DANIELS v. BOARD OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION LLC (2026)

The underlying dispute involves a class of plaintiffs asserting allegations of mismanagement of a high school in New Orleans by a foundation; but the present writ application merely concerns a procedural issue. Relators are the members of the class of plaintiffs,¹ and Respondent is New Beginnings Schools Foundation (“NBSF”). Relators seek review of the trial court's August 27, 2026 judgment, which denied their “Motion for Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record with Affidavits” (“2026 Motion for Leave”). For the following reasons, we grant Relators’ writ application, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand this matter for further proceedings.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2019, Relators filed a petition and amending petitions, wherein they asserted NBSF grossly mismanaged Kennedy High School. Daniels v. State, 2024-0833, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/25), 424 So.3d 158, 162, writ denied, 2025-01313 (La. 1/21/26), 424 So.3d 1098. Specifically,

the petition (as amended) alleges that NBSF failed to maintain staff and teachers; overused substitute teachers; mismanaged school finances; falsified contracts that affected school operations; failed to learn the policies and practices of the Louisiana Department of Education (“LDE”) regarding successful matriculation from high school; negligently provided students with incorrect information regarding graduation credits; and misused a computer-based learning program titled “GradPoint” in a manner that disqualified students from getting course credits even when they completed the assigned work. At the trial of the motion for class certification (“the Trial”), evidence was offered that NBSF personnel had falsified student records and misled auditors who were sent by the Orleans Parish School Board (“OPSB”) and the LDE to investigate the same complaints made by [Relators].

Id. at pp. 1-2, 424 So.3d at 163 (footnote omitted).

Subsequently, on July 22, 2022, Relators filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of intentional grade changing and emotional distress; and, on July 24, 2022, Relators filed another motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of educational malpractice/negligence and negligent supervision/entrustment. Then, on October 10, 2023, NBSF filed competing motions for summary judgment. Thereafter, on October 13, 2023, Relators filed another motion for summary judgment regarding fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Additionally, Relators filed oppositions to NBSF's motions for summary judgment. These motions remained pending during the class certification hearing. In 2024, Relators initially sought to supplement the summary judgment proceedings with portions of the transcript from the class certification hearing by filing a “Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record Regarding [Relators]’ Motions for Summary Judgment with Testimony from the Class Certification for Hearing for Completeness” (“2024 Motion for Leave”). The trial court denied Relators’ 2024 Motion for Leave in July 2024.²

Nearly two years later, on June 11, 2026, Relators filed their 2026 Motion for Leave, wherein they sought leave to supplement the summary judgment record with affidavits from Kathleen Padian, Litouri Smith, Dr. Rahn Bailey, and Dr. Ashonta Wyatt. According to Relators’ writ application, these affidavits summarize the testimony provided by those individuals during the class certification hearing, i.e., the subject of Relators’ 2024 Motion for Leave. With regard to the timing of Relators’ 2026 Motion for Leave in relation to other events, the writ application establishes that the trial court set the hearing on the motions for summary judgment for October 8, 2026. Prior to that scheduled hearing, however, in August 2026, the trial court held a hearing on Relators’ 2026 Motion for Leave and, one week later, on August 27, 2026, issued its judgment which denied that Motion.

Relators then noticed their intent to seek a writ, and the trial court issued a return date and stayed the scheduled summary judgment proceedings. Thereafter, Relators’ timely writ application to this Court followed. (Of import for understanding some of Relators’ below assignments of error, NBSF filed a motion for new trial regarding the stay of the proceedings. The trial court held a hearing on that motion on September 21, 2026, and granted it but did not lift the stay.)

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In their writ application, Relators assert seven assignments of error:

1. The [trial] court erred by equating [Relators’] [2026] Motion for Leave ․ and timely filed oppositions with the untimely opposition filings addressed in Auricchio [v. Harrison, 2020-01167 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 660] and its progeny.

2. The [trial] court erred by denying supplementation without determining the applicable [La. C.C.P. art.] 966 deadline and procedural use for each affidavit in relation to each pending motion or opposition.

3. The [trial] court erred by failing to account for [Relators’] June 2024 [Motion for Leave] effort to present the same substantive evidence and the extended stays associated with NBSF's supervisory and appellate review.

4. The [trial] court erred by treating the prior transcript ruling as a basis to exclude affidavits that [La. C.C.P. art.] 966 expressly recognizes as a distinct evidentiary form.

5. The [trial] court erred by bypassing particularized objections under [La. C.C.P. arts.] 966, 967, and 1425(F) and excluding all four affidavits wholesale.

6. The [trial] court erred by setting NBSF's Motion for New Trial for hearing, when a stay was ordered and a submission date set.

7. The error warrants immediate supervisory review because the affidavits bear directly on numerous competing Motions for Summary Judgment affecting the certified class.

We find that resolution of this writ application requires us to resolve whether Relators could supplement their motions for summary judgment and oppositions if said supplementation was timely.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, we note the standard of review: this issue requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Relators’ 2026 Motion for Leave. Stonetrust Comm. Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 2021-0721, 0722, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/22) 341 So.3d 819, 825; Baez v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 3 of Allen Par., 2016-951, p. 11 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/5/17), 216 So.3d 98, 106. Turning to the summary judgment codal law, La. C.C.P. art. 966 is titled “Motion for summary judgment; procedure.” It lists the “documents that may be filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion [for summary judgment],” and that list includes affidavits. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4)(a). Thus, affidavits are proper summary judgment evidence. Additionally, La. C.C.P. art. 966 delineates the summary judgment deadlines. As established by that Article and “[u]nless extended by the court and agreed to by all of the parties,” the “motion for summary judgment and all documents in support of the motion” are due no later than sixty-five days before trial; the opposition (if any) “to the motion and all documents in support of the opposition” are due no later than fifteen days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment; and the reply (if any) is due no later than five days before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(1-3). Further, La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(3) provides that “[n]o additional documents may be filed with the reply memorandum.”

In Dufour v. Schumacher Group of Louisiana, one of the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs (Beth and Drew Dufour) filed an opposition. 2018-20, p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/1/18), 252 So.3d 1023, 1025. Attached to the Dufours’ opposition was an affidavit by Beth and an affidavit by Dr. Thomas Arnold (“Dr. Arnold”). Id. The Dufours asked the trial court to continue the scheduled June 2017 hearing on the motion for summary judgment to give them the opportunity for additional discovery to defend against the motion, and the trial court granted that request. Id. at pp. 2-3, 252 So.3d at 1025-26. Thereafter, “the Dufours filed a supplemental opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 4, 2017, in preparation for the rescheduled hearing on August 21, 2017.” Id. at p. 3, 252 So.3d at 1026. That supplemental opposition included not only a supplemental affidavit from Dr. Arnold but also an affidavit from Dr. Christina Lord. Id. The defendant filed a motion to strike the supplemental opposition, which the trial court ultimately granted. Id.

In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal (“Third Circuit”) explained that “the only time limitation imposed upon the filing of an opposition to a motion for summary judgment is that any and all opposition and accompanying documents must be filed ‘not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing on the motion.’ ” Id. at p. 6, 252 So.3d at 1027-28 (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2)). Additionally, the Third Circuit explained the reasoning behind this deadline “is to allow both the court and parties sufficient time to narrow the issues in dispute and prepare for argument at the hearing.” Id. at p. 6, 252 So.3d at 1028 (quoting Finch v. HRI Lodging, Inc., 49,497, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So.3d 1039, 1043). As explained by the Third Circuit, “[b]ecause the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was reset, the deadline for filing opposition documents to the motion was reset as well in the absence of any limiting orders from the trial court, of which there were none in this case.” Id. at p. 9, 252 So.3d at 1029 (citing Mahoney v. East Caroll Par. Police Jury, 47,494, pp. 7-11 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/12), 105 So.3d 144, 150-152). In other words, “the rescheduling of the hearing reset the time for the filing of opposition documents.” Id. at p. 7, 252 So.3d at 1028. As reasoned by the Third Circuit, “based upon the plain wording and intent of [La. C.C.P. art. 966]” and the trial court's continuation of the summary judgment hearing, “the Dufours had at least until August 6, 2017, to file and serve any timely opposition documents regarding the August 21, 2017 summary judgment hearing without court approval.” Id. at p. 6, 252 So.3d at 1028 (emphasis added). In fact, the Third Circuit held the trial court not only “abused its great discretion in striking the” supplemental opposition but also “had no authority to” do so. Id. at p. 9, 252 So.3d at 1029. The Third Circuit concluded the Dufours had timely filed their supplemental opposition within the timeframe set by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B) because they filed it on August 4, 2017, ahead of the August 6, 2017 deadline. Id.

In so ruling, the Third Circuit also explained that the trial court had misapplied the holding of Baez, 2016-951, 216 So.3d 98. Dufour, 2018-20, p. 8, 252 So.3d at 1029. As explained by the Third Circuit in Dufour, “Baez does not stand for the proposition that a party is only permitted to file a single opposition without the ability to supplement that opposition even when the supplemental opposition is filed within the delays provided for in [La. C.C.P. art.] 966(B).” Id. Rather, “[t]he Baez court dealt with the admissibility of a surreply filed one day before the hearing on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. By contrast, the Third Circuit explained “[t]he filings on behalf of the Dufours were not filed as a surreply” but rather “as part of the Dufours’ response to the original motion for summary judgment.” Id. at p. 9, 252 So.3d at 1029.

Notably, in Stonetrust Commercial Insurance Company, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal (“First Circuit”) similarly considered certain plaintiffs’ motion for leave to supplement their opposition with a deposition, which the trial court had denied. 2021-0721, 0722, p. 9, 341 So.3d at 824. As explained by the First Circuit, the plaintiffs did not file their motion until four days before the scheduled hearing on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at p. 9, 341 So.3d at 824-25. The First Circuit concluded that “because the supplemental opposition was not filed within the mandatory time limitations set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2),” the trial court did not “abuse[ ] its discretion in denying [the] plaintiffs’ motion.” Id. at p. 9, 341 So.3d at 825 (emphasis added). The reverse implication of the First Circuit's holding is that if the plaintiffs had filed their motion within the deadlines established by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2), then the trial court's denial of their motion would have constituted an abuse of discretion.

We find the Dufour and Stonetrust Commercial Insurance Co. cases procedurally similar to the matter sub judice and, therefore, hold their reasoning is applicable. Like the Dufours’ filings, Relators’ 2026 Motion for Leave and the affidavits attached thereto were part of their original filings, i.e., their motions for summary judgment and opposition to NBSF's motions for summary judgment, not a reply or surreply. Whether we deem the affidavits part of Relators’ motions for summary judgment or their opposition to NBSF's motion, the outcome is the same. The record reveals the trial court set the summary judgment hearing for October 8, 2026. The first of the two relevant deadlines—established by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(1)—required Relators to file their motions for summary judgment sixty-five days prior to trial. The writ record reveals there was no pending trial date set for fewer than sixty-five days after Relators filed their 2026 Motion for Leave. The second of the two relevant deadlines—established by La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2)—required Relators to file an opposition and any supporting documents regarding NBSF's motions for summary judgment by September 23, 2026, i.e., fifteen days prior to the scheduled October 8, 2026 hearing. Relators filed their 2026 Motion for Leave long before that deadline on June 11, 2026. Thus, Relators’ 2026 Motion for Leave was timely under both of the foregoing deadlines. Because Relators timely filed their 2026 Motion for Leave and the attached affidavits prior to the deadlines set by La. C.C.P. art. 966, the trial court had no authority to deny that Motion and abused its discretion in so doing. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Relators’ writ application; reverse the trial court's August 27, 2026 judgment, which denied their 2026 Motion for Leave; and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The case caption lists the plaintiff as “Darnette Daniels, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Taylor McClendon.” However, the trial court certified a class in this matter, and the attorneys who filed the writ application identify themselves as “class counsel” and utilize the word “plaintiffs.” This Opinion will refer to the class of plaintiffs as “Relators.”

2.   In their writ application, Relators contend the trial court denied their 2024 Motion for Leave because a certified transcript is not a permissible document pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966.

Judge Dale N. Atkins

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT