SUCCESSION OF KITE v. << (2026)

Plaintiff, Heath Alan Kite, appeals from a trial court judgment granting a motion to dismiss his petition to invalidate his grandfather's last will and testament with prejudice following his failure to amend his petition within the time set by the trial court. For the following reasons, we affirm on other grounds.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 22, 2023, Robert J. Kite executed a notarial testament in which he declared: “I, ROBERT J. KITE, ․ domiciled in Beauregard Parish, Louisiana, declare this to be my will. I revoke all of my prior wills and codicils.” Under Article I, the testament provided: “Family. I am currently single and have had only two children, namely, Robert Alan Kite, who has predeceased me, and Jeffrey D. Kite.”

The testament contained the following particular legacies: (1) cash legacies to three employees, Timothy Mayes ($400,000.00), Barbara Daffin ($400,000.00), and Myreshia Ashworth ($250,000.00), and his grandson, Kael Kite ($200,000.00); (2) the transfer of two tracts of immovable property to Grace Church of DeRidder, LA, Inc. (“Grace Church”); (3) $100,000.00 to Rosepine High School (“Rosepine”), through the Vernon Parish School Board (“VPSB”), for the establishment of a ten-year $10,000.00 annual scholarship. Regarding Mr. Kite's residuary estate, the testament stated:

3.1 Residuary Estate. All of my property that shall not pass to legatees who survive me under Article II of this will constitutes my Residuary Estate.

3.2 Residuary Legacy. I give and bequeath my Residuary Estate as follows:

(a) If Dianne Survives Me. If she shall survive me, I give my Residuary Estate to my sister, Barbara Dianne Kite Penney.

(b) If Dianne Does Not Survive Me. If my sister, Barbara Dianne Kite Penney, does not survive me, then I give and bequeath my Residuary Estate as follows:

(i) I give an undivided twenty percent (20%) of my Residuary Estate to the Board of Regents of The University of Texas System (“Board of Regents”) for the use and benefit of The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center․

(ii) I give the remaining eighty percent (80%) of my Residuary Estate in equal undivided shares to the following persons who shall survive me:

(1) Paul H. Penney

(2) Kellie Penney Blackmon

(3) Kevin P. Penney, subject to (iii) below

(4) Jason G. Penney

(5) Cynthia Kite Hall

(6) Pamela Kite Penton

(iii) If Kevin P. Penney shall be entitled to a legacy under section 3.2(b)(ii), then I hereby create and name a trust entitled the “Robert Kite Trust for Kevin Penney” and said legacy shall instead be given to the Trustee, subject to the terms and conditions of Article V of this will.

The testament appointed Mrs. Penney as the executor of Mr. Kite's estate, and further provided:

4.6 Disinherison of Jeffrey. I declare that my son, Jeffrey D. Kite, has been guilty of cruel treatment towards me, including but not limited to leaving me stranded on the side of the street, at the age of 89 years old and during the summer, in Lafayette, Louisiana, instead of taking me to my home in DeRidder, Louisiana as was intended when I entered his vehicle. It is my intention and desire that none of my property shall be given to my son, Jeffrey D. Kite, to the full extent permitted under the laws of the State of Louisiana as in effect at the time of my death, and in no event shall Jeffrey D. Kite serve as the Executor of my estate or Trustee of any trust created under this will.

Mr. Kite (“the decedent”) passed away on October 29, 2024. Two days later, Mrs. Penney filed a petition in the Succession of Robert J. Kite (“the Succession”), to have the August 22, 2023 notarial testament filed and executed and for her to be confirmed as independent executor of the Succession. That same day, the trial court ordered that the testament be filed and “given the effect of probate according to law[,]” and confirmed Mrs. Penney as independent executor.

On February 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a petition in the Succession, seeking to have the decedent's testament declared invalid and Mrs. Penney's letters of administration revoked. Named as defendants were the testament's legatees, including Mrs. Penney, in her individual capacity. Plaintiff argued that the decedent lacked the procedural capacity to execute the testament based on the following allegations:

4.

In the matter entitled “Robert J. Kite vs. Jeffrey Dale Kite, individually, and as Trustee of the Robert J. Kite Grantor Trust” bearing docket number 2023-0815 of this 36th Judicial District Court, Robert Kite sought to declare a prior Will (executed in 2021) establishing a trust invalid based upon his claims of incapacity.

5.

In his Petition (No. 2023-0815) filed October 23, 2023, Robert J. Kite alleged he had “severe limitations, including seeing, hearing and walking.” (Paragraph 4) [sic] and that “Mr. Kite is particularly vulnerable to undue influence, pressure and coercion by those he trusts” (Paragraph 5). These allegations were used to support a request to revoke a trust established in the [2021] Testament, and to revoke donations into the trust․

6.

Robert J. Kite signed a verification of the allegations contained in the Petition described in Paragraph 3 asserting they were true and correct, and thus constitute a judicial confession by Robert J. Kite as to his lack of procedural capacity when he executed the Testaments in question, that date being October 27, 2021.

Plaintiff further alleged that Mrs. Penney exerted undue influence over the decedent as evidenced by her being named the residual legatee in the testament whereas, previously, she was only to receive $750,000.00 in the decedent's March 9, and August 16, 2021 testaments.

On March 6, 2025, the Vernon Parish School Board (“School Board”), as Rosepine High School's administrator, answered Plaintiff's petition. That same day, Mrs. Penney (individually), Mr. Mayes, Ms. Ashworth, Grace Church, and Rosepine (the “Legatees”) filed a dilatory exception of vagueness and a peremptory exception of nonjoinder of indispensable parties. Noting that the decedent had disinherited Plaintiff in his five previous testaments, the Legatees argued that Plaintiff failed to place them on notice of which of the previous testaments should be probated in the event that the August 23, 2023 testament was invalidated. They further argued that Plaintiff had not named Mrs. Penney as a defendant in her capacity as the independent executor of the Succession and that Kael, Plaintiff's son, was not properly joined to the suit as Plaintiff had withheld service of process on him. The exceptions were set for hearing on April 17, 2025.

On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 508, seeking a rule to show cause hearing why the decedent's former counsel, Scott Scofield, should not be deposed and required to respond to discovery requests. Specifically, he sought information regarding “the factual material Scofield considered supported the factual allegations made relative to the competence and the susceptibility of the Decedent to ‘undue influence[ ]’ ” in the decedent's October 23, 2023 suit against Jeffrey and his wife. That same day, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking similar information from Kody Cannon, the counsel who had prepared the decedent's August 22, 2023 testament. Both of these motions were set for hearing on the same day as the Legatees’ exceptions.

On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff amended his petition to name Mrs. Penney as a defendant in her capacity as the independent executor of the Succession. He further requested service of the amended petition on all defendants, including Kael. Five days later, on April 9, Plaintiff opposed the Legatees’ exception of vagueness and argued that his amended petition cured the non-joinder issues. On April 15, the Legatees, including Mrs. Penney, individually and as independent executor of the Succession, replied to Plaintiff's opposition.

On April 16, 2025, Standard Law, LLC, through its representative, Ramon John Fonseca, Jr., filed formal proof of a claim against the Succession, alleging that it was “a creditor of the succession, for legal services rendered to Decedent's closely held businesses in the amount of $15,166.40, as more particularly detailed in” the two November 2, 2023 invoices attached as exhibits. Mr. Fonseca, individually, also filed formal proof of a claim against the Succession, stating that “[t]he total amount of Ramon John Fonseca, Jr.’s claim against the Succession of Robert J. Kite ․ is $5,000,000.00 [sic] and is based on claims raised in the matter, ‘Ramon John Fonseca, Jr. vs. Robert J. Kite, et al, 36th Judicial District Court, Beauregard Parish, Docket No. C-2024-0952[.]’ ” The suit, against the decedent and Mrs. Penney sought no less than $5,000,000.00 in “[c]ompensatory damages for defamation per se, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress[.]” Attached to the suit were copies of the decedent's March 19, 2021 and August 16, 2021 Last Wills and Testaments.

During the April 17, 2025 hearing, the Legatees’ exception of vagueness was considered first. The following colloquy occurred after Plaintiff's counsel argued that the argument by the Legatees’ counsel centered on whether Plaintiff had a cause or right of action rather than on the vagueness exception pled:

Mr. SCOFIELD:

Mr. Wright is correct. We said vagueness, and vagueness as to remedy, and we wanted him to pick a will, a previous will in which he thought - Heath believes was suitable for him to assert that that's the remedy that he should have. And in all five previous wills, Heath was disinherited.

And we do plan to file a no right of action as soon as he picks a will. And that is - I've been very clear about it in our pleadings, but rather than have the problem of going to four or five different lawyers, 508 motions on four or five different lawyers, having to get their files, having them to come in and be deposed, have their staff to be deposed, have to go and talk to other Kite family members.

And whether those wills chosen by Heath has been disinherited would have other Kite members object to that will for whatever reason, undue influence or whatever else they can think of. I think as a matter of – for us to be able to prepare our defense and in an economic fashion at the very least, they should pick a will.

And once they do that, we will file a motion for no right of action, if the facts suit it. But until he does that and complies with his remedy, which is part of his cause of action, I think the Court has the discretion to make him do that, and we ask him to do that to save money. And that's our main problem.

And so that is my objection, and I think we've attached the Wills to our pleadings, and I move to introduce those and —

MR. WRIGHT:

I object to those, Your Honor, they are not original copies, and they are not verified or authenticated.

MR. SCOFIELD:

Well, --

MR. WRIGHT:

Your Honor, the only will at issue is the one which this Court has probated.

THE COURT:

No, sir. that is not true.

MR. WRIGHT:

The Court has to address the issue of whether or not that will is appropriate. If the Court decides that the will is valid, all the rest of this is irrelevant.

So, the first issue is, is that will be [sic] invalid for one of the reasons that for which the code and jurisprudence gives someone a right to contest it. That's the first issue, which was have [sic] raised that issue as the fact that that will may well be based upon allegations made by Mr. Scofield, and he had verified by Mr. Kite.

As a result of that, if that is the case, yes, we will get to the next step. What is the appropriate after [sic] that? Are any of those wills - are there any Wills [sic] that are - any of the original wills available? If they're not available, are there circumstances where a copy could be probated, but those issues have not arisen?

THE COURT:

Would you like to look at the original wills because I think they are being waived right here. So, if you'd like to take a few minutes to look at those, and then we will go from there.

But let me say this, okay. Ya'll might have all the time in the world to litigate this matter, and all the time to build this matter, but in the efficiency of this Court, I am not going to piece mill [sic] this case together to allow ya'll to continue this sort of matter.

What I'm going to do is say, that you do have to say what will you are doing next. What will do you want next, because otherwise we're wasting our time here. If this will -

MR. WRIGHT:

Well, --

THE COURT:

- I'm talking. If this will is found to be invalid, then we go to the next will, and your client has no standing, and we've wasted the Court's time, we've wasted money, we've wasted all kinds of things. Money on you, money on Mr. Scofield, and your client's money. And I will not allow that to happen.

I understand - unfortunately, the legacy that Mr. Kite apparently has left is one of litigation. That is unfortunate for everyone here today. But I do think, and I will cut to the chase because I have read everything, for the last month I've read everything.

Everything [sic] in all these cases keeps coming and coming in because all of you want to litigate, but you have got to claim what will because I am not wasting my time if your client has no standing in any of the next wills.

Do you understand?

MR. WRIGHT:

I understand that, and he might also have -

THE COURT:

I note your objection to the record. And I know -

MR. WRIGHT:

He might also -

THE COURT:

And I note -

MR. WRIGHT:

I apologize; I thought you were finished.

THE COURT:

Go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. WRIGHT:

He would also have the opportunity if he was disinterested in a will that was next to contest that.

THE COURT:

And you are to say why he's to do that. So, you are going to have to lay out in your petition and it is the order of the Court that you're going to have to say in your petition, that in the event this will was found to be invalid, then why the next will is invalid, and the next will, all the way back to 2013. And that is going to be the order of the Court.

I'm not going to waste a lot of time on this because I've you're your memorandums. I've read everything you've written, and I understand the position that both of you are in. But I also know that you're not going to waste this court's [sic] time. I am not going to play that game. Both of you can do it all you want, but I'm going to order that in the next thirty days you amend your pleadings, and you state in your pleading what it is that you want - what will it is that you believe should be next and why it's invalid.

During the hearing, the trial court allowed Mrs. Penney's counsel, Mr. Cannon to file the decedent's following original testaments and codicils into the record: a December 28, 2015 testament, including a June 14, 2016 confirmation and ratification, and three codicils, dated December 29, 2017, June 29, 2018, and February 28, 2019; and an April 17, 2020 testament. The trial court also noted that Mr. Fonseca had ten days to file any prior testaments in his firm's possession into the record. Thereafter, on April 30, 2025, he filed three original testaments, dated December 17, 2021; August 16, 2021; and October 17, 2022, into the record.

After allowing Plaintiff's counsel time to review the testaments introduced by Mr. Cannon, it issued the following oral ruling:¹

So, the order of the Court is that you have 30 days to amend your pleading and name what will it is that you wish to intend to [sic] have probated in lieu of the will that you are attacking and to provide reasons for that. Until that is done, I think everything else pending in this matter is premature.

On May 29, 2025, the Legatees moved to dismiss Plaintiff's petition pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 933(B), due to his failure to comply with the trial court's order that he amend his petition. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for August 11, 2025. On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a supplemental petition, alleging:

11.

Petitioner alleges that the Decedent, Robert John Kite, entered into a Consent Judgment dated April 4, 2024, in the matter entitled Robert J. Kite vs. Jeffrey Dale Kite, et al[.], bearing docket number 2023-0815-A, which this Court is requested to take judicial notice of pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 201, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as though written herein in extenso as Exhibit “ 1.”

12.

Pursuant to Paragraph XII of the Consent Judgment, the Decedent, Robert John Kite, is asserting the revocation of all prior wills and testaments, and the estate is judicially estopped from asserting the validity of any will prior to the August 22, 2023 testament.

13.

This renders the estate of the decedent to be intestate based upon the invalidation of the August 23, 2023 testament either for incapacity or undue influence invalidating the appointment of Barbara Dianne Kite Penney as Independent Executrix requiring that she be discharged as not being appointed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 3396.5, as none of the intestate heirs have consented to her appointment.

The Legatees opposed Plaintiff's supplemental petition on August 7, 2025, arguing that Plaintiff failed to “list any prior Wills that should instead be probated as required by the Court in April 2025.” The Legatees also argued that Plaintiff's claim that the decedent died intestate because the consent judgment's language revoked “all previous Wills[,]” was a “misrepresentation because the Consent Judgment only stated that Mr. Kite had the mental capacity to revoke prior Wills if he chose to do so.” Finally, the Legatees argued that Plaintiff was “not named as a beneficiary or executor in any of Mr. Kite's previous six wills, including the 2023 Will, where the Consent Judgment specifically found Mr. Kite to be competent to execute it, and that the 2023 Will complied with all state and federal laws.” Thus, the Legatees reasserted their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition for failure to comply with the trial court's April 17, 2025 order.

During the August 21, 2025 hearing on the motion, counsel for the Legatees argued that Plaintiff's petition should be dismissed with prejudice based on his failure to comply with the trial court's order to amend his petition within the time allowed by naming the particular testament he wished to have probated.

Counsel for Plaintiff argued that absent a finding regarding the decedent's testamentary capacity to execute the August 23, 2025 testament, he was unable to identify the next testament to be probated. He claimed that if the trial court were to find that the decedent lacked the capacity to execute the testament, then it would have to determine when the decedent's incapacity began. He stated that if the trial court found that the decedent had capacity and was not under undue influence, then the August 23 testament would be valid. He further argued that if the trial court found that the decedent did have capacity to execute the August 23 testament, then that testament revoked all of his prior testaments and codicils; but if Mrs. Penney was found to have exerted undue influence over the decedent, then the decedent would have died intestate based on the above revocation, and Plaintiff, as a direct-line descendent through his father, Robert Alan Kite, would have an interest in the decedent's succession.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court orally ruled as follows:

It is the opinion of the Court, that at the prior hearing, I ordered Mr. Wright to state specifically that in the event that the last Will, as probated by Robert Kite, was thrown out, what Will would he rely on? He never has identified that. I fail to see how the judgment and settlement documents change that in any form or fashion.

It is the opinion of the Court that if the Will is thrown out, either for capacity or undue influence, that either way the entirety of the Will is thrown out and we go back to the prior Will, which his client still has no standing. In fact, I think we would have to go back four or five Wills, I don't recall at this time, before his client would have the right to be here.

So, at this point and time [sic], the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss is correct. I will order a judgment to be prepared, and I will state on the record that Mr. Wright has failed to identify the Will. And in your circumstance, that the Court finds, in [sic] the entirety of the Will is thrown out for capacity or undue influence, we would still need to know what Will he relies on and where he finds the authority for his client to have that right of action as filed herein.

He's failed to show that, so at this time, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

The trial court further held that the petition was dismissed with prejudice, stating, “Well, I think it's with prejudice because, otherwise, you can come back and go through this with another defendant, another heir of Mr. Jeff Kite, who seeks that, or someone else. And, furthermore, I just think that we need to resolve this issue and move forward for all parties.”

Judgment was rendered on September 10, 2025, granting the Legatees’ motion to dismiss and dismissing Plaintiff's petition with prejudice. The trial court further rendered written reasons for judgment on September 24, 2025. Regarding the dismissal with prejudice, the trial court stated:

Heath Kite, [sic] failed to amend his petition to claim which testament of Robert Kite he sought to enforce in a timely manner. [Specifically] the 30 days ordered by this court. There being no valid amendment that could defeat the vagueness exception, the motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice at the cost of the Mover, Health Alan Kite.

Counsel for Heath Kite requested the matter be without prejudice, but this court believes in the efficiency of judicial economy and to allow the legatees, several of which are non-profits, to move forward, without on-going [sic] costly litigation, the matter was dismissed with prejudice.

It is from this judgment that Plaintiff perfected the appeal before us. Herein, Plaintiff raises one assignment of error: “The Trial Court erred in dismissing the claims of Heath Kite with prejudice.” The issue presented by Plaintiff for review states: “The Trial Court committed legal error by granting the exception of vagueness and dismissing appellant's petition with prejudice.” (All caps changed to sentence case.)

However, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), we notice sua sponte that the record fails to disclose that Plaintiff has a right or interest to maintain an action to annul the testament as he is neither a legatee nor a succession representative of the decedent's succession. Accordingly, we need not address Plaintiff's assignment of error.

OPINION

“[A] peremptory exception of no right of action may be noticed by either the trial or appellate court sua sponte where the record supports such an action.” Gorum v. La. Hosp. Ass'n Emp. Benefit Tr., 95-468, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 664 So.2d 662, 664. “The exception of no right of action is appropriate procedurally when questioning whether a plaintiff has any interest in judicially enforcing a right.” Gannett River States Publ'g Corp. v. Landry, 22-452, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/22/23), 363 So.3d 580, 584, writ denied, 23-580 (La. 6/21/23), 363 So.3d 258.

In In re Succession of Guidry, 06-1089, pp. 1-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 945 So.2d 187, 188-89 (last two alterations in original), this court stated:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 681 states: “Except as otherwise provided by law, an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts.” A persons [sic] who is not an heir of the testator can not [sic] maintain an action to annul the testator's will. Succession of Gardiner, 366 So.2d 1065 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writs denied, 369 So.2d 154, and 369 So.2d 156 (La. 1979); Succession of Wilson, 210 So.2d 602 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ refused, 252 La. 83 8, 214 So.2d 162 (La. 1968), appeal dismissed, certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 713, 89 S.Ct. 1465, 22 L.Ed.2d 673, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 713, 89 S.Ct. 1470, 22 L.Ed.2d 764.

In Estate of Mallet v. Mallet, 527 So.2d 30 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 528 So.2d 155 (La.1988)[,] we stated the following:

C.C.P. art. 2972 provides:

“ART. 2972. OPPOSITIONS

An opposition to the petition, motion, or other application of a party to a succession proceeding for an order or judgment of the court shall be in writing and be filed within the delay allowed. It shall comply with the provisions of Articles 853 through 863; shall state the name, surname, and domicile of the opponent; shall allege the interest of opponent in filing the opposition, and the grounds for opposing the petition, motion, or other application; and shall conclude with a prayer for appropriate relief.”

For one to be allowed to oppose a succession proceeding, one must have a justiciable interest in doing so. One must therefore be able to benefit from the attack. Succession of Kilpatrick, 356 So.2d 1083 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1978), writ denied[,] 359 So.2d 198 (La. 1978), appeal after remand, 422 So.2d 464 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1982), writ denied[,] 429 So.2d 126 (La. 1983). The interest may come in the form of being named as executor of the estate, see Kilpatrick, supra, or as attorney for a succession, see Succession of Pope, 230 La. 1049, 89 So.2d 894 (La. 1956), or gaining an interest as an heir or legatee.

In the case sub judice, Gail Guidry would neither inherit nor share in any inheritance from the testator, her father, even if the testament were annulled. The Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the exception of no right of action in Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-0612, pp. 6-7 (La.3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1216-17:

[T]he focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit.

․

The function of an exception of no right of action is a determination of whether plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 927; Turner v. Busby, 03-3444, p. 4 (La.9/9/04), 883 So.2d 412, 415. The exception of no right of action serves to question whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id.

Inasmuch as she would not gain an interest as an heir of the legatee, she does not belong to “the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”

During the August 21, 2025 hearing, counsel for Plaintiff introduced the entire succession record into the record, which included the decedent's prior testaments dating back to 2015. In his December 28, 2015 testament, the decedent named Plaintiff the income and principal beneficiary of a testamentary trust established in the amount of $800,000.00 unless his wife and Mrs. Penney both certified in writing within ninety days to the executor of his succession that Plaintiff “did not have a loving, active relationship with me in the years preceding my death[.]” Plaintiff is not mentioned in the decedent's first codicil to the testament, dated December 29, 2017. However, the second codicil, dated June 29, 2018, states that “Article VIII is amended by removing reference to Louisiana College and my grandchild HEATH, it being my intention that neither should inherit from me.” The third codicil, dated February 28, 2019, states:

It is my intent not to bequeath and not to leave anything to SHARON JOHNSON KITE or to my grandson HEATH or to Louisiana College and that they shall not inherit from me. My Last Will and Testament, as supplemented and amended by codicils should be read to further this directive.

Thereafter, the next four testaments, dated, April 17, 2020, August 16, 2021, December 17, 2021, and October 17, 2022, state:

To the extent my express, absolute desire to effect the above bequests is somehow thwarted, and just cause must be shown for me to disinherit my grandson, HEATH KITE, I declare that I have just cause to disinherit HEATH KITE because, among other cruel acts, he has failed to appropriately communicate with me for extended periods. It is my intent that my disinheriting of my grandson, HEATH KITE, be absolute.

The decedent did not name Plaintiff as an heir in the August 23, 2023 testament, and he specifically disinherited Plaintiff in his four previous testaments and his December 28, 2015 testament, as amended by his June 29, 2018 Second Codicil, and his February 28, 2018 Third Codicil. Thus, even if the August 22, 2023 testament were annulled, Plaintiff would not inherit anything from the decedent. As he is also not an heir of any of the legatees listed in the decedent's testament, he is not “a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the” decedent's succession. Badeaux v. Sw. Comput. Bureau, Inc., 05-612, p. 7 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1217.

Accordingly, we sustain the peremptory exception of no right of action raised on our own motion and find that Plaintiff has no standing to contest the decedent's testament. Thus, we pretermit consideration of Plaintiff's assignment of error.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, we sustain the peremptory exception of no right of action, raised sua sponte, finding that Heath Alan Kite has no right or interest in contesting the decedent's August 22, 2023 testament. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons stated, and the petition of Heath Alan Kite is dismissed with prejudice. The costs of this appeal are assessed to Heath Alan Kite.

AFFIRMED ON OTHER GROUNDS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record contains no written order of the trial court's oral ruling.

KYZAR, judge.