STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DA QUALON ROBINSON (2026)

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-111

Judgment rendered and mailed to all parties or counsel on October 21, 2026. Applications for rehearing may be filed within the delays allowed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 or La. Code Crim. P. art. 922.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DA'QUALON ROBINSON

APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 22-K-2226-A HONORABLE GREGORY J. DOUCET, DISTRICT JUDGE

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Jonathan W. Perry, and Guy E. Bradberry Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE VACATED AND SET ASIDE; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR SECOND DEGREE MURDER AFFIRMED.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

26-111

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DA'QUALON ROBINSON

APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 22-K-2226-A HONORABLE GREGORY J. DOUCET, DISTRICT JUDGE

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Jonathan W. Perry, and Guy E. Bradberry, Judges.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE VACATED AND SET ASIDE; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR SECOND DEGREE MURDER AFFIRMED.

Rémy Voisin Starns State Public Defender Annette Roach Louisiana Appeal & Writ Service of the Office of the State Public Defender Post Office Box 6547 Lake Charles, Louisiana 70606 (337) 436-2900 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Da'Qualon Robinson

Chad Pitre District Attorney, Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Alisa Ardoin Gothreaux Assistant District Attorney Post Office Drawer 1968 Opelousas, Louisiana 70571 (337) 948-0551 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: State of Louisiana

PERRY, Judge.

This criminal case addresses whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a fifteen-year-old juvenile who was indicted for one count of obstruction of justice and tried in adult court before a jury.¹ As discussed hereinafter, we vacate Defendant's conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During the early evening on November 2, 2022, twelve-year-old B.F.² and her thirteen-year-old friend, T.E., were visiting B.F.’s boyfriend, fifteen-year-old Da'Qualon Robinson (“Defendant”) in Opelousas, Louisiana. After hearing about B.F. texting someone else, a physical altercation ensued between B.F. and Defendant. B.F. used pepper spray on Defendant, and ultimately, the two of them went onto the front porch to rinse Defendant's eyes with milk. After B.F. and Defendant stopped arguing, B.F. and T.E. left and began walking home.

On the way home, B.F. and T.E. came across two boys, seventeen-year-old J.C., and fifteen-year-old Ketravion George (“Ketravion”); the two boys walked with the girls toward the Dollar General store. As they walked, they saw a vehicle driven by Daylon Wheeler (“Wheeler”). In the vehicle were Defendant's older cousin, Desment Green (“Green”), Christopher Coleman (“Coleman”), and Defendant. When B.F. saw the group drive by, B.F. ran, distancing herself from the group. The car then pulled to the curb near B.F., and Defendant tried to get B.F. inside the vehicle so they could give her a ride home; B.F. declined the invitation. According to Wheeler, Green, and Coleman, Defendant became agitated and exited the car to get B.F. to enter the car. Ultimately, Coleman and Green exited the vehicle and placed Defendant back inside the car. By this time, T.E., J.C., and Ketravion were walking past the car. At some point, Ketravion and Defendant had words.

Green testified that as the car pulled away from the curb, Defendant, brandishing a gun, lunged over him and fired three shots through the open back window. Later, they learned that one of the shots struck Ketravion in the head, killing him.

B.F., Defendant's girlfriend, testified that Defendant telephoned her after the shooting to tell her not to speak to anyone about the shooting. Before dropping the car off to its owner, the passengers looked for, but did not find, any bullet casings in the car. One witness testified that everyone went their separate ways. When they learned the next day that they were on the news, they traveled from Opelousas to a hotel in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The next morning, they learned that warrants for their arrests had been issued. Defendant was the first to surrender himself to the police.

No bullet casings were found at the crime scene or in the vehicle. Even though there was testimony that more than one gun was in the vehicle that night, no weapon was recovered. One of the investigators testified that Defendant and the others in the car were charged with obstruction of justice because he felt they “did a lot of cleaning up” and tampered with evidence.

On November 29, 2022, a grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and one count of obstruction of justice, a violation of La.R.S. 14:130.1.³ On December 13, 2022, the State orally moved in district court for Defendant to be transferred from the Opelousas City Court, juvenile division,⁴ to adult court; as reflected in the court minutes for that date, the district court granted the motion, ordered the State to follow up with a written motion, and remanded Defendant to the custody of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office. On December 15, 2022, pursuant to the district court's direction, the State filed a written motion to conform with its earlier oral motion to transfer Defendant from the jurisdiction of the Opelousas City Court to the Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court Adult Division.⁵ After a three-day jury trial that began on October 14, 2025, a unanimous jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

Thereafter, on December 4, 2025, the district court sentenced Defendant for second degree murder to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, the district court recognized that under La.R.S. 15:574.4(F)(1) Defendant shall be eligible for parole consideration after serving twenty-five years, if all conditions specified in subsections (b) through (g) of that statute are met. On December 11, 2025, the district court also sentenced Defendant for obstruction of justice to twenty-five years at hard labor, to run concurrently with the sentence for second degree murder.

On November 18, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for appeal. By order signed on December 11, 2025, the district court granted Defendant's motion for appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Defendant filed a brief alleging one assignment of error:

The Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try [Defendant] for the offense of obstruction of justice, as the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the charge because obstruction of justice is not one of the specifically enumerated felony offenses set forth in La. Const. art. V, § 19 and La. Child. Code art. 305 (A) or (B), which allow for the juvenile court's jurisdiction to divest when an indictment is filed charging a fifteen-year-old juvenile with an enumerated felony offense.

ERRORS PATENT

As provided in La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all criminal appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, there is one jurisdictional error patent involving a potential jurisdictional issue.⁶ However, as that issue has been assigned as error, we will discuss it in the body of this opinion.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A St. Landry Parish grand jury charged that Defendant committed the offense of second degree murder and the offense of obstruction of justice, both committed on November 2, 2022. Because Defendant's date of birth is December 4, 2006, it is evident he was fifteen years of age at the time he committed the charged offenses.

Defendant contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try him for obstruction of justice. From the outset, we note that the State agrees with Defendant's assignment of error relating to the district court's jurisdiction and “stipulates to a remand of the matter, with the conviction on obstruction being vacated and the district court being ordered to amend his commitment order to reflect the same.” After reviewing statutory law and jurisprudence and for the reasons stated below, we agree with the parties that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the obstruction of justice charge. Statutory Law, Jurisprudence and Analysis

“Jurisdiction” is defined in La.Code Crim.P. art. 16:

Courts have the jurisdiction and powers over criminal proceedings that are conferred upon them by the constitution and statutes of this state, except as their statutory jurisdiction and powers are restricted, enlarged, or modified by the provisions of this Code.

Thus, the district courts have either exclusive or concurrent original jurisdiction in any criminal matter, except when the Constitution and state statutes themselves vest jurisdiction in another tribunal.

Louisiana Constitution Article 5, § 19 states the following regarding jurisdiction over juveniles:

The determination of guilt or innocence, the detention, and the custody of a person who is alleged to have committed a crime prior to his seventeenth birthday shall be pursuant to special juvenile procedures which shall be provided by law. However, the legislature may (1) by a two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house provide that special juvenile procedures shall not apply to juveniles arrested for having committed first or second degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated rape, armed robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, forcible rape, simple rape, second degree kidnapping, a second or subsequent aggravated battery, a second or subsequent aggravated burglary, a second or subsequent offense of burglary of an inhabited dwelling, or a second or subsequent felony-grade violation of Part X or X-B of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances, and (2) by two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house lower the maximum ages of persons to whom juvenile procedures shall apply, and (3) by two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house establish a procedure by which the court of original jurisdiction may waive special juvenile procedures in order that adult procedures shall apply in individual cases. The legislature, by a majority of the elected members of each house, shall make special provisions for detention and custody of juveniles who are subject to the jurisdiction of the district court pending determination of guilt or innocence.

The divesture of juvenile court jurisdiction is provided in La.Ch.Code art. 305 which states, in pertinent part:

A. (1) When a child is fifteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated or first degree rape, or aggravated kidnapping, he is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court until either:

(a) An indictment charging one of these offenses is returned.

(b) The juvenile court holds a continued custody hearing pursuant to Articles 819 and 820 and finds probable cause that he committed one of these offenses, whichever occurs first. During this hearing, when the child is charged with aggravated or first degree rape, the court shall inform him that if convicted he shall register as a sex offender for life, pursuant to Chapter 3-B of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.

․

B. (1) When a child is fifteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of any of the offenses listed in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph, he is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court until whichever of the following occurs first:

(a) An indictment charging one of the offenses listed in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph is returned.

(b) The juvenile court holds a continued custody hearing and finds probable cause that the child has committed any of the offenses listed in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph and a bill of information charging any of the offenses listed in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph is filed. During this hearing, when the child is charged with forcible or second degree rape or second degree kidnapping, the court shall inform him that if convicted he shall register as a sex offender for life, pursuant to Chapter 3-B of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950.

(2)(a) Attempted first degree murder.

(b) Attempted second degree murder.

(c) Manslaughter.

(d) Armed robbery.

(e) Aggravated burglary.

(f) Forcible or second degree rape.

(g) Simple or third degree rape.

(h) Second degree kidnapping.

(i) Repealed by Acts 2001, No. 301, § 2. (ii)

(j) Aggravated battery committed with a firearm.

(k) A second or subsequent aggravated battery.

(l) A second or subsequent aggravated burglary.

(m) A second or subsequent offense of burglary of an inhabited dwelling.

(n) A second or subsequent felony-grade violation of Part X or X-B of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances.

(3)(a) The district attorney shall have the discretion to file a petition alleging any of the offenses listed in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph in the juvenile court or, alternatively, to obtain an indictment or file a bill of information. If the child is being held in detention, the district attorney shall file the indictment, bill of information, or petition in the appropriate court within sixty calendar days after the child's arrest, unless the child waives this right.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 857(A) also states:

A. The court on its own motion or on motion of the district attorney may conduct a hearing to consider whether to transfer a child for prosecution to the appropriate court exercising criminal jurisdiction if a delinquency petition has been filed which alleges that a child who is fourteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged offense but is not otherwise subject to the original jurisdiction of a court exercising criminal jurisdiction has committed any one or more of the following crimes:

(1) First degree murder.

(2) Second degree murder.

(3) Aggravated kidnapping.

(4) Aggravated or first degree rape.

(5) Aggravated battery when committed by the discharge of a firearm.

(6) Armed robbery when committed with a firearm.

(7) Repealed by Acts 2001, No. 301, § 2.

(8) Forcible or second degree rape if the rape is committed upon a child at least two years younger than the rapist.

As noted in Defendant's brief to this court, obstruction of justice is neither listed in La.Const. art. 5, § 19 nor in the above-cited articles in the Louisiana Children's Code as an offense for which the juvenile court's jurisdiction may be divested. However, before we address this jurisdictional concern, we must first determine if this issue is properly before us.

Louisiana Children's Code Article 887 provides in pertinent part:

A. On motion of the child prior to disposition, a delinquency adjudication shall be vacated and the child discharged if, after contradictory hearing, the court finds that:

․

(3) The court making the adjudication lacked jurisdiction.

After reviewing the record, we find that Defendant did not raise this jurisdictional issue at the time of his indictment or file a motion to quash the indictment under the La.Code Crim.P. art. 532(A)(8). Nevertheless, this does not end our inquiry.

Although Defendant did not file a motion to quash in the present case, we find this court's pronouncement in State v. Newton, 12-510 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/13/13), 129 So.3d 11, writ denied, 13-595 (La. 10/11/13), 123 So.3d 1214, is informative and dispositive of this issue. There this court found the lack of a motion to quash did not waive a jurisdictional issue:

Defendant did not file a motion to quash the amended bill, and he did not object at the time the bill was amended. The State now argues, as a result of this failure to file the motion to quash or object at the time of the amendment, the jurisdictional issue is waived.

․

In Nerness v. Christian Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 98-1827, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/21/99), 733 So.2d 146, 151, this court explained:

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unlike other jurisdictional defects, may not be waived or conferred by the consent of the parties. La.Code Civ.P. art. 3; Tran v. Schwegmann's Giant Super Market, 609 So.2d 887 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992). Thus, a party may raise an exception of subject matter jurisdiction at any time during the proceedings. Id. Similarly, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised on appeal by the court's own motion. Id.

In State ex rel. K.S., 07-1045, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07), 977 So.2d 35, 38–39, the court explained:

While there has been no exception raised challenging the juvenile court's subject matter jurisdiction, we are required to consider the issue. It is the duty of a reviewing court to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Whittenberg v. Whittenberg, 97-1424, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/98), 710 So.2d 1157, 1158. “Whenever there is a serious issue regarding subject matter jurisdiction, a court (including an appellate court) should consider and rule on the issue at anytime, and the issue can even be raised by the court on its own motion.” Lowenburg v. Entergy New Orleans, Inc., 99-2894, p. 1 (La.12/17/99), 751 So.2d 868, 868 (Lemmon, J., concurring opinion).

Newton, 129 So.3d at 15–16.

Commenting further in State v. Jackson, 04-2863, p. 8 (La. 11/29/05), 916 So.2d 1015, 1019 (alterations in original), the supreme court stated the following regarding the recognition of jurisdictional issues:

It has long been established that lack of jurisdiction is a defect fatal to a criminal prosecution:

And, so far as nullity resulting from absence of jurisdiction is concerned, why that is a matter which in the words of this court in the case of Decuir v. Decuir, 105 La. [481,] 485, 29 South. [932,] 934 [(1901)], ‘may be invoked by any one at any time and anywhere.’

State v. Nicolosi, 128 La. 836, 55 So. 475, 478 (1910).

Additionally, Louisiana jurisprudence shows that jurisdictional issues are considered in an error patent review. State ex rel. A.N., 03-2776 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/25/04), 886 So.2d 514.

For the same reasons outlined above, we find the jurisdictional issue is properly before us despite Defendant's failure to file a motion to quash. See also State v. Mock, 18-530 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 1029. Having disposed of this preliminary issue, we now turn to the merits of Defendant's argument.

In support of his argument, Defendant cites State v. Smith, 56,209, 56,210, 56,211, 56,212 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/16/25), 409 So.3d 1114, writ denied, 25-622 (La. 11/25/25), 421 So.3d 531, a case where the second circuit found the district court lacked jurisdiction over a charge that was not enumerated in La.Ch.Code. art. 305. Smith, a fifteen-year-old, was tried as an adult and convicted of one count of second degree murder, eight counts of attempted second degree murder, and four counts of aggravated criminal damage to property. Like Defendant's argument in the present case, Smith contended the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the charges of aggravated criminal damage to property because that offense is not enumerated in La.Ch.Code. art. 305(2).

In Smith, 409 So.3d at 1121 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted), the appellate court summarized the State's argument as follows:

The State argues that, upon properly divesting the juvenile court of its jurisdiction and transferring jurisdiction to the district court pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 305(A) and (B) as to the count of second degree murder and eight counts of attempted second degree murder, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the four counts of aggravated criminal damage to property. The State contends that the aggravated criminal damage to property charges were part of the same event that resulted in the second degree murder and attempted second degree murder charges and, as such, were properly tried with them in spite of the fact that the offense of aggravated criminal damage to property is not one of the enumerated offenses under either La. Const. art. V, § 19 or La. Ch. C. art. 305.

The State points out that it would be a waste of judicial resources and time, taxpayer money, and the State's limited resources to conduct the same trial in two courts to ensure that the defendant be held accountable for his actions. The State notes that there is jurisprudence in support of the defendant's position. See, State v. Myles, 23-0585 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/5/24), 384 So.3d 938, 940-41, writ denied, 24-00291 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 603, writ denied sub nom. State v. Smith, 24-00258 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 609.

Against that backdrop, the second circuit then analyzed the issue as follows:

In the instant case, this Court finds, as did the Fourth Circuit in State v. Myles, supra, that the district court had jurisdiction only over the crimes specifically set forth in La. Ch. C. art. 305(B), i.e., second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The offense of aggravated criminal damage to property is not an enumerated offense under La. Ch. C. art. 305(B) or La. Const. art. V, § 19. Therefore, the district court lacked the jurisdiction to try the defendant, Ja'Shun Smith, on four counts of aggravated criminal damage to property. These convictions and sentences will be vacated for lack of jurisdiction over Smith as to these charges.

Smith, 409 So.3d at 1122.

Applying the reasoning recognized and discussed in Smith and Myles to the facts of the present case, the indictment, as it related to obstruction of justice, returned against Defendant on November 29, 2022, did not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction over that charge because it is not enumerated as an offense in either La.Ch.Code art. 305(A) or (B). Accordingly, the Opelousas City Court, juvenile division, was not divested of jurisdiction over that charge. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to indict and try Defendant on the charge of obstruction of justice, rendering the jury's verdict of guilty on the obstruction of justice charge null and void and without effect.

However, in reaching that determination, we emphasize that the unanimous jury verdict that found Defendant guilty of second degree murder remains unaffected because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over that offense. Defendant did not raise any errors in this court regarding the conviction and sentence for second degree murder.

DECREE

Defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice is set aside, and the twenty-five-year sentence imposed for that conviction is vacated. The district court is instructed to amend its commitment order to reflect that the conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice is vacated. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE VACATED AND SET ASIDE; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR SECOND DEGREE MURDER AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the same indictment, Defendant was also charged, tried, and convicted of second degree murder. Although Defendant has raised a jurisdictional issue regarding his conviction for obstruction of justice, his appeal does not challenge his conviction and sentence for second degree murder.

2.   We have identified Defendant by name because he was tried in adult court. We have also chosen to identify the victim, Ketravion George, by name. See La.R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a). The initials for the other minor children have been used to protect their identities. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5–2.

3.   Three other co-defendants, Coleman, Wheeler, and Green, were also charged in the same indictment. Defendant, however, was tried alone.

4.   Pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 302(4), “City courts, except where a separate juvenile court with exclusive original juvenile jurisdiction is established by law, shall have original juvenile jurisdiction for their territorial jurisdiction. This jurisdiction shall be concurrent with that of the district court.”

5.   As Defendant's appellate counsel notes in her brief, although the minutes state the district court ordered the case transferred, no written order to transfer the case is in the record. Additionally, we note that the record fails to reflect that any charges were filed against Defendant in Opelousas City Court.

6.   There is a second error patent involving the sentence imposed by the district court regarding Defendant's second degree murder conviction. Our review of the record reveals that the district court failed to state that the sentence imposed for second degree murder was to be served at hard labor as required by La.R.S. 14:30.1(B). Although the trial court minutes show that Defendant was committed to the Department of Corrections to serve his second degree murder sentence, the transcript does not reflect such statement. “When the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Womack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Although we have the discretionary authority to correct an illegally lenient sentence under La.Code Crim.P. art. 882, this court does not recognize an illegally lenient sentence if the issue has not been raised as an error. State v. Parker, 24-628 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/23/25), 416 So.3d 503. In this instance, the State has not asked this court to correct this error.