ARITA v. IBERVILLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (2026)

In this matter, the plaintiff/appellant, Shamira Cummings Arita (“Arita”), was injured while attempting to smash a guitar on stage as part of her routine while performing at an event sponsored by the defendant/appellee, the Iberville Chamber of Commerce (“the Chamber”). She relied on the alleged promise of her dance partner, defendant/appellee, James Barker (“Barker”), that he would properly prepare the guitar to be smashed on stage, specifically by replacing its original strings, and she maintains he failed to do so. The Chamber and its insurer filed motions for summary judgment that were granted, and Arita now appeals.

For the following reasons, we affirm the grant of the Chamber's and its insurer's motions for summary judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Arita participated as a paid professional dancer in the Chamber's “Dancing with the Stars” event, which was held at a civic center allegedly leased by the Chamber from the Iberville Parish Council (“the Council”). Arita was paired with a volunteer celebrity, Barker, who purportedly requested that a rock star-themed dance be choreographed to include the smashing of a prop guitar on stage. Arita alleged the Chamber approved the routine, but neither it nor Barker properly prepared the guitar. Before walking on stage, Arita was handed the guitar but with the original strings intact. She attempted to smash the guitar; however, because the neck was still connected with the original guitar strings, the guitar struck and injured her knee.

Arita filed a petition for damages against the following defendants: the Chamber; the Council, through the Iberville Parish Parks and Recreation District and/or the Carl F. Grant Civic Center; Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”); Atain Specialty Insurance Company ¹ ; Barker; and Barker's unknown homeowner's insurer. Arita asserted claims of negligence, fault, strict liability, and/or omissions.

The Chamber then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Arita's petition, arguing it did not owe a duty to Arita, and alternatively if it did, the duty was not breached. The Chamber asserted Arita cannot produce evidence that it was anything more than a host/promoter of the event, and it had no control or custody over the performance or performers such as Barker. The following documents were referenced in and filed with the Chamber's motion: the petition; excerpts from Arita's deposition; and the affidavit of Pam Boesch (“Boesch”), executive director of the Iberville Chamber.

Subsequently, in a first supplemental and amending petition, Arita named Barker's insurer, Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), as an additional defendant, and she also alleged the Chamber was vicariously liable for the negligence of Barker and Kayla Messina (“Messina”), the event manager.

Arita opposed the Chamber's motion, arguing genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Chamber owed a duty that was breached. She further argued Barker was acting at the direction of the Chamber and performed for the benefit of the Chamber, making it vicariously liable for his negligence. Attached to her opposition to the Chamber's motion were: Messina's deposition and Boesch's deposition. Arita's opposition generally refers to Barker's deposition and her own deposition; however, the record does not include those documents as having been filed with the opposition nor does it reference them as having been previously filed into the record. Barker and Farm Bureau also joined Arita's opposition.

The Chamber and Great American filed a reply to Arita's opposition, maintaining the Chamber did not owe any specific duty to Arita that was breached and further arguing it was not vicariously liable for the acts of Barker, a volunteer, or Messina, the event manager.

Arita filed a supplemental memo in opposition to the Chamber's motion, arguing the Chamber, under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(F), should not be allowed to improperly raise new issues not addressed in its motion, e.g., denying vicarious liability for the actions of Messina and Barker.

Subsequently, Great American filed its own motion for summary judgment adopting the arguments, exhibits, and attachments set forth in the Chamber's motion for summary judgment.

The Chamber and Great American then filed a joint motion for summary judgment, arguing there is no basis in law or fact to justify imposing liability on the Chamber for Barker's or Messina's tortious conduct. The following documents were filed with the joint motion: the petition; the Chamber's first motion for summary judgment; the first supplemental and amending petition; Arita's opposition to the Chamber's first motion for summary judgment; the Chamber's and Great American's reply to the first motion for summary judgment; Boesch's affidavit; excerpts from Barker's deposition; and excerpts from Messina's deposition.

Subsequently, Barker and Farm Bureau opposed the Chamber's and Great American's joint motion for summary judgment. They argued the Chamber exercised significant control over Barker's volunteer activities to establish vicarious liability, or at minimum, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the Chamber's degree of control and the existence of a master-servant relationship between them. The following documents were filed with the opposition: excerpts from Boesch's deposition; excerpts from Barker's deposition; and excerpts from Jennifer Landry's deposition, the Chamber's office manager.

Arita also opposed the Chamber's and Great American's joint motion for summary judgment, maintaining a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Chamber owed a duty that was breached, and whether the Chamber is vicariously liable for Barker's and Messina's allegedly negligent activities. The opposition referenced Messina's deposition, Boesch's deposition, Barker's deposition, and Arita's deposition, but the record does not reflect that any documents were filed with this opposition. However, Arita subsequently filed a “Memorandum with Citations to Previously filed Exhibits in the Record Referenced in Plaintiff's Opposition to Iberville Chamber of Commerce's Supplemental or Second Motion for Summary Judgment” with citations giving the titles and filing dates for the documents ² as required by La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(4)(b).

The Chamber and Great American filed a reply to Arita's opposition to their motion for summary judgment.³

The various motions were heard on April 7, 2025. The district court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by the Chamber and/or Great American, reasoning “they met their burden of no genuine issue of material fact as to the two issues for vicarious liability and the custody controller knowledge that the Chamber would have with regard to the duty[.]”

On April 15, 2025, the district court signed a judgment stating:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions for Summary Judgment are granted and that all claims filed by Shamira Cummings Arita against The Iberville Chamber of Commerce and Great American Insurance Company are dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs.

In this appeal, we review the April 15, 2025 judgment granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the Chamber and Great American and dismissing Arita's claims against them. In a related appeal, our Docket Number 2025 CA 1282, we review an April 22, 2025 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Barker and Farm Bureau and dismissing Arita's claims against them. On Arita's motion, this court consolidated this appeal with Docket Number 2025 CA 1282 for oral argument and submission only.

DISCUSSION

Arita asserts the following assignments of error: (1) the district court was wrong to find the Chamber owed her no duty; and (2) it was also wrong in finding the Chamber was not vicariously liable for its employees and volunteers.

Summary judgment procedure is favored and “is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action” and “shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(2). In reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, this court applies a de novo standard of review using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Short v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 2022-0859 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/24/23), 361 So.3d 1051, 1058, writ denied, 2023-00535 (La. 6/7/23), 361 So.3d 973.

The initial burden of proof is on the mover. If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the mover's burden does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, but only to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more of the elements necessary to the adverse party's claim. Thereafter, the burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1). If the non-moving party fails to produce sufficient factual support in its opposition that proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, Article 966(D)(1) mandates the granting of the motion for summary judgment. See Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40 (per curiam); Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-0874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/20), 305 So.3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020-00835 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 315.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Short, 361 So.3d at 1059. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Id.

The Chamber's Duty

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315(A) states that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” Further, “[e]very person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.” La. Civ. Code art. 2316. Also, “[w]e are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by ․ the things which we have in our custody.” La. Civ. Code art. 2317. Whether a claim arises in negligence under Article 2315 or in premises liability under Article 2317.1, the traditional duty/risk analysis is the same. Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2022-00849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 473.

In Farrell, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment in a premises liability suit that was filed after the plaintiff slipped and fell while trying to traverse a large puddle of water at the edge of a gas station parking lot. In its analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court cleared up the admitted confusion in the jurisprudence surrounding the application of the duty/risk analysis when assessing an allegedly unreasonably dangerous condition in general negligence or premises liability claims. Id. at 478.

Farrell reaffirmed the well-settled rule that under the duty/risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of duty element); and (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element). Id. at 473. If the plaintiff fails to prove any one element by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant is not liable. Id.

Farrell then explained that courts have exhibited a tendency to conflate the duty and the breach elements when evaluating an allegedly unreasonably dangerous condition. The duty element, which is a question of law, examines whether there is any legal support for the plaintiff's claim that the defendant owed him a duty. Farrell, 359 So.3d at 473.

More specific to the case before us, “[s]ponsors of fairs and festivals owe to patrons of their events a duty of reasonable care, commensurate with the potential dangers posed by their operations.” Mosley v. Temple Baptist Church of Ruston, Louisiana, Inc., 40,546 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So.2d 355, 357 (citing Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 2003-1533 (La. 2/20/04), 866 So.2d 228, 235).

Arita argues the Chamber owed her a duty because it organized, managed, supervised, and controlled the event. Further, she contends the Chamber was responsible for the negligence of Boesch, its director; Messina, the event manager; and Barker, a volunteer.

She maintains the Chamber, its employee, its volunteer, and the event manager owed her a duty not to injure her or place her in a perilous position. The Chamber failed in this regard, she contends, because the use of the guitar was approved by the Chamber but not properly prepped by Barker, creating an unreasonably dangerous condition. Arita argues this duty was breached because Barker acquired and prepped the guitar, but he failed to prep it in conformity with her instructions. Further, Arita contends Boesch and Messina failed to properly supervise rehearsals. She argues that but for the Chamber's actions, she would riot have been injured. Moreover, she asserts an injury by a participant is within the scope of the duty. Lastly, she notes damage occurred because her knee required medical attention.

Contrarily, the Chamber argues it owed no duty to Arita because, while it acknowledges it did have general coordination over the event, it did not exercise control over the specific activity that caused harm: the use of a particular prop in a particular dance routine. The Chamber contends that it functioned solely as the sponsor of the event, and it was Arita's job to work with Barker to develop a dance routine and practice together. Further, the Chamber maintains that it did not approve or control the props or choreography used and did not participate in, or have knowledge of, the routine or decision to use the guitar—these decisions were independently made by Arita and Barker. In sum, the Chamber asserts it had no custody or control over the performance.

In Lambert v. Pepsico, Inc., 96-0648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 8/6/97), 698 So.2d 1031, writ denied, 97-2272 (La. 9/19/97), 701 So.2d 178, patrons of a fair at the Louisiana Superdome were burned while on a ride at the event. The defendants who were named in their capacity as sponsors and promoters of the fair filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing event sponsors cannot be liable for rides over which they have no control. Id. at 1032. Relying on St. Pierre v. Frey Amusement, 93-0653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/29/94), 635 So.2d 358, where a church was found not liable for an injury that occurred on a slide at a church event because the church had no control over the slide, Lambert found the plaintiffs failed to establish facts to defeat the conclusion that an event sponsor cannot be liable for an injury from an activity over which it had no control. Lambert, 698 So.2d at 1032.

Similarly, the Chamber argues its role was limited to organizing and sponsoring the event, while the activity that caused the injury—the smashing of a guitar as part of the dance routine—was entirely outside its control. The Chamber acknowledges it contracted with Messina to organize practices and rehearsals, but it notes Arita was a professional dancer contracted to choreograph the routine for herself and Barker.

In Coleman v. Lowery Carnival Company, 53,467 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/22/20), 295 So.3d 427, 430, writ denied, 2020-00594 (La. 9/23/20), 301 So.3d 1179, the Colemans’ child was injured after falling from a ride at the State Fair, and the Colemans sued the owner and promoter of the fair and the contractor who installed and operated the rides. Both owner/promoter and contractor filed motions for summary judgment that were granted. Id. at 431. As to the contractor, the Second Circuit reversed the summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether it owed a duty. Id. at 433. Regarding the promoter, however, Coleman found summary judgment was proper because the promoter was not involved in the operation or regulation of the rides. Id. at 435. Coleman found the evidence clearly established that the promoter was only responsible for providing the location for the fair, ride coupons and armbands, and advertising for the carnival. Id. at 436. Further, the court reasoned that the promoter's right to exclude rides it deemed undesirable did not rise to the level of control or assumption of duty that would raise a genuine issue of fact as to the promoter's liability. Id.

The Chamber argues the same principle applies here because its general coordination does not create a duty. The relevant inquiry, the Chamber contends, is not whether it organized the event, but whether it exercised control over the conduct that caused the injury, i.e., the smashing of a guitar as part of a dance routine.

The Chamber maintains that Arita instructed Barker to prepare the guitar for the performance and agreed to incorporate it into the routine. The Chamber asserts that it was not involved in these decisions and had no knowledge of the use of the guitar. The Chamber argues that Arita relies on generalized assertions of control, but these do not create a genuine issue of material fact; thus, Arita cannot satisfy the duty element of the duty/risk analysis.

The Chamber correctly notes that Lambert and St. Pierre found no liability for sponsors and promoters of events for activity over which the sponsor had no control. However, those cases offered no specific discussion regarding duty; instead, they broadly found no liability or that if a duty existed it did not apply. Lambert, 698 So.2d at 1032; St. Pierre, 635 So.2d at 361. In Coleman, the court discussed duty and found the sponsor did not have one because it was not involved in the operation and regulation of rides or employment and training of ride operators. Coleman, 295 So.3d at 436. In Mosley, where one patron was struck and hurt by another patron, the court accepted the position that the sponsor had a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of festival patrons. Mosley, 920 So.2d at 358.

According to the testimony from the Chamber's director, Boesch, it did exercise an element of control over the event and choreography even though Messina, a “third-party vendor,” was contracted to coordinate, choreograph, and manage the event Boesch confirmed the Chamber hosted and sponsored the event, and it promulgated a code of conduct for the participants. For example, if she had seen someone in an inappropriate outfit, she could have decided it had to be changed. Boesch further indicated that Messina sent her updates, sometimes daily, on the status of the practices. Moreover, the Chamber decided the location and time of the event and the dress rehearsal time. The dancers and volunteers were required by the Chamber to attend the rehearsal. The Chamber did not choose or create the choreography, but Boesch indicated it had the opportunity to review the routines, and hypothetically, it could refuse to authorize a prop for a routine if the Chamber found it dangerous.

Messina testified that she was paid by the Chamber to help manage the event, but the Chamber chose the volunteer celebrities and when and where the event took place. While Messina managed the event, Boesch was still the director and had ultimate authority if any issues came up, such as disagreements about routines, music, or costumes. Further, she testified the Chamber gave Barker and Arita permission to miss rehearsal.

In sum, although the Chamber allowed the dance partners and Messina much discretion over the routines, the Chamber retained ultimate control over them. Thus, following Farrell and Mosley, we find the Chamber owed Arita, a paid professional dancer, “a duty of reasonable care, commensurate with the potential dangers posed by their operations.” Mosley, 920 So.2d at 357.

Whether there was a breach of that duty is a different question and one mixed of fact and law. Farrell, 359 So.3d at 474. We assess this question through application of the risk/utility balancing test by evaluating: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff's activities in terms of social utility or whether the activities were dangerous by nature. Id. at 474. As Farrell held, if reasonable minds could only agree that the condition was not unreasonably dangerous, summary judgment may be granted based on the absence of liability as the plaintiff would be unable to prove the breach element at trial. Id. at 478.

The Chamber argues, alternatively, that if it did owe a duty, there was no breach because this matter involves a sudden and unforeseen act despite taking reasonable steps to ensure safety. In Mosley, the plaintiff was injured while attending the festival organized by a church when another patron broke her arm. Mosley, 920 So.2d at 356. Mosley sued the church, alleging a breach of duty to provide adequate security for an event on church property. Id. The church filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty and breached no duty, and the district court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit found the church had a duty to provide reasonable care for the safety of patrons. Id. at 358. Regarding breach of that duty, however, Mosley reasoned that for an estimated 2,500 attendees, the church had 150 volunteers and five uniformed officers working the event, and this constituted adequate security. Id. Mosley also testified she did not see the patron that hit her before it happened, and she did not think the patron meant to hurt her. Thus, the court reasoned this was a “sudden and precipitous event” the church would have a hard time preventing, regardless of the security presence. Id. Mosley found the plaintiff failed to show the church's security measures were insufficient under the circumstances; thus, summary judgment in the church's favor was appropriate. Id. at 359.

Similarly, the Chamber argues it held a charitable event that included numerous routines before and after the routine at issue, and there had been no prior accidents. Further, the Chamber notes it contracted with Messina to coordinate and manage the routines and contracted Arita, a paid professional dancer, to choreograph the routine at issue. This injury arose from Arita's own performance and her partner's actions, and the Chamber contends the risk associated with the use of the guitar was neither known nor reasonably foreseeable by the Chamber. The Chamber maintains that the performers were responsible for their own choreography and props, and it reasonably relied on the participants to govern their own performance. Thus, the Chamber argues it did not breach the general duty of care it owed Arita.

We agree. Under the risk/utility balancing test analyzing the breach element, we first look at the utility of the complained of activity. The presence of a guitar has the social utility of being an expected element of the event/routine sponsored by the Chamber, and it poses no inherent risk of harm.

Next, we address the likelihood and magnitude of the harm for the activity of smashing a guitar as part of the dance routine under the unique facts of this case. This factor examines the degree to which the condition will likely cause harm. If it is likely to cause harm, that weighs in favor of finding it is unreasonably dangerous, but if not, that weighs in favor of it not being unreasonably dangerous. Farrell, 359 So.3d at 474. The magnitude of the harm factor asks whether the activity presents a risk of great or small injury and the likelihood of each. Id.

Arita testified that during rehearsal they would not have smashed the guitar because they did not practice with props; instead, they would have held the guitar while practicing the choreography. Thus, the Chamber would have been hard pressed to prevent this accident regardless of how many times the routine was practiced at dress rehearsal because Arita and Barker would not have practiced smashing the guitar each time. Further, Arita noted that as a professional dancer she was concerned because anytime a prop is incorporated into a routine with someone who is not a professional, “who knows what could happen,” thus its “just the protocol. You practice with your props before you hit the stage.” Yet, she also acknowledged that she and Barker never practiced with any guitar. Moreover, Arita testified that the dance routine was a secret known only to her and Barker, other than someone she told with the Chamber.

Additionally, contrary to other testimony about missing dress rehearsal, Arita noted she and Barker attended the dress rehearsal; she noticed the strings had not been replaced; and she asked him if he would have strings replaced before the event. Thus, she knew the night before the event that the guitar was not prepped to her specifications. Further, Arita testified that she arrived at the event several hours early, and had approximately five minutes with Barker before the routine. She had time for a picture with Barker, but she did not ask him for a picture of the guitar or if she could see it before the routine to inspect the strings.

Importantly, Arita was a paid professional dancer hired to choreograph a routine. She agreed to incorporate the smashing of a guitar into that routine and claimed to know more about the guitar preparation than Barker. Arita was aware the guitar was not prepared to her specifications the night before the event, and she arrived at the event hours before the routine but did not ask to inspect the guitar. As the professional dancer in charge of the routine, had Arita thought it too dangerous for lack of practice or because Barker had not replaced the strings as she instructed, she could have determined the routine was not ready for the event and refused to participate.

Further, anyone encountering the guitar at issue at the concert would not necessarily conclude that it presented an unreasonable risk of harm because there is no evidence the average person knows that when a guitar is meant to be smashed in a dance routine, one needs to look to see if the guitar's original strings have been replaced with rubber or yarn, as Arita claimed. Moreover, there is conflicting testimony as to the proper way in which to prepare the guitar as a prop for smashing. Arita asserts the strings should have been replaced, but Barker testified they had no such conversation about replacing strings; rather, his understanding was the guitar needed to be broken at the “fretboard.” Therefore, under the unique facts of this case, we find that the complained-of activity did not present an unreasonable risk of harm.

Regarding the cost of preventing harm, the Chamber sponsored an event that involved couples dancing, and the Chamber's director acknowledged she knew little about dancing. Thus, the Chamber hired Messina, who also was a professional dancer, to manage the event. Further, the Chamber hired professional dancers, like Arita, to accompany the volunteer celebrity dance partners who were non-professional dancers. Thus, we find that by hiring professional dancers to choreograph dances and oversee props and by hiring a professional dancer to manage the event, the Chamber took reasonable care to prevent harm to the event's participants.

Therefore, we find Arita failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Chamber breached its general duty of reasonable care. Thus, summary judgment was warranted.

Vicarious Liability

Regarding vicarious liability, “[m]asters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed[,]” and “responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers ․ might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it.” La. Civ. Code art. 2320. Whether someone is an employee rather than an independent contractor is a fact-specific inquiry the essence of which is control, and the following factors are considered in a totality-of-the-circumstances approach: selection and engagement, payment of wages, power of dismissal, and power of control. Hillman v. Comm-Care, Inc., 2001-1140 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 1157, 1162-63.

“A servant is one employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who is subject to the other's control or right of control with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services.” Weaver v. City of Shreveport, 52,869 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/14/19), 276 So.3d 1091, 1095. Further, “[a]n unpaid volunteer may be deemed a servant of the organization accepting his services based upon the organization's right to control the volunteer's activities.” Id. (citing Cason v. Saniford, 2013-1825 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/6/14), 148 So.3d 8, 12, writ denied, 2014-1431 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So.3d 602). Moreover, the master-servant relationship may arise by implication and an express employee contract is not needed. Id. Also, “[a] non-servant agent contributes to the master's business, but is not such a part of his master's business that his physical acts and the time to be devoted to the business are subject to control.” Cason, 148 So.3d at 11-12.

In Weaver, the children of a couple killed in a law enforcement high-speed chase sued the city and the officers involved. The city filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing there was no master-servant relationship between the officers and the civilian volunteer who left keys in the vehicle, which allowed it to be stolen by the person involved in the police chase. Weaver, 276 So.3d at 1093-94. The court noted the Weavers had to show the volunteer was a servant of the police for purposes of the chase. Id. at 1095. The civilian regarded herself as a volunteer, and she and the city were pursuing a common purpose. Id. at 1096. Further, an officer indicated he believed he had control over the volunteer's action. Id. The court ultimately found a genuine issue of fact remained as to the master-servant relationship. Id.

In Cason, a church was sued for vicarious liability because its intern in a religious program struck another car while driving to a prayer meeting. This court noted the intern was an unpaid volunteer; did not have any authority or position within the hierarchy; paid tuition to participate in the program; was free to withdraw at any time; and the program did not furnish his transportation or dictate the route to be taken. Cason, 148 So.3d at 13. Further, this court noted that failure to attend the meetings could result in dismissal from the program or punishment in the form of writing chapters from the Bible. Id. Prior to the accident, the intern stopped to buy donuts at the request of a supervising volunteer, but doing so was not a requirement of the internship, and completion of the program did not result in the option to remain with the church. Id. Thus, this court found no master-servant relationship existed. Id.

Arita argues the Chamber is not entitled to summary judgment on vicarious liability because whether an organization has the right to control a volunteer, i.e., whether there is a master-servant relationship, is a question of fact. She contends the deposition testimony of Boesch, Messina, and Barker supports her position that all three were servants rendering services to the master, the Chamber. She asserts that Barker stated he volunteered for the event and did everything with the permission and direction of Boesch and Messina. Further, Arita contends it's unclear whether Messina was an employee, contractor, or volunteer. Additionally, she maintains Boesch had the right to control Messina's actions. Thus, Arita asserts that genuine issues of fact remain as to the employment status of Messina and Barker.

Contrarily, the Chamber argues it's not vicariously liable for Barker's or Messina's allegedly negligent conduct because Arita cannot establish a master-servant relationship.

As to Barker, the Chamber argues he was a voluntary participant in a charitable event, as he was not employed by the Chamber and did not perform subject to the Chamber's direction and control. Unlike the volunteer in Weaver, the Chamber contends Barker was not acting under its control; instead, he was merely a participant in a charity event who performed a dance routine. The Chamber maintains it did not manage the physical details of Barker's performance, unlike the police controlling the volunteer's actions in Weaver.

Regarding Messina, the Chamber argues it's not vicariously liable for her actions because she was an independent contractor. The Chamber notes that Messina was retained and paid to coordinate and manage the event pursuant to a verbal agreement. Her role, according to the Chamber, required independent judgment, specialized knowledge, and discretion; thus, it did not direct how she carried out her responsibilities, instead relying on her expertise. Therefore, the Chamber maintains it did not control Messina's work, confirming her status as an independent contractor.

We agree with the Chamber. Boesch attested that the Chamber has no expertise in dance or the use of props for dances, and it did not choose, have knowledge of, or create the choreography for the event. More specifically, it was not even aware Arita and Barker were going to perform a rock star-themed routine, and it did not acquire any props for them to use, as Barker noted the guitar belonged to him. The Chamber was not aware they planned to smash it as part of the routine; in fact, Boesch never discussed the matter with Arita and Barker. Moreover, Barker was not employed by and holds no leadership role within the Chamber.

Because it lacked expertise in dance and choreography management, the Chamber hired Messina to manage the event. The Chamber promulgated a code of conduct for participants, but Boesch testified the volunteer celebrities were chosen by industry partners and not the Chamber, and once chosen, the Chamber did not send them anything about their requirements, did not ask that they sign any agreement, and they were not compensated. On the night of the event, Boesch was managing ticket sales and crowd flow. If someone had an outfit on Boesch thought inappropriate, she would have talked to Messina about it and had Messina address it first; if that failed, the issue would come back to her. Boesch testified that Messina was not a Chamber employee; instead, she considered her a “third-party vendor” who coordinated, choreographed, and managed the event. Generally, the Chamber was not aware of choreography before the dance, but could have reviewed it and had authority to alter dances or props if it thought it necessary.

Messina testified that she is a former dance teacher, owned a studio, has experience renting venues, and has used props in routines before. She was approached by the Chamber in 2015 to help with the event and was initially a volunteer, but now she has a verbal contract with the Chamber and was paid approximately $2,500.00 to manage the event in 2022. She met with Boesch to discuss the event, and the Chamber chose the local celebrities to pair with the professional dancers. She maintains she was hired to manage the routines and actual dancers, but Boesch was still director of the event with ultimate authority. It was the Chamber, Messina testified, that determined where and when the event took place, and she provided updates to Boesch. She suggested a schedule to the dancers and volunteers, but they made their own schedule. She testified the Chamber gave Arita and Barker permission to miss the dress rehearsal, and the ultimate decision on routines remained with Boesch. Messina managed the event but had no say in time, location, ticket sales, celebrity selection, budget, lighting, DJ selection, or security.

Barker testified that he was never employed or paid by the Chamber, and it was his idea to use the guitar that he already owned as a prop. It was his understanding the dancers and celebrities choreographed the dance, and he and Arita managed their practice times and outfits. He acknowledged, however, the Chamber had authority to prohibit him from using songs with profane language or inappropriate choreography, for example. He testified he never had any discussion with Arita about changing the strings on the guitar as part of the needed alterations. He noted that no one from the Chamber questioned him about what they were doing with the guitar. He claims the guitar was visible for anyone to see; no one stopped to inspect it; and he discussed with Arita how he prepped the guitar by breaking it at the fretboard.

Regarding the elements of control, Barker was not compensated for his participation, and Messina was paid approximately $2,500.00 for her management services. As for authority, neither had much authority within the Chamber: Barker was acknowledged by all to be a volunteer, and Messina was hired to manage this particular event. Further, the Chamber did not restrict Barker's or Messina's travel in any way. Barker was free to practice his routine anywhere, and the Chamber only required the participants to be present for a dress rehearsal, but there is also testimony that he was given permission to miss the dress rehearsal. Neither Messina nor Barker were required to participate; they could leave at any time. Additionally, the Chamber did not provide for Barker's transportation to and from practices; he agreed to practice on his own time at locations agreed to with his dance partner. Moreover, the Chamber did not furnish the dance couples or Messina with specific instructions on dance style and props.

The Chamber, Messina, and Barker did have a common purpose, the success of the event at issue, and the Chamber did retain ultimate authority over the event. But it is also clear the Chamber hired Messina to manage this particular event, and according to the Chamber, relied on her independent judgment, specialized knowledge, and discretion. Thus, it did not direct how she carried out her responsibilities, instead relying on her expertise to govern the dancers and their partners, including Barker. We therefore find the facts presented do not establish a master-servant relationship between the Chamber, Messina, and Barker.

Accordingly, we find the Chamber met its burden by showing there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the master-servant relationship between the Chamber and Messina and Barker. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Chamber, finding no vicarious liability for Messina's and Barker's alleged negligence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's April 15, 2022 judgment granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the Iberville Chamber of Commerce and Great American Insurance Company. We assess all costs of this appeal to the plaintiff, Shamira Cummings Arita.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Atain Specialty Insurance Company was dismissed.

2.   The memorandum referenced the deposition of Kayla Messina, deposition of Pam Boesch with exhibits, deposition of James Barker with exhibits, and deposition of Arita with exhibits.

3.   The reply objected to Arita's attachment of the insurance policy to her opposition because it was not certified and thus improper under La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(4)(a). Neither the minutes nor the transcript indicate the district court ruled on the objection as required by La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(2); however, whether the policy was improperly considered is not pertinent to the issue before us.

LANIER, J.