IN RE: SUCCESSION OF TERRY JOSEPH BREAUX (2026)

Sherry Louise Breaux Smith appeals the judgment of the trial court, finding that her father, Terry Joseph Breaux, bequeathed a lifetime usufruct in his will to his surviving spouse, Kaye Anne Robichaux Breaux (Sherry Smith's stepmother). For the following reasons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and render judgment.

Terry Joseph Breaux passed away on July 18, 2022, leaving behind his wife, Kaye Anne Robichaux Breaux, and three children from a previous marriage: Jolene Marie Breaux Comeaux, Terry J. Breaux, and Sherry Louise Breaux Smith. All of his children were over the age of twenty-four at the time of his death.

Kaye Anne Robichaux Breaux filed a Petition for Probate and Confirmation of Executrix on August 17, 2022, seeking to probate Terry Joseph Breaux's will dated August 2, 2017. Kaye was appointed executrix of the estate, and she filed a petition for possession on September 30, 2022. Sherry Smith filed an Answer to Petition for Possession on October 24, 2022, alleging that Terry's will contained “inconsistent provisions concerning disposition of succession assets to certain legatees including Sherry and Kaye.”

On January 31, 2023, Kaye filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that she was the universal legatee of Terry's will, and she accepted those legacies. Sherry opposed the motion. Kaye's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied by the trial court.

Thereafter, Kaye filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment, naming as Defendants Terry's three children and seeking a judicial determination of the proper allocation of the assets of the estate. A trial on the matter was held April 8, 2024. The trial court ruled “that the will of Terry Joseph Breaux dated August 2, 2017, particularly paragraphs V. and VII. of the will, bequeaths and conveys all of the rest, residue and remainder of the Estate of Terry Joseph Breaux to his widow, Kaye Anne Robichaux Breaux.” Sherry appealed.

This court issued a ruling in Succession of Breaux, 24-391 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/25), 412 So.3d 243, reversing and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings. Sherry asserted that Paragraphs VII and IX rendered the testament ambiguous. These paragraphs concern what happens to the remainder of Terry's estate after the special bequests are disposed of. We agreed with Sherry, finding Terry's will contains irreconcilable legacies “that prevent discerning Terry's intent from within its four corners” and that extrinsic evidence was needed to determine intent. Id. at 247. We further found that communications between Terry and his lawyer were admissible for the purpose of determining donative intent.

On remand, the trial court held a hearing on September 24, 2024, wherein it considered emails and testimony previously excluded. Written Reasons and Judgment Interpreting Will were signed September 16, 2025. The trial court noted that the will at issue “is the most unartfully drafted will that has come before this Court.” Terry's will leaves special bequests to Kaye, including the contents of the family home and shed and an automobile of her choosing. As the trial court points out, what happens to the remainder of the estate is more problematic due to the contradictory provisions found in Paragraphs VII and IX. Paragraph VII of the will bequeaths to Kaye “all the rest, residue and remainder of all of my property.” Paragraph IX states that “all other items belonging to me be sold ․ and the proceeds distributed ․ unto Sherry Louise Breaux Smith.”

The trial court settled this matter by applying La.Civ.Code art. 1615, which states, in pertinent part: “When a testament contains contradictory provisions, the one written last prevails.” As a result, the trial court disregarded Paragraph VII and gave the residual of Terry's estate to Sherry. Kaye did not appeal this part of the judgment. Additionally, the trial court found that Terry intended to provide a lifetime usufruct to Kaye. Sherry appealed this part of the judgment.

Sherry assigns as errors the following:

1. The Trial Court erred by holding that paragraph VIII of Mr. Breaux's will bequeathed the lifetime usufruct to his surviving spouse when none of his children were forced heirs at the time of his death.

2. The Trial Court erred by holding that paragraph VIII of Mr. Breaux's will bequeathed the lifetime usufruct to his surviving spouse when the property which was to be the subject there to had been disposed of by said will.

The paragraphs of Terry's will at issue are paragraphs VIII and IX. Paragraph VIII states:

In the event that any of my children are entitled to a forced portion of my estate, then, in that event, I leave to said child the legitime to which they are entitled, subject to a usufruct in favor of my wife which I confirm for life.

Paragraph IX states:

I further direct that in the event my wife survives me that, other than the provisions in Sections V-VII and the usufruct stated in Section VIII above, all other items belonging to me be sold by my Executor and the proceeds be distributed in equal undivided shares unto Sherry Louise Breaux Smith.

The trial court ordered “that the lifetime usufruct in favor of Ms. Kaye Anne Robichaux Breaux, indicated in provision VIII of the will, shall remain in full force and effect.” It found that it is “clear in the language of the provisions of VIII and IX of the will, that Mr. Breaux intended to provide for Mrs. Kaye Anne Robichaux Breaux a lifetime usufruct.” Sherry argues that, in accordance with Terry's will, Kaye is only entitled to a lifetime usufruct in the event that there is a forced heir, and in that case, only the forced portion of the estate would be subject to a usufruct. We agree.

In Estate of Rick, 23-391, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/5/24), 384 So.3d 945, 948, writ denied, 24-294 (La. 4/23/24), 383 So.3d 604, the court explained:

[W]hen interpreting a testament, the reviewing court must determine the testator's intent without departing from the terms of the will. Succession of Martin, 262 So. 2d 46, 47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (citing Delaureal v. Roguet's Succession, 177 La. 815, 149 So. 464 (1933); Succession of Cunningham, 142 La. 701, 77 So. 506 (1918)). Further, “the court must interpret the will as written and give effect to what the testator said, not what the court thinks the testator intended to say.” Succession of Martin, 262 So. 2d at 48. In other terms, “[i]f the language of the testament is clear, its letter is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” La. C.C. art. 1611(A). The court must determine the expressed intent in the document, not the probable intent. Succession of Martin, 262 So. 2d at 48 (citing Succession of Jarreau v. Succession of Jarreau, 184 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Succession of Blue, 126 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961)).

We find the particular legacy stated in Paragraph VIII to be clear and unambiguous. The paragraph uses the conditional language “in the event” twice, with the event being the forced heirship of one of Terry's children. Louisiana Civil Code Article 1493(A) defines forced heirs as follows:

[D]escendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death of the decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of the first degree of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the death of the decedent.

As Sherry points out, the condition does not exist. Terry died without leaving a forced heir. If no forced heir exists, then there is no forced portion over which Kaye would be entitled to a lifetime usufruct. A usufruct is only mentioned one other time in Terry's will at Paragraph IX, wherein the usufruct provided in Paragraph VIII is referenced. Therefore, the testament does not include irreconcilable legacies regarding a usufruct belonging to Kaye. The panel in Succession of Breaux, 412 So.3d at 246, noted this, explaining, “Terry only provided for a usufruct in favor of Kaye in the event one or more of his children were forced heirs.”

We find the condition upon which Kaye is entitled to a lifetime usufruct does not exist. As such, we reverse the trial court's judgment granting Kaye a lifetime usufruct. Because Kaye did not appeal any part of the trial court's judgment, the judgment is affirmed in all other respects. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841; Hageman v. Foreman, 525 So.2d 73 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988).

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND RENDERED.

GUY E. BRADBERRY JUDGE