STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHARLES LEE WOODS JR (2026)

Defendant, Charles Lee Woods, Jr., appeals his sentences totaling forty-five years in the Louisiana Department of Corrections (“LDOC”) following his convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment while armed with a dangerous weapon, and domestic abuse aggravated assault. For the reasons set forth, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged by bill of information on June 24, 2024, with carjacking, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64.2; armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64; false imprisonment while armed with a dangerous weapon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:46.1; and domestic abuse aggravated assault, in violation of La.R.S. 14:37.7(A). All of the charged offenses occurred on March 2, 2024, and all involved the victim, Shantel Delean Williams.¹ On July 15, 2024, Defendant appeared in court and entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. On March 17, 2025, the State filed an amended bill of information deleting the charge for carjacking and amending the charge of domestic abuse aggravated assault to domestic abuse aggravated battery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(A) and (O).

On March 18, 2025, the morning of jury selection, Defendant moved to continue the trial, arguing that he was prejudiced by the amendment of the bill of information the previous day because the domestic abuse aggravated battery charge had different elements of proof and a higher penalty than the previous charge. While the State opposed the continuance, it declared that it was amending charge back to domestic abuse aggravated assault. This second-amended bill of information was filed prior to jury selection and with that, the trial court denied the motion to continue. Defendant then entered a not guilty plea to the second-amended bill of information.

The case then proceeded to a trial by jury. At trial, the State called three witnesses, Officer Nicholas Ray Spencer, the victim, and the victim's cousin, Jollyn Nixon.

Officer Spencer,² a former employee of the Jennings Police Department, testified that he was dispatched to the Walmart Supercenter (“Walmart”) in Jennings, Louisiana on March 2, 2024, in reference to a call that “a Mr. Charles Woods was chasing the victim through the Wal-Mart [sic] parking lot with a knife entering WalMart [sic].”

Officer Spencer stated that upon arrival at Walmart, he approached a large crowd of people near the grocery entrance and observed a black Dodge Challenger automobile that appeared to have crashed into a parked car. When he exited his patrol unit, he “started talking to the crowd who basically corroborated the caller's statements saying they observed the male subject later identified as Mr. Charles Woods to be chasing the victim through the parking lot with a knife.” He then located the victim, who had been secreted in a dressing room by Walmart employees for her safety. Officer Spencer testified that she was visibly “ very upset[,]” “crying[,]” and “appeared to be really scared in the moment.” He stated that he noticed she was “holding a napkin in her right hand with what looked like blood on it[,]” and “[w]hen I asked her what happened, she said it was due to the incident between her and Mr. Woods.” He stated that while waiting on an ambulance for the victim, he and Walmart employees isolated video footage of the incident captured on three different security cameras. The State introduced the three surveillance videos during his testimony and played them for the jury.

The victim testified that she had been in a relationship with Defendant and had lived with him at his residence until two days before the incident, when she ended the relationship and moved out. She identified Defendant as the person on the surveillance video and the perpetrator of the crimes against her. The victim's cousin, Jollyn Nixon, also testified that she observed at least some of the events that occurred at Walmart, and she identified Defendant as the perpetrator.

Defendant ³ acknowledges, in brief, that the evidence presented by the State at trial established the following:

According to the testimony of Shantel Dejean Williams (hereinafter referred to as Williams), on or about March 2, 2024, she had just finished her daily shopping at the Wal-Mart [sic] in Jennings and was seated in her vehicle with the door open while applying makeup she had just bought. Appellant Charles Lee Woods, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as Woods) approached her vehicle and attempted to speak to her about their recent break up. At some point during the conversation, Woods produced a kitchen knife and demanded Williams move over to the passenger side of the vehicle.

Woods began asking Williams for her keys, and when she did not comply, he “poked” her with the knife. During the incident, Woods cut Williams[’] hand with a knife as she blocked her face.

Woods then began searching for Williams's key on her person, located it, and started the vehicle. Williams asked if Woods was going to kill her, and he said “yeah.”

Next, Woods began driving the vehicle out of the parking lot, with Williams exiting the vehicle while it was in motion. Woods then also exited the vehicle while it was still in drive and began chasing her into the store with the knife in his hand. The vehicle then crashed into a parked vehicle.

On the day of the incident, Jollyn L. Nixon, the cousin of Williams, was also shopping at Wal-Mart [sic] with her mother Laura[,] Nixon and her two minor children. As she exited Wal-Mart [sic], Williams ran up to her screaming for help and stating, “He's trying to kill me.” Williams ran into Wal- Mart [sic], and Woods ran behind her. She then observed Woods exit Wal-Mart [sic].

Nicholas Ray Spencer, with the Jennings Police Department, received a dispatch call. The caller said that Woods was chasing a victim through Jennings Wal-Mart [sic] parking lot. He arrived and canvassed the parking lot for Woods; however, Woods had already fled the scene.

Spencer located a crowd near the entrance and observed a black Dodge Challenger crashed into a parked car. The crowd also indicated that Woods had chased the victim through the parking lot with a knife. Wal-Mart [sic] employees reported that they hid Williams in the women's dressing room, and they escorted Spencer there to interview Williams.

Spencer observed Williams to be crying and fearful. He saw that she was holding a bloody napkin in her right hand, and he asked her what happened. She said that the cut was due to the incident between her and Woods.

Spencer then called an ambulance and took Williams to review the surveillance video. Wal-Mart [sic] security was not able to download the video, and he was instructed to check back later. He returned later that afternoon or the next day to obtain the videos.

Spencer testified to being unable to locate Woods; he put out a BOLO on Woods to surrounding agencies. Woods was arrested a few days later in Acadia Parish, specifically the city of Midland.

(Record page numbers omitted.)

After the State rested its case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Defendant offered no evidence, and thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts on each count. A pre-sentence investigation was ordered and prepared. Defendant was then sentenced to serve thirty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on the armed robbery conviction; ten years on the false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon conviction; and five years on the domestic abuse aggravated assault conviction. All of the sentences were ordered to be served with LDOC and to run consecutively to one another. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence on July 7, 2025, which was denied. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Defendant urges two assignments of error:

I. Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 487, the State is prohibited from making substantive amendments to a bill of information after trial has commenced. Here, the State amended the bill of information to change the charge after trial had begun. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial upon the State's mid-trial amendment of the bill of information.

II. Under Louisiana jurisprudence, maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders. Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant to combined consecutive sentences totaling forty-five (45) years at hard labor, with thirty of those years being without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the sentence imposed is excessive and should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

DISCUSSION

The Amending of the Bill of Information

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after the State amended the bill of information back to the original charge of domestic abuse aggravated assault following the start of trial. This ruling was in response to Defendant's objection wherein he alleged prejudice by the State's earlier amendment to domestic abuse aggravated battery, which has different elements of proof and a higher penalty than the previously billed charge. Defendant argues that La.Code Crim.P. art. 487 prohibited the State from making substantive amendments to the bill of information after trial commenced, which he alleges was done here. We disagree.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 487(A) provides that “[b]efore the trial begins the court may order an indictment amended with respect to a defect of substance[ ]” but that “[a]fter the trial begins a mistrial shall be ordered on the ground of a defect of substance.” Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 761, “[a] jury trial commences when the first prospective juror is called for examination.” The motion to continue the trial, filed by Defendant on March 18, 2025, resulted in the State amending the bill back to its original charge of domestic abuse aggravated assault to alleviate his claim of prejudice. The trial court accepted the amendment and denied the continuance.

Our review of the record reflects that the March 18 amendment to the bill of information came before the first prospective juror had been sworn in, and the trial court addressed the matter before the first panel of prospective jurors was called up for examination. Thus, the trial had not yet commenced as per the plain language of La.Code Crim.P. art. 761. Accordingly, no mistrial was required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 487(A), and Defendant's argument to the contrary lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

Defendant next urges that because the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive under the circumstances of this case, it should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. After correctly noting that Defendant's sentence requires him “to serve a total of forty-five years hard labor at DOC, thirty of which being without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence[,]” he argues that “[t]he trial court's sentence fails to consider any mitigating factors, such as his educational history, family history, age, and other relevant factors.” He further argues that the “consecutive sentences lacked particular justification as required by [La.Code Crim.P. art.] 883.” Again, we disagree.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court gave an extremely thorough, well thought out, and rational explanation for the sentences imposed:

Mr. Woods you stand before the Court today for sentencing after having previously been found guilty by a jury of your peers for the crime of Armed Robbery, False Imprisonment, Armed with a Dangerous Weapon, Domestic Abuse Aggravated Assault. The Court ordered a presentence investigation which has now been received and carefully studied.

The Court has considered the following factors as well as the nature of the present offence [sic] in interpreting an appropriate sentence. The Court makes the following findings in considering sentencing.

Armed [sic] Robbery in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:64 carries with it a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for no less than ten (10) and no more than 99 years without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

False Imprisonment Armed with a Dangerous Weapon [,] a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:46.1 carries with [sic] a sentence of imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than ten (10) years.

Domestic Abuse Aggravated Assault, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:37.7 carries with it a fine up to $5000 and a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than one [sic] no [sic] more than five (5) years.

The presentence investigation report indicates that you're 53 years of age. You are currently divorced with five young children. Your highest level of education is the 10th grade when you quit attending high school in Jennings. You have previously worked in the construction industry and the oil field related jobs.

The presentence investigation state [sic] that you do not have a criminal history; however, you do have eight (8) prior felonies.

In particular on January 24, 2000, you pled no contest to Sexual Battery in Jefferson Davis Parish for which you received a five (5) year sentence with the Department of Corrections. On June [sic] in which he received a five-year sentence with the Department of Corrections.

On June 20, 2000[,] you pled to Second-Degree Kidnapping in Calcasieu Parish and received a six (6) year sentence with the Department of Corrections.

On April 14 of 2008[,] you pled no contest to Simple Rape in Acadia Parish and was sentenced to fifteen (15) years with the Department of Corrections.

In addition, you were also charged while incarcerated with Introduction of Contraband into a Penal Facility which you received additional time added to your sentence.

The instant offense on March 2, 2024, a patrolman with Jennings Police Department responded to an active Armed Robbery in the parking lot of Walmart. While in route the patrolman stated you were the suspect and you were chasing the victim with a knife and both of you had entered the store. Once the patrolman arrived, the witnesses stated that you had left the store and got into a white Chrysler Sedan and drove onto [sic] the eastbound lane of I-10. The officer went into the store and questioned the victim and stated that she had been in a relationship with you until two days earlier, and that you threatened her with a knife. She stated that she had gotten into her car when she was leaving the store and you attempted to make her drive.

However, the victim was able to jump from the moving vehicle so she could escape. She sustained an injury to her hand in [sic] a result of a knife you were carrying. After several vehicle pursuit [sic], the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Department was able to bring you into custody a few days later.

Now, I'm going to file that presentence report onto [sic] the record. Now, the Court notes that you are 53 years of age. However, the Court notes your prior felony conviction [sic]. In particular your prior convictions involving violence against women and the fact that you were not out of jail for very long before this incidence [sic] happened.

So, at this time the Court is going to sentence you to serve thirty (30) years with the Department of Corrections at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

The Court is going to sentence you as to the charge of False Imprisonment with a Dangerous Weapon, the Court is going to sentence you to serve ten (10) years at hard labor with the Department of Corrections.

As to the Domestic Abuse Violence, the Court is going to sentence you to serve five (5) years with the Department of Corrections.

Furthermore, I will order that these sentences run consecutively to one another. The Court advises that you have two (2) years from the date that your conviction becomes final to apply for any post-conviction relief.

The Court is going to order the presentence investigation report be filed and sealed into the record.

In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993) (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted), the supreme court discussed the parameters of excessive sentence review and when those parameters are met through the circumstances of a given case and a particular defendant:

Louisiana's judiciary maintains the distinct responsibility of reviewing sentences imposed in criminal cases for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La. 1979). According to Sepulvado, the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, Article I, Section 20 “ ‘gives the courts, in the exercise of their judicial power, a basis for determining that sentences, whether fine, imprisonment or otherwise, though not cruel or unusual, are too severe as punishment for certain conduct and thus unconstitutional. It is a basis for extending the court's control over the entire sentencing process.’ ” Id. at 766, citing “The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974”, 35 La.L.Rev. 1, 63 (1974). Thus, “[t]he imposition of a sentence, although within the statutory limit, may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment․ [.]” Id. at 767. Accordingly, under the 1974 Constitution “the excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.” Id. at 764.

“A punishment is constitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” State v. Scott, 5 93 So.2d 704, 710 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1991); State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751 (La. 1992).

In State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-06 (first alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261, this court provided the following guidelines regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La. 1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La. 1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00), 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 95 7, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 13 6 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La. 1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

We find Defendant's argument that the trial court failed to consider any mitigating factors, such as his educational and family history, his age, and other relevant factors, to be totally without merit as a simple reading of the detailed oral reasons shows. The trial court specifically considered Defendant's age, mentioning it not once, but twice, and his educational background and family situation. The trial court also considered the dates of Defendant's prior convictions, noting that he had only recently been released from State custody on his last conviction when these offenses occurred. Further, the oral reasons set forth by the trial court provided ample justification for these three sentences running consecutively as they again involved violence towards a female victim. As the trial court noted, at least three of Defendant's prior convictions involved violence against women.

All of the sentences imposed for the crimes at hand are within the statutory range and, thus, are not illegally excessive. The armed robbery conviction carried a maximum sentence of ninety-nine years in prison, without benefits. Defendant's total sentence here does not even reach half of the maximum sentence for armed robbery alone.

The trial court adequately considered the nature of the crime as well as Defendant's nature and background in its reasons for the sentences, which we adopt. This was a violent crime against Defendant's former girlfriend, who did nothing other than attempt to separate herself from a violent man. Once again, Defendant has committed a crime involving violence towards a female victim, for which he has three previous convictions and prison sentences exceeding twenty-six years. One of those previous convictions was for rape, a most heinous affront to the dignity of that victim and one that undoubtedly leaves life-long emotional wounds. In the instant case, the victim testified about the emotional trauma she is suffering as a result of this event. Obviously, Defendant's proclivity for terrorizing women is progressive and cannot be deterred by any lesser sentences than those imposed here.

In State v. Kessler, 45,863, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 56 So.3d 1026, 1028, writ denied, 11-113 (La. 5/20/11), 63 So.3d 978, the second circuit held that a forty-year sentence for armed robbery was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion and was not “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense” or “shocking to the sense of justice[,]” as the defendant there had previously been convicted of attempted armed robbery five years previously. Likewise, in State v. Watson, 575 So.2d 411 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1991), the fourth circuit held that a sentence of fifty years for a single count of armed robbery was not excessive as the defendant had a previous armed robbery conviction.

Finally, in State v. Stipe, 10-877 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 59 So.3d 480, this court affirmed a forty-five-year sentence for armed robbery with a firearm, which was ordered to run concurrently with a ten-year sentence for carjacking but consecutively to a life sentence imposed in another parish. This court found that the sentence was not excessive because it was “a midrange penalty for armed robbery, with a mandatory five-year enhancement for use of a firearm.” Id. at 487. It further noted that “[a]lthough the sentence will likely result in a term of imprisonment which is longer than the defendant's natural life, we find that the sentence for each charge is appropriate in light of the defendant's criminal history and the violent nature of the crime.” Id. The same is true here.

Given Defendant's extensive criminal history, including repeated felony offenses involving violence towards women, together with the serious nature of these violent offenses, we find no error in the sentences imposed herein. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and the sentences imposed.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there is one error patent.

The trial court gave Defendant incorrect advice as to the time period for seeking post-conviction relief. The trial court stated that Defendant had “two (2) years from the date that your conviction becomes final to apply for any post conviction relief.” Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8(A) (emphasis added) states, “No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922[.]”

Because the trial court failed to advise Defendant that the two-year period for filing post-conviction relief begins when his judgment of conviction and sentence become final, Defendant is notified by this opinion that the time period for filing post-conviction relief shall be within two years after his conviction and sentence have become final. See State v. Lewis, 25-398, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/11/26), 433 So.3d 122, 128 (“Because the trial court improperly advised [the defendant], this opinion can and will serve as notice of the correct time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief”).

DECREE

Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed. Defendant is, hereby, notified that he has two years from the finality of his convictions and sentences to file for post-conviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The bill of information reflects that Defendant is also known as Charles Lee Jr. Woods, Charles Lee - Jr. Woods, and Charles Woods.

2.   At the time of trial, Officer Spencer was employed by the Acadia Parish Sheriff's Office.

3.   Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions.

VAN H. KYZAR JUDGE