JENKINS III v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS (2026)

This is a city civil service matter. Appellant, Joseph Jenkins, III (“Mr. Jenkins”), seeks review of the November 3, 2025 decision issued by the City Civil Service Commission (“Commission”), which upheld his employment termination by Appellee, the Department of Public Works (“DPW”). For the following reasons, we reverse the Commission's decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to the record, in December 2018, DPW hired Mr. Jenkins as a tow truck operator. However, on February 12, 2021, Mr. Jenkins suffered an injury to his left shoulder and his head while working and ultimately underwent surgery on his shoulder later that year. Mr. Jenkins eventually returned to duty as a tow truck operator in September 2022 but subsequently reinjured his shoulder and, at some point in time, began experiencing lower back problems. In light of same, Mr. Jenkins’ pain management physician, Joshua Kaufman, M.D. (“Dr. Kaufman”), placed him on “light duty” in November 2023. Thereafter, DPW provided Mr. Jenkins with transitional employment; but, after one year of transitional duty, Mr. Jenkins remained unable to return to his position as a tow truck operator. On April 26, 2025, DPW terminated Mr. Jenkins’ employment, and he then appealed his termination to the Commission.

Hearing

On June 17, 2025, a hearing examiner held a hearing regarding Mr. Jenkins’ appeal of his termination. In pertinent part, Mr. Jenkins testified that one of his transitional employment positions was at the City of New Orleans’ facility on Almonaster Avenue, and that role required him to check vehicles in as tow truck operators returned them for the day and to direct the drivers where to park the vehicles. Mr. Jenkins reported no problems in fulfilling those duties. However, Mr. Jenkins explained that DPW moved him to a different transitional role working at the City of New Orleans’ Claiborne Avenue tow lot,¹ and this role required him to carry parking boots (wheel clamps), a task which he was unable to do because of his medical restrictions.² Mr. Jenkins answered in the negative when asked whether he believed he was “able to go back to full duty of being a tow truck operator.” In the same vein, Mr. Jenkins subsequently testified, “I [cannot] drive a tow truck,” and “I [cannot] do a tow truck driver's job.” Further, when asked by the hearing examiner whether he would like to return to employment with the City of New Orleans, Mr. Jenkins responded affirmatively. However, when the hearing examiner asked the clarifying question, “[t]hat position would not be as a tow truck driver; is that correct also,” Mr. Jenkins responded, “Yes, sir.” Instead, Mr. Jenkins voiced his desire to return to a position like the one he performed at the Almonaster Avenue facility. In this regard, Mr. Jenkins testified, “[I]f [I am] doing a job [that is] productive ․ I [do not] see the reason why I would be taken out of that position.”

The hearing examiner admitted into evidence a May 23, 2024 form completed by Dr. Kaufman. In pertinent part, Dr. Kaufman answered in the affirmative to the question “Is Mr. Jenkins at Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI)[?]” On the form, Dr. Kaufman recommended that Mr. Jenkins undergo a “Functional Capacity Evaluation” (“FCE”). The hearing examiner admitted Mr. Jenkins’ subsequent FCE into evidence at the hearing. The FCE listed Mr. Jenkins as having problems with his left shoulder and lower back and stated Mr. Jenkins was unable to return to work as a tow truck operator without restrictions. More specifically, in the “Estimated Residual Functional Capacity” section, the FCE stated:

The results of this FCE estimate that the patient should be able to safely perform work consisting of job tasks classified in the physical demand level (PDL) of light as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 4th Edition (U.S. Dept. [o]f Labor) with the following restrictions:

1.) Occasional lifting of up to 20 lbs

2.) Frequent lifting of up to 10 lbs

3.) Occasional carrying of up to 15-20 lbs

․

Based on these findings it is determined that the client was unable to demonstrate sufficient residual functional capacities to safely return to his prior job as a tow truck driver without the restrictions described above. Comparison of his demonstrated residual capacities to the demands of his current job should be used for return to work consideration at this time.

On the “Patient's Self-Perception of Disability Level” section of the FCE, “Severe Disability”³ and “Crippled”⁴ were selected.

Additionally, Tamara Sylvain (“Ms. Sylvain”) testified and identified herself as a human resources manager who performed human resources services for DPW. According to Ms. Sylvain, when a DPW employee enters a transitional position, the goal is that the employee will ultimately leave the temporary restricted position and return to the position for which he was hired and from which his injury provisionally prevented him from fulfilling. Ms. Sylvain testified that the job description for tow truck operator for DPW includes the requirement of being able to lift items above a certain weight—likely above twenty pounds. During Ms. Sylvain's testimony, the hearing examiner admitted DPW's tow truck operator description into evidence. It provided, in relevant part, that “[w]ork may also include light or heavy physical labor when not operating equipment.” Ms. Sylvain answered affirmatively when asked whether the foregoing requirement, Dr. Kaufman's May 2024 form, and Mr. Jenkins’ subsequent FCE, all “indicate[d] that [Mr. Jenkins] would ․ be unable to return to his position of a tow truck operator.” According to Ms. Sylvain it was for that reason and because Mr. Jenkins had maxed out the amount of time he could stay at his transitional assignment that DPW terminated him. When counsel for DPW asked Ms. Sylvain whether there “[w]as ․ a full-time ․ Civil Service position[ ] available for Mr. Jenkins that would fit his job description,” she responded, “No, there was not,” such that “there [were not] any other options” other than to terminate him.

Rick Hathaway (“Mr. Hathaway”), who identified himself as the Director of DPW, also testified at the hearing. Regarding whether there were any other options for Mr. Jenkins’ situation, counsel for DPW specifically asked Mr. Hathaway if there was “any position available that would have had restrictions that Mr. Jenkins would have been able to handle,” and he responded, “None that I was made aware of.” Mr. Hathaway stated that DPW does not have the option for “light duty” but only has the previously-discussed “transitional duty” which is temporary and dependent on availability.

After the hearing, the hearing examiner took the matter under advisement. Ultimately, the hearing examiner recommended that the Commission deny Mr. Jenkins’ appeal.

The Commission's Decision

In its November 3, 2025 decision, the Commission explained that “Mr. Jenkins has reached maximum medical improvement, and he is not able to return to the position of [t]ow [t]ruck [o]perator.” The Commission further explained that DPW had provided Mr. Jenkins with a year of transitional duty, thereby offering him the time and opportunity to return to full duty, yet he was unable to do so. Accordingly, the Commission denied Mr. Jenkins’ appeal, and his timely appeal to this Court followed.

DISCUSSION

DPW terminated Mr. Jenkins on the basis that he was unable to perform the duties of his job. In Mr. Jenkins’ pro se appellant brief, he does not include specific assignments of error. Rather, Mr. Jenkins merely explains he is “appealing the decision to be terminated as a tow truck driver because [he cannot] lift or carry the wheel dollies ․ used to tow certain vehicles.” Further, Mr. Jenkins alleges that “their [sic] was another driver that worked for DPW as a tow truck driver that had a disability as well” who “received help from other drivers that the supervisor's [sic] sent to help him with the dollies.” Mr. Jenkins explains that “all [he] wanted was to be treated the same way” and to receive “some help if [he] had to tow a vehicle that needed wheel dollies instead of [being fired] because [he] could not do this.” In concluding his brief, Mr. Jenkins explains that “this is why [he] felt discriminated against.”

In response, DPW asserts the Commission did not abuse its discretion in affirming Mr. Jenkins’ termination and Mr. Jenkins did not establish a reason for this Court to reverse his termination. In support, DPW states that Mr. Jenkins has reached maximum medical improvement and is unable to return to his job, “a fact he has freely admitted in his own testimony.” Further, DPW contends that although there is jurisprudential support from this Court for reversing a city worker's termination if that employee is using sick leave and affirmatively taking steps to return to work, that is not the case here. Rather, DPW points out that it “reassigned Mr. [Jenkins] to transitional duty for a year to give him an opportunity to return to full duty,” yet he is still unable to return to his job as a tow truck operator. Insofar as Mr. Jenkins contends that another driver with a medical problem was treated differently, DPW counters that “[t]here is no legal support for the proposition that the Commission may reduce a penalty because it is greater than one imposed on another employee.”

As this Court has explained, “The civil service provisions ․ are designed to protect public career employees.” Scott v. Dep't of Fin., 2001-0907, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/19/01), 804 So.2d 836, 837-38 (citations omitted). Specifically, La. Const. art. X, § 8(A) establishes that “[n]o person who has gained permanent status in the classified state or city service shall be subjected to disciplinary action except for cause expressed in writing.” More particularly, this Court has explained the termination must be for “good cause.” Laviolette v. Dep't of Police, 2016-0095, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/24/16), 200 So.3d 962, 966 (first citing La. Const. art. X, § 8(A); and then citing Walters v. Dep't of Police of New Orleans, 454 So.2d 106, 113 (La. 1984)). Good cause exists if the employee's conduct is “prejudicial to the public service involved or detrimental to its efficient operation.” Id. The appointing authority must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that there is “a real and substantial relationship” between the employee's conduct and “the efficient operation of the appointing authority.” Id. at pp. 5-6, 200 So.3d at 966 (citing Cittadino v. Dep't of Police, 558 So.2d 1311, 1315 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990)). In an appeal to the Commission, the appointing authority bears the burden of proof. Id. (citing Walters, 454 So.2d at 112-113).

As established in La. Const. art. X, § 12(B), the Commission's decision is “subject to review on any question of law or fact.” This Court has previously explained that “[t]he Commission has a duty to decide independently from the facts presented whether the Appointing Authority ha[d] good or lawful cause for taking the disciplinary action and, if so, whether the punishment imposed [was] commensurate with the dereliction.” Muhammad v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 2000-1034, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/11/01), 791 So.2d 788, 790. In turn, the “appellate court is presented with a multifaceted review function.” West v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 2016-0148, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/21/16), 201 So.3d 1011, 1013 (citing Walters, 454 So.2d at 113). In terms of the Commission's factual conclusions, the appellate court affords deference as it does in other civil matters. Id. (first citing Walters, 454 So.2d at 113; and then citing Newman v. Dep't of Fire, 425 So.2d 753, 754 (La. 1983)). Accordingly, in determining whether to affirm the Commission's factual conclusions, the appellate court applies the clearly wrong or manifest error standard of review. Id. at pp. 2-3, 201 So.3d at 1013 (first citing Walters, 454 So.2d at 113; and then citing Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La. 1978)).

Turning to “the Commission's determination as to whether the disciplinary action [was] both based on legal cause and commensurate with the infraction,” the appellate court considers whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion.” Id. at p. 3, 201 So.3d at 1013-14 (first citing Walters, 454 So.2d at 114; then citing Newman, 425 So.2d at 754; and then citing La. R.S. 49:964). If the appellate court's review reveals an “absence of a rational basis for the action taken,” then the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at p. 3, 201 So.3d at 1014 (citing Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So.2d 961, 964 (La. 1991)). As previously explained by this Court, “It is only when this [C]ourt finds that the Commission's actions were arbitrary or capricious that it can disturb the Commission's judgment.” Muhammad, 2000-1034, p. 5, 791 So.2d at 791.

In the matter sub judice, DPW terminated Mr. Jenkins pursuant to Civil Service Rule IX, Section 1, Paragraph 1.1(a), which states:

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

․

Section 1. MAINTAINING STANDARDS OF SERVICE

1.1 When an employee in the classified service is unable or unwilling to perform the duties of his/her position in a satisfactory manner, or has committed any act to the prejudice of the service, or has omitted to perform any act it was his/her duty to perform, or otherwise has become subject to corrective action, the appointing authority shall take action warranted by the circumstances to maintain the standards of effective service. The action may include one or more of the following:

(a) termination from the service

In Wilson v. New Orleans Police Department, this Court considered the termination of Officer Calvin Wilson (“Officer Wilson”) by the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”). 2000-2484 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/19/01), 804 So.2d 838. As asserted by the NOPD, “Officer Wilson's treating physician certified that he [was] permanently disabled and [could] never return to full duty as a police officer and ․ Officer Wilson admitted as much at both his pre-termination hearing and the [C]ommission hearing.” Id. at p. 5, 804 So.2d at 842. During the Commission hearing, the NOPD presented the testimony of a deputy superintendent, who explained “the NOPD has no permanent limited duty positions” and “that all officers must be capable of performing 100% of the requirements of a police officer.” Id. at p. 6, 804 So.2d at 842. In the latter regard, the deputy superintendent explained the reason was “that all of the officers assigned to desk jobs, such as the [temporary] position that Officer Wilson held [prior to his termination], had to be available to report for full duty in an emergency situation or to report to a special event such as Mardi Gras.” Id. The deputy superintendent further testified that there was thus “no permanent limited duty assignment available where Officer Wilson could remain,” hence why the NOPD gave him “the options of seeking reasonable accommodations within City government through the Civil Service's [Americans with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’)] Coordinator, retiring, or being terminated.” Id. at p. 7, 804 So.2d at 843. The Commission upheld Officer Wilson's termination; and, on appeal, this Court concluded the Commission's decision was not arbitrary or capricious because the NOPD proved “it has a legitimate need to staff its department with able-bodied officers,” i.e., in case of emergencies or for special events. Id. at p. 10, 804 So.2d at 844. Because of this need, this Court reasoned “the NOPD proved that its policy of temporarily assigning injured officers to limited duty positions, but requiring their removal from duty once they are declared permanently disabled and unable to return to full duty, was justified.” Id. Correspondingly, this Court held “the NOPD proved that its refusal to establish permanent limited duty positions was justified by the needs of the department.” Id.

The principles enunciated by this Court in Wilson are applicable to the matter sub judice. Like Officer Wilson, Mr. Jenkins testified that he could not return to his job as a tow truck operator. However, unlike in Wilson, the record lacks evidence that “no reasonable accommodation will allow him to” remain employed by DPW either as a tow truck operator or in another capacity. Insofar as DPW contends “[t]here is no legal support for the proposition that the Commission may reduce a penalty because it is greater than one imposed on another employee,” we find that Wilson stands for the proposition that the Commission must consider what the appointing authority presented in terms of reasonable accommodations—whether those were provided to another employee or not. Like the deputy superintendent stated in Wilson, Mr. Hathaway testified that DPW does not have permanent “light duty” positions (as he termed them). However, unlike the testimony in Wilson establishing the NOPD's need for an “all hands on deck” and able-bodied police force for emergencies and special events because of the nature of that department's work, Mr. Hathaway did not identify a specific and legitimate need of DPW that prevented it from having a permanent position that Mr. Jenkins could fulfill in light of his disability and Dr. Kaufman's restrictions, i.e., a reasonable accommodation. In other words, DPW did not “prove[ ] that its policy of temporarily assigning injured [employees] to limited duty positions, but requiring their removal ․ once they are declared permanently disabled and unable to return to [their prior] duty, was justified.” Wilson, 2000-2484, p. 10, 804 So.2d at 844. Likewise, DPW did not establish that “its refusal to establish permanent limited duty positions was justified by the needs of the department.” Id. Mr. Hathaway failed to establish there was no available position DPW could have placed Mr. Jenkins in that would have accommodated his abilities and Dr. Kaufman's restrictions, responding merely that he was not “aware of” any rather than confirming that no such position existed. Similarly, Ms. Sylvain testified that there were no positions available that met Mr. Jenkins’ job description, i.e., tow truck operator, not whether there was a permanent position he could fulfill under his changed circumstances.

DPW failed to meet its burden of proving that Mr. Jenkins remaining in a position like the one at the Almonaster Avenue facility would have been prejudicial to the public service involved and detrimental to its efficient operation. Thus, unlike in Wilson, DPW failed to establish there was “no reasonable accommodation” that would both allow Mr. Jenkins to remain employed and avoid hindering that Department's operations. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and we reverse it.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Commission's November 3, 2025 decision, which upheld DPW's termination of Mr. Jenkins’ employment.

REVERSED

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to Mr. Jenkins, he “was pulled from Almonaster because of personal reasons that the Administrator has.” More specifically, Mr. Jenkins alleged that Valerie Petty (“Ms. Petty”), who is identified in the record as the Parking Administrator for DPW, “has a vendetta with [someone named] Mr. Jones.” Mr. Jenkins further alleged that he “[did not] give [Ms. Petty] whatever information she was trying to get on [Mr. Jones],” so that is when she “shipped” him to the Claiborne lot.

2.   Mr. Jenkins questioned why he was “taken from ․ Almonaster and put in another position [at the Claiborne lot] that would have injured [him] worse than [he] was.”

3.   The FCE described “Severe Disability” as: “Pain remains the main problem, but travel, personal care, social life, sexual activity and sleep are also affected. This patient requires detailed investigation.”

4.   The FCE described “Crippled” as: “Pain impinges on all aspects of the life of the patient both at home and at work and positive intervention is required.”

Judge Dale N. Atkins