IN RE:ROBERT MARION PRICE (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-230

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on October 21, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

IN RE: ROBERT MARION PRICE, JR. AND DIANA ELIZABETH GUILLOTTE PRICE APPLYING FOR PRIVATE ADOPTION OF V.E.A.

APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LASALLE, NO. 43666 HONORABLE J. CHRISTOPHER PETERS, DISTRICT JUDGE

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Jonathan W. Perry, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-230

IN RE: ROBERT MARION PRICE, JR. AND DIANA ELIZABETH GUILLOTTE PRICE APPLYING FOR PRIVATE ADOPTION OF V.E.A.

APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LASALLE, NO. 43666 HONORABLE J. CHRISTOPHER PETERS, DISTRICT JUDGE

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Jonathan W. Perry, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Elizabeth K. Fox EKF Family Law, L.L.C. 23422 Cypress Cove Springfield, Louisiana 70462 (225) 465-7138 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Spence-Chapin Services To Families and Children

Shelia H. Willis Morris, Lee, Bayle & Willis 1515 Poydras Street, Suite 1000 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 (504) 524-3781 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Spence-Chapin Services To Families and Children

Todd E. Gaudin Gaudin Law Group, Inc P.O. Box 3442 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821 (225) 412-8048 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT Spence-Chapin Services To Families and Children

Emily M. Saska Odom-Saska Adoptions, LLC 500 North 7th Street West Monroe, Louisiana 71291 (318) 387-8811 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Robert Price, Jr. and Diana Elizabeth Guillotte Price

Steven R. Baker Warren & Baker, LLC 401 Edwards Street, Suite 2010 Shreveport, Louisiana 71101 (319) 588-8000 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Farrington Noon Abbott and Mariela Huber Abbott

PERRY, Judge.

This appeal addresses whether a non-profit child-placing agency has a cause of action to intervene in a private Louisiana adoption to request orders requiring the adopting parents to provide for continued contact between minor sisters. These minor sisters were originally adopted together by another couple and are now separated. For reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court judgment that found the non-profit child-placing agency has no cause of action to intervene.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This adoption proceeding involves two biological sisters born in Bogatá, Colombia, namely, V.E.A,¹ born on June 18, 2018, and G.A.A., born on February 14, 2020. Later, in September 2023, Farrington Noon Abbott and Mariela Huber Abbott (“the Abbotts”), residents of the state of California, adopted V.E.A. and G.A.A. in Colombia and readopted them in California shortly thereafter. Spence-Chapin Services to Families and Children (“Spence-Chapin”), a non-profit child-placing agency registered and domiciled in New York state, facilitated the placement of the two sisters and served as the reporting agency for various post-adoption reporting duties associated with international adoptions.

The Abbotts later elected to pursue a private adoption placement for V.E.A. with a married couple in Louisiana. On January 1, 2025, the Abbotts, still residents of California, executed Voluntary Acts of Surrender in favor of a proposed private adoption placement for V.E.A. with Robert Marion Price, Jr., and Diana Elizabeth Guillotte Price (“the Prices”), Louisiana residents. The appropriate authorities in California and Louisiana, proceeding through the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, approved the proposed placement of V.E.A. Afterwards, surrender proceedings filed in the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court of Louisiana approved the voluntary surrender, terminated the Abbotts’ parental rights regarding V.E.A. pursuant to the Louisiana Children's Code, and authorized the placement to proceed to adoption.

On June 20, 2025, Spence-Chapin filed a Petition for Intervention and for Visitation (“Petition”) in the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court.² Citing the Abbotts and Prices in its Petition, Spence-Chapin: (1) alleged that as the adoption support server, it had a continuing duty associated with the sisters’ international adoption and wanted to provide information concerning V.E.A.’s history, her relationship with G.A.A., and the effects of the separation of the sisters; (2) urged that continued contact between the sisters was in V.E.A.’s best interest and requested that judicial relief be granted to preserve that relationship; and (3) sought orders from the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court for continued contact between the sisters, requiring cooperation by the Abbotts and Prices, and directing compliance with Spence-Chapin's reporting obligations. Spence-Chapin also specifically stated that it believed V.E.A.’s placement with the Prices was “good and healthy,” and it did not oppose the Prices’ request to adopt her.

In response to Spence-Chapin's Petition, the Abbotts and Prices each filed various exceptions, including the peremptory exception of no cause of action. After conducting a hearing on November 13, 2025, the trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action filed by the Abbotts and Prices and dismissed Spence-Chapin's Petition. A judgment to that effect was signed on November 21, 2025.³ On December 2, 2025, the trial court considered the petition for final decree of adoption filed by the Prices and granted a final decree and judgment of adoption on January 22, 2026.

On December 18, 2025, Spence-Chapin appealed the November 21, 2025 judgment on the peremptory exception of no cause of action.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

(1)The trial court committed legal error by dismissing the Petition to Intervene and for Visitation after recognizing that the grounds of the objection pleaded by the Exception of No Cause of Action could be removed by amendment.

(2)The trial court committed legal error by issuing the Final Decree of Adoption while the suspensive appeal was pending.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT

Spence-Chapin urges this court to reverse the judgment that sustained the peremptory exception of no cause of action, vacate the final decree of adoption, and remand this matter for further proceedings. In support of its requests, Spence-Chapin advances three arguments.

First, Spence-Chapin points out that the trial court concluded that it could not obtain its request in its Petition to obtain a court-ordered continuing contact arrangement for V.E.A. and her sister. Although the trial court recognized that this requested relief constituted a defect in its Petition, it did not find that Spence-Chapin could not generally participate in the adoption proceedings.

Second, despite the trial court's finding in this regard, Spence-Chapin argues that the trial court should not have simply dismissed its Petition. Rather, the trial court should have followed the provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art. 934 and allowed Spence-Chapin to amend its petition to remove its request for a court-ordered continuing contact arrangement.

Third, Spence-Chapin, relying on La.Ch.Code art. 1261, contends that the trial court committed legal error when it proceeded to final adoption. It argues that Article 1261 provides for a suspensive appeal from the judgment that dismissed its intervention. Therefore, it argues the trial court committed legal error when it deprived Spence-Chapin to have its suspensive appeal addressed before granting the final judgment of adoption.

APPELLEES’ POSITION

The Abbotts and Prices urge this court to affirm the trial court judgment and to leave the final decree of private adoption undisturbed.

Initially, they observe that Spence-Chapin acknowledged its support for V.E.A.’s proposed adoption and did not urge the denial of the adoption, her placement with another family, or any other relief that would have affected the trial court's decision. Rather, its sole objective in filing its Petition was to compel post-adoption sibling contact, something Louisiana law does not provide in private adoptions. Because no legally cognizable remedy existed for the relief Spence-Chapin sought, the trial court properly sustained the peremptory exception of no cause of action. Moreover, because the remedy sought by Spence-Chapin did not legally exist, any amendment of its petition under La.Code Civ.P. art. 934 would have been a vain and useless act.

The Abbotts and Prices further argue that the trial court did not legally err when it proceeded with the adoption following its dismissal of Spence-Chapin's Petition. The argument urged by Spence-Chapin that its appeal was suspensive is premised on a misreading of La.Ch.Code art. 1261. Simply stated, Article 1261 did not suspend all further proceedings. Only an adoption judgment rendered in accordance with Title XII of the Children's Code carries with it a mandatory suspensive appeal. Accordingly, applying the provisions of La.Ch.Code art. 1259, this appealed judgment did not involve “a judgment granting or refusing to grant an interlocutory or final decree regarding any type of adoption[.]” Therefore, they argue that the trial court properly proceeded with the final decree of adoption.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Christian D. Chesson, PLC v. Gandy, 25-57, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/13/25), 419 So.3d 814, 822–23 (footnote omitted), writ denied, 25-1389 (La. 1/21/26), 424 So.3d 1100, we stated:

“The function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 923. The peremptory exception of no cause of action examines the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy under the facts alleged. Hayes v. Univ. Health Shreveport, 21-1601 (La. 1/7/22), 332 So.3d 1163. “A cause of action, when used in the context of the peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant.” Wederstrandt v. Kol, 22-1570, p. 4 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 47, 51.

“No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 931.

The purpose of an exception of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. The exception is triable on the face of the papers and for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well pleaded facts must be accepted as true.

City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-690, p. 2 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 241. “The burden of demonstrating that no cause of action has been stated is upon the mover or exceptor.” Id. at 253.

Consequently, we conduct a de novo review because the peremptory exception of no cause of action “raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition.” Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, pp. 7–8 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 119. “The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff's behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.” Id.

In Broussard v. F.A. Richard & Assocs., Inc., 99-10, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99), 740 So.2d 156, 160, this court, addressing the right to amend, stated:

Article 934 does not require that the plaintiff be provided the opportunity to speculate on unwarranted facts merely for the purpose of defeating the exception. Miller v. Everett, 576 So.2d 1162 (La.App. (3)Cir.1991). The right to amend one's petition is qualified by the restriction that the objections to the petition be curable. Further, the decision to allow amendment is within the discretion of the trial court. Doe v. Entergy Services, Inc., 608 So.2d 684 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), writ denied, 613 So.2d 978 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 816, 114 S.Ct. 66, 126 L.Ed.2d 35 (1993).

DISCUSSION

Background

In its Petition, Spence-Chapin alleged, in pertinent part:

6.

[V.E.A.’S] PLACEMENT WITH THE PRICES

A.) SPENCE-CHAPIN believes that [V.E.A.’s] current placement with THE PRICES is good and healthy and does not oppose THE PRICE's request to adopt her.

B.) It also has a legal duty to express its opinion and to disclose data about [V.E.A.’s] best interest before this Court decides the merits of her adoption.

7.

[V.E.A.’S] BEST INTEREST

SPENCE-CHAPIN contends that [V.E.A.’s] best interest are served if this Court orders continuing contact, to include visits, between [V.E.A.] and her sister; it asks this Court to order THE ABBOTTS and THE PRICE families to cooperate in the continuing contact plan[ ] and comply with post-adoption reporting to SPENCE-CHAPIN and the country of Colombia.

As the trial court explored the peremptory exception of no cause of action advanced by the Prices and Abbotts, the following colloquy between the trial court and counsel occurred at the hearing:

[THE COURT:] Tell me how I get to the Cause of Action, because as I understand, your cause of action is, you want to argue best interest, but your main argument is the best interest is a continued contact order [involving V.E.A. and G.A.A.] Because if I remember reading the Intervention right, I think it was, that you're not really contesting the placement [with the Prices]. You're contesting a requirement for a continued custody order that your client requires.

MR. GAUDIN [counsel for Spence-Chapin]: Correct. And I appreciate you saying that because the focus should be on [V.E.A.] not the Prices, not the Abbotts.

․

I acknowledge that there's no specific statute that says, in this situation, a court can order continuing contact between relatives. There are such statutes that exist. There's one for grandparents, post-adoption, under those specific guidelines. There's some in the child in care of need section that said relatives should maintain contact with each other and the court has authority to order that contact. There's no specific statute in the private adoption articles that replicates those kinds of things. But ․ I think the legislature, in the code, does place an importance on sibling relationships and the cause of action stated in this petition would be yes, this court's inherent authority and its ability to fashion a remedy that would make sense under the circumstances.

․

[MS. SASKA [counsel for the Prices]:] It's ․ the Prices [sic] position, that even if the Abbotts had an intention to adopt the girls jointly and to keep them together, that intention to keep them together doesn't supersede their parental rights and ability to make decisions to place them subsequently for adoption. That intention would not limit their parental rights to make and have the authority to make that determination. I believe that Spence-Chapin may be well-intentioned ․ but that ․ does not give rise to a cause of action. They're asking this court to fashion a remedy that's enforceable without any legal support do so. Best interest of the child is the standard. It, in and of itself, is not a cause of action. The inherent authority articles reference that when the court has the authority to make it a custody determination, they can use that inherent authority to modify that custody, but there is no legal support for a custody determination in these proceedings. This court will have the opportunity to consider [V.E.A.’s] best interest in due course in these adoption proceedings as laid out in [the] Louisiana Children's Code.

․

[THE COURT:] But my question ends up being ․ is, and you [Ms. Saska] said something really good that I made it in my mind to check it. The best interest of the child is a standard. It's not a cause of action ․ So basically[,] it's evidence that you present to show the best interest, not give you a cause of action to operate under.

The Children's Code

Louisiana Children's Code Article 1230(B) provides, in pertinent part, that at the hearing on the petition for private adoption “the court shall consider: (1) Any motion to intervene which has been filed.” Louisiana Children's Code Article 1231 then states:

A. Intervention in private adoption proceedings shall not be allowed except on motion to the court and a showing of good cause.

B. Such intervention shall be limited to persons having a substantial caretaking relationship with the child for one year or longer, or any other person that the court finds to be a party in interest.

C. The intervention of a party in interest shall be for the limited purpose of presenting evidence as to the best interests of the child.

Even though Spence-Chapin acknowledged in its Petition ⁴ that there was no specific statute that states the trial court can order continuing contact between relatives in a private adoption, it asserted that the trial court has inherent authority to confect such an order for the best interest of the child. For the following reasons, we disagree, finding the rules of statutory construction command a contrary result.

Statutory Construction

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Moreno v. Entergy Corp., 12–0097, p. 12 (La.12/4/12), 105 So.3d 40, 48. Words and phrases shall be read in context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La. R.S. 1:3. The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety, and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law, and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law. Moreno, 12–0097 at 12, 105 So.3d at 48.

Winn-Dixie La. v. Physicians Surgical Specialty Hosp., 13-2680, pp. 2–3 (La. 2/21/14), 156 So.3d 1129, 1130.

In Duckworth v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 11-2835, p. 12 (La. 11/2/12), 125 So.3d 1057, 1064, the supreme court stated:

In Louisiana, as in other civil law jurisdictions, legislation is superior to any other source of law. See, La. C.C. art. 1; Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 00–0947, p. 13 (La.12/19/00), 774 So.2d 119, 128. Therefore, as the solemn expression of the legislative will, if an enactment provides a solution to a particular situation, then no jurisprudence, usage, equity or doctrine can prevail over the legislation. See La. C.C. arts. 2 and 3. It is only when a particular situation is not covered by legislation that a solution can be sought elsewhere. La. C.C. art. 4.

The judiciary's role in the civil law, first and foremost, is not to legislate from the bench, but to interpret the legislative will and apply statutory pronouncements to specific cases. Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La.L.Rev. 727, 728 (1962) (“The Louisiana judge must, as stated, find primarily in legislative enactments the legal principles to be applied in deciding the case before him.”). Interpretation of the legislative will is accomplished through the rules of statutory construction. Pursuant to these rules, the interpretation of a legislative enactment begins with the language of the law itself. In re Succession of Faget, 10–0188, p. 8 (La.11/30/10), 53 So.3d 414, 420; Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885, 888 (La.1993). When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law must be applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of the legislative intent. La. C.C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1:4. Unequivocal provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving the words their generally prevailing meaning. La. C.C. art. 11; La. R.S. 1:3; Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan, 11–0097, p. 12 (La.12/16/11), 79 So.3d 987, 997. Further, laws on the same subject matter are to be interpreted in reference to each other. La. C.C. art. 13.

Adoption Services, Inc (“Beacon House”). When the unwed father opposed the proposed adoption, Beacon House intervened in a private adoption. The supreme court addressed the merits of this intervention without questioning the standing of the adoption agency. In the present case, we are not called upon to determine whether the phrase “or any other person” includes an out-of-state agency such as Spence-Chapin that did not have legal custody of the child.

Furthermore, in M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, pp. 13–14 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27 (citations omitted), the court said:

It is also well established that the Legislature is presumed to enact each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption the Legislature was aware of existing statutes, well established principles of statutory construction and with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view.

With these principles of interpretation in mind, our review of the legislative process shows that the legislature recognized that because bits and pieces of laws affecting children were scattered through multiple titles and codes, there was a need to construct a comprehensive Children's Code.

“Adoption is a creature of statute [and] is only what the law makes it[.]” In re McK, 444 So.2d 1362, 1365 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984). Accordingly, by Acts 1991, No. 235, § 3, effective January 1, 1992, the legislature adopted the Louisiana Children's Code. As part of that Code, the legislature specifically included Title 12 that addresses agency adoptions, private adoptions, and intrafamily adoptions. It then devoted separate chapters within Title 12 and individually crafted articles pertinent to each mode of adoption, identifying specific provisions for visitation.

In an agency adoption, “grandparents may obtain limited visitation rights to the adopted child.” La.Ch.Code art. 1218(C). Likewise, in La.Ch.Code art. 1218(D) “[p]arents, grandparents, siblings, or other relatives by blood, adoption, or affinity who have an established and significant relationship may be allowed continuing contact with an adopted child in accordance with Chapter 14-A of this Title.”⁵ Moreover, Chapter 14-A of the Children's Code authorizes continuing contact agreements only for children in foster care for whom the Louisiana Department of Social Services has arranged an adoption. Under the provisions of La.Ch.Code art. 1269.1, these continuing agreements for continuing contact involve only certain biological relatives or foster parents with an adopted child “provided that the adopting parents and biological relative or foster caregiver voluntarily execute the agreement[.]”

Likewise, in intrafamily adoptions, La.Ch.Code art. 1256 provides that “grandparents may obtain limited visitation rights to the adopted child[,]” but only as provided in La.Ch.Code art. 1264. Specifically, such visitation rights are only for those grandparents claiming through a deceased parent or in the case of an intrafamily adoption, those claiming through a parent whose parental rights have been legally terminated as a result of nonsupport or failure to maintain contact with the child. La.Ch.Code art. 1245.⁶

In contrast to agency and intrafamily adoptions, we are asked in the present case to review a private adoption under Title 12, Chapter 10 of the Children's Code, namely, La.Ch.Code arts. 1221–1242. Our reading of those articles shows that, but for one instance, the legislature made no provision for the court to order continuing contact between relatives. The one exception established by the legislature in private adoptions may be found in La.Ch.Code art. 1240(C) that provides grandparents with limited visitation rights to the adopted child “[u]nder the circumstances and pursuant to the procedures authorized by Chapter 14 of this Title[.]”

In the present case, Spence-Chapin sought to intervene in this private adoption as a party in interest. As provided in La.Ch.Code art. 1231(A) its intervention had to have been made on “a showing of good cause.” Additionally, under the direct provisions of La.Ch.Code art. 1231(C), its intervention was “for the limited purpose of presenting evidence as to the best interest of the child.”

“[T]he function of an exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading.” Hayes, 332 So.3d at 1168. After reviewing La.Ch.Code arts. 1221–1242, specifically involving private adoptions, the provisions of the Children's Code do not provide the trial court with the authority to order that V.E.A. have visitation with her sister. To find otherwise would require us to provide a remedy that the legislature chose not to provide in private adoptions. Although the trial court has inherent authority in the exercise of its office, when the law is clear and unambiguous, the role of the courts is to apply the law as written without further interpretation. Duckworth, 125 So.3d 1057.

Finally, because the Children's Code does not provide a legal remedy to Spence-Chapin, the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception of no cause of action cannot be removed by amendment of the petition. Here, Spence-Chapin's Petition stated that it “believes that [V.E.A.’s] current placement with THE PRICES is good and healthy and does not oppose THE PRICE's request to adopt her.” Implicit in Spence-Chapin's statement is that the Price's adoption of V.E.A. is in her best interest—the limited purpose of intervention as provided in La.Ch.Code art. 1231(C). Therefore, we do not find that the trial court legally erred when it did not provide Spence-Chapin with an opportunity to amend its petition under the provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art. 934.

The Appeal

The record shows that in its motion for appeal, Spence-Chapin referenced the general articles for appeals without ever asserting that it was suspensive. However, in its brief to this court, the agency contends that its appeal was suspensive by virtue of La.Ch.Code art. 1261. Accordingly, it asserts that the trial court legally erred when it issued a final decree of adoption while its appeal of the judgment granting the peremptory exception of no cause was pending.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 1259(A) (emphasis added) states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny party to the proceedings or any other party in interest shall have the right to appeal a judgment granting or refusing to grant an interlocutory or final decree regarding any type of adoption[.]” Furthermore, La.Ch.Code art. 1261 states, “All appeals from any judgment rendered in accordance with this Title shall be suspensive in nature. There shall be no requirement for posting of bond. Otherwise, the appeal shall be governed by Chapter 9 of Title III.”

The adoption judgments referenced in La.Ch.Code arts. 1259 and 1261 fall within Title XII and would be under the special appellate provisions addressed. After reviewing the judgment of the trial court, Spence-Chapin did not appeal a judgment granting or refusing to grant an interlocutory or final decree regarding any type of adoption. To the contrary, the present judgment adjudicated a peremptory exception of no cause of action involving Spence-Chapin's Petition for Intervention and Visitation. As such, Spence-Chapin's appeal is governed by Chapter 9 of Title III and is not suspensive. Therefore, after reviewing La.Ch.Code arts. 1259 and 1261, we find no merit to Spence-Chapin's argument that the trial court was prohibited from issuing a final decree of adoption until after this court ruled on its appeal.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Spence-Chapin Services to Families and Children.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The initials for the minor children have been used to protect their identities. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.

2.   Although the Order attached to Spence-Chapin's Petition does not indicate that service was requested on the Abbotts, the Order shows they and the Prices were required to show cause why the trial court should not decide in favor of Spence-Chapin.

3.   In its judgment, the trial court further found that its ruling on the peremptory exception of no cause of action rendered moot the other exceptions of no right of action and lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction raised by the Prices and Abbotts. However, it also reserved the parties’ rights to assert these exceptions should the need arise.

4.   We have identified one case that involved intervention in private adoption proceedings by an adoption agency. In The Matter of R.E., 94-2567, 94-2596, 94-2663 (La. 11/9/94), 645 So.2d 205, the child's mother executed an act of voluntary surrender of the child to Beacon House

5.   Commenting further on the post-adoption visitation rights of grandparents recognized in La.Ch.Code arts. 1245 (intrafamily adoptions) and 1264 (visitation rights of grandparents in agency adoptions), this statement is made: “This Article creates a cause of action for post-decree visitation only for grandparents vis-à-vis other blood relatives.” Harrison, Jack, “Louisiana Children's Code Handbook” p. 829 (2026 ed., Thomson West).

6.   Beyond the provisions regarding adoptions, it has been noted that in Child In Need of Care cases, Paragraph (A)(4) of La.Ch.Code art. 684 authorizes the court to address issues of visitation or other forms of contact, including any limitations necessary for the child's safety, and the court should ensure that a child's established and significant relationships with his parents, sibling, or other are preserved. Comment–2001, La.Ch.Code art. 684; see also In re J.M.P., 528 So.2d 1002, 1015 (stating “preservation of the child's sense of lineage and access to his extended biological family can be important psychologically, as evidenced by the felt need of some adoptive children to search out their natural parents.”)