STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JADEN MICHAEL ARDOIN (2026)

Defendant Jaden Michael Ardoin was indicted on March 28, 2022, with the first degree murder of Wade Shaquille Vaughn-Smith ¹ , in violation of La.R.S. 14:30, and the attempted first degree murder of James Preston Allen Vaughn, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30. Jaiman Maurice Mason was also indicted with identical charges and the trial court consolidated the two cases.² The two cases were tried jointly, with the jury trial commencing on June 25, 2025. On June 30, 2025, a unanimous jury found both defendants guilty as charged. Defendant filed a Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial, which were denied by the trial court following a hearing on October 20, 2025. Defendant was then sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the first degree murder of Mr. Vaughn-Smith and thirty years at hard labor without benefit or parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the attempted first degree murder of Mr. Vaughn. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant has appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On February 15, 2022, law enforcement received several 911 calls with reports that shots had been fired at a vehicle and that the vehicle had run off the road, crashed into a tree, and caught fire. At trial, the State played for the jury three 911 calls which had been recorded by the St. Landry Parish Communications District 911 Center on the night of February 15, 2022.

The first 911 call was received at 7:27 p.m. and was placed by Suzanne Bellow. She claimed to have heard shots being fired at a vehicle that then ended up off the road by a cemetery near her house on Highway 105. In the background, the caller can be heard arguing with a male who claimed that someone shot the vehicle and that the vehicle swerved off the road. Ms. Bellow relayed that it sounded like multiple shots were fired while two cars were passing her house, then one of the cars appeared to go off the road shortly thereafter. She noted that the second car “kept driving off.”

The second 911 call, also from Ms. Bellow, was received at 7:31 p.m. She called back to report that the vehicle that went off the road was “now on fire.” As Ms. Bellow was describing the location to the fire department and walking towards the burning vehicle, she stopped and exclaimed, “Shit, it's exploding.” When asked to identify the vehicle, Ms. Bellow asked a male what type of truck the vehicle was and he identified it as “a 1998 Chevy Silverado—it's Wade's.” Ms. Bellow informed the dispatcher that she believed one of the individuals in the truck was Wade Vaughn-Smith. She stated that one person was out of the vehicle but that the other remained in the burning truck.

The third 911 call was received at 7:32 p.m. while Ms. Bellow was still on the phone with a different operator. The caller, Paige Coburn, reported that a vehicle had crashed into a tree, someone was still inside the vehicle, and another individual was on the ground nearby. The 911 dispatcher relayed to law enforcement that there were two people in the vehicle.

The State then called Christine Marie Vaughn Smith, the mother of the two victims. She testified that in February of 2022, her sons, Wade and James, were twenty and twenty-two years old, respectively. They were both living with her in Melville, Louisiana, at the time of the shooting.

Mary Dupont testified next. She was nineteen on February 15, 2022, and was temporarily staying with her grandparents because they all had Covid. Ms. Dupont testified that on the night of the shooting, she needed to run an errand. As she was outside walking to her car, she heard “a bunch of gunshots.” She stated that hearing gunshots was not uncommon in that area, so she continued about her business. As she approached Highway 105 from a side road, she “saw Jaden's car pass.” According to Ms. Dupont, she saw Defendant in the car because the window was going up and she noted that the car was heading north on Highway 105 towards Melville. Ms. Dupont then proceeded to her mother's home nearby before receiving a message from her friend that Wade Vaughn-Smith was dead. Ms. Dupont testified that at the time of the incident, Mr. Vaughn-Smith was her “on and off again boyfriend” and that she was pregnant with his child. After speaking with her father, Ms. Dupont informed Chief Susie Snyder of the Krotz Springs Police Department that she had seen Defendant shortly after hearing the gunshots.

On cross-examination, Ms. Dupont clarified that she saw Defendant driving the car but could not see anyone else. She also testified that she heard “a lot” of gunshots but could not tell where the shots occurred.

The State's next witness was Captain Cody Richard of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office Patrol Division. Captain Richard testified that he was on active patrol duty on February 15, 2022, and responded to the report of a burning truck on Highway 105 at 7:29 p.m. He described the scene as “quite chaotic” upon arrival, noting that the fire department was already on site as well as members of the Krotz Springs Police Department. Once on scene, Captain Richard was informed by the fire department that one individual had burned in the vehicle and that a second individual, identified as James Vaughn, had managed to escape.

Captain Richard spoke briefly with Mr. Vaughn in the ambulance at the crime scene. He testified that Mr. Vaughn was struggling due to his injuries but was able to talk. According to Captain Richard, Mr. Vaughn told him he was riding with his brother, Wade Vaughn-Smith, and that they were being following by “J.D.” before being shot at by someone in a brown Toyota car. Mr. Vaughn told Captain Richard that Mr. Vaughn-Smith left the road after the shooting started, at which time the truck struck a tree and caught on fire. Captain Richard was unable to get any additional information from Mr. Vaughn at the scene due to Mr. Vaughn's injuries.

After speaking with Mr. Vaughn, Captain Richard noted that the fire department had put out the vehicle fire, so he conducted a visual inspection of the truck, finding “it to be a Chevrolet pickup truck with a Louisiana license plate.” He noticed “two entry holes that were consistent with that of bullet projectile entry holes” on the truck's tailgate. He subsequently found a pair of .223 shell casings and a 9mm shell casing on Highway 105.³ Captain Richard testified that he marked the casings but did not recover them. He instead contacted the on-call detective and began securing the scene.

The State then called Detective Samuel Tidwell, Jr., of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office Criminal Investigation Division, who testified that he had been a crime scene technician for about four years. Detective Tidwell testified that he was called out to the crime scene on Highway 105 between Krotz Springs and Melville. He described the scene as secure despite the large crime scene area and the large number of people nearby. Detective Tidwell noted that the truck had struck a utility pole before ultimately crashing into a tree.

Detective Tidwell had taken photographs of the crime scene, which he identified at trial. He testified that one of the photographs showed that one of the bullets that hit the tailgate of the truck went all the way through the tailgate. He further testified that he collected the three shell casings from Highway 105 and a cell phone found at the scene on the night of the incident but noted that the inside of the vehicle was not searched until after a warrant was obtained.

Assistant Chief Nolan Noel of the Krotz Springs Police Department was the next witness. He testified that upon arriving at the Krotz Springs police station that night, he learned that other officers had identified Defendant as a person of interest. He knew that Defendant lived at “Perry's Apartments,” and immediately went to the apartment complex to apprehend Defendant. Assistant Chief Noel testified that when he arrived at Defendant's apartment, an individual who identified himself as “Buddha” opened the door and informed him that Defendant was “right there on the couch.”⁴ Assistant Chief Noel then stepped into the apartment, detained Defendant, and searched the couch on which he had been sitting. He then walked Defendant outside and handed him over to the detectives who were investigating the shooting. At that time, Assistant Chief Noel did not have any information that “Buddha” might be a suspect, and so he was not detained.

Assistant Chief Noel further testified that he returned to the scene of the crash later that night between midnight and 1:00 a.m., at which time the scene was clear. While walking along the side of the road, Assistant Chief Noel found five shell casings in the grass on the east side of Highway 105, which was where the emergency vehicles had been parked when responding to the accident. He noted that the casings were easy to find at night because the metallic shells reflected the light from the flashlight. Assistant Chief Noel testified that he found the shell casings “right before the skid marks that went off to the side.” He estimated that the distance from the casings to the skid marks was between fifteen and twenty-five yards. On cross-examination, Assistant Chief Noel testified that he believed the shell casings he recovered were .223/5.56 casings.

The State's next witness was Officer Austin Lee, who, at the time of the incident, was employed by the Port Barre Police Department. Officer Lee was present when Defendant's co-defendant, Jaiman Mason a.k.a “Buddha,” was arrested on February 17, 2022, pursuant to a warrant which had been issued in connection with the investigation of the shooting. Officer Lee identified for the State his body camera footage of the arrest, as well as a second body camera video showing him returning to the area where Mr. Mason was arrested to retrieve a firearm from under a bush in front of the residence where Mr. Mason had been handcuffed. The second body camera video was taken approximately ten minutes after Mr. Mason was arrested. According to Officer Lee, after Mr. Mason's arrest, the residents called and reported a firearm in the bushes in front of their home. Officer Lee testified that the firearm was in bushes roughly twenty feet from where Mr. Mason was arrested. He then identified for the State the firearm recovered from the bushes, which was identified as an SAR 9mm. Officer Lee also identified the iPhone taken from Mr. Mason during his arrest, which was then turned into the evidence locker.

The State then called Kyle Mayes, a DNA analyst with the Acadiana Crime Lab. Initially, Mr. Mayes was accepted as an expert in the field of DNA analysis. He was subsequently also accepted as an expert in TrueAllele analysis. After noting that there was insufficient DNA to recover a profile from the cartridge cases recovered during the investigation, Mr. Mayes explained that was “not uncommon․ Typically because of the intense heat that happens when the cartridge is fired from the gun it erases a lot of DNA present, so we typically do not have a lot of success of obtaining DNA profiles from cartridge cases.”

Mr. Mayes was then questioned about a DNA swab taken from the SAR 9mm recovered by Officer Lee at the scene of Mr. Mason's arrest. He noted that the DNA swab contained a mixed sample of DNA from at least two individuals. TrueAllele analysis indicated that one of the indicators was likely Mr. Mason. However, Defendant was excluded as a contributor.

Dr. Christopher Tape, the coroner for St. Tammany Parish, testified next. He was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Tape conducted the autopsy on Mr. Vaughn-Smith. He testified that Mr. Vaughn-Smith's body was “almost entirely burned” and had a bullet in his head that did not exit. Regarding the bullet wound, Dr. Tape noted “there's a bullet I recovered from within the brain on the right side of the head, so if you look at the trajectory based on the head, it's going back to front, it's going left to right and it was not really going upward or downward.” He further testified that “the gunshot wound is clearly the cause of death,” but that the higher levels of carbon monoxide present in Mr. Vaughn-Smith's body indicated that “he's probably alive at least a little bit breathing smoke.”

The State then called Captain Lynette Chevis of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office. She testified that her primary involvement in the investigation was collecting evidence. This included helping Detective Mark LeBlanc search Defendant's car, a brown Toyota Corolla, on February 16, 2022. She identified a firearms brochure from Diamondback Arms and a Glock 9mm gun case which were recovered from the car.

The State's next witness was Detective Mark LeBlanc of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office, who assisted Detective Donald Thompson with the search of Mr. Vaughn-Smith's burned truck. Detective LeBlanc testified that he inspected the two holes in the tailgate of the truck. While one bullet went completely through the tailgate, the other bullet made a prominent dent on the inside of the tailgate “indicating that the projectile or possible parts of the projectile may still be contained within the tailgate.” Detective LeBlanc further noted that they recovered a .223/5.56 shell casing from the inside of Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck. However, he noted that the primer on the shell had not been struck, so the round likely combusted from the heat of the fire, not from being fired by a weapon. Detective LeBlanc stated that there was no evidence that any firearms were in Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck at the time it burned. On cross-examination, Detective LeBlanc indicated that he found no evidence that the bullet that went through the tailgate actually entered the cab of the truck.

The State then called Detective Amber Robin of the Krotz Springs Police Department. She testified that she was sent to collect surveillance footage of the night of the incident from a Texaco station on Highway 190, a nearby Exxon station, and Billy's, which was a business on the opposite side of Highway 190 facing the Texaco station. Detective Robin further identified surveillance footage taken from a park across from Defendant's apartment, as well as a map showing the locations of the businesses from which she gathered surveillance.

James Vaughn, the victim in the attempted first degree murder charge, was then called by the State. He testified that on February 15, 2022, he and his brother, Mr. Vaughn-Smith, were both at home in Melville after work when they decided to get something to eat in Krotz Springs. They took Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck to a Canal Station that served food.  ⁵ Surveillance footage introduced into evidence showed the brothers arriving at the Canal station around 6:19 p.m. According to Mr. Vaughn, after he and his brother ordered food, Mr. Vaughn-Smith went into the store portion of the station to buy Black and Mild cigars. However, he did not buy the cigars because the female employee told him not to talk to her. Mr. Vaughn-Smith returned to the dining area where the brothers spoke with a relative before eating. Mr. Vaughn testified that after eating, he and Mr. Vaughn-Smith left the Canal station to head to the Exxon station next door so Mr. Vaughn-Smith could buy his cigars. The Exxon station and the Canal station share a large parking lot; thus, the brothers never left the parking lot when they went from one station to the other.

Surveillance footage from the Exxon station showed Mr. Vaughn-Smith dropping Mr. Vaughn off by the front door of the Exxon before parking his truck. The footage then shows Mr. Vaughn exiting the store and talking with a cousin who was getting gas. Mr. Vaughn-Smith was shown having a conversation beside his truck with another individual who had also exited the Exxon. Mr. Vaughn testified that this individual eventually pointed out to Mr. Vaughn-Smith and Mr. Vaughn that there was a car parked nearby and that he thought the occupants of that car were watching the brothers. Mr. Vaughn noted that the vehicle was a brown Toyota car with the windows partially down. He saw one person in the front seat whom he recognized as Defendant, “white guy, red hair, he had a um, tattoo on his neck.” The two of them had worked together briefly at Billy's “for about a week,” and Mr. Vaughn knew Defendant by his nickname, “J.D.” Mr. Vaughn testified that no words were exchanged between them that night and Defendant drove off.

Mr. Vaughn testified that he and Mr. Vaughn-Smith then left the Exxon station and headed north on Highway 105 toward their home in Melville. At a stop sign, Mr. Vaughn noticed the same brown Toyota was in front of them also heading towards Melville. Once on Highway 105, the Toyota was in front, with Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck behind the Toyota, and a white car behind the truck. Mr. Vaughn testified that they drove behind the Toyota for about five to seven minutes when Mr. Vaughn had a weird feeling and suggested Mr. Vaughn-Smith pass the Toyota so they could hurry home. According to Mr. Vaughn, he had never seen Defendant in Melville before.

Mr. Vaughn-Smith passed the Toyota on Highway 105 and was driving normally for a couple of minutes when Mr. Vaughn noticed that the white car had turned off the highway, leaving only the truck and the Toyota. According to Mr. Vaughn, “[i]mmediately right after I noticed - - noticed that um, shots started um, going off,” and the back window of the truck shattered. Mr. Vaughn turned to warn his brother to duck; however, Mr. Vaughn-Smith appeared to be shot. The truck then veered off the highway and crashed into a tree in Amy Thompson's front yard. When the truck veered off the road, the Toyota “kept going straight towards Melville.” After they crashed into the tree, the truck immediately caught on fire.

Mr. Vaughn testified that he did not remember how he was able to get out of the truck. He recalled trying to pull himself up on the tire of the truck to check on his brother but fell twice. He then realized that his left arm and right leg would not work. Mr. Vaughn was pulled away from the burning truck by a man and woman who then tried to check on Mr. Vaughn-Smith. Mr. Vaughn learned later while in the ambulance that his brother had died and “I just passed out.” He did not recall speaking to law enforcement at the scene or in the ambulance but remembered speaking with someone at the hospital before he went into surgery. Mr. Vaughn did recall picking out Defendant in a photographic lineup that he was shown at the hospital and identifying Defendant as the person who did the shooting. He again noted that “I only know him as JD.”

Mr. Vaughn testified he did not see anyone else in the Toyota while on the highway, noting that when he and Mr. Vaughn-Smith passed the Toyota, the windows were rolled up and had dark tint. Mr. Vaughn testified that he had no idea why anyone would want to shoot him or his brother. He further testified that neither he nor Mr. Vaughn-Smith had a firearm in the truck and he had no idea why there would be a shell inside the cab of the truck, although he noted that Mr. Vaughn-Smith would often give people rides when they needed one. According to Mr. Vaughn, he and his brother talked about everything, and Mr. Vaughn-Smith never mentioned having any kind of negative altercation or interaction with Defendant.

On cross-examination, it was noted that Mr. Vaughn knew Mr. Mason's brother and had cut both Mr. Mason's and his brother's hair. Mr. Vaughn testified that he did not recall seeing Mr. Mason at the Canal station, the Exxon station, or at any other point on February 15, 2022. Mr. Vaughn confirmed that he did not remember telling law enforcement at the scene that Defendant was the shooter; however, he testified that he did identify the shooter at the hospital. Mr. Vaughn also testified that he knew the female employee at the Canal station who asked Mr. Vaughn-Smith not to talk to her, but that neither he nor Mr. Vaughn-Smith knew her beyond the fact that she worked at the store because they often saw her there. Prior to the shooting, he had never had contact with the employee outside of seeing her when she was at work. Mr. Vaughn again confirmed that he was friends with Mr. Mason's brother in high school, and, because of that relationship, Mr. Mason would have known exactly where Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Vaughn-Smith lived.

The State's next witness was Kane Roy. Mr. Roy testified that he had met Defendant a few times through a mutual friend, Earl Atkins, whom he referred to as E.J. He did not know who Mr. Mason was. According to Mr. Roy, he had spent time with Defendant on two or three occasions, but always with Mr. Atkins. Mr. Roy testified that on February 15, 2022, he was living in Eunice. He recalled picking up Mr. Atkins prior to 5:00 p.m. on that day in Krotz Springs because they then returned to Eunice to pick up Mr. Roy's girlfriend from work. After they picked up his girlfriend, they arrived home no later than 6:00 p.m. and remained there the rest of the night with Mr. Atkins.

Reviewing surveillance footage of Defendant's apartment taken from the park across the street, Mr. Roy was asked to identify his vehicle outside the apartment complex. The video showed Mr. Roy and his girlfriend's little girl waiting on Mr. Atkins to walk over from his house at 4:47 p.m. Mr. Roy testified that after leaving to go to Eunice, neither he nor Mr. Atkins returned to Krotz Springs, Port Barre, or Melville on February 15, 2022.

The State then called Dakoa Matte, Mr. Roy's girlfriend. Ms. Matte testified that she got off work at 5:00 p.m. on February 15, 2022, and that Mr. Roy and Mr. Atkins picked her up. She believed that they spent the remainder of the night at her and Mr. Roy's home. Ms. Matte testified that that she had only met Defendant once and did not know who Mr. Mason was.

The State's next witness was Detective Donald Thompson of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office. He testified that on February 15, 2022, he was the on-call detective and was assigned to the shooting-turned-vehicle crash on Highway 105. Detective Thompson testified that it was about 8:30 p.m. when he arrived at the crime scene. He estimated that there were already about thirty people at the scene, between law enforcement, first responders, family of the victims, and passing motorists. At the scene, he was presented with a 9mm shell casing and a pair of .223/5.56 casings. He noted that .223 and 5.56 refer to essentially the same size shell. He further noted that the shell casings were fresh, not smashed or impacted by traffic, and not discolored by sun or weather.

Detective Thompson testified that Chief Susie Snyder of the Krotz Springs Police Department was already on site when he arrived. She informed Detective Thompson that Defendant and Mr. Mason were suspects. Detective Thompson spoke briefly with Mr. Vaughn while Mr. Vaughn was in the ambulance:

I - - I went to the door uh, little side door of the ambulance and I looked at him and kind of asked him a little bit you know what happened, you know who done this and all - - he was still in and out I'm gonna say, but he was saying man, J.D., J.D., J.D. and I left it alone because I hadn't gathered information from others before I approached the ambulance․

Detective Thompson also spoke with Ms. Dupont, who gave him Defendant's name and a description of Defendant's car.

Detective Thompson testified that Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck was towed to an impound storage building. After obtaining a search warrant, a thorough search of the truck was conducted the following day, including the recovery of a bullet fragment from inside the tailgate.

After the truck had been towed from the scene, Detective Thompson and Chief Snyder went to the Texaco/Canal station to speak with Makayla Atkins, whom they understood was Defendant's girlfriend. She confirmed that she had a relationship with Defendant. Detective Thompson testified that he asked Makayla to come into the Sheriff's office because he needed to speak with her further. She followed through with that request and gave them additional information.

Detective Thompson further testified that he spoke with Mr. Mason the night Defendant was arrested. However, Mr. Mason was not arrested at that time because Detective Thompson wanted to gather additional evidence. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued for Mr. Mason, who, as noted above, was arrested by the Porte Barre Police Department on February 17, 2022.

Detective Thompson noted that during the investigation, a firearm was recovered from Earl Atkins, the brother of Makayla Atkins and a friend of Defendant. The weapon was not submitted to the crime lab for any testing. Detective Thompson further noted that, when questioned, Mr. Atkins verified that the gun case found in Defendant's car belonged to him and acknowledged that he had been with Defendant earlier in the day on February 15, 2022.

On cross-examination, Detective Thompson acknowledged that nothing at the crime scene initially indicated that Mr. Mason had been present. Detective Thompson also testified that he was not concerned with searching for additional shell casings initially and that he was not sure how far from the crime scene the shells found by Assistant Chief Noel were located. Detective Thompson verified that Ms. Atkins told him she saw the victims and Defendant at the Texaco station where she worked the night of the shooting, and that although she saw Mr. Mason that night, she did not know if he left with Defendant.

Detective Thompson acknowledged that in his Affidavit for Probable Cause for an arrest warrant, the summary of evidence against Mr. Mason was that he was with Defendant before and after the shooting, failed to render aid, and failed to report the shooting. He additionally acknowledged that he was unaware that Mr. Mason had a SAR 9mm until it was recovered in the bushes of the yard where Mr. Mason was arrested. Detective Thompson testified that when questioned by law enforcement, Earl Atkins stated that Defendant owned a Diamondback AR-15 and an SAR 9mm. Mr. Atkins also told them that he was close friends with Defendant and that he had hung out with Defendant earlier on the day of the shooting. Detective Thompson affirmed that Mr. Atkins claimed that he did not know Mr. Mason “to play with guns.” Detective Thompson testified that he had no evidence placing Mr. Atkins with Defendant at the time of the shooting, despite Mr. Atkins’ gun case being found in Defendant's car.

On redirect examination, Detective Thompson noted that Mr. Roy identified Mr. Mason as being at Defendant's apartment when Mr. Roy picked up Mr. Atkins between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on the day of the shooting. Additionally, there was surveillance footage from the night of the shooting showing Mr. Mason with Defendant at the service station.

The State's next witness was Earl Atkins, Makayla Atkins’ older brother and Defendant's friend. Mr. Atkins testified that he had known Defendant for about five or six years at the time of trial. According to Mr. Atkins, on February 15, 2022, he was at Defendant's and Ms. Atkins’ home at the Perry Apartments playing video games. At the time, he lived with his mother within walking distance of the apartments. Mr. Atkins testified that he did not stay with Defendant all day, noting that he went to Mr. Roy's home in Eunice. He further testified that while he was at Defendant's apartment that day, Defendant, Mr. Mason, Mr. Roy, and Mr. Roy's girlfriend's daughter were also at the apartment. Mr. Atkins identified Mr. Mason as “Buddha” and stated that he knew Mr. Mason because of his friendship with Defendant.

When questioned about Defendant's and Mr. Mason's relationship, Mr. Atkins testified that they knew each other from school and hung out together “[a] couple of times a week.” He noted that he only hung out with Mr. Mason when Defendant was also with them. Mr. Atkins testified that when he and Mr. Roy left the apartment complex around 4:00 p.m., Defendant and Mr. Mason remained at Defendant's apartment. After Mr. Atkins and Mr. Roy left, they picked up Ms. Matte at work and went straight to Mr. Roy's house, where they “smoked weed.” Mr. Atkins ended up staying at Mr. Roy's house for a couple of days.

According to Mr. Atkins, he got a phone call from his friend Logan about the shooting. He tried calling Defendant to “checkup on him” but couldn't remember if Defendant actually answered his call that night. He testified that he never spoke to Defendant or Mr. Mason about what happened on the night of February 15, 2022. He also noted that if he had not gone to Mr. Roy's house, he would likely have been hanging out with Defendant that night. When questioned about his gun case in the back of Defendant's car, Mr. Atkins stated that he used the gun case to store his marijuana and that he believed he had thrown the case on the floorboard after he finished his marijuana.

Mr. Atkins identified multiple phone calls from Defendant's phone logs that he made the night of the shooting. However, he had no recollection of the content of any of the phone calls. Mr. Atkins testified that he attended a gun show with Defendant and Mr. Mason two days before the shooting. He recalled Defendant buying a firearm, although he did not recall the exact weapon. Mr. Atkins was questioned about his interview with Detective Thompson and stated that he “willfully” turned his firearm, a Glock, over to investigators. According to Mr. Atkins, he received threats on social media after the shooting, which he believed was because people knew he was connected to Defendant.

On cross-examination, Mr. Atkins acknowledged telling Detective Thompson about the gun show and that Defendant purchased an AR-15 pistol at the show. Mr. Atkins also acknowledged telling Detective Thompson that Defendant owned an SAR 9mm pistol. When asked if he'd ever seen Mr. Mason with guns, Mr. Atkins replied, “Barely even knew him.”

The State then called Makayla Atkins. She testified that she previously worked at Cajun Corner, a Valero station that became a Texaco station, in 2021 and 2022. Ms. Atkins testified that she knew Mr. Mason through his friendship with Defendant and had known him for about a year prior to the shooting. She identified Defendant as “the father to my kids.” At the time of the shooting, Ms. Atkins and Defendant were living together at the Perry Apartments in Krotz Springs. On February 15, 2022, she was eighteen years old, had a little girl with Defendant, and was pregnant with his second child. Ms. Atkins testified that on February 15, 2022, she went to work around 12:30 p.m. and would have been there until 9:00 p.m. Defendant typically spent this time at home, hanging out with Mr. Atkins or Mr. Mason. She noted that Defendant only had a “solid job” for about six months of their relationship.

Ms. Atkins testified that although Cajun Corner was part convenience store and part restaurant, she worked in the convenience store portion as a cashier. She knew that Mr. Mason was with Defendant on February 15, 2022, but she did not know when they had met up. According to Ms. Atkins, Defendant stopped by Cajun Corner around 7:00 p.m. that night. He would often come to the store while she was working, either to buy something or just to see her. Ms. Atkins testified that Mr. Mason was with Defendant when he came to the store that night. Ms. Atkins stated that she did not see when Defendant originally arrived at the store. However, she noted that when he came inside, Mr. Vaughn-Smith and Mr. Vaughn were already eating in the restaurant. Ms. Atkins testified that after they ate, “[Mr. Vaughn-Smith] came to the register like to talk and I asked him to please not talk to me no more and he said okay and went sat back down.”

Ms. Atkins was shown the surveillance footage from the store that night and identified Defendant as entering around 6:59 p.m. She testified that Defendant “came in kind of looking funny” at Mr. Vaughn-Smith and Mr. Vaughn. Ms. Atkins also identified Mr. Mason on the surveillance footage getting out of the passenger seat of Defendant's car. She testified that she told Defendant to go home and clean the apartment, at which point he and Mr. Mason left. According to Ms. Atkins, Mr. Vaughn-Smith and Mr. Vaughn were still in the diner at that time.

Ms. Atkins further testified that Defendant was angry with Mr. Vaughn-Smith because Ms. Atkins had previously saved a video of Mr. Vaughn-Smith that she had taken when working at Exxon. Mr. Vaughn-Smith was making silly faces, and Ms. Atkins sent the video to her friend who liked Mr. Vaughn-Smith. Defendant had seen the video on her phone in the middle of the night and woke her up at 3:00 a.m. to have a fight over her having a video of Mr. Vaughn-Smith saved on her phone.

Ms. Atkins testified that while she was still at work that night, her “nanny” and sister called her to tell her that the “[d]udes in the green truck wrecked.” One of them called back later and told Ms. Atkins that people were saying Defendant caused the wreck. Ms. Atkins tried to call Defendant, but he didn't answer. Defendant eventually responded to her text messages in which she asked if he had caused the wreck, saying that he did not know what she was talking about. Ms. Atkins noted that she looked on Instagram to figure out his location and it showed that he was in Port Barre. Defendant told her he was playing a video game with Mr. Mason on Mr. Mason's PlayStation. According to Ms. Atkins, this was about forty minutes after he and Mr. Mason left Cajun Corner. Eventually, there was a Facetime call between Ms. Atkins and Defendant during which she could see that Defendant was in a room she didn't recognize. Defendant told her it was Mr. Mason's room at his house. Other than Mr. Mason, she didn't see anyone else with Defendant.

Ms. Atkins testified that she went to the police station after work and while there discovered that Defendant had returned home. She related that information to law enforcement, and “the cops ran out of the police station to go to the apartment.” When Ms. Atkins got home, law enforcement was still at her apartment, as were Defendant and Mr. Mason. While gathering her daughter's things from the apartment, Ms. Atkins noticed Defendant's cell phone near the couch. She put the phone in her pocket before ultimately turning it over to law enforcement voluntarily.

The State asked Ms. Atkins to go through a number of messages from the Cellebrite report made while extracting information from her phone. The State first focused on text messages between Ms. Atkins and Defendant wherein she asked Defendant what he meant at the store that night when he told her he was “gonna explain it to you.” Defendant responded at 7:24 p.m., “you know what it is.” Ms. Atkins then sent nine messages in a row before Defendant responded, “Bae chill momma,” at 8:07 p.m. At 8:26 a.m., Ms. Atkins asked Defendant, “Did you follow them boys and shoot their car,” which he denied.

Ms. Atkins testified that she messaged Mr. Mason on Instagram at 12:30 a.m. on February 16, 2022, about Defendant going to jail for murder and people threatening her and her baby. She also acknowledged speaking to Mr. Mason on the phone about an hour later for roughly nine minutes. According to Ms. Atkins, she asked Mr. Mason what was going on since she saw him with Defendant at the store and then again at her apartment when Defendant was arrested. She claimed that Mr. Mason denied any knowledge of why Defendant had been arrested.

The State then went through text messages between Ms. Atkins and Defendant on February 13, 2022, when Defendant bragged about buying a firearm described by him as an “ARP 556 with the drum at the bottom.” Ms. Atkins was asked about a video which was taken from Defendant's phone showing a person shooting that firearm. According to Ms. Atkins, the person shooting the gun in the video was Defendant's stepfather, Jeremy, and the video was filmed in the field behind Defendant's mother's house.

On cross-examination, Ms. Atkins testified that in 2022 her brother Earl spent time at her and Defendant's apartment almost every day. Earl would sleep on their couch four or five times a week. She further testified that she had never known Mr. Mason to have a firearm and acknowledged that Defendant owned both the AR15 pistol and another pistol.

The State's final witness was Dr. Mohammed Ilyas Yasin, a forensic chemist and the supervisor of the physical evidence section of the Acadiana Crime Lab. Dr. Yasin was accepted as an expert in forensic firearms identification analysis. He testified that he performed the testing on the firearms in this case and determined that the 9mm casing found near the scene of the shooting was fired from the SAR 9mm pistol recovered immediately after Mr. Mason's arrest. Dr. Yasin further identified the rifle casings which were found on the southbound lane of Highway 105 near the scene of the shooting as .223/5.56 cartridges. He testified that all the .223/5.56 rounds recovered in this case were fired from the same weapon.

According to Dr. Yasin, the bullet fragment recovered from the tailgate of Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck had markings similar to the SAR 9mm test rounds. However, the fragment was too damaged to conclusively find that the bullet was fired from that weapon. Dr. Yasin was questioned about the markings made on a bullet fired from a Glock 9mm, which was the type of firearm owned by Mr. Atkins. He testified that the rifling present on the bullet found in the tailgate was “totally different” than the rifling that would have been created if it had been fired from a Glock 9mm. Regarding the bullet fragment recovered from Mr. Vaughn-Smith's head, Dr. Yasin testified that it was a “twenty-two caliber class” bullet, which includes .223/5.56 rounds. He was adamant that the bullet recovered during the autopsy could not have come from a 9mm pistol.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty of first degree murder and guilty of attempted first degree murder. On October 20, 2025, the trial court sentenced Defendant for the conviction of first degree murder to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and for the conviction of attempted first degree murder to thirty years at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court further ordered that Defendant's sentences were to run concurrent with each other and Defendant was given credit for time served.

Defendant appeals, assigning the following errors:

A. The State failed to prove sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill - a necessary element of first degree murder [of] the decedent. The insufficient evidence therefore cannot support a verdict of first degree murder and that count should be overturned.

B. Inadmissible testimony was introduced which should result in a mistrial.

C. The jury committed error when it rejected the responsive verdict of manslaughter.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we have identified one error patent; however, based on the record, we find that it is harmless.

The record of this matter indicates that a motion for sanity commission was filed on behalf of Defendant. Although the motion itself is not contained in the record before us, the trial court issued a per curiam regarding the motion on April 11, 2022, noting that allegations had been made that Defendant lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 642 provides, in pertinent part, “When the question of the defendant's mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no further steps in the criminal prosecution, except the institution of prosecution, until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to proceed.”

The per curiam issued by the trial court on April 11, 2022, ordered Defendant to show cause on May 5, 2022, as to why a sanity commission should be appointed. The minutes of May 5, 2022, indicate that Elbert Guillory orally enrolled as Defendant's counsel and that a sanity commission was appointed. The minutes of May 11, 2022, indicate that the State filed a Notice of Intent to Not Seek the Death Penalty. Additionally, on May 11, 2022, Defendant's appointed counsel filed a Motion and Order to Withdraw, stating that Defendant had retained Mr. Guillory to represent him. The trial court granted the motion to withdraw that same date. According to the June 2, 2022 minutes, a motion for discovery scheduled for hearing on that date was passed and “[d]efense counsel agreed to accept open file discovery whenever it becomes available.”

On July 7, 2022, an Order Appointing Sanity Commission was filed by the trial court, referencing the May 5, 2022 minute entry indicating the trial court's finding that a sanity commission was needed. On December 28, 2022, a Joint Stipulation was filed regarding the State's disclosure of Defendant's entire investigative file. Thereafter, on January 26, 2023, the trial court ordered that the State's response to open file discovery be filed under seal.

On May 4, 2023, the trial court held a Sanity Status Hearing. Finding conflicting sanity evaluation reports, the trial court ordered another doctor to evaluate Defendant and reset the matter for August 3, 2023. On May 12, 2023, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial 90-Day In-Jail Treatment Order. It stated that on May 4, 2023, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant “does not currently have the mental capacity to proceed, but is likely to be restored within 90 days as a result of in-jail competency restoration education and treatment[.]” The trial court ordered the Louisiana Department of Health, through Community Forensic Services, to provide immediate jail-based competency restoration services to Defendant for a period not to exceed ninety days, pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 648(A)(2). Additionally, the trial court ordered a hearing be held on September 5, 2023, to determine Defendant's competency to proceed.

On August 14, 2023, the trial court issued an order stating that Defendant was found competent on August 3, 2023, and could return to court for further proceedings.

We note that while the issue of Defendant's mental incapacity to proceed was pending, several “steps” took place—the State's Notice of Intent to Not Seek the Death Penalty; defense counsel's motion to withdraw due to Defendant's retention of Mr. Guillory as his attorney and the trial court's granting of that motion to withdraw; defense counsel's agreement to accept open file discovery whenever it became available; a joint stipulation regarding the State's disclosure of Defendant's entire investigative file; and the trial court's order that the State's response to open file discovery be filed under seal.

For guidance, we look to State v. Westbrook, 19-237, pp.3–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/27/19), 286 So.3d 474, 478–79 (alterations in original), wherein similar steps took place during the pendency of the sanity commission:

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on April 17, 2017, and then a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity on May 5, 2017. A written motion questioning Defendant's mental incapacity was filed on or about March 28, 2017, resulting in the trial court signing an order appointing a sanity commission on the same day. The hearing on the motion was held on June 21, 2017 wherein the trial court found that the Defendant had the requisite mental capacity to proceed to trial. However, in this interim period, between March 28, 2017 and the determination of competency on June 21, 2017, Defendant orally moved to and did change his plea from not guilty to not guilty by reason of insanity as set forth above. Further, during this same period, the following motions and pleadings were filed: (1) a pro se motion of Defendant for discovery and inspection; (2) a pro se motion of Defendant for a preliminary examination; (3) a Motion for Discovery and Inspection on behalf of Defendant; (4) a Motion for Discovery and For Production of Initial Police Report, Criminal History and NCIC Reports and Brady Motion on behalf of Defendant; (5) a Joint Stipulation filed and signed by the State and Defendant, through counsel; (6) the State's Production of Discoverable Materials; (7) an Authorization to Permit Discovery; (8) the State's Motion for Discovery and Inspection; (9) a Melendez-Diaz Notice and Intent to Use La.R.S. 15:499 Certificate of Analysis; and (10) a Notice of Intent.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 642 provides:

The defendant's mental incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the defense, the district attorney, or the court. When the question of the defendant's mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall be no further steps in the criminal prosecution, until the defendant is found to have the mental capacity to proceed.

It was error to allow steps in furtherance of the prosecution to take place between the trial court signing the motion appointing a sanity commission and June 21, 2017, when Defendant was found competent to proceed. However, that does not end the inquiry. “Whether a patent error, like other statutory error, requires reversal must be evaluated in light of the potential impact on the fairness of the proceedings[,]” and “[j]ust as non-prejudicial violations of the accused's statutory rights do not mandate reversal, an error in procedure which does not affect the fundamental fairness of the process does not necessarily require reversal and remand, unless prejudice is shown.” State v. White, 404 So.2d 1202, 1204-05 (La.1981) (citing La.Code Crim.P. art. 921).

In State v. Kelly, 95-1663 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 677 So.2d 495, this court held that it was patent error to arraign the defendant after he raised the issue of mental incapacity but before a determination was made as to his competency to proceed to trial. This court found the lack of a contemporaneous objection resulted in a waiver of the error and rendered the error patent harmless. Accordingly, we reach the same conclusion in the present case as to the entry of the first plea of not guilty in April 2017 and the subsequent withdrawal of the not guilty plea and substitution of the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity in May 2017.

We further find the filing of the various motions, pleadings, and actions between March 28, 2017 and June 21, 2017, while steps in furtherance of the prosecution, resulted in no harm or prejudice to Defendant, nor did any of these actions affect the fundamental fairness of the process. As reflected, these actions were taken by all parties, including Defendant himself in the filing of pro se motions. The filing of such motions by Defendant and counsel for Defendant and the failure to object to any of the filings by the State waives any objection thereto. State v. Beauchamp, 510 So.2d 22 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 512 So.2d 1176 (La.1987). Accordingly, while we find error in allowing any actions in furtherance of the prosecution to occur during this period, we find the error to be harmless in the case at hand.

As in State v. Westbrook, we find that the actions taken by both the State and defense counsel in this matter while the issue of Defendant's mental incapacity was pending did not affect the fundamental fairness of the process. Furthermore, the failure to object to any of the filings of the State waives any objection thereto. For these reasons, we find that any error in this case was harmless.

In addition, while reviewing the record, we have discovered that the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO) needs correction. The sentencing transcript reflects that Defendant was sentenced for first degree murder to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Although the USCO indicates that Defendant's thirty-year sentence for attempted first degree murder is to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, it does not include this for Defendant's life sentence. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Although the sentencing minutes are correct in this case, this court also considers correction of the commitment order when it conflicts with the transcript. See State v. Barker, 24-379 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 776, writ denied, 25-257 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1179. Thus, we order the correction of the USCO to include the denial of parole, probation, and suspension of sentence for Defendant's life sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends that “[t]he State failed to prove sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill – a necessary element of first degree murder [of]the decedent. The insufficient evidence therefore cannot support a verdict of first degree murder and that count should be overturned.” In short, Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he fired any weapon or that he had the intent to cause death, as required for the attempted murder of Mr. Vaughn, or great bodily harm sufficient for the murder of Mr. Vaughn-Smith.

The analysis for a sufficiency of evidence claim is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trie of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Defendant contends that because there was no direct evidence that he shot at the victims in this case, the State failed to prove that he fired a gun, and thus, failed to prove that he had the intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. We disagree.

This court previously addressed a conviction based on circumstantial evidence in State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817, 826-27, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 950, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017):

When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that the state “must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” in order to convict. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d 1207, 1209 (La.1984). “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which elemental factors may be inferred according to reason, experience and common sense.” State v. Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). However, La.R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than the rational juror's reasonable doubt standard. The statute serves as a guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence. On appeal, the issue is whether a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. State v. Williams, 13-497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 13-2774 (La.5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024.

Defendant contends that the State failed to prove that he fired a weapon on the night of the shooting and, therefore, did not prove intent to kill because the intent of one defendant cannot be transferred to the other. In the alternative, Defendant claims that because the victims passed him on the road, “whatever occurred during this brief roadway encounter provoked Mason to react violently in sudden passion or heat of blood,” and that provocation should result in a manslaughter conviction rather than a first degree murder conviction, if any conviction.

The law of principals is laid out in La.R.S. 14:24: “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” Defendant is correct that “[t]he mental state of one defendant may not be imputed to another defendant.” State v. Acker, 12-1116, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/13), 111 So.3d 535, 541 (quoting State v. Mason, 10-284, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 59 So.3d 419, 425-26, writ denied, 11-306 (La. 6/24/11), 64 So.3d 216). However, a defendant's mental state “ ‘may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.’ ” State Singleton, 24-547, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/26/25), 404 So.3d 1090, 1095–96 (quoting State v. Draughn, 05-1825, pp. 7– 8 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 592–93, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537), writ denied, 25-344 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 622.

The evidence recovered from the scene of the shooting clearly showed that two weapons had been fired towards the victims—a gun firing .223/5.56 ammunition and a 9mm pistol. Forensic testing confirmed that the SAR 9mm recovered feet from where Mr. Mason was arrested was in fact the 9mm pistol in question. Although trial counsel tried to paint a picture that Mr. Atkins was a third person in the car at the time of the shooting, there was no evidence to support that assertion. Dr. Yasin was clear that a Glock 9mm, the type of gun owned by Mr. Atkins, could not have fired the bullet fragment recovered from the victim's tailgate. Additionally, the only 9mm casings recovered at the scene matched the SAR 9mm. Finally, despite trial counsel's claims during closing arguments that he believed “that there had to be a third person in [Defendant's] vehicle,” and that he would “go to [his] grave believing that [Defendant's] vehicle was fired upon first and they fired back in self-defense,” there was zero evidence presented to support these claims.

At the trial of this case, Ms. Atkins testified that Defendant was angry at her a few days before the shooting because he found a brief video of Mr. Vaughn-Smith on her phone. Additionally, two days before the shooting, Defendant bought a Diamondback AR-15 pistol, which he bragged about in text messages to Ms. Atkins was chambered for .223/5.56 rounds and had a drum magazine. Finally, when Defendant saw Mr. Vaughn-Smith in the convenience store the night of the shooting, he told Ms. Atkins he was “gonna explain something to [her] later.” Ms. Atkins also described Defendant as looking at the victims funny when he noticed them in the store eating.

Evidence and testimony presented at trial supported the fact that Defendant owned an SAR 9mm pistol and a Diamondback AR-15 pistol chambered to fire .223/5.56 rounds. Law enforcement recovered seven spent .223/5.56 cartridge cases and a 9mm cartridge case from the scene of the shooting. All seven .223/5.56 rounds recovered were fired from the same weapon. Additionally, the 9mm round matched the SAR 9mm recovered shortly after Mr. Mason was arrested and on which Mr. Mason's DNA was found. Multiple witnesses testified that Defendant owned such a weapon. Furthermore, a bullet belonging to the same caliber of ammunition that the Diamondback AR-15 fired was recovered from Mr. Vaughn-Smith's head.

Simply put, the State proved that two weapons were fired from Defendant's vehicle at Mr. Vaughn-Smith's vehicle. Evidence indicated that Defendant owned the types of weapons used. We find that a jury could infer from the circumstantial evidence that the SAR 9mm recovered when Mr. Mason was arrested was the firearm that both Ms. Atkins and Mr. Atkins testified was owned by Defendant, particularly in light of the testimony that no one recalled Mr. Mason carrying a weapon. Additionally, a jury could have reasonably inferred that the Diamondback AR-15 purchased by Defendant shortly before the shooting fired .223/5.56 rounds.

At trial, Defendant put forth two potential hypotheses: (1) there was a third person in the vehicle with that night, and it was this mystery person and Mr. Mason who did all of the shooting; or (2) the victims shot at Defendant's car first, and therefore, the shooting from Defendant's car was done in self-defense. Not only is there no evidence to support either hypothesis, but they are both directly contradicted by eyewitness testimony. Ms. Atkins testified that when she saw Defendant at Cajun Corner that night, he and Mr. Mason were the only individuals in his car. Additionally, surveillance footage from both gas stations and Billy's across the street shows that no one aside from Defendant and Mr. Mason entered or exited Defendant's vehicle between the time Defendant arrived at Cajun Corner and left driving towards Melville. Furthermore, uncontested testimony from Mr. Atkins, Mr. Roy, and Ms. Matte established that they were in Eunice, not Krotz Springs, the night of the shooting. With respect to trial counsel's statement that the victims fired at Defendant's vehicle first, there is no evidence to support this claim. No gun was recovered from the victim's truck, which was on fire with multiple witnesses present when law enforcement arrived.

On the other hand, the evidence presented could easily lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that Defendant had the intent to kill Mr. Vaughn-Smith. As previously noted, intent to kill can be inferred by circumstance. Ms. Atkins testified that Defendant was angry about a video of Mr. Vaughn-Smith that he found on her phone and that he had noticed Mr. Vaughn-Smith and Mr. Vaughn in Cajun Corner the night of the shooting. The evidence proves that two firearms were fired from Defendant's car towards the victims. Defendant owned a weapon that was the same type of one of the firearms used and had purchased a weapon capable of firing the other rounds two days before the shooting. “[T]he pointing of a gun at the victim as it was fired has been ruled evidence of a specific intent to kill.” State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369, 373 (La.1980). See also, State v. Procell, 365 So.2d 484 (La.1978).

It is clear that at least one of the occupants of Defendant's vehicle, proven to be Defendant and Mr. Mason, pointed a gun at the victims and opened fire while driving down Highway 105. The likeliest scenario is that both Defendant and Mr. Mason were shooting. Given that the victim's truck had just passed Defendant on the road, the occupants of Defendant's vehicle had to know someone was in the vehicle when they opened fire. Thus, a jury could have found intent to kill.

Furthermore, even if the State failed to prove that Defendant personally fired one of the guns, the jury was instructed on the law of principals. And while there was no evidence to indicate any personal animosity between Mr. Mason and the two victims, Ms. Atkins testified to Defendant's animosity toward Mr. Vaughn-Smith. The circumstantial evidence adduced at trial indicated that Defendant was the only individual of those at issue who owned the types of guns capable of firing the shell casings recovered from the scene of the shooting. Thus, the jury could have inferred that either he fired one or both of the weapons or he provided the weapons to others who were riding with him so that they could shoot the occupants of the vehicle. Either action would indicate a desire for the death of said occupants. As both Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Vaughn-Smith were in the vehicle, a jury could have inferred intent to kill both men.

The jury was presented with unsubstantiated conspiracies as a defense, which they clearly rejected. We find that the evidence presented to the jury could easily, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, lead a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of the first degree murder of Wade Vaughn-Smith and the attempted first degree murder of James Vaughn.

Although Defendant discusses manslaughter as a responsive verdict in this assignment of error, his third assignment of error specifically argues that the jury erred in rejecting manslaughter as a responsive verdict. As such, we will address the manslaughter issue separately.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends that “[t]he Trial Court committed reversible error by permitting Dakoa Matte and Kane Roy to testify in order to bolster the credibility of Earl Atkins before his credibility had been attacked[.]”

Defendant relies upon La.Code Evid. art. 607(B), which states:

The credibility of a witness may not be attacked until the witness has been sworn, and the credibility of a witness may not be supported unless it has been attacked. However, a party may question any witness as to his relationship to the parties, interest in the lawsuit, or capacity to perceive or recollect.

Defendant also cites La.Code Evid. art. 608, which addresses attacking or supporting credibility through character evidence. Specifically, La.Code Evid. art. 608(A) states:

A. Reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of general reputation only, but subject to these limitations:

(1) The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

(2) A foundation must first be established that the character witness is familiar with the reputation of the witness whose credibility is in issue. The character witness shall not express his personal opinion as to the character of the witness whose credibility is in issue.

(3) Inquiry into specific acts on direct examination while qualifying the character witness is otherwise prohibited.

In addition to citing the two articles above, Defendant relies upon State v. Batiste, 363 So.2d 639 (La.1978), and State v. Lawrence, 98-348 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/1/99), 752 So.2d 934, writ denied, 00-03 (La. 6/16/00), 764 So.2d 962. The court in Batiste held that allowing an Assistant United States Attorney to testify that the State's key witness had agreed to testify truthfully in numerous cases constituted prejudicial error because the attorney was the first witness called. However, the court determined that the issue was waived because trial counsel failed to timely object or put forth the correct grounds for objection.

In Lawrence, the fourth circuit held that it was impermissible for a detective to describe her perception of the truthfulness of her interview with a child sex abuse victim and likewise, her perception of the defendant's honesty. The court ultimately upheld the defendant's conviction, however, based upon a harmless error analysis.

In this case, the objections raised at trial to Ms. Matte testifying were that her testimony was irrelevant and cumulative of Mr. Roy's testimony. As to Mr. Roy's testimony, trial counsel did argue that the State was trying to bolster Mr. Atkins’ credibility. However, he also stated, “The basis for my objection is the relevancy of this witness, Judge. I see absolutely no probative value of his testimony. He was not present at the commissioning of the crime, there's absolutely no evidence that he has any connection whatsoever to the material facts[.]”

On appeal, defense contends that “[t]he testimonies of Dakoa Matte and Kane Roy were solely purposed to bolster the credibility of Earl Atkins prior to him being sworn in as a witness and his credibility being attacked, thereby usurping the jury's essential function of determining credibility.” After a review of the record, we find that this is a mischaracterization of Ms. Matte's and Mr. Roy's testimonies. Neither Ms. Matte nor Mr. Roy gave any testimony regarding Mr. Atkins’ character, his tendency for truthfulness, or any other aspect of his reputation, as was done in Batiste. They instead simply testified that on the day of the shooting, Mr. Atkins was with them and Ms. Matte's young child in Eunice around 5:00 p.m. Additionally, they testified that he stayed at their house for a couple of days before returning to Krotz Springs. Thus, these two individuals were fact witnesses, not character witnesses, which the trial court noted in denying the relevancy objection to Ms. Matte's testimony:

THE COURT: I can't control the uh, how the State wants to present their case, if they want to bring more witnesses to confirm a fact um, because I think this - - the fact that they're trying to confirm is one of the facts that's in question or gonna be used by the defense counsels, so uh, I'm gonna overrule your objection, I'm gonna allow the testimony I mean, she's just - - she's just supporting the State's claim uh, with the witness being where he was present.

We find that the trial court was correct. Both defense attorneys advanced theories that there was a third individual in the back of Defendant's car during the shooting, and both asked the jury to infer that the third person was Earl Atkins. The State called a pair of witnesses who testified that Mr. Atkins was present with them in Eunice at the time Defendant and Mr. Mason were supposedly shooting at the victims outside of Krotz Springs. Unlike the testimony in Batiste and Lawrence, neither Ms. Matte nor Mr. Roy gave any testimony regarding Mr. Atkins’ reputation or their impression of his tendency for truthfulness or untruthfulness. They were fact witnesses testifying about where he was at the time of the shooting.

This argument was also raised in Defendant's Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial, as well as his subsequent memorandum in support of the motions. Defendant argued that the erroneous testimony of Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy entitled him to a new trial under La.Code Crim.P. art. 851(B)(2), which states that a new trial shall be granted when “[t]he court's ruling on a written motion, or an objection made during the proceedings, shows prejudicial error.”

Louisiana courts have long held that “[t]he decision on a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Quimby, 419 So.2d 951, 960 (La.1982). As noted above, the testimony of Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy is not remotely the same type of evidence at issue in Batiste and Lawrence. They testified to a tangible fact of which they had first-hand knowledge—Mr. Atkins’ location at the time of the shooting. In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court stated:

The Court finds that the witnesses were fact witnesses and not character witnesses called to establish character of another witness. Allowing those witnesses to testify was in accordance with Louisiana law. Earl Atkins was subject to cross-examination in this matter. The alleged errors were not prejudicial to the extent that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Defendant has failed to satisfy [his] burden for a new trial. Accordingly, the Motion for New Trial is denied.

Defendant's entire argument under this assignment of error is based on the premise that Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy were character witnesses for Mr. Atkins. The trial court explicitly denied that claim at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Defendant has provided no jurisprudence or statutory support for this court to find that the trial court abused its discretion. Therefore, Defendant's assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

In his third and final assignment of error, Defendant contends that the jury erred when it rejected the responsive verdict of manslaughter. Defendant contends that the State did not disprove the possibility “that the confrontation arose from a rapidly escalating roadway encounter that provoked Mason to respond violently in sudden passion or heat of blood.” He also argues, again, that the State did not prove that he “personally possessed the specific intent required for first-degree murder as a principal[.]” We first note that, as discussed in Defendant's first assignment of error, the State's evidence was sufficient to establish intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. As such, the second portion of Defendant's argument lacks merit.

Defendant's other argument is that his conviction for first degree murder should be manslaughter because it is possible that Mr. Mason began shooting when the victims created a road rage situation by passing Defendant's car. In short, Defendant is arguing for this court to apply La.R.S. 14:31(A)(1), which defines manslaughter as:

A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to a manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]

Defendant's theory that the shooting was the result of road rage is not properly before this court, as it was not a theory argued to the jury. As noted above, Defendant raised two theories at trial: (1) that a third person was in the vehicle and it was this person or Mr. Mason who did the shooting; or (2) the victims shot at Defendant's car first. Now, Defendant raises the theory that this was a road rage incident, which we find to be an attempt at developing a new theory of defense. Such an attempt is not allowed, as noted by this court in State v. Gilliam, 14-228, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 354, 357–58 (alterations in original):

This argument differs from Defendant's argument at trial which suggested that he possessed no gun at all. When presenting his case, Defendant put his mother on the witness stand, and she testified that “no one had a gun.” Our brethren in the fourth circuit in a case involving La.R.S. 14:95.1 held:

[I]n evaluating a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we are restricted to those theories of defense actually put forward to the trier of fact. See State v. Juluke, 98-0341, pp. 4–5 (La.1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291, 1293–94 (per curiam). In other words, a defendant may not develop a new theory on appeal and demonstrate that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to negate the new theory. Id.

State v. Hamden, 13-113, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/11/13), 131 So.3d 197, 203, writ denied, 14-51 (La.6/13/14), 140 So.3d 1188.

Additionally, while Defendant argued in his Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial and the supporting memorandum that he should be found guilty of manslaughter, he again raised a different argument. Defendant's argument in writing and at the hearing was that he and Mr. Mason were only engaged in aggravated criminal damage to property and should therefore be found guilty of manslaughter under La.R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a), which defines manslaughter as a homicide which occurs without intent to cause death or great bodily harm “[w]hen the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 30 or 30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person[.]” Because Defendant fails to raise this felony-manslaughter argument on appeal and instead relies on his belief that the State failed to prove specific intent, we will not consider this portion of his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

As discussed above under Defendant's first assignment of error, we find that the State's evidence was sufficient to prove specific intent. Accordingly, the jury did not err in finding Defendant guilty as charged. This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed. The trial court is instructed to correct the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order to indicate that Defendant's life sentence is to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

AFFIRMED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Defendant Jaimon Mason appeals his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. Defendant also challenges the thirty-year, hard labor sentence imposed for the attempted first degree murder conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences, with instructions.

FACTS

As likewise reported in the corresponding case of State v. Jaden Michael Ardoin, 26-33 (La.App. 3 Cir. _/_/26), _ So.3d _, St. Landry Parish Communications District 911 Center received three calls on the evening of February 15, 2022 regarding shots having been fired at a vehicle that ended up off the road near the caller's home on Louisiana Highway 105. As reported by the callers, the vehicle, a Chevrolet pickup truck, ran into a tree, ignited, and then exploded. Another vehicle continued travelling on the highway. One of the callers indicated that two people were in the truck, including Wade Vaughn-Smith. She further reported that one of the individuals remained in the burning truck while another had been able to get out.

Mary Dupont reported that she was outside of her grandmother's home on that evening when she heard gunshots. As she left the home and travelled toward Highway 105 from a side road, she explained that she saw Jaden Ardoin's vehicle travelling north on Highway 105. She noted that Mr. Ardoin was in the car and that his window was going up. She later received a call indicating that Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck was on fire. She explained Mr. Vaughn-Smith was her “on and off again boyfriend.” She was pregnant with his child at that time. Ms. DuPont contacted Krotz Springs Chief of Police to report that she had seen Mr. Ardoin shortly after hearing gunshots.

First responders were dispatched in response to the witnesses’ accounts. When Captain Cody Richard of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office arrived at the “quite chaotic” scene, the fire department and officers from the Krotz Springs Police Department were on site. Captain Richard was advised by the fire department that “there was a deceased male who had burned up in the vehicle that had struck a tree in the yard of the address[.]” He was also informed that a passenger, who he ultimately identified as James Vaughn, had “managed to escape the vehicle fire[.]” Although Mr. Vaughn had been placed in an ambulance, Captain Richard briefly questioned him regarding what had occurred. According to Captain Richard, Mr. Vaughn identified his brother, “Mr. Wade Smith, Jr., as the driver and he said that they were being followed in another vehicle by a male, white male.” Mr. Vaughn knew the male by the name “J.D.” He informed Captain Richard that, upon being followed, “J.D. began shooting at them from a brown Toyota car[.]” Mr. Vaughn explained that after shots were fired toward their vehicle, Mr. Vaughn-Smith “left the road in a panic.” The truck struck a tree and caught on fire. Mr. Vaughn confirmed his identification of Mr. Ardoin as the shooter.

Captain Richard's further investigation revealed “two entry holes that were consistent with that of bullet projectile entry holes” on the tailgate of the involved Chevrolet pickup truck. A subsequent search of the truck revealed a bullet fragment lodged in the tailgate. Captain Richard later found a pair of .223 shell casings and a 9mm shell casing on Highway 105.  ¹ Those casings were collected for analysis.

Later that evening, upon learning that Mr. Ardoin was a person of interest in the incident, Assistant Chief Nolan Noel of the Krotz Springs Police Department travelled to Mr. Ardoin's apartment. Assistant Chief Noel explained that an individual “describing himself as Buddha” opened the door of the apartment and acknowledged that Mr. Ardoin was there. Assistant Chief Noel arrested Mr. Ardoin at that time. Assistant Chief Noel explained that he did not detain “Buddha,” later identified as Defendant Jaimon Maurice Mason, as Defendant was not a suspect at that time.

Returning to the scene after it had been cleared, Assistant Chief Noel searched the area with a flashlight and found what he believed to be five .223/5.56 shell casings alongside the east side of Highway 105. Assistant Chief Noel explained that the distance from the casings to the skid marks “that went off to the side” was between fifteen and twenty-five yards.

Defendant Mason was not initially named as a suspect. However, in investigating the group's movements that evening, officers were led to interview Makayla Atkins, the girlfriend of Defendant Ardoin and the sister of Mr. Ardoin's acquaintance, Earl Atkins. Working at a convenience store and restaurant in Krotz Springs on the evening of the incident, Ms. Atkins explained that Mr. Vaughn-Smith and Mr. Vaughn were at the store prior to the shooting. Both Mr. Ardoin and Defendant were there as well, but she did not know whether Defendant left with Mr. Ardoin. Given that information, along with surveillance footage obtained from surrounding Krotz Spring businesses, Detective Donald Thompson of the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office applied for an arrest warrant on the bases that Defendant was with Mr. Ardoin “pre and post commission of the homicide ․ and [Defendant] failed to contact law enforcement and render aide, and contact emergency services[.]”

Officer Austin Lee explained that, prior to going on patrol on February 17, 2022, he became aware that an arrest warrant was issued for Defendant, who he knew as “Buddha.” While on patrol, he encountered Assistant Chief of Police Robert Hardy in a pursuit of Defendant, who was on foot and running in the general direction of what Officer Lee knew to be Defendant's home. Chief Hardy and Officer Lee ultimately caught up with Defendant, taking him into custody.

Immediately thereafter, residents of the home located at the site where Defendant was arrested informed officials that they found a “firearm in the bushes.” According to Officer Lee, the weapon was within “[c]lose range, possibl[y] fifteen twenty feet” of the site of where Defendant was apprehended and on the path where he had run. Officer Lee collected the weapon, which was later identified as a SAR 9mm. A DNA swab obtained from the SAR 9mm revealed a mixed sample with DNA from two individuals. TruAllele analysis indicated that one of the contributors was likely Defendant. Mr. Ardoin was excluded as a contributor.

Dr. Christopher Tape, the coroner for St. Tammany Parish, accepted as an expert in forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on Mr. Vaughn-Smith, finding that his body had been almost entirely burned and that he had sustained a bullet in his head that did not exit. Dr. Tape found the gunshot wound to be the cause of death but found that Mr. Vaughn-Smith was “probably alive at least a little bit breathing smoke.” Dr. Tape explained that the bullet had moved from the back left of Mr. Vaughn-Smith's head and lodged in the right side of the brain. He stated that “the trajectory based on the head, it's going back to front, it's going left to right[,] and it was not really going upward or downward.”

The matter was presented to a St. Landry Parish grand jury, which indicted both Mr. Ardoin and Defendant for the first degree murder of Mr. Vaughn-Smith, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30, as well as for the attempted first degree murder of Mr. Vaugh, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30. The cases against both defendants were presented together in June 2025. A unanimous jury found each defendant guilty as charged on each count of the indictment.

Defendant Mason thereafter filed a “Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial,” whereby he asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the jury should have found him guilty of the lesser included offense of felony manslaughter, and that a new trial was warranted because two witnesses, Dakoa Matte and Kane Roy, testified to Earl Atkins’ truthfulness prior to him being called as a witness. The trial court denied both motions, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction as charged and specifically determining that Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy were fact witnesses, not character witnesses as Defendant maintained.

The trial court thereafter sentenced Defendant, imposing the mandatory life sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for first degree murder and a sentence of thirty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for attempted first degree murder. The trial court ordered that Defendants’ sentences be served concurrently.

Defendant appeals, assigning the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial where the State's failure to disclose, prior to trial, the identity and anticipated testimony of witness Dakoa Matte despite the joint discovery stipulations and La. Code Crim. Proc. Arts. 716 and 723 constituted a prejudicial discovery violation and fundamental unfairness within the meaning of La. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 851(B)(1)–(2) and the Due Process Clause.

II. The trial court committed prejudicial error by permitting State's witnesses, Dakoa Matte and Kane Roy, to testify in a manner that effectively vouched for and bolstered the credibility of key State witness Earl Atkins, in violation of La. Code Evid. arts. 607 and 608 and the jury's exclusive role as arbiter of credibility, and then denying relief on this ground in ruling on the Motion for New Trial.

III. The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 821 to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, and the trial court therefore erred in denying the Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal.

IV. The concurrent thirty-year sentence at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, imposed for attempted first-degree murder is constitutionally excessive under La. Const. art. I, § 20 and represents a manifest abuse of the trial court's sentencing discretion, particularly in light of the nature of the proof and Appellant's individual circumstances.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we review all appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. We find no such errors. We note, however, that the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO) requires correction. Namely, the sentencing transcript indicates that the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the first degree murder conviction. The USCO does not reflect those restrictions. In the event of a conflict between the transcript and the USCO, the transcript prevails. See State v. Curry, 24-79 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/24), 395 So.3d 955. We therefore instruct the trial court to correct the USCO to correctly reflect the trial court's order that the sentence imposed for first degree murder be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first turn to Defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). See also State v. Charles, 19-745 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/24/20), 299 So.3d 688 (providing that a reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence before consideration of other purported trial errors). Defendant specifically maintains that the State's case was “predominantly circumstantial and depended heavily on the testimony of a single, heavily impeached witness, and it was unsupported by forensic or physical evidence linking [him] to the weapons or shell casings recovered at the scene.” Given the state of the evidence, Defendant maintains, a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the offenses, particularly identity and specific intent, proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

This court has previously explained that an appellate court reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim considers:

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Regarding the State's reliance on circumstantial evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 provides that: “The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This court has explained that La.R.S. 15:438 does not establish a more stringent standard of review on appeal than the rational juror's reasonable doubt standard. See State v. Baumberger, 15-1056 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859, cert. denied, 583 U.S. 950, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017).

Initially, we note that Defendant's argument is foundationally flawed as he maintains that “[t]he record reflects that the police investigation yielded no forensic or scientific link” to him. Defendant's allegation, as well as his assertion that the State presented no evidence that “any of the 9mm shell casings recovered at the scene were fired from [his] weapon[,]”² is contradicted by record.

Pointedly, the State presented Dr. Mohammad Ilyas Yasin, a forensic chemist and the supervisor of the physical evidence section of the Acadiana Crime Lab. Accepted as an expert in forensic firearms identification analysis, Dr. Yasin testified that his testing determined that the 9mm casing found near the scene of the shooting was fired from the SAR 9mm pistol recovered immediately after Defendant's arrest. Dr. Yasin also identified the rifle casings recovered on the southbound lane of Highway 105 as .223/5.56 NATO cartridges and determined that they were fired from “one unknown firearm.”

Dr. Yasin further explained that the bullet fragment recovered from the tailgate of Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck had similar markings to test rounds fired from the SAR 9mm, although the fragment was too damaged to conclusively find the bullet was fired from that weapon. Dr. Yasin noted that the type of rifling present on the fragment was “totally different” than the rifling that would have been created if the round was fired from a Glock 9mm recovered from Mr. Atkins.

Dr. Yasin explained further that a bullet fragment recovered from Mr. Vaughn-Smith's head was a “twenty-two caliber class” bullet, which includes .223/5.56 NATO rounds. Dr. Yasin was adamant that the bullet recovered from Mr. Vaughn-Smith during the autopsy could not have come from a 9mm pistol.

Regarding Defendant's contention that the State failed to prove that he had specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm, we note that a defendant's mental state may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the defendant's conduct. See State v. Singleton, 24-547 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/26/25), 404 So.3d 1090, writ denied, 25-344 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 622. Additionally, a specific intent to kill may be inferred from the act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369 (La.1980).

The State presented surveillance footage from Krotz Springs businesses in the period immediately before the shooting which showed Defendant and Mr. Ardoin getting in and out of Mr. Ardoin's Toyota. While defense counsel insinuated at trial that Mr. Atkins was in Mr. Ardoin's vehicle at the time of the shooting, there was no actual evidence supporting that claim. Instead, Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy both testified that at the time of the shooting, Mr. Atkins was with them. Again, Mr. Atkins does not appear in any of the surveillance footage that showed Defendant and Mr. Ardoin getting into or out of the vehicle. Mr. Atkins’ sister, Makayla Atkins, testified that the only people in the car were Defendant and Mr. Ardoin. Given that evidence, a rational juror could have determined that defendant and Mr. Ardoin were the only two people in Mr. Ardoin's vehicle at the time of the shooting.

Additionally, it is clear that two separate guns were aimed and fired at Mr. Vaughn-Smith's vehicle. Given that the State presented testimony indicating that the car carrying Mr. Vaughn and Mr. Vaughn-Smith had just passed Mr. Ardoin on the road, the occupants of Mr. Ardoin's vehicle were obviously aware that the vehicle was occupied when they opened fire. Absent a belief that Mr. Ardoin was both driving and also firing two different firearms, the jury could have reasonably inferred that both men were firing a weapon and that both men, in turn, had an intent to kill.

The State presented evidence that two weapons were fired from Mr. Ardoin's vehicle toward Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck; the SAR 9mm recovered shortly after Defendant was arrested and an unrecovered firearm firing .225/5.56 NATO rounds. Additional evidence indicated that Mr. Ardoin had purchased a firearm chambered for .225/5.56 NATO rounds two days prior to the shooting. As such, the circumstantial evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, could reasonably be viewed to have established that both Defendant and Mr. Ardoin fired shots at Mr. Vaughn-Smith's vehicle. As intent to kill can be inferred from shooting at someone, the jury could reasonably have found Defendant had the specific intent to kill both men when he fired a weapon at Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck shortly after it passed the Toyota in which Defendant was a passenger.

Finally, although not specifically addressed by Defendant in his appellant's brief, it must be noted that the jury was charged in this case with the law of principals. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:24 provides that:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.

Referencing this provision, the supreme court has explained that:

A person may be convicted of an offense even if he has not personally fired the fatal shot. The law of principals states that all persons involved in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, are equally culpable. However, the Defendant's mere presence at the scene is not enough to “concern” an individual in the crime. A principal may be connected to those crimes for which he has the requisite mental state.”

State v. Hampton, 98-331 (La. 4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 880 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504 (1999). Notably, specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Stewart, 25-1032 (La. 6/29/26), _ So.3d _ (2026 WL 1861893).

As stated, the State presented evidence placing Defendant in the car with Mr. Ardoin and also presented evidence that two weapons fired upon Mr. Vaughn-Smith's truck. One of those weapons, the SAR 9mm recovered from the site of Defendant's arrest, was linked to a fragment recovered from the truck whereas an unrecovered weapon was responsible for the fatal shot. Pursuant to the law of principals, even if Defendant did not fire that fatal shot, the State's evidence clearly supports an inference that he was present and knowingly participated in the crime. He was thus “concerned in the commission” of the crime. See La.R.S. 14:24.

Finding that the record supports the defendant's convictions, we conclude that this assignment lacks merit.

Motion for New Trial

Defendant also asserts that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial error” in denying his motion for new trial. In particular, Defendant maintained that because the State did not disclose Ms. Matte as a witness until after the start of trial and then allowed defense counsel a pre-testimony interview with her, the defense was ambushed and “deprived of a fair chance to challenge.”

A trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial rests within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Turner, 16-1841 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 337, cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1080, 140 S.Ct. 555 (2019). In support of his motion for new trial, Defendant argued he was prejudiced by Ms. Matte's and Mr. Roy's testimony because they impermissibly bolstered Mr. Atkins's credibility before he testified or had his credibility attacked. Defendant did not mention at the trial court, as he urges here, the State's failure to disclose Ms. Matte as a witness prior to trial, the court's allowance of an out-of-court interview prior to her taking the stand. Those grounds are thus not properly before this court as a basis for why the trial court should have granted a new trial.

Further, while Defendant did file a “Motion for Disclosure of Witness Statements and Alternative Relief” addressing the State's failure to disclose Ms. Matte as a witness prior to trial, the trial court granted the exact relief requested, i.e., the opportunity to examine Ms. Matte “outside the hearing of the jury so as to ascertain the substance of [Ms. Matte's statement].” Defendant now argues that the requested relief was insufficient. We find no merit in this assertion.

Witness Testimony

Defendant's next assignment of error pertains to the basis that he did, in fact, advance in seeking a new trial. Repeating that claim here, Defendant again suggests that the trial court erred in “permitt[ing] the State's witnesses, Dakoa Matte and Kane Roy, to offer testimony primarily for the purpose of vouching for the credibility of the State's central witness, Earl Atkins.” As did Mr. Ardoin in the companion appeal, Defendant maintains that Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy were offered as character witnesses who bolstered Mr. Atkins's credibility.

Nothing in the testimony of either witness, however, discussed the credibility or character of Mr. Atkins. Like Mr. Ardoin in the companion case, Defendant relies upon La.Code Evid. arts. 607 and 608. See Ardoin, _ So.3d _.

In pertinent part, La.Code Evid. art. 607 states:

B. Time for attacking and supporting credibility. The credibility of a witness may not be attacked until the witness has been sworn, and the credibility of a witness may not be supported unless it has been attacked. However, a party may question any witness as to his relationship to the parties, interest in the lawsuit, or capacity to perceive or to recollect.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 608 further provides:

A. Reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of general reputation only, but subject to these limitations:

(1) The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

(2) A foundation must first be established that the character witness is familiar with the reputation of the witness whose credibility is in issue. The character witness shall not express his personal opinion as to the character of the witness whose credibility is an issue.

(3) Inquiry into specific acts on direct examination while qualifying the character witness or otherwise is prohibited.

In State v. Batiste, 363 So.2d 639 (La.1978), the supreme court determined that allowing an Assistant United States Attorney to testify that the State's key witness had agreed to testify truthfully in numerous cases constituted prejudicial error because the attorney was the first witness called. The court explained that trial counsel waived the issue, however, as counsel had failed to timely object or advance grounds for an objection.

In the trial of this case, defense objections regarding Ms. Matte addressed whether her testimony was irrelevant and cumulative of Mr. Roy's testimony. Defense counsel's objection to Mr. Roy testifying was likewise limited in scope. Counsel stated: “The basis for my objection is the relevancy of this witness, Judge. I see absolutely no probative value of his testimony. He was not present at the commissioning of the crime, there's absolutely no evidence that he has any connection whatsoever to the material facts[.]” Defense counsel did not object at trial on the basis that Mr. Roy was trying to bolster Mr. Atkins’ credibility.

In addition to this lack of objection at trial, and to the extent Defendant advanced them as a basis for his motion for new trial, we note that the trial court addressed this very argument in the denial of the motion, explaining:

The Court finds that the witnesses were fact witnesses and not character witnesses called to establish character of another witness. Allowing those witnesses to testify was in accordance with Louisiana law. Earl Atkins was subject to cross-examination in this matter. The alleged errors were not prejudicial to the extent that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Defendant has failed to satisfy its [sic] burden for a new trial. Accordingly, the Motion for New Trial is denied.

Here, Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy testified to Mr. Atkins’ location at the time of the shooting as well as who was—or was not—with him. This testimony, based on first-hand knowledge, differs from the type of evidence at issue in either Batiste. Defendant cites no jurisprudence or statutory authority supporting his contention a witness testifying to first-hand knowledge of another witness’ whereabouts constitutes testimony regarding the credibility of a later-called witness. We further note that Defendant's argument is premised on his contention that the State's case “turned almost entirely on the believability of Mr. Atkins[.]” Review of the record indicates that this is a disproportionate characterization of the importance of Mr. Atkins’ testimony. The record further undermines Defendant's contention that “the State's case turned so heavily on Atkins's testimony,” that the alleged error in its admission “struck at the heart of the central contested issue at trial and unfairly prejudiced” his right to have the jury make an independent assessment of the evidence. While Defendant contends that his convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for new trial, we find no merit in that contention. Rather, the record supports the trial court's rulings regarding the testimony of both Ms. Matte and Mr. Roy.

This assignment lacks merit.

Sentence

In his final assignment of error, Defendant asserts that his thirty-year sentence for attempted first degree murder is constitutionally excessive and constitutes a manifest abuse of the trial court's sentencing discretion. We find this assignment lacks merit.

We first point out that Defendant failed to object at the time the trial court pronounced the sentence. Further, although Defendant contends that a motion for reconsideration was timely filed and, in turn, was denied by the trial court, the record contains no such filing.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides:

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

We therefore do not consider Defendant's particular assertion that the trial court failed to consider “the circumstantial nature and relative weakness” of the State's evidence.

We instead review Defendant's argument as a bare claim of excessiveness. See State v. Cheatham, 25-629 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/25/26), 433 So.3d 157. Regarding the standard of review applicable to excessive-sentence claims, this court has explained:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate.

Id. at 162 (quoting State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331).

In reviewing the defendant's sentence, an appellate court considers the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Soileau, 13-770 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261. Further,

In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

Id. at 1006. The trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limits. Id. A manifest abuse of that discretion is required before a sentence within statutory limits will be set aside on appeal. Id.

The State did not seek the death penalty in this case. Thus, the mandatory sentence for first degree murder is life imprisonment at hard labor under La.R.S. 14:30. Defendant does not contest the excessiveness of his life sentence. Under La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a), the sentencing range for attempted first degree murder is imprisonment “at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” Contrary to Defendant's contention that the trial court imposed “the harshest available term on Count 2[,]” the thirty-year sentence for attempted first degree murder is a mid-range sentence.

Given the weight and gravity of the underlying offense, along with the fact that it was accompanied alongside a first degree murder, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's tailoring of the sentence for the conviction of attempted first degree murder. This court has previously held that such a mid-range, thirty-year sentence was not excessive even when imposed consecutively to a life sentence. In State v. Sant, 18-752 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/19), 268 So.3d 1102, writ denied, 19-777 (La. 11/12/19), 282 So.3d 226, the panel explained:

[T]here is no practical difference between running Defendant's sentences concurrently or consecutively. Defendant's thirty year sentence for conspiracy is consecutive to his mandatory life sentence, which he has not contested. As this court noted in State v. Dennard, 482 So.2d 1067, 1068 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1986), “Since [Defendant] has but one life to serve, it is difficult to see that a consecutive sentence would penalize him excessively.” Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in running Defendant's sentences consecutively.

Id. at 1112 (alteration in original).

In this case, the trial court ordered Defendant's sentences to run concurrently to each other. As noted in Sant, there is no practical difference in whether a sentence is concurrent or consecutive to a life sentence, as Defendant will spend the remainder of his life in prison. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sentencing of Defendant.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Jaiman Maurice Mason's convictions and sentences are affirmed. The trial court is instructed to correct the Uniform Commitment Sentencing Order to correctly reflect the trial court's order that the sentence imposed for first degree murder is to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

AFFIRMED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

P.O. Box 16577

Lake Charles, LA. 70616

(337) 433-9403

Elbert Lee Guillory

Attorney at Law

633 E. Landry St.

Opelousas, LA 70570

Chad Patrick Pitre

District Attorney 27th JDC

P.O. Box 1968

Opelousas, LA 70571

Kathleen E. Ryan

27TH JDC ADA St Landry

P. O. Box 1968

Opelousas, La 70571

Hon. Gregory James Doucet

Judge, 27th JDC

P. O. Box 777

Opelousas, LA 70571

Caleb K. Aguillard

Attorney At Law

141 South Sixth Street

Eunice, LA 70535

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

October 21, 2026

Docket Number: KA 26-33

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JADEN MICHAEL ARDOIN

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attached judgment and written opinion was rendered this date and a copy was mailed to the trial judge, all counsel of record and all parties not represented by counsel as listed above.

FOR THE COURT

Renée R. Simien Clerk of Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although numerous witnesses refer to the victim as “Smith,” the bill of indictment lists his last name as “Vaughn-Smith.” Accordingly, we will refer to the decedent as “Mr. Vaughn-Smith” unless the name “Smith” appears in a direct quote. Any reference to “Mr. Vaughn” is a reference to the victim of the attempted first degree murder, Mr. James Preston Allen Vaughn.

2.   Mr. Mason has also appealed his conviction and sentence, which has been consolidated with Mr. Ardoin's appeal and bears the docket number 26-34.

3.   At trial, the shell casings found at the scene of the shooting were sometimes referred to by witnesses as .223 shell casings and, at other times, as 5.56 NATO shell casings. Mohammed Ilyas Yasin, who conducted the firearms identification analysis in this matter, explained at trial that a .223 caliber cartridge and a 5.56 NATO caliber cartridge “are dimensionally the same. 5.56 NATO is a military designation of the same cartridge[.]” Thus, the shell casings described as .223 are the same shell casings described as 5.56 NATO. Hereinafter, we shall refer to these shell casings as .223/5.56.

4.   It has been established that “Buddha” is the codefendant, Jaiman Mason.

5.   The Canal station referenced by Mr. Vaughn is also referred to as the Texaco station by different witnesses. It is the same business. There is also a café located inside of the Canal/Texaco station which serves food.

1.   At trial, the shell casings found at the scene of the shooting were sometimes referred to by witnesses as .223 shell casings and, at other times, as 5.56 NATO shell casings. Mohammed Ilyas Yasin, who conducted the firearms identification analysis in this matter, explained at trial that a .223 caliber cartridge and a 5.56 NATO caliber cartridge “are dimensionally the same. 5.56 NATO is a military designation of the same cartridge[.]” Thus, the shell casings described as .223 are the same shell casings described as 5.56 NATO. Hereinafter, we shall refer to these shell casings as .223/5.56.

2.   Defendant does not question that the SAR 9mm recovered in the immediate area of his arrest, with his DNA on the gun, is connected to him.

WILBUR L. STILES JUDGE