JOHN HUVAL AND RHONDA HUVAL v. HOME SOLUTIONS LLC WESTERN WORLD INSURANCE CORPORATION LARRY COCKERHAM BLAKE HUVAL UNITED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

In this product liability suit, plaintiffs, John and his wife, Rhonda Huval, allege that a retractable ladder was unreasonably dangerous due to the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings to prevent improper installation. Plaintiffs appeal a grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Louisville Ladder, Inc. (Louisville Ladder). Louisville Ladder answered the appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the motion for summary judgment and the answer to the appeal is denied.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This litigation arises from an accident that occurred on November 30, 2020, when John Huval was injured after climbing a newly installed retractable attic ladder that became dislodged at his son's house. After adequate discovery, the parties agreed that the ladder was improperly installed. The plaintiffs allege that the accident arose because of the manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings about improper installation condition that renders the ladder unreasonably dangerous for its reasonably anticipated use. Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought this suit against the manufacturer, Louisville Ladder.¹

The plaintiffs asserted in their amended petition for damages that Louisville Ladder violated the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and La. R.S. 9:2800.51, et seq., alleging the ladder in question was unreasonably dangerous as it failed to adequately warn users of the dangers of improper installation. Louisville Ladder then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting it was not reasonably anticipated that the ladder installation would be defective, and therefore, it was not liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries.

The motion was heard on March 18, 2025, and after considering the evidence introduced, the trial court granted Louisville Ladder's motion for summary judgment and signed a judgment on June 3, 2025, dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice.² Plaintiffs now appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The plaintiffs assign the following as errors:

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment as they allege genuine issues of material fact exist.

2. The trial court erred as a matter of law in having found that appellants “failed to present sufficient evidence identifying the specific warning they allege Louisville Ladder, Inc. should have provided.”

3. The trial court erred as a matter of law in having found that appellants “did not show with sufficient evidence that any such warning would have attracted Mr. Cockerham's attention or prevented the accident in question.”

Louisville Ladder filed an answer to the appeal and asserts the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant Louisville Ladder's motion for Summary Judgment on alternate grounds of plaintiffs’ failure of proof on the element of reasonably anticipated use; (2) the trial court erred in denying Louisville Ladder's motion to preclude or limit testimony of Deborah Treise, Ph.D.; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to exclude the self-serving affidavit of Deborah Treise, Ph.D.

LAW

The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure places the burden of proof on the party filing a motion for summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The mover can meet its burden by filing supporting documentary evidence consisting of pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions with its motion for summary judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Id. The moving party must only point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). This Court must first determine whether the supporting documents presented by the mover are sufficient to resolve all material fact issues. See Avis Rent a Car Sys., LLC v. Knox, 2026-0074 (La. App. 1 Cir. 05/20/26), 2026 WL 1428503 *2.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce factual support, through the use of proper documentary evidence attached to its opposition, which establishes the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Lewis v. Four Corners Volunteer Fire Dep't, 2008-0354 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/26/08), 994 So. 2d 696, 699.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, appellate courts review evidence de novo using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3); Sketchier v. Hernandez, 2020-0292 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/19/21), 326 So. 3d 912, 916. If on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La. 07/05/94), 639 So. 2d 730, 751.

Further, the LPLA provides “the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products.” La. R.S. 9:2800.52. To successfully bring a products liability action under the LPLA, a plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) the defendant is a manufacturer of the product; (2) the claimant's damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; (3) this characteristic renders the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) the claimant's damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or someone else. See Jack v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 2006-1883, (La. 02/22/07), 949 So. 2d 1256, 1258; See also La. R.S. 9:2800.54(A).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.57(A) provides:

A product is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about the product has not been provided if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control, the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product.

But, “[a] manufacturer is not required to provide an adequate warning about his product when ․ [t]he product is not dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user or handler of the product, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics.” La. R.S. 9:2800.57(B)(1). Furthermore, “sophisticated users” of a product may be presumed to know about the danger because of their familiarity with the product. Johnston v. Hartford Ins. Co., 623 So.2d 35 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 626 So.2d 1170 (La. 1993).

Before reaching the question of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous because of an inadequate warning, as asserted by plaintiffs in their petition, a plaintiff must first meet the threshold requirement of showing that the injury arose from a “reasonably anticipated use” of the product. It is only after such use is shown that the inquiry moves on to whether an adequate warning was required. Bates v. Progressive Tractor and Implement Co., LLC, 2021-033 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So. 3d 71, 76. A “reasonably anticipated use” of the product is defined as “a use or handling of a product that the product's manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances.” La. R.S. 9:2800.53(7).

In Ortolano v. BDI Mktg., 2005-989 (La. App. 5 Cir. 04/25/06), 930 So. 2d 92, 193, a plaintiff sued a drug manufacturer, alleging that the ingestion of a drug caused a heart attack. The drug packaging had an instruction that stated the proper dose was one-half to one tablet every four hours, and not more than six tablets in twenty-four hours. However, the plaintiff stated in his deposition that he took all six tablets in fourteen and a half hours. As a result, the trial court granted summary judgment, upheld on appeal, in favor of the drug manufacturer, holding that the plaintiff's use of the drug was not “reasonably anticipated” as he failed to adhere to the product instructions. Id. at 196. The same analysis can be used in the instant case.

In Hardisty v. Walker, 2025-00239 (La. 06/03/25), 410 So. 3d 774, 776, the plaintiff and his co-worker attached chains from a tractor to a bulldozer that was stuck in the mud in order to remove it. As the men attempted to tow the bulldozer, one of the chains snapped and flew backward, striking the plaintiff in the head and face. Plaintiff subsequently brought claims under the LPLA against several parties, including the manufacturer of the bulldozer, Caterpillar. Id. On summary judgment, Caterpillar argued that plaintiff was not engaged in a reasonably anticipated use of its product because the bulldozer's manual explicitly stated: “Do not use a chain for pulling a disabled machine. A chain link can break. This action may cause personal injury.” Id. at 777. In light of this warning language, the supreme court reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, finding that there is no reasonably anticipated use since Caterpillar's manual expressly warned users against using chains to tow a disabled machine, and there was no evidence that Caterpillar knew of any incidents or accidents involving the use of a chain to tow a disabled machine. Id. at 779-80.

DISCUSSION

Did the defendant show an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to plaintiffs’ claim?

On a de novo review, we look to the evidence submitted. To support its motion for summary judgment, Louisville Ladder provided affidavits of Michael Van Bree, David Fortenbaugh Ph.D., and Erick Knox, Ph.D. In addition, Louisville ladder also submitted the sworn depositions of John Huval, Larry Cockerham and Deborah Treise, Ph.D.

The affidavit by Michael Van Bree, the Director of Product Safety and Engineering at Louisville Ladder, stated that the model AA2510 attic ladder met the standards as established by the American Nation Safety Institutes (ANSI) Standard Requirements for Disappearing Attic Stairways and withstood the Rail Test, Top Support Test, and Step Bending Test. He also stated that “[p]roper installation of the ladder is a prerequisite to safe use of the ladder” and that “Louisville Ladder expects and anticipates that the ladder will be properly installed pursuant to the instructions before it is used.” Van Bree also stated that when it left Louisville Ladder's control the attic ladder was in a box “secured with a plastic zip tie” and the “installation instructions were located on top of the secured ladder sections underneath the zip tie.” In addition, there was a caution label “which tells the user there are installation instructions available and warns the user not to remove the strap until instructed.” Finally, he noted that there was an installation kit provided with the ladder.

Dr. Fortenbaugh, also a member of ANSI, stated in his sworn affidavit that he reviewed the installation instructions Louisville Ladder provided with the model AA2510 attic ladder that included lag bolts and deck screws to be used in the installation of the product. He made note of several statements in the installation instructions including that “[i]nstallation requires two people”; “[i]mproper installation could result in bodily injury”; “only use the lag screws provided for the permanent installation step”; and “never use deck or sheetrock screws in place of lag screws for permanent installation.”

Dr. Erick Knox, a co-author of the investigative report regarding the instant case, identified deficiencies in Cockerham's installation in his affidavit: (1) Mr. Cockerham did not use the lag screws supplied by Louisville Ladder and instead used deck screws; (2) Mr. Cockerham failed to install proper number of fasteners, and only installed two screws on the header board and one on each side near the footer, the instructions stated to use ten lag bolts; (3) Mr. Cockerham failed to eliminate the gap at the header board and shim the remaining gap between the ladder frame and the rough opening at the fastener locations; and (4) Mr. Cockerham failed to install the fasteners into the wood of the header board and instead drove the fasteners at the bottom edge of the header board.

In his deposition, Mr. Huval stated that prior to the accident he held an HVAC mechanical license in 12 cities. He was the Vice-President of Big H Temperature Control, a family business that installed HVAC units. He explained that he closed the business because he could not take on jobs as a result of the accident. Leading up to the accident, Mr. Huval stated that he was helping his son who was doing an addition to his house and had put in some HVAC components in the attic. Mr. Huval stated that he was at his son's house when he fell off the attic ladder. After the fall, he has memory lapses and he could not recall why he climbed the ladder. He had spinal surgery, rehab, and other medical treatments as a result of his fall. He stated that he knew that Larry Cockerham installed the ladder. Mr. Huval confirmed that he never saw the ladder prior to its installation and he did not read the instruction manual.

Mr. Cockerham, owner of LC Home Solutions, LLC, testified during his deposition that he had done 6-10 projects including the addition of a master bedroom and bath work at Mr. Huval's son's, Blake's, house. This entailed forming the frame for the slab, trim work, installing the attic ladder, moldings, baseboards, and vinyl sidings. He did not have a written contract with the plaintiffs, or Blake. Mr. Cockerham explained how he installed the stairs involved in the instant case, “We put the screws in the head of it and the foot of the stairs ․ and that was it.” He confirmed that he did not use the screws that came with the ladder, and instead used four wood screws. He did not go up the ladder to test it, but “walked up a bit” Mr. Cockerham was not present when Mr. Huval fell. He went back to the house after the incident, and secured that attic stairs with two-by-eight joist with new screws. He also changed the screw placement to higher onto the ladder access.

Mr. Cockerham originally thought that the attic stairs were safe but after observing the dangling ladder opined “looking at it, the screws that were put in the head were too far to the bottom of the joist.” He agreed that there was an installation problem, it was his job to install it securely, and he did not install it securely. He recalled that the ladder included fasteners, but did not recall ever seeing or reading the installation instructions that came with the ladder. When asked, he agreed he did not install the correct number of screws, or use the ones that were provided. Further, he could not recall the manufacturer of the ladder. Based on the record before us, the evidence submitted by the Louisville Ladder was sufficient to point out an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to plaintiffs’ LPLA claim. Specifically, the plaintiffs’ use or handling of the ladder was not reasonably expected of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances.

Did the Plaintiffs show there was a genuine issue of material fact?

The burden shifted to plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. To support their position, plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from Dr. Treise, a purported expert on warnings for consumer products wherein she testified in her deposition that installation manuals are rarely used by experienced professional installers such as Mr. Cockerham. (R. 945). She agreed she is not an expert on ladders or its installation, but has read several articles. (R. 943) Dr. Treise testified that she thought the accident occurred because there were no warning labels on the ladder to warn the installer. She further opined that placing a warning on the header of the ladder is “for the benefit of the installer, directly on the product, is easily plausible, effective, and affordable.” However, she agreed that she did not know the point of the label on the header for an installer that followed the steps to install the ladder since the warning label on the header would not readily visible.

Dr. Treise did not have an objective way of knowing whether the warning label she proposed would have been more effective than the caution labels already on the product which Mr. Cockerham ignored. She has not tested her theory and suggested that she would use focus groups to determine whether her suggested placement and label is adequate. She was not aware of the warning label that was visible when the ladder was removed from the box. After reading the instructions under “proper climbing and use,” she agreed that the proper installation is a precondition to using the ladder safely.

Herein, the first page of the installation instructions themselves warn installers that, among other things, “[i]mproper installation could result in serious bodily injury,” and to “[o]nly use the lag screws provided for the permanent installation step.” The installation instructions go on to provide step-by-step instructions on how to properly install the ladder, combining text and graphics for the installer to follow. The “Permanent Installation” instructions expressly states: “WARNING: Never use deck or sheetrock screws in place of lag screws for permanent installation.” As pointed out in Hardisty and Ortalano, there can be no reasonably anticipated use where the installation manual expressly warned against using the wrong screws, and there was no evidence that Louisville Ladder, to date, knew of any incidents or accidents the installation of the ladder.

Could an Additional Warning Prevent Improper Installation?

Mr. Cockerham acknowledged that he installed the ladder improperly. Mr. Cockerham admitted that he did not read the installation instructions, nor did he use fasteners or screws included in the ladder's installation kit He believed that the installation instructions and the installation kit “were thrown away.” Mr. Cockerham, admittedly, failed to adhere to the product instructions. Mr. Cockerham also testified that he did not fully climb the ladder after it was installed.

The plaintiffs have not provided evidence that any additional warning would have changed Mr. Cockerham's installation process. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence to establish that Louisville Ladder should have reasonably anticipated that an installer like Mr. Cockerham would ignore the instructions and warnings provided by Louisville Ladder and proceed to install the product in a defective manner. After reviewing the record before us, Louisville Ladder has proven the attic ladder, model AA2510, was improperly installed despite the warnings already included. Therein, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs failed to submit evidence that another warning would have changed the installation process. Therefore, the plaintiffs were not engaged in a reasonably anticipated use of its product as it was defectively installed. See Payne v. Gardner, 2010-2627 (La. 02/18/11), 56 So. 3d 229, 231. There is no genuine issue of material fact. We find that summary judgment was appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's June 3, 2025 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of Louisville Ladder, Inc., and dismissing John R. Huval's and Rhonda Huval's claims with prejudice. In light of our findings, Louisville Ladder, Inc.’s answer to the appeal is denied.

Costs are assessed to the appellants.

AFFIRMED. ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The plaintiffs added Louisville Ladder as a defendant in their “First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages”.

2.   The trial court also denied Louisville Ladder's motion to preclude and limit the testimony of Dr. Deborah Treise, and overruled Louisville Ladder's objection to Dr. Treise's affidavit submitted as an exhibit to plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

BALFOUR, J.