, 2016-0370, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/16), 206 So.3d 311, 317-318, this Court defines the harmless error standard as follows:

‘Harmless error analysis begins with the premise that the evidence is otherwise sufficient to sustain the conviction if viewed from the perspective of a rational fact finder and asks whether beyond a reasonable doubt the error could not have contributed to the verdict actually returned by the defendant's jury.’ ” [State v.] Campbell, [20]15-0017, p. 27 [(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/15),] 171 So.3d [1176,] 192 (quoting State v. Gibbs, 41,062, p. 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/28/06), 935 So.2d 349, 354); [State v.] Dove, [20]15–0783, p. 30 [(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/16)], 194 So.3d [92], 112, n. 3. See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Stated otherwise, harmless error exists when the guilty verdict actually rendered was “surely unattributable” to the error. State v. Higginbotham, [20]11–0564, p. 3 (La. 5/6/11), 60 So.3d 621, 623. “A trial error ․ may ‘be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Merwin, [20]15–0681, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 759, 769 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308–09, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)).

While the other firearms were introduced despite not matching the murder weapon, the State presented ample other evidence, including eyewitness accounts of the shooting and multiple videos to support the defendant's second degree murder conviction. Therefore, introduction of the 404(B) evidence was harmless given the weight of all other evidence the jury considered. This assignment of error is meritless.

Assignment of Error Number 4

The defendant complains “[t]he trial court erred in excluding [the co-defendant]’s statement.” The trial court ruled to exclude this statement, reasoning: the statement was not against the declarant's interest and was not “trustworthy based on the corroborating evidence” including the video introduced. The defendant objected to this ruling, thus preserving this issue on appeal.

Both the defendant and the state agree this evidence qualifies as hearsay where the declarant is unavailable due to his unwillingness to testify. See La. C.E. arts. 801, 804. However, they disagree as to whether the statement was relevant, trustworthy and against interest under La. C.E. arts. 804(B)(3). The defendant insists the statement was necessary to support his self-defense claim by confirming the victim “was behaving in an aggressive manner.” The state counters that “the trial court was unpersuaded by this argument” arguing the statement lacked “reliability and trustworthiness.” Specifically, the “statement lacked corroboration because it was unsupported by the clear video evidence.”

La. C.E. art 804(B)(3) defines a statement against interest as:

A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

“The exceptions to the hearsay rule listed in [La. C.E. art. 804(B)] are based upon the conclusion that when the qualifying circumstances are met there are usually sufficient grounds for crediting the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement to justify making an exception to the hearsay rule.” La. C.E. art. 804(B) legis. comment (a). “[G]enerally there must be sufficient indication from the circumstances that the declarant had firsthand knowledge of that of which he spoke.” La. C.E. art. 804(B) legis. comment (b). “[T]he ‘against interest’ requirement [in La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3)] assures some degree of trustworthiness, because a person ordinarily does not make a statement that is disadvantageous to himself without substantial reason to believe that the statement is true.” State v. Wilson, 2017-0908, pp. 9-10 (La. 12/5/18), 319 So.3d 262, p. 269.

Here, aspects of the co-defendant's statement corroborate the defendant's testimony (and Ms. Simmons’ admitted statement) that the victim threatened their lives. However, as noted by the trial court in its ruling, these assertions are contradicted by the video evidence, thus casting doubt on the statement's reliability and trustworthiness. Specifically, the co-defendant denies any knowledge of the victim's bag but was seen on video holding up the bag prior to the dispute. Given the hearsay nature of the evidence, the trial court did not err in excluding this statement, and this error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Number 5

Finally, the defendant complains “[t]he trial court erred in overruling the defense's objection to the State presenting other crimes evidence in its closing argument” referring specifically to the defendant's possession of a firearm in a school zone. In his brief, the defendant asserts “no evidence was presented to prove the offense” and he was only “prepared to defendant against the crimes for which he was charged.” On the other hand, the state highlights the 911 calls which mentioned the school's location across the street along with the video evidence showing children boarding buses after school. Additionally, the state asserts this error is moot since while the defendant objected, he did not “move for a mistrial or ask for the jury to be admonished” as required by State v. Varnado, 1997-2823 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/19/99), 737 So. 2d 240. Regardless, the state suggested even if this remark were an error, it would be harmless as a “fleeting comment.”

La. C.Cr.P. art. 774 provides:

The argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice. The state's rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the defendant.

See State v. Casey, 1999-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022. Prosecutors have wide discretion in choosing tactics used in closing argument. Casey; State v Stewart, 2024-0454 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), ––– So.3d ––––, 2025 WL 1414856; State v. Allen, 2012-1757 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/13), 126 So.3d 675. In State v. Stewart, 2024-0454, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), ––– So. 3d ––––, this Court stated:

The scope of closing arguments is limited to the evidence admitted, lack of evidence, conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw from, and the law applicable to the case. State v. Casey, 99-0023, p. 17 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, 1036. The trial court has vast discretion in determining the scope of closing argument. State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564, 580 (La. 1981)․ Louisiana jurisprudence affords prosecutors wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics. State v. Allen, 12-1757, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/13), 126 So. 3d 675, 678. See also State v. Martin, 539 So.2d 1235, 1240 (La. 1989).

Even assuming that remarks were inappropriate, a conviction will not be reversed due to an improper remark during closing argument unless the court is thoroughly convinced that remark influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Much credit should be accorded to the good sense and fair-mindedness of jurors who have seen the evidence and heard the arguments, and have been instructed by the trial judge that arguments of counsel are not evidence.

State v. Kyles, 513 So.2d 265, 275-76 (La. 1987) (emphasis in original).

Considering the foregoing, even if a reviewing court finds that argument is improper, it should not reverse a conviction unless it is thoroughly convinced that the remark contributed to the verdict by influencing the jury.

Here, the state made multiple references to the school zone during their closing argument and in its rebuttal argument. The defendant objected during the state's rebuttal, thus preserving this issue. However, the jury heard on the 911 calls and saw in the video evidence the school across the street along with the afterschool activity; therefore, the prosecutor's remark about the nearby school should not have surprised the defendant. Further, while there were multiple comments made, they were minor compared to the lengthy closing arguments which focused almost exclusively on the defendant's four charges, especially the defendant's justification claims. Ultimately, given the ample discretion allowed prosecutors during closing remarks and the limited nature of these comments, mentions of the school zone and the suggestion of another crime did not substantially impact the jury's verdict. This fifth and final assignment of error has no merit.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above and foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for second degree murder, obstruction of justice, and felon in possession of a firearm are affirmed. However, the defendant's armed robbery conviction is reversed.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

FOOTNOTES

1.   The state did not pursue the possession of stolen things charge and later nolle prosequi'ed the charge.

Judge Daniel L. Dysart

BROWN, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT