SHAMIRA CUMMINGS ARITA v. THE IBERVILLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE THE IBERVILLE PARISH COUNCIL THROUGH THE IBERVILLE PARISH PARKS AND RECREATION DISTRICT AND OR THE CARL GRANT CIVIC CENTER GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY ATAIN INSURANCE COMPANY JAMES BARKER AND UNKNOWN INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

In this matter, the plaintiff/appellant, Shamira Cummings Arita (“Arita”), was injured while attempting to smash a guitar on stage as part of her dance routine while performing at an event sponsored by the defendant/appellee, the Iberville Chamber of Commerce (“the Chamber”). She relied on the alleged promise of her dance partner, defendant/appellee, James Barker (“Barker”), that he would properly prepare the guitar to be smashed on stage, specifically by replacing its original strings, and she maintains he failed to do so. Barker and his insurer, Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), filed motions for summary judgment, and one was granted dismissing all of Arita's claims and one was passed without date. Arita now appeals.

For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of Barker's and Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment regarding immunity.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Arita participated as a paid professional dancer in the Chamber's “Dancing with the Stars” event, which was held at a civic center leased by the Chamber from the Iberville Parish Council (“the Council”). Arita was paired with Barker, a volunteer celebrity, who purportedly requested that a rock star-themed dance be choreographed to include the smashing of a guitar on stage. Arita alleged the Chamber and/or the Council approved the routine, but neither it nor Barker properly prepared the guitar. Before walking on stage, Arita was handed the guitar but with the original strings intact. She attempted to smash the guitar; however, because the neck was still connected with the original guitar strings, the guitar struck and injured her knee.

Arita filed a petition for damages against the following defendants: the Chamber; the Council, through the Iberville Parish Parks and Recreation District and/or the Carl F. Grant Civic Center; Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”); Atain Specialty Insurance Company ¹ ; Barker; and Barker's unknown homeowner's insurer. Arita asserted claims of negligence, fault, strict liability, and/or omissions. In a first supplemental and amending petition, Arita named Farm Bureau as an additional defendant, and she also alleged the Chamber was vicariously liable for the negligence of Barker and Kayla Messina (“Messina”), the event manager.

Barker and Farm Bureau filed two motions for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss Arita's claims against them. In the motion at issue on appeal, they contend Barker was a volunteer and statutorily immune for all alleged acts of negligence pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2792.3. The following documents were referenced in and filed with Barker's and Farm Bureau's first motion for summary judgment: the deposition of Pam Boesch (“Boesch”), executive director of the Chamber; excerpts from Barker's deposition; excerpts from Arita's deposition; and Barker's and Farm Bureau's answer to Arita's first supplemental and amending petition.

Subsequently, Barker and Farm Bureau filed a supplemental and/or alternative motion for summary judgment, maintaining Barker is immune from acts of negligence pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2792.3 and further arguing there is an absence of factual support to find he owed or breached a duty to Arita. Barker's supplemental/alternative motion referenced and attached the petition and Arita's deposition.

Arita filed an opposition to Barker's and Farm Bureau's motions for summary judgment. She argued La. R.S. 9:2792.3 was inapplicable to Barker and/or the Chamber. Further, she asserted Barker assumed a duty to her that he breached. The opposition referenced Messina's deposition, Boesch's deposition, Barker's deposition, and Arita's deposition, but the record does not reflect that anything was filed with this opposition. The opposition did attach exhibits Al, A2, A3, A4, and A5 that included: certified records from the Louisiana Secretary of State, including an amendment to the Chamber's articles of incorporation; IRS website printouts explaining different nonprofit organizations; and the civic center lease.

Subsequently, Arita filed a “Memorandum with Citations to Previously filed Exhibits in the Record Referenced in Plaintiff's Opposition to James [Barker]’s and Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment” with citations providing the titles and filing dates for the documents as required by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(A)(4)(b).

Barker and Farm Bureau filed a reply in support of their motion, and they objected to several of Arita's exhibits because exhibits A2, A3, and A4 were website printouts explaining IRS provisions. Barker and Farm Bureau objected on the grounds the exhibits were improper summary judgment evidence under La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(4)(a). At the hearing, Arita's counsel agreed to withdraw them.

The various motions were heard on April 7, 2025. The district court granted Barker's and Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity, reasoning that:

Barker was a volunteer working for a nonprofit organization, and although this might not have been a fair or festival, I think the scope of fundraising for different organizations, nonprofit organizations, has expanded over the years. I think this still falls under the type of activity that is meant to be covered by this particular statute so the motion for summary judgment will be granted.

On April 22, 2025, the district court signed a judgment stating:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants, James Barker and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company's, Motion for Summary Judgment seeking statutory immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2792.3 for all claims of Plaintiff that seek to hold James Barker individually liable is GRANTED. Accordingly, all claims of Plaintiff against James Barker and Southern [sic] Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company in this matter are DISMISSED with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the hearing and argument on James Barker and Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company's Supplemental and/or Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment was passed without date.

In this appeal, we review the April 22, 2025 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Barker and Farm Bureau and dismissing Arita's claims against them. In a related appeal, our Docket Number 2025 CA 1281, we review an April 15, 2025 judgment granting the motions for summary judgment filed by the Chamber and Great American and dismissing Arita's claims against them. On Arita's motion, this court consolidated this appeal with Docket Number 2025 CA 1281 for oral argument and submission only.

DISCUSSION

Arita asserts the following assignment of error: the district court was wrong to find that Barker is immune from his alleged negligence under La. R.S. 9:2792.3.

Summary judgment procedure is favored and “is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action” and “shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(2). In reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, this court applies a de novo standard of review using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Short v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 2022-0859 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/24/23), 361 So.3d 1051, 1058, writ denied, 2023-00535 (La. 6/7/23), 361 So.3d 973.

The initial burden of proof is on the mover. If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the mover's burden does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, but only to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more of the elements necessary to the adverse party's claim. Thereafter, the burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1). If the non-moving party fails to produce sufficient factual support in its opposition that proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, Article 966(D)(1) mandates the granting of the motion for summary judgment. See Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40 (per curiam); Jenkins v. Hernandez, 2019-0874 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/3/20), 305 So.3d 365, 371, writ denied, 2020-00835 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So.3d 315.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or determine the truth of the matter but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Short, 361 So.3d at 1059. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Id.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2792.3 provides:

A person who serves as a director, officer, trustee or volunteer worker for any nonprofit organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, including but not limited to an organization whether incorporated or not, which sponsors a fair or festival, or any nonprofit historical organization, whether incorporated or not, which is organized for civic or historical purposes, whether he serves with or without compensation for such services shall not be individually liable for any act or omission resulting in damage or injury arising out of the exercise of his judgment in the formation and implementation of policy, or arising out of the management of affairs, while acting as a director, officer, trustee or volunteer worker of that organization, provided he was acting in good faith and within the scope of his official functions and duties, unless such damage or injury was caused by his willful or wanton misconduct. (Emphasis added.)

Arita argues that the Chamber is not the type of organization generally protected under the statute and that Barker did not perform activities generally protected. Arita contends the statute does not apply to all nonprofits or all injuries caused by a volunteer worker; instead, it applies only to those that specifically arise out of certain functions involving the formation of policy and/or the management of the affairs of the organization, but Barker is involved in neither. Even if the Chamber was a qualifying organization, Arita maintains that negligently preparing a guitar to be smashed as part of a dance routine is simply not covered.

“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La. Civ. Code art. 9. When interpretation is needed, the paramount consideration is the Legislature's intent because “[l]egislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.” La. Civ. Code art. 2; Grant v. Grace, 2003-2021 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1011, 1014. When the language of the law is ambigous, “[t]he words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning;” “interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law;” and the “meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.” La. Civ. Code arts. 10, 11, and 12.

There is little jurisprudence on the statute at issue, but Arita argues other courts have addressed immunity for recreational use under another statute, La. R.S. 9:2795, and their approach should be followed here because under La. Civ. Code art. 13, “[l]aws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.” Because immunity statutes are in derogation to common rights, they are strictly interpreted and should not be extended beyond their obvious meaning. See Monteville v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Government, 567 So.2d 1097, 1100 (La. 1990). Further, tort immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in an answer, and the one asserting immunity has the burden of proof. Grimsley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 52,872 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/14/19), 276 So.3d 1142, 1147, writ denied, 2019-01467 (La. 11/12/19), 282 So.3d 232.

Arita argues that La. R.S. 9:2792.3 can be broken down into three parts: the qualifying person and organization, the qualifying activity, and an exception for willful misconduct.

As for the qualifying organization, Arita contends the Chamber is neither a nonprofit organization sponsoring a fair nor a nonprofit historical organization established for civic or historical purposes. She notes the Chamber is registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State as a nonprofit 501(C)(6) organization—generally consisting of business leagues and chambers of commerce formed to promote the business interests of its members—not a nonprofit 501(C)(3) charitable organization or a 501(C)(4) nonprofit civic organization. According to Arita, because the Chamber is not an organization falling under the statute, no immunity attaches for a person serving as a volunteer for it.

Regarding the qualifying activity, Arita argues even if this court finds the Chamber was a qualifying organization, the injury must have arisen out of “the formation and implementation of policy” or “out of the management of the affairs” of the organization. However, according to Arita, Barker was a volunteer with no authority within the Chamber over policy or management and who received no fee. Therefore, because Barker's alleged negligence does not fall under the statute, Arita argues La. R.S. 9:2792.3’s immunity does not apply here.

Contrarily, Barker argues the statute must be interpreted as having a meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. Barker contends it is logical to presume the intent of the statute is to encourage civic involvement by assuring participants at charitable events they will not be sued for simple negligence, as such would have a chilling effect on volunteers’ willingness to participate in such events. Thus, Barker maintains the reasonable result of La. R.S. 9:2792.3 is to provide tort immunity to individuals in the exact scenario presented here—where a person is sued in his individual capacity for negligence for acts arising out of his activity as a good steward in the community by volunteering his time without compensation.

Regarding whether the Chamber is the type of nonprofit that qualifies under the statute, Barker argues the first sentence of La. R.S. 9:2792.3 includes broad language of “any nonprofit organization,” and it then proceeds to give illustrative examples such as sponsors of fairs and historical organizations created for civic purposes. Further, even if this court interprets the language to apply only to the examples given, Barker contends the Chamber still qualifies because it relates to the parish's community affairs. Arita's argument, Barker maintains, is based solely on the Chamber's 501(C) subsection designation, but the statute makes no mention of the Federal Tax Code. Such an argument, Barker asserts, would result in absurd conclusions where immunity for volunteers would be dependent on the nonprofit's tax classifications.

As for Barker's actions, he argues his participation was a qualifying activity as well. While Barker acknowledges he had no role in forming or implementing policies for the Chamber, he also notes the statute includes acts “arising out of the management of affairs” for the organization. Barker's alleged activity is the negligent preparation of a guitar to be used exclusively for the event. Thus, Barker contends by Arita's own pleading he was acting as one who donated his time to the Chamber. Additionally, Boesch testified that as a volunteer Barker was to manage the acquisition of props for his routine.

Regarding the exception under the statute for “willful or wanton misconduct,” Barker argues there has been no evidence to suggest ill will or hostility on his part toward Arita, thus, that exception does not apply.

As to the types of organizations the statute applies to, we agree with Barker that the clear and unambiguous language of the statute refers to “any nonprofit organization,” and it does not necessarily require the organization to fall within a certain federal tax classification for the statute's immunity to apply. Further, Boesch testified that the Chamber was a nonprofit organization. Thus, we find the Chamber's 501(C)(6) designation irrelevant. Moreover, Arita's argument regarding the activity the different organizations undertake is based on website printouts explaining IRS provisions that were objected to and that Arita's counsel agreed to withdraw.

We disagree, however, as to Barker's status. In Lester v. BREC Foundation, 2022-0514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 18, writ denied, 2023-00019 (La. 3/7/23), 357 So.3d 351, this court interpreted the recreational use immunity provision found in La. R.S. 9:2795. Although this is not the statute before us in this appeal, we find the analysis instructive. While playing golf on property owned by BREC, Lester was struck by LeBlanc, BREC volunteer golf marshal, driving a golf cart. Lester sued LeBlanc and BREC and alleged that BREC was vicariously liable for LeBlanc's actions. BREC and LeBlanc filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing no liability applied to either under La. R.S. 9:2795, and the district court granted the motion. As to LeBlanc's request for immunity under the statute, this court found that LeBlanc had no power to govern the management or policies of the golf course or any authority over the operation of the course. Id. at 26. Thus, this court found immunity did not apply under the statute. Id.

Here, it is undisputed that Barker was an unpaid volunteer and non-professional dancer who agreed to dance in the Chamber's sponsored event. We find that his alleged negligent activity—failing to properly prepare a guitar to be smashed on stage as part of his dance routine—does not fall within the statute's language that a qualifying activity must “aris[e] out of the exercise of his judgment in the formation and implementation of policy, or aris[e] out of the management of affairs[.]” La. R.S. 9:2792.3. Because Barker had no leadership role within the Chamber, and applying the principle that tort immunity statutes are strictly construed, we find that his activity did not involve policy implementation or the management of the Chamber's affairs. Thus, La. R.S. 9:2792.3’s immunity is inapplicable here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the district court's April 22, 2025 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment regarding immunity is reversed. We assess all costs of this appeal to the defendants, James Barker and Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.

REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Atain Specialty Insurance Company was dismissed.

LANIER, J.