ROBINS v. PIRZADAH (2026)

The plaintiffs appeal a trial court judgment in favor of the defendants in which the trial court granted the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action with prejudice. In addition, the trial court denied the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. The defendants filed an answer to the appeal, requesting that this court reverse the trial court's denial of its peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. For the following reasons, we deny the answer to appeal, and vacate and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter has been before this court previously, and the following relevant facts and procedural history are taken from this court's earlier opinion in Robins v. Pirzadah, 2019-0523 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/19), 292 So.3d 570, writ denied, 2020-00043 (La. 4/27/20), 295 So.3d 396 (Robins I).

On February 20, 2012, Douglas Robins presented to the emergency room (ER) at Our Lady of the Lake Hospital (OLOL) in Baton Rouge with complaints of chest tightness, shortness of breath, and coughing yellow sputum. Mr. Robins was first examined by Dr. Gerard Broussard in the ER, who ordered a chest x-ray. The x-ray revealed findings consistent with congestive heart failure (CHF).

Based on his examination and the x-ray, Dr. Broussard admitted Mr. Robins to the intensive care unit (ICU) under Dr. Pirzadah's care. Mr. Robins alleged that Dr. Pirzadah discontinued treatment for CHF as ordered by Dr. Broussard and diverted Mr. Robins from the ICU to a telemetry bed. Mr. Robins remained at OLOL overnight, and on the following day was seen by Dr. Pearson. Mr. Robins alleged that Dr. Pearson did not timely review the x-ray or electrocardiogram performed on Mr. Robins which indicated CHF, and thus misdiagnosed Mr. Robins with pneumonia.

During the afternoon of February 21, 2012, Dr. Pearson noted that Mr. Robins's condition was worsening. He transferred Mr. Robins to critical care after he was placed on a ventilator for being hypoxic.

․ When Mr. Robins was released from OLOL on March 8, 2012, he was diagnosed with anoxic brain damage, acute ventilator dependent respiratory failure, status post-cardiac arrest, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and candida in sputum. His prognosis for a functional recovery was poor.

[Mr. Robins and his wife, Katherine Robins,] filed a request for a Medical Review Panel (MRP). The MRP rendered an opinion, which was mailed to [Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins] on June 15, 2015. ․ [Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins] filed a petition for damages on September 10, 2015, in which they claimed that Dr. Pirzadah breached the applicable standards of care by failing to follow and continue Dr. Broussard's treatment plans for CHF, and by cancelling Dr. Broussard's plan for admitting Mr. Robins to the ICU, thereby reducing the level of acute care he required. [Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins] also claimed that Dr. Pearson breached the applicable standards of care by failing to review and interpret the chest x-ray and echocardiogram results, and by not diagnosing Mr. Robins’[ ] worsening CHF until it resulted in cardiac arrest and hypoxia.

Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants on September 26, 2018, finding that [Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins] failed to meet their burden of proof on their claims. The trial court dismissed [Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins’] suit with prejudice, and [Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins] appealed.

Robins I, 292 So.3d at 572-73.

On January 20, 2024, Mr. Robins died. On January 13, 2025, the plaintiffs, Katherine Robins, the wife of the decedent, and Douglas Edward Robins, II, and Soledad Robins, the Robins’ children, requested to convene a second MRP with the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund (PCF) pursuant to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA), La. R.S. 40:1231.1, et seq. In response to the plaintiffs’ MRP request, on April 9, 2025, the defendants, Mohammad Z. Pirzadah, M.D. and Charles L. Pearson, Jr., M.D., filed ¹ peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right of action and res judicata.² The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no right of action against them because the claims had previously been adjudicated and therefore they were barred by res judicata. In the second PCF complaint, the plaintiffs alleged medical malpractice by the defendants in their treatment of Mr. Robins at OLOL on February 20, 2012 through March 8, 2012, and asserted a claim for wrongful death. The defendants argued that the second PCF complaint alleged “substantially the same facts and allegations of medical malpractice that were the subject of the [f]irst PCF [c]omplaint filed in 2013 against [the defendants.]” The first PCF complaint was denied by a 2018 trial court judgment, that was affirmed by this court in Robins I, and writs were denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims against the defendants were dismissed with prejudice in a valid final judgment; therefore, another medical malpractice claim against the defendants could not be adjudicated in this matter.

The plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ exceptions, arguing the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata should be denied because two of the plaintiffs in this suit, Douglas Edward Robins, II, and Soledad Robins, were not parties in Robins I. The plaintiffs do not dispute that the first judgment in Robins I was valid and final; however, they argued that a MRP must determine the standard of care for a wrongful death cause of action. Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that res judicata at the medical review panel stage was premature. The plaintiffs further argued that they could not seek “all relief and rights” at the time of the first PCF complaint on February 19, 2012, because the wrongful death cause of action had not arisen until Mr. Robins’ death on January 20, 2024. The plaintiffs argued that the right of action did not exist at the time of the underlying final judgment regarding Robins I because Mr. Robins was still alive.

On June 30, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on defendants’ exceptions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata and denied their peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. In its ruling, the trial court stated that “[t]he negligence was an essential issue to the prior judgment, which [was] litigated and determined. So that's why [the trial court granted] the exception of res judicata.”

On August 25, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its oral ruling, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs subsequently devolutively appealed the judgment and assigned as error that the trial court erred by granting the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata. The defendants have answered the appeal seeking review of that portion of the judgment denying the peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action.

DISCUSSION

In their appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in sustaining the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata, arguing that the August 25, 2025 judgment and the judgment from Robins I involve different parties. They also argue that the second PCF complaint involves a wrongful death claim unlike the first PCF complaint in Robins I. The plaintiffs argue that the named parties in the first PCF complaint were only Mr. Robins and his wife, Katherine Robins, while the parties in the second PCF complaint were Katherine Robins, and the Robins’ two children, Douglas Edward Robins, II, and Soledad Robins. In sum, the plaintiffs argue that the elements of a res judicata defense are not present in this case because “the second lawsuit must involve the identical parties to those who litigated the prior case” and “the new lawsuit must involve the same underlying claim, or cause of action, as the first.”

The legislature itself has spoken and has enumerated the legal defenses available to a health care provider while a medical review panel proceeding is pending. Specifically, the LMMA allows health care providers in a medical review panel proceeding to raise only the defenses listed therein: no right of action and prescription/peremption. La. R.S. 40:1231.8(B)(2)(a); see Sebble on Behalf of Estate of Brown v. St. Luke's #2, LLC, 2023-00483 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So.3d 615, 625.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Perritt v. Dona, 2002-2601 (La. 7/2/03), 849 So.2d 56, 66, stated:

Based upon the provisions of [La.] R.S. 9:5628 and [La.] R.S. 40:1299.47(B)(2)(a)[3] a health care provider is allowed to only assert the peremptory exception of prescription during the medical review panel stage of the proceedings. [Emphasis in original.]

Following Perritt, La. R.S. 40:1231.8(B)(2)(a) was amended by 2012 La. Acts No. 802, § 1, to add that no right of action can be raised during the panel proceedings. The legislature did not add any other exceptions to the statute. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1231.8(B)(2)(a) as amended, now reads as follows:

A health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part may raise peremptory exceptions of no right of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 927 or any exception or defenses available pursuant to [La.] R.S. 9:5628 in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue at any time without need for completion of the review process by the medical review panel.

Accordingly, it appears that during the panel stage of the medical review proceeding, only the peremptory exception raising the objections of prescription/peremption or no right of action can be raised in the trial court. See Guffey v. Lexington House, LLC, 2018-475 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/22/18), 254 So.3d 1, 9, and rev'd, 2018-1568 (La. 5/8/19), 283 So.3d 1001. Therefore, we must vacate the trial court's judgment granting the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata as La. R.S. 40:1231.8(B)(2)(a) does not allow a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata to be raised during the medical review panel stage of the proceedings.

DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO APPEAL

On January 8, 2026, the defendants timely filed an answer to the appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. In sum, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs do not have a right of action in medical malpractice against them, as their claims against them were previously adjudicated and are barred by res judicata. The defendants further argue the plaintiffs right of action in this case was extinguished by Robins I. Therefore, the defendants request that this court reverse the portion of the August 25, 2025 trial court judgment denying their peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action.

When the legislature enacted La. R.S. 40:1231.8(B)(2), it was made clear that a “claimant” must possess a right of action to seek damages to make a valid request for a medical review panel. In re Medical Review Panel Claim of Babin, 21-198 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/15/21), 335 So.3d 332, 338, writ denied, 2022-00092 (La. 3/22/22), 334 So.3d 755. Only a person who has a real and actual interest can bring an action, unless otherwise provided by law. See La. C.C.P. art. 681. The peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action tests whether the plaintiff has any interest in judicially enforcing the right asserted. See La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(6). The exception does not raise the question of the plaintiff's ability to prevail on the merits nor the question of whether the defendant may have a valid defense. See Pearce v. Lagarde, 2020-1224 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/21), 330 So.3d 1160, 1166-67, writ denied, 2022-00010 (La. 2/22/22), 333 So.3d 446. A trial court's ruling on a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action is generally reviewed under the de novo standard of review to determine whether the trial court was legally correct. However, when evidence is introduced to support or controvert an exception raising the objection of no right of action, the trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. McKinley v. McKinley, 2024-0850 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/21/25), 410 So.3d 375, 379-80.

The party that files the exception raising the objection of no right of action bears the burden of proof. Three Rivers Commons Condominium Association v. Grodner, 2016-0067 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/17), 220 So.3d 776, 780 (per curiam), writ denied, 2017-0974 (La. 4/2/18), 248 So.3d 315. To prevail on a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, the defendant must show that the plaintiff does not have an interest in the subject matter of the suit or legal capacity to proceed with the suit. OXY USA Inc. v. Quintana Production. Co., 2011-0047 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/19/11), 79 So.3d 366, 376, writ denied, 2012-0024 (La. 3/2/12), 84 So.3d 536.

In examining a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, a court should focus on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but assume that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person. Turner v. Busby, 2003-3444 (La. 9/9/04), 883 So.2d 412, 415. As to the exception of no right of action, the function of the exception is a determination of whether plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. La. C.C.P. art. 927; Badeaux v. Southwest Computer Bureau, Inc., 2005-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So.2d 1211, 1217. In this case, because the plaintiffs are the spouse and children of the decedent, they belong to the class of persons to which the law grants a remedy for the negligence and wrongful death claims alleged. La. C.C. art. 2315.2.⁴ See Campbell v. Nexion Health at Claiborne, Inc., 49,150 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 436, 440. Thus, the record is clear that the plaintiffs have a “real and actual interest” in this case, as they belong to the class of persons which the law grants a remedy for the wrongful death claim alleged. See Id. at 440. As such, the trial court was correct in denying the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. Therefore, the defendants’ answer to appeal is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the August 25, 2025 trial court judgment granting the defendants’, Mohammad Z. Pirzadah, M.D. and Charles L. Pearson, Jr., M.D., peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata is vacated. The trial court's judgment denying the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action is affirmed. The defendants’ answer to appeal is denied. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendants.

VACATED; AFFIRMED IN PART; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendants attached several exhibits to its exceptions, which included the first and second PCF complaint, two supplemental and amending PCF claims, Mr. Robins and Katherine Robins’ petition, the transcript of the hearing for Robins I, the trial court's judgment for Robins I, this court's judgment for Robins I, and the supreme court's decision denying writs for Robins I.

2.   The defendants also filed a motion for sanctions that is not at issue in this appeal.

3.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.47 was re-designated to La. R.S. 40:1231.8 by 2015 La. Acts No. 84.

4.   Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.2 sets forth the classes of beneficiaries for wrongful death actions, as follows: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving; (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving; and (4) the surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving. The primary category of beneficiaries under this article includes “children” of the deceased tort victim. See Warren v. HDI Global Insurance Company, 21-570 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/22), 341 So.3d 1249, 1258, writs denied, 2022-00938, 2022-01002 (La. 11/1/22), 349 So.3d 10 and 349 So.3d 5.

STROMBERG, J.