EVANS LLC v. LONG CTB (2026)

Defendant-Relator, AIX Specialty Insurance Company (“AIX”), seeks supervisory review of a trial court judgment denying its motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether its commercial general liability policy excluded coverage for property damage to the insureds’ work or product. For the following reasons, we grant the writ, reverse, and render judgment in favor of AIX, dismissing the claims against it with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 8, 2012, L & L Delta Farms, Inc. (“Delta Farms”), whose principal officer is Jeff Lueke, entered into a contract with Grain Bin Services, Inc. (“GBS”), whose principal officer is Ivo H. Long, Jr. (referred to collectively as “Long/GBS”), for the purchase and construction of four grain bins, which were manufactured by Brock Grain Systems (“Brock”), a division of CTB, Inc. (“CTB”). The grain bins were constructed on property owned by Delta Farms and farmed by Marcus Evans and his son, Chad Evans, in Harrisonburg, Louisiana. Construction of the grain bins was supervised by Mr. Long. After construction was completed in September 2013, Marcus and Pamela Evans and Chad and Jessica Evans, who operate as M & C Farms, entered into a ten-year lease of the grain bins.

On July 30, 2018, Plaintiffs-Respondents, Marcus, Pamela, Chad, and Jessica Evans, M & C Farms,¹ Delta Farms, and Mr. Lueke (referred to collectively as “Plaintiffs”), filed suit against Long/GBS, and CTB, alleging defects in the bins and seeking damages based on Long/GBS's breach of contract and negligent construction and CTB's negligence and breach of warranty. On October 19, 2020, Plaintiffs amended their petition to add Charles Owens Concrete, Inc. (“COC”) and its insurer, Seneca Specialty Insurance Company (“Seneca”), Long/GBS's insurer, AIX, and CTB's insurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, as defendants. The commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy at issue here was issued by AIX to Long/GBS and provided coverage for the following policy periods: February 14, 2013-February 14, 2014; February 14, 2014-February 14, 2015; and February 14, 2015-February 14, 2016.²

On May 21, 2025, AIX moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not have a duty to defend Long/GBS as its CGL policy excluded coverage for property damage to the grain bins based on the “your product” and “your work” (referred to collectively as “work product”) exclusions. It also argued that coverage was excluded for property damage arising out of work performed by COC, Long/GBS's subcontractor, unless COC was covered by an insurance policy that provided identical coverage and named Long/GBS as an additional insured. AIX further argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of indemnification for the same reasons. Alternatively, it argued that it was entitled to partial summary judgment finding it was not required to indemnify Long/GBS for Plaintiffs’ property damage to and loss of use of their work or product, the grain bins.

AIX introduced the following exhibits in support of its motions: Plaintiffs’ original and amended petitions, Plaintiffs’ responses to Long/GBS and CTB's Second Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Requests for Admissions; certified copies of the three CGL policies issued by AIX to Long/GBS; the Seneca policy issued to COC; Seneca's response to the First Set of Requests for Admission propounded by the AIX; and the depositions of Mr. Lueke, Chad Evans, Marcus Evans, Charles Owens, the principal officer of COC, Mr. Long, and Mark Dingeldein, Brock's vice president of engineering.

In opposition to the motions, Plaintiffs introduced excerpts from the deposition of Chad Evans, the affidavit of Carroll Barren, Jr., and various pictures of the grain bins and parts thereof. Long/GBS also opposed AIX's motions and introduced the affidavit and report of Gregory D. Williams, PhD., P.E.³

Following a July 10, 2025 hearing, the trial court requested additional briefing and requested that both sides submit proposed judgments with reasons. On October 29, 2025, the trial court rendered judgment denying AIX's motion, without writing its own reasons for judgment but adopting the entirety of Plaintiffs’ original and supplemental Opposition Memorandums with regard to both facts and law. Although the trial court's reasons for judgment are not clear, as they are written in the form of argument as adopted, it evidently found that there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether the grain bins qualified as Long/GBS's product and on whether the Plaintiffs suffered a loss of profits due to the defective condition of the grain bins.

AIX filed the instant application for supervisory review of the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the writ application. Notably, Long/GBS did not file an opposition. We granted the writ, for the limited purpose of offering the parties additional time for briefing and oral argument, per the provisions of La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(H). Evans v. Long, 25-704 (6/12/2026) (unpublished writ ruling). Oral argument was held on September 30, 2026.

On application for review, AIX raises one issue: “Whether AIX is entitled to summary judgment dismissing it with prejudice based on the lack of coverage pursuant to the ‘Your Product’ exclusion or ‘Your Work’ exclusion.”

DISCUSSION

In Reed obo Cope v. Black Star Energy Services, LLC, 23-148, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/22/23), 374 So.3d 419, 422, this court set forth our standard of appellate review for a judgment granting summary judgment:

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that governed the trial court's consideration of whether or not summary judgment was appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La. 1991). Summary judgment is proper if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue of [sic] as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 charges the moving party with the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. In doing so, the moving party's supporting documentation must be sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact remains at stake. Townley v. City of Iowa, 97-493 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97), 702 So.2d 323. Once the mover makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that summary judgment should be granted, the burden shifts to the non-mover. Id.

․ Thus, summary judgment is appropriate when all relevant facts are brought before the court, the relevant facts are undisputed, and the sole issue remaining is the conclusion to be drawn from the relevant facts. [Kumpe v. State, 97-3 86 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 701 So.2d 498, writ denied, 98-50 (La. 3/13/98), 712 So.2d 882]. If the mover's supporting documentation is sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden of proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact shifts to the nonmoving party. To satisfy her burden of proof, the nonmoving party must not rely on the mere allegations or denials of her pleadings, but her response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La.Code Civ.P. art. 967.

Resolution of this matter involves the application and interpretation of a contract of insurance issued by AIX to Long/GBS, which Plaintiffs allege provides coverage for damages they have sustained as a result of Long/GBS's actions or omissions in constructing the grain bins. “An insurance policy is a contract between the parties[,]” and the rules of contract interpretation are applicable in construing the terms of the policy. Kazan v. Red Lion Hotels Corp., 21-1820, p. 3 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 267, 270.

Interpretation of an insurance policy is the determination of the common intent of the parties – this analysis starts by examining the words of the policy itself. [Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-54, (La. 5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583,] (citing La. C.C. arts. 2045 and 2046). Words and phrases in an insurance policy must be given their generally prevailing meaning unless they are words of art or have acquired a technical meaning. Id., 07-0554, p. 8, 956 So.2d at 589 (citing La. C.C. art. 2047). When the words of an insurance policy are clear and explicit and do not lead to absurd consequences, courts must enforce the language as written. Id., 07-0054, p. 8, 956 So.2d at 589 (citing La. C.C. art. 2046). Courts lack the authority to alter the terms of an insurance policy under the guise of interpretation and should not create an ambiguity where none exists. Id., 07-0554, pp. 8-9, 956 So.2d at 589. An insurance policy is construed against an insurer and in favor of coverage only when an ambiguity remains after applying the aforementioned general rules for the interpretation of contracts. Id., 07-0054, p. 9, 956 So.2d at 590 (further observing that for strict construction to apply, an ambiguous provision must be susceptible to two or more reasonable alternative interpretations); Edwards v. Daugherty, 03-2103, p. 12 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So.2d 932, 941. The language of an insurance policy may be general without being ambiguous. Ledbetter [v. Concord Gen. Corp.], 95-0895, p. 6, [(La. 1/6/96),] 665 So.2d [1166,] 1170 (citing United National Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993)).

Id. at 270.

The terms of an insurance policy are interpreted to provide rather than deny coverage. Supreme Servs. & Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny Greer, Inc., 06-1827 (La. 5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634. “[U]nless a statute or public policy dictates otherwise, the insurers may limit liability and impose such reasonable conditions or limitations upon their insureds[,]” and “unambiguous provisions limiting liability must be given effect.” Id. at 638-39. Moreover, “the insurer bears the burden of proving that a loss falls within a policy exclusion.” Id. at 639.

Herein, AIX argues that based on the policy language in the CGL policies issued to Long/GBS, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the policies exclude coverage for Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, it asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment and its dismissal from Plaintiffs’ suit, with prejudice. AIX argues that coverage is excluded based on the “your product” exclusion, as the grain bins were “sold, handled, distributed, or disposed of by” Long/GBS. Thus, it urges that it is immaterial whether Long/GBS manufactured the grain bins, as its handling of them was sufficient to exclude coverage under the “your product” exclusion. It further argues the trial court erred in focusing on whether Long/GBS deviated from Brock/CTB's specifications regarding the bolts used during the grain bins’ construction.

The undisputed facts here show that Long/GBS contracted to sell and install four Brock/CTB grain bins to Lueke/Delta Farms, who leased the farmland and grain bins to the Evanses. Long/GBS constructed or partially constructed the grain bins from the major components and construction plans provided by Brock/CTB.

Plaintiffs alleged in their original and amending petitions that Long/GBS was obligated to construct the grain bins and their component parts in a good and workmanlike manner. They further alleged that the defects in the grain bins, which arose after the grain bins were put into use, substantially interfered with the grain bins’ use, reduced their use-life expectancy, caused a failure of their structural integrity, and “the total failure of certain bin components.” Plaintiffs alleged that the defects resulted from Long/GBS's breach of contract, negligent construction of the grain bins and the grain bins’ component parts, and their failure to properly supervise their subcontractor, COC, during the construction of the grain bins’ concrete slabs.

According to Marcus Evans's deposition testimony, the construction of the grain bins was completed well over a year before any defects were noticed. Mr. Lueke testified that the alleged defects in the grain bins did not arise until after they were put into use.

Marcus Evans further admitted in his deposition that Plaintiffs were not alleging a loss of profit although he stated that there probably were some. When asked, “You are or you're not[ ]” alleging a loss of profit, he stated, “I guess not.” He said that he had not “sat down and studied” the loss of profits issue and that it would be hard to determine. He further stated that the alleged defects in the four grain bins have not affected their total capacity of 300,000 bushels of grain per year

Additionally, Chad Evans testified in his deposition that the only damages being sought were for the defects in the bins and that they were not “alleging a loss of profit as a result of’ the alleged defects. When AIX's counsel repeated the question at the request of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Chad responded, “I guess not.” He also stated that there was no way to document the revenue generated from each bin because grain was sometimes taken directly from the fields to the grain elevator.

Mr. Lueke was also asked in his deposition if he was “alleging physical damage to anything besides the grain bins, their component parts and the concrete slabs[,]” he said he thought there was “an element of loss in the grain side[ ]” but that the Evanses could answer that question. He stated, “As far as I'm concerned, it's the bins themselves and the residual value[ ]” that were the alleged damages sought.

AIX issued CGL insurance policies to Long/GBS. Those policies, covering the various years in question in this lawsuit, provide for certain exclusions from coverage, including Subsection “2. Exclusions” of Section I, Coverage A of the CGL Coverage Form, which provides in pertinent part:

This insurance does not apply to:

․

k. Damage To Your Product

“Property damage” to “your product” arising out of it or any part of it.

l. Damage To Your Work

“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it and included in the “products-completed operations hazard”.

This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.

Further, Section V of the CGL Coverage Form provides the following definitions:

17. “Property damage” means:

a. Physical injury to tangible property including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or

b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the “occurrence” that caused it.

․

21. “Your product”:

a. Means:

(1) Any goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by:

(a) You;

․

b. Includes:

(1) Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance, or use of “your product”;

․

22. “Your work”

a. Means:

(1) Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and

(2) Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work or operations.

b. Includes:

(1) Warranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance, or use of “your work.”

Additionally, all of the policies issued to Long/GBS contain endorsement form AGL04290811 “Exclusion – Uninsured Sub-contracted Operations,” which excludes coverage for the following:

“[P]roperty damage” ․ arising out of operations performed for you or on your behalf, by any independent contractor or sub-contractor of yours, unless such contractor has in-force general liability coverage including “products-completed operations hazard” and contractual liability coverage, with limits equal to the limits on this policy and on which you are named as an additional insured.

The policy provisions are clear and unambiguous. No coverage is provided for damage to a product manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by Long/GBS. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Long/GBS at least, partially, manufactured the finished product that became the grain bins and that Long/GBS handled and sold the grain bins to Lueke/Delta Farms. Plaintiffs seek damages to and for the very product manufactured and sold, the grain bins. “Louisiana courts have consistently held that the ‘work product’ exclusion eliminates coverage for the cost of repairing or replacing the insured's own defective work or defective product.” Supreme Servs., 958 So.2d at 643. AIX's policies clearly excludes coverage for these damages.

“[W]hen coverage is sought to be excluded under a policy of insurance, only one exclusion is necessary to exclude coverage.” Perrodin v. W. World Ins. Co., 24-524, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/25), 414 So.3d 865, 869. However, we note here that the “your work” exclusion equally applies and supplies additional reasons for summary judgment in favor of AIX. Plaintiffs are seeking to recover for damage to the grain bins resulting from defective construction, assembly, and manufacturing, including the allegedly defective slabs. This encompasses work or operations performed by Long/GBS or by COC, on Long/GBS's behalf, and also includes materials, parts, or equipment furnished in connection with the work or operations. This exclusion also includes warranties or representations that Long/GBS may have made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance, or use of their work. As the “your work” exclusion for damage to the grain bins also applies, there is no coverage provided under the AIX CGL policies.

We further find that the AIX CGL policies exclude coverage for the work performed by the subcontractor COC in connection with the construction of the slabs, which support the grain bins. The AIX CGL policies explicitly exclude coverage for property damages caused by a sub-contractor of Long/GBS, which would include COC, unless COC had in-force general liability coverage, including products-completed operations hazard (“PCOH”) and contractual liability coverage, with limits equal to the limits on AIX's policy, and on which Long/GBS is named as an additional insured. AIX introduced the insurance policy issued by Seneca to COC for the relevant times in question showing that Long/GBS was not, in fact, listed as additional insureds. Further, Seneca's response to the First Set of Requests for Admission propounded by AIX, which it introduced in support of its motion, confirms that Long/GBS were not named as additional insureds on COC's policy.

As to any damages other than to the alleged defective grain bins themselves, including loss of profits, loss of grain, or additional labor costs associated therewith, Plaintiffs have failed to come forth with any summary judgment evidence supporting such claims as were alleged in their petitions. Once Defendant established a lack of factual support for an element essential to Plaintiffs’ claim, the burden shifted to them to establish the existence of such damages or that Defendant would be unable to prevail on this claim on the merits. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). They have failed to do so.

Notably, Plaintiffs cannot rely on the mere allegations of their petitions as proof of any other damages suffered by them. La.Code Civ.P. art. 967(B). As recited above, Mr. Lueke testified that he was not claiming any damages other than to the grain bins themselves, and the lost valuation thereof. The Evanses testified that they were not alleging a loss of profits resulting from the defective grain bins and that any such claim would be hard to determine. Nor did any summary judgment evidence support a claim for damages as a result of loss of profits, loss of grain, or increased labor costs. We note that it has been over twelve years since the grain bins were first placed into use and well over eight years since Plaintiffs’ suit was filed, yet there are no quantifiable claims for any damage other than to the grain bins themselves.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, the writ application by AIX Specialty Insurance Company is granted and made peremptory. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is rendered in favor of AIX Specialty Insurance Company, finding no coverage under its CGL policy and dismissing the claims of Marcus Evans, Pamela Evans, Chad Evans, Jessica Evans, M & C Farms, L & L Delta Farms, LLC, and Jeff Lueke against it with prejudice.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY; REVERSED AND RENDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although M & C Farms was included as a plaintiff, it was determined during Marcus Evans's deposition that M & C Farms was not incorporated, and there was discussion that M & C Farms would be dismissed from the lawsuit.

2.   As the policies are identical, we will only refer to the policy covering February 14, 2013-February 14, 2014.

3.   The facts will be discussed in more detail below.

KYZAR, Judge.