STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LEO MICHAEL WILSON (2026)

The State charged the defendant, Leo Michael Wilson, by amended bill of information with simple burglary, a violation of La. R.S. 14:62, to which he pled not guilty.¹ Following a jury trial, the jury convicted the defendant as charged. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment at hard labor. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On March 9, 2023, officers with the New Roads Police Department (“NRPD”) responded to a possible vehicle burglary in progress at DNS Auto Repair on Hospital Road. Behind the building, officers observed the defendant rummaging inside the passenger side of a truck before fleeing on foot. Officers located the defendant hiding in a nearby pond, after which they detained him, read him his Miranda ² rights, and transported him to the police station. At the station, officers again advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, this time in connection with the execution of a waiver of rights form, which the defendant signed. The defendant admitted he “busted” the vehicle's window but insisted he did not take anything from the vehicle.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Suppress Statements

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress his statements made to police officers at the scene. Specifically, he contends the officers’ initial Miranda warning was incomplete and administered in a coercive setting during a physical struggle.

For a confession to be admissible, the State must show it was freely and voluntarily given without influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menace, threats, inducements, or promises. La. R.S. 15:451; La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Brown, 2016-0998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So. 3d 745, 789, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023). This “voluntariness” determination is based on the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was given. Brown, 347 So. 3d at 789. A trial court has considerable discretion in determining the admissibility of a statement, and its ruling should not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence. Brown, 347 So. 3d at 790. In determining whether the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress was correct, we may consider all pertinent evidence given at the motion hearing and the trial of the case. See State v. Parker, 2023-0941 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/27/24), 392 So. 3d 652, 658.

The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Those safeguards include that the defendant be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.

The Miranda safeguards are only applicable whenever a person in custody is subject to interrogation. See State v. Lozada, 2024-1245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/16/26), __ So. 3d __, __, 2026 WL 160555, *2; State v. Payne, 2001-3196 (La. 12/4/02), 833 So. 2d 927, 934. A person is in custody when “deprived of [their] freedom of action in any significant way[ ]” or “arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any offense[.]” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; La. Const. art. I, § 13; see State v. Noehl, 2024-01224 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So. 3d 360, 365. The term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Spontaneous and voluntary statements are admissible in evidence without Miranda warnings even where a defendant is in custody, as long as the statements are not made as a result of police interrogation or compelling influence. See State v. Dickerson, 2012-0388 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/12), 2012 WL 5387365, *7 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-2580 (La. 5/3/13), 113 So. 3d 209; State v. Smith, 2000-1838 (La. 5/25/01), 785 So. 2d 815, 817.

Temporary detentions that fall short of circumstances associated with a formal arrest are not considered custody for Miranda purposes, and statements made during such a temporary detention are not rendered inadmissible based on the absence of Miranda warnings. State v. Hill, 2025-0316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 8/19/25), 418 So. 3d 1119, 1130. This is true even in instances when officers instruct someone to sit down in a particular spot while they handle the situation at hand. Hill, 418 So. 3d at 1130. Even the use of handcuffs does not necessarily escalate a detention into a state of being in custody for Miranda purposes, particularly if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant while ․ question[ing] him. Hill, 418 So. 3d at 1130, quoting State v. Barabin, 2013-0334 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/11/13), 124 So. 3d 1121, 1124.

Prior to the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court reviewed NRPD officer-worn body camera footage, which recorded the defendant's statements made immediately after his detainment. Neither party presented any testimony at the hearing. Footage recorded by NRPD Officer Raven Chenevert begins with two other officers removing the defendant from the pond, handcuffing him, and advising him of the Miranda warnings. Officers then escorted the defendant to a police vehicle while he repeatedly stated he did nothing wrong. In a separate video recorded by Officer Chenevert, the defendant repeatedly voluntarily stated that although he “busted” the vehicle's window, he did not take anything from inside. Once at the police station, Officer Chenevert advised the defendant of his Miranda rights via a written form, which the defendant signed. The defendant insisted he did not take anything from the vehicle.

At the hearing, the defendant argued his statements should be suppressed because he made them without being fully advised of his Miranda rights. In response, the State argued Miranda had not attached at the point the statement was made as the defendant was not in custody nor was he interrogated. The defendant contended that he was in custody because he was handcuffed and held down by one officer while another officer began to read him his rights. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Miranda did not attach because the defendant's statements were voluntary and not a result of interrogation. The defendant objected to the trial court's ruling.

At trial, the State presented testimony from NRPD Officers Kevin Battley, Cody Baron, and Chenevert. Officers Battley and Baron each testified that, upon locating the defendant in the pond, they detained him, and Officer Baron advised him of his Miranda rights. Officer Chenevert testified her body camera footage was on and activated during that time, which confirmed the testimony of Officers Battley and Baron. The jury also viewed both of Officer Chenevert's body-camera videos.

After review, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the motion to suppress. At the time of the defendant's statements, the defendant was handcuffed and detained in connection with the burglary investigation, such that he was in custody. See Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; Noehl, 413 So. 3d at 365. However, NRPD officers did not interrogate or attempt to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. The defendant's statements occurred in the early stages of the investigation, i.e., during his initial detainment at the crime scene, transport, and immediately thereafter at the police station. See Payne, 833 So. 2d at 938. Further, his statements were spontaneous and voluntary, not in response to questioning by the police. See Payne, 833 So. 2d at 938. Thus, the “inherent compulsion” brought about by the combination of custody and interrogation was not present. Payne, 833 So. 2d at 938-939. Where there is no interplay of custody and interrogation, an individual's privilege against self-incrimination is not threatened. Payne, 833 So. 2d at 939. Accordingly, where the defendant's statements were voluntary and did not result from interrogation, the statements are admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings, and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress statements. This assignment of error is without merit.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Batson ³ challenge during voir dire. In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues his trial counsel was also ineffective at sentencing for failing to: (1) present mitigating evidence; (2) object to the sentence; or (3) move to reconsider the sentence. As both assignments of error relate to trial counsel's ineffective assistance, we will address them together.

Every criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; La. Const, art. I, § 13. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must first show his attorney's performance was deficient in that counsel made errors so serious he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, the defendant must show the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, depriving him of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is more properly raised by an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted.⁴ However, in the interest of judicial economy, an appellate court may address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel where the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue and the defendant raises the issue by assignment of error on appeal. State v. Harris, 2023-1298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/24), 404 So. 3d 876, 881, writ denied, 2025-00110 (La. 4/15/25), 406 So. 3d 421.

As to the defendant's first claim, the trial court did not undertake a Batson analysis because, as noted, defense counsel failed to make a Batson objection to the four African-American jurors peremptorily challenged by the State. As a result, the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that the State exercised any of its peremptory challenges to excuse those jurors on the basis of race, and the burden never shifted to the State to articulate race-neutral reasons for striking those jurors.⁵ Accordingly, this claim is more properly raised by application for post-conviction relief where, if necessary, the trial court may conduct a full evidentiary hearing. See State v. Turner, 2023-0831 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/19/24), 2024 WL 1694002, *7 (unpublished); State v. Cobb, 2013-1593 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/14), 144 So. 3d 17, 28-29.

We also cannot fully assess the defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective at sentencing. As noted by the defendant, his trial counsel did not file any post-trial motions prior to sentencing.⁶ At the sentencing hearing, the defendant's trial counsel did not present any mitigating evidence or argument to the trial court. The trial court imposed the sentence based on the charge and the facts presented at trial. Defense counsel neither objected to the sentence nor moved to reconsider the sentence, orally or in writing. The defendant received the maximum sentence for simple burglary, i.e., twelve years imprisonment at hard labor. See La. R.S. 14:62(B)(1). While the sentence was within the authorized range, it may have been different if the trial court had been presented with mitigating evidence, as the record does not establish that the defendant was the worst offender and the crime was the most serious offense. See State v. Skipper, 2024-0502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/26/25), 408 So.3d 593, 598 (“Maximum sentences may be imposed for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety in light of his past repeated criminality.”).

Nevertheless, an attorney's failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence in itself does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Harris, 404 So. 3d at 881-882. If the defendant can show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's error, his sentence would have been different, a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be found. Harris, 404 So. 3d at 882, citing State v. Scott, 2017-0209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So. 3d 207, 210, writ denied, 2017-1743 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So. 3d 410. In the instant case, the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence. See Harris, 404 So. 3d at 882. Accordingly, this claim is likewise more properly raised by application for post-conviction relief. See Turner, 2024 WL 1694002 at *7.

These assignments of error are without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State dismissed two additional counts of simple burglary prior to trial.

2.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3.   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

4.   The defendant would have to satisfy the requirements of the articles governing post-conviction relief found in La. C.Cr.P. art. 924, et seq., in order to receive such a hearing.

5.   In Batson, the Supreme Court adopted a three-step analysis for evaluating claims that the State used peremptory challenges in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the State exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if that requisite showing is made, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of showing purposeful discrimination. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1035, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).

6.   On the post-trial motions date, while the defendant was not present, defense counsel informed the trial court he would not be filing any post-trial motions. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that he “researched it and could[ ] [not] find anything [he] thought that would be appropriate to file” and that he was ready to proceed with sentencing.

MILLER, J.

McClendon, C.J. concur in the result reached by the majority.