KAPITUS SERVICING INC v. STRATEGIC SUPPORT CORPORATION INC (2026)

In this contract and tort litigation arising from a merchant financing agreement, defendants/appellants, Strategic Support Corporation, Inc. d/b/a Strategic Support Corporation and Gregory C. Carter (collectively, “Strategic”), appeal a November 17, 2025 judgment, which sustained certain declinatory, dilatory, and peremptory exceptions and overruled others. The exceptions were filed by plaintiff/defendant-in-reconvention, Kapitus Servicing, Inc., f/k/a Colonial Funding Network, Inc., as servicing agent for Discount Merchant Funding (“Kapitus”), and third-party defendant, David Wolfson (“Wolfson”). Strategic also seeks supervisory review of portions of the same judgment in a writ application consolidated with this appeal.

For the reasons that follow, we find that the ruling on Wolfson's exception of lack of personal jurisdiction lacks the decretal language required of a valid final judgment, and that the judgment's remaining rulings are interlocutory and too indefinite to permit meaningful supervisory review. We therefore dismiss the appeal without prejudice, deny the writ application, and remand to the district court with instructions to render an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kapitus filed suit against Strategic Support Corporation, Inc. and Gregory C. Carter on October 27, 2022, for breach of contract arising out of a merchant funding agreement. On March 24, 2025, Strategic answered and asserted a reconventional demand against Kapitus and a third-party demand against Wolfson, a Kapitus corporate representative; Discount Merchant Funding, Inc.; and Merchant Discount Direct, Inc. Against each, Strategic alleged fraud, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) and the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).

On May 14, 2025, Kapitus and Wolfson jointly filed six exceptions. Although filed in a single pleading, their supporting memorandum argued each exception in party specific terms. Wolfson individually asserted a declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, directed at all of Strategic's claims against him. Kapitus individually asserted a peremptory exception of res judicata, likewise directed at all of Strategic's claims against it. Kapitus and Wolfson jointly asserted four additional exceptions, each directed at a different subset of Strategic's theories: a dilatory exception of nonconformity of the petition with La. C.C.P. art. 891, directed at the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims; dilatory exceptions of improper cumulation of actions and improper joinder of parties, directed at all of Strategic's claims; a peremptory exception of prescription and peremption, directed at Strategic's fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and LUTPA claims; and a peremptory exception of no cause of action, directed at all of Strategic's claims.

Following a September 5, 2025 hearing, the district court orally sustained the exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction, no cause of action, and improper cumulation of actions and improper joinder of parties, and overruled the exceptions of nonconformity, prescription and peremption, and res judicata. The parties then submitted competing proposed judgments. Kapitus and Wolfson's proposed judgment addressed each exception by party and by claim and would have dismissed the claims against Wolfson with prejudice. Strategic objected to the “with prejudice” language and to a proposed fifteen-day deadline to amend. The district court signed Strategic's version, over Kapitus and Wolfson's objection, on November 17, 2025.

Strategic timely appealed, challenging the dismissal of its claims against Wolfson, the dismissal of its LUTPA claim, and the ruling sustaining the dilatory exceptions of improper cumulation of actions and improper joinder of parties. Strategic separately applied for supervisory writs, seeking review of the ruling sustaining the exception of no cause of action as to its breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims. This Court consolidated the writ application with the appeal.

DISCUSSION

Before reaching the merits of either the appeal ¹ or the writ application ² , we must determine whether, and by what means, each ruling in the November 17, 2025 judgment is properly before us. We therefore examine each decretal paragraph of the judgment to determine whether it constitutes a final, appealable judgment or an interlocutory ruling reviewable only by supervisory writ, and whether its terms are sufficiently definite to permit review.

“Prior to addressing the merits of an appeal, appellate courts have the duty to determine sua sponte whether their appellate court jurisdiction has been properly invoked by a valid, final judgment.” Safford v. New Orleans Fire Dep't, 23-0495, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/1/24), 384 So.3d 909, 924-25) (citing Bayer v. Starr Int'l Corp., 17-0257, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/17), 226 So.3d 514, 517); see also La. C.C.P. art. 2162. An appellate court must undertake this inquiry “even when the parties do not raise the issue.” Moon v. City of New Orleans, 15-1092, 15-1093, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/16), 190 So.3d 422, 425. Thus, this Court may not address the merits of an appeal “unless our jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid, final judgment.” Urquhart v. Spencer, 15-1354, 15-1355, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/16), 204 So.3d 1074, 1077 (citing Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C., 14-0506, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/15/14), 151 So.3d 908, 910).

“A judgment is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action and may award any relief to which the parties are entitled.” La. C.C.P. art. 1841(A).³ “A valid judgment must be precise, definite and certain. ․The decree alone indicates the decision. ․The result decreed must be spelled out in lucid, unmistakable language. ․The quality of definiteness is essential to a proper judgment.” Bd. of Supervisors, 14-0506, p. 2, 151 So.3d at 910 (quoting Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 10-477, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909, 915-16). Therefore, a valid final judgment must be signed and dated and must contain specific decretal language, which “shall, in its decree, identify the name of the party in whose favor the relief is awarded, the name of the party against whom the relief is awarded, and the relief that is awarded.” La. C.C.P. art. 1918(A); Bd. of Supervisors, 14-0506, pp. 2-3, 151 So.3d at 910 (quoting Palumbo v. Shapiro, 11-0769, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/14/11), 81 So.3d 923, 927). “The specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment.” Input/Output Marine, 10-477, p. 13, 52 So.3d at 916 (citation omitted). If appealed, a final judgment that does not contain the appropriate decretal language “shall be remanded to the trial court, which shall amend the judgment in accordance with Article 1951 within the time set by the appellate court.” La. C.C.P. art. 1918(A).

La. C.C.P. art. 1915 was amended by 2025 La. Acts No. 250, § 3, effective August 1, 2025. As amended, Paragraph A sets out the categories of judgments that may be rendered as final even though other issues in the case remain unresolved, including: dismissal of the suit as to fewer than all parties; judgment on the pleadings; summary judgment; judgment on a separately tried principal or incidental demand; judgment on liability tried separately; and the imposition of sanctions or disciplinary action. La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A). The amendments removed the trial court's former authority to designate a partial judgment as final after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. La. C.C.P. art. 1915, Comments–2025, cmt. (a). Paragraph C now provides that, except as otherwise provided by law, when a court sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories by or against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, “that judgment is an interlocutory judgment.” La. C.C.P. art. 1915(C); see also La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(5) (as amended by 2025 La. Acts No. 250) (recognizing the objection of no cause of action in part).⁴ Strategic's appeal and writ application were both filed after the amendment went into effect, so the amended article governs. 2025 La. Acts No. 250, § 6 (providing that the amendments to Article 1915 apply prospectively and do not apply to appeals or writs filed before the Act's effective date).

Two rules relevant to our review follow. A judgment that dismisses all of a party's claims against another party may be final under Article 1915(A)(1). A judgment that dismisses only some of a party's claims against a party who remains in the suit is interlocutory under Article 1915(C).

“An interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 2083(C). Otherwise, review of an interlocutory ruling lies within this Court's discretionary supervisory jurisdiction. La. Const. art. V, § 10(A). When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory ruling, this Court may consider the appeal as an application for supervisory writs, and generally should do so when the ruling is arguably incorrect, a reversal will terminate the litigation, and there is no dispute of fact to be resolved. Herlitz Constr. Co. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam). This Court typically exercises that discretion only when the motion for appeal was filed within the thirty-day delay for applying for supervisory writs under Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal. Scurlock v. Heitmeier, 24-0455, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/25), 414 So.3d 652, 656 (citing Joseph v. Wasserman, 17-0603, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/10/18), 237 So.3d 14, 20).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the judgment itself. The November 17, 2025 judgment resolves the six exceptions filed by Kapitus and Wolfson in four separate decretal paragraphs and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Strategic's claims under the (i) Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act; and (ii) the federal Truth in Lending Act are hereby dismissed, and Strategic may amend its claims under (i) breach of contract, (ii) fraud, and (iii) negligent misrepresentation within 30 days of the signing of the judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Dilatory Exceptions of Improper Cumulation of Actions and Improper Joinder of Parties are hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the (i) Dilatory Exception of Nonconformity of the Petition with Article 891; (ii) Peremptory Exception of Prescription and Peremption; and (iii) Peremptory Exception of Res Judicata are hereby OVERRULED.

Paragraph One: Wolfson's Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Declinatory Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.

Paragraph One addresses Wolfson's declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, which was directed at all five of Strategic's theories of recovery against him. If that ruling dismisses all of Strategic's claims against Wolfson, it would constitute a final judgment under Article 1915(A)(1). The paragraph, however, does not contain the decretal language Article 1918(A) requires. It states only that the exception is “GRANTED.” It does not name Wolfson as the party in whose favor the ruling runs. It does not name Strategic or Carter as the parties against whom the ruling runs,⁵ and it does not state the relief granted. In particular, it does not indicate whether Strategic's claims against Wolfson are dismissed, which of Strategic's theories of recovery are affected, or whether any dismissal is with or without prejudice. See La. C.C.P. art. 932 (requiring a judgment sustaining a declinatory exception to order curative action within a set delay or dismiss the affected claims). Paragraph One does not permit this Court to determine what relief the district court granted. As we explain next, Paragraph Two does not cure these deficiencies.

Paragraph Two: The Exception of No Cause of Action

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Strategic's claims under the (i) Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act; and (ii) the federal Truth in Lending Act are hereby dismissed, and Strategic may amend its claims under (i) breach of contract, (ii) fraud, and (iii) negligent misrepresentation within 30 days of the signing of the judgment.

Kapitus and Wolfson jointly asserted the exception of no cause of action against all of Strategic's claims. Paragraph Two dismisses Strategic's LUTPA and TILA claims and permits Strategic to amend its breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims. Although this paragraph is more informative than Paragraph One, it has two defects. First, it does not identify against whom the dismissed claims and the surviving claims run: Kapitus, Wolfson, or both. Because Kapitus and Wolfson do not necessarily stand in the same posture, particularly in light of Wolfson's separate exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, this omission is significant. Second, the paragraph does not state whether the dismissal of the LUTPA and TILA claims is with or without prejudice. These defects have different consequences depending on whether Paragraph Two is read as applying to Strategic's claims against Wolfson or its claims against Kapitus.

As applied to Strategic's claims against Wolfson, Paragraph Two cannot supply the terms missing from Paragraph One, because it does not say whether it applies to Wolfson at all. Read together, the first and second paragraphs do not permit a determination, from the judgment itself, of whether all of Strategic's claims against Wolfson have been dismissed, which is required for the ruling on the exception of lack of personal jurisdiction to constitute a final judgment under Article 1915(A)(1). See Input/Output Marine, 10-477, p. 13, 52 So.3d at 916. Accordingly, as to Strategic's claims against Wolfson, the judgment lacks the decretal language Article 1918(A) requires to be final and appealable.

As applied to Strategic's claims against Kapitus, a different issue arises. Kapitus remains a party to this suit, and Strategic's breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims against it remain pending with leave to amend. To the extent Paragraph Two dismisses the LUTPA and TILA claims against Kapitus, it dismisses some, but not all, of Strategic's claims against a party who remains in the suit. Such a ruling is interlocutory under Article 1915(C), and it does not fall within any category enumerated in Article 1915(A). As amended, Article 1915 no longer permits the district court to designate such a ruling as final.

Strategic appealed the dismissal of its LUTPA claim; it did not appeal the dismissal of its TILA claim.⁶ On either reading of Paragraph Two, the LUTPA ruling is not properly before us on appeal. As to Wolfson, the ruling lacks the decretal language required of a final judgment. Indeed, whether the ruling is final or interlocutory as to Wolfson depends on whether all of Strategic's claims against him have been dismissed, which, as explained above, cannot be determined from the judgment. As to Kapitus, the ruling is interlocutory and reviewable only by supervisory writ, and Strategic's writ application does not seek review of it. For the reasons explained below, we decline to convert the appeal of this ruling into an application for supervisory writs.

Additionally, Strategic's writ application asks us to review the portion of Paragraph Two addressing its breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation claims. We cannot meaningfully do so. Because the paragraph does not identify against whom those claims survive, we cannot determine the scope of the ruling Strategic asks us to review.

Paragraph Three: The Exceptions of Improper Cumulation and Improper Joinder

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Dilatory Exceptions of Improper Cumulation of Actions and Improper Joinder of Parties are hereby GRANTED.

Kapitus and Wolfson jointly asserted dilatory exceptions of improper cumulation of actions and improper joinder of parties against all of Strategic's claims. As written, Paragraph Three does not dismiss any claim against any party and is therefore interlocutory.⁷ Strategic challenges this ruling only on appeal. Its writ application does not seek review of it. For the reasons explained below, we decline to convert the appeal of this ruling into an application for supervisory writ.

We cannot determine from this paragraph what the district court ordered. Like Paragraph One, it does not name the party in whose favor, or against whom, the ruling runs, and it does not state the relief awarded. The parties’ briefs illustrate the resulting uncertainty. Kapitus and Wolfson describe the ruling as dismissing all claims against the third-party defendants. Strategic's original brief likewise treats its third-party claims as dismissed, but its reply maintains that the ruling did not dismiss its claims against Discount Merchant Funding, Inc. and Merchant Discount Direct, Inc.

Nor does Paragraph Three direct Strategic to take any curative action or fix a delay within which to do so. When the grounds of an objection pleaded by dilatory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition or other action by the plaintiff, the judgment sustaining the exception “shall order [the] plaintiff to remove them within the delay allowed by the court,” and the affected claim may be dismissed only for noncompliance with that order. La. C.C.P. art. 933(B); see also La. C.C.P. art. 464 (providing the effect of improper cumulation). Paragraph Three contains no such order and no other disposition. We express no view on which disposition is appropriate. We hold only that the judgment does not state one, and without one, there is no ruling we can meaningfully review.

Paragraph Four: The Overruled Exceptions

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the (i) Dilatory Exception of Nonconformity of the Petition with Article 891; (ii) Peremptory Exception of Prescription and Peremption; and (iii) Peremptory Exception of Res Judicata are hereby OVERRULED.

Paragraph Four overrules the exceptions of nonconformity, prescription and peremption, and res judicata. Strategic prevailed on these exceptions, and no party has sought review of them. Paragraph Four is therefore not before us, and we do not address it further.⁸

CONCLUSION

Article 1918(A) requires that an appealed final judgment lacking appropriate decretal language be remanded for amendment. The principal ruling Strategic appeals, and the one that could constitute a final, appealable judgment, is the ruling on Wolfson's declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, read together with any portion of the remaining paragraphs that applies to Strategic's claims against Wolfson.⁹ If that ruling dismisses all of Strategic's claims against Wolfson, it would be final under Article 1915(A)(1). As written, however, it does not identify the parties, the claims affected, or the relief granted. Article 1918(A) therefore requires that it be remanded for amendment. Because the interlocutory rulings Strategic challenges also require clarification before any review is possible, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice rather than retain it pending amendment of the judgment.

Although Strategic's motion for appeal was filed within the thirty-day delay provided by Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, we decline to convert the appeal of the LUTPA ruling and of the ruling on the exceptions of improper cumulation and joinder, to the extent those rulings are interlocutory, into an application for supervisory writs. We likewise decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction over the no cause ruling challenged in Strategic's writ application. As written, each of these rulings is too indefinite to permit meaningful review. We cannot determine against whom the surviving claims run, what Paragraph Three ordered, or what Strategic must do to comply. Review at this stage would risk addressing rulings in a form that may not survive remand. Moreover, reversal of any of them would not terminate the litigation. See Herlitz, 396 So.2d 878; see also Elysian, Inc. v. Neal Auction Co., Inc., 20-0674, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21), 325 So.3d 1075, 1086 (declining to convert appeals of interlocutory judgments into applications for supervisory writs). Our decision is without prejudice to any party's right to seek supervisory review of any interlocutory ruling in the amended judgment within the delays provided by Rule 4-3.

Article 1951 permits a final judgment to be amended to correct deficiencies in its decretal language, but not to change its substance. La. C.C.P. art. 1951. The district court retains jurisdiction to make such an amendment. La. C.C.P. art. 2088(A)(11) (as amended by 2025 La. Acts No. 250). We therefore remand with instructions that the district court, after notice to all parties and a hearing if necessary, render an amended judgment that sets forth, in decretal language complying with La. C.C.P. art. 1918(A), the rulings it made on each of the six exceptions heard on September 5, 2025.¹⁰ For each exception, the amended judgment shall identify the party or parties in whose favor and against whom the ruling is rendered; the claims and theories of recovery affected; and the relief granted, including whether any claim is dismissed and, if so, whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice. As to any exception sustained with leave to amend or to remove the grounds of the objection, the amended judgment shall order the required action and set the delay for compliance. See La. C.C.P. arts. 932, 933(B), and 934.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice, the application for supervisory writs is denied, and the matter is remanded to the district court with instructions to render an amended judgment consistent with this opinion within thirty (30) days of this opinion. Upon the signing of the amended judgment, any party aggrieved may seek review in this Court by appeal or by application for supervisory writs, as appropriate, and need not pay this Court's costs again. See Anderson v. Briggs, 24-0232, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/20/24), 2024 WL 4284343, at *8 (unpub.) (dismissing appeal without prejudice and remanding for rendition of a valid judgment, without requiring payment of appellate costs on subsequent review).

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; WRIT DENIED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   On appeal, Strategic asserts three assignments of error as follows:1. The Trial Court erred by granting the declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction.2. The Trial Court erred by granting the dilatory exception of improper cumulation of claims and joinder of parties.3. The Trial Court erred by granting the peremptory exception of no cause of action and dismissing claims under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practice Act.

2.   In its writ application, Strategic raises a single assignment of error, contending that “[t]he Trial Court erred in granting a peremptory exception of no cause of action as to Strategic's claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract.”

3.   In 2026, the legislature again amended La. C.C.P. arts. 1841 and 2083 to clarify that a judgment that determines the merits in part may be a partial final judgment under Article 1915(A) or an interlocutory judgment under Article 1915(C). See 2026 La. Acts No. 127, § 1. These amendments do not alter our analysis.

4.   The comment to the amendment of Article 927(A)(5) explains that a partial judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action may be appropriate when two or more actions based on the same operative facts of a single transaction or occurrence are cumulated, and that this changes the result reached in Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So.2d (La. 1993). See La. C.C.P. art. 927, Comments-2025. Everything on Wheels had held that a partial exception of no cause of action generally should not be sustained when the petition states a cause of action as to any ground or portion of the demand, unless the plaintiff has pleaded separate and distinct causes of action arising from separate transactions or occurrences. 616 So.2d at 1239. Because each of Strategic's theories of recovery arises from the same merchant funding agreement, the amendment is what permits the partial ruling in Paragraph Two. Article 1915(C) then makes that ruling interlocutory.

5.   The judgment defines “Strategic” as Strategic Support Corporation only and does not mention Gregory C. Carter, who is also a plaintiff-in-reconvention and third-party plaintiff.

6.   In its writ application, Strategic acknowledges that it does not seek review of the dismissal of its TILA claim and states it seeks review of the dismissal of its LUTPA claim by appeal.

7.   To the extent the district court intended this ruling to dismiss all of Strategic's claims against one or more third-party defendants, the ruling could be final as to those parties under Article 1915(A)(1). The judgment, however, does not say so, and it lacks the decretal language Article 1918(A) would require.

8.   Nevertheless, we note that Paragraph Four suffers from the same lack of clarity that affects the other paragraphs in that it does not name the party in whose favor the ruling runs, against whom it runs, and the relief awarded pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1918.

9.   See n. 7, supra (addressing the ruling on the exceptions of improper cumulation and joinder).

10.   The parties submitted competing proposed judgments and dispute the scope of several rulings, including whether any dismissal is with or without prejudice, the delay for amendment. The parties’ briefs also reflect disagreement over whether the ruling on the exceptions of improper cumulation and joinder affects Strategic's claims against Discount Merchant Funding, Inc. and Merchant Discount Direct, Inc., which did not join the exceptions. We express no view on the content of the district court's rulings. Our instruction is limited to requiring that the judgment state those rulings in definite terms.

Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano