STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MICHAEL MOORE (2026)

On April 30, 2024, the State filed a bill of information charging Defendant, Michael Moore, with domestic abuse battery in the presence of a child under the age of thirteen, which is a violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(A) and (I). On May 14, 2024, Defendant pled not guilty, and his bench trial began on June 9, 2025. On that same date, the trial court found Defendant guilty as charged. On November 5, 2025, it sentenced Defendant to six months in parish jail with a three-year hard labor enhancement. The trial court did not specify whether the three-year enhancement was to run concurrently or consecutively to the six-month period. However, when asked if the sentence was essentially three years, the court said yes. Additionally, Defendant was ordered to pay any restitution and a $150.00 Pre-Sentence Investigation report fee. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, and on December 8, 2025, the motion was denied. He then filed a motion for appeal, which was granted on December 12, 2025. He asserts three assignments of error.

Defendant claims the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to prove he committed battery upon a household member. He also argues his sentence was excessive. Lastly, Defendant submits the trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence and erred in ordering restitution without determining whether the victim suffered pecuniary loss.

For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's conviction but vacate his sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In his first assignment of error, Defendant claims the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of domestic abuse battery. He argues that not only did the evidence fail to establish that he was the aggressor, but it also failed to show that the victim did not consent to the altercation.

Relevant Law

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

The trial court found Defendant guilty of domestic abuse battery in the presence of a child under the age of thirteen, a violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(A) and (I), which provide, in pertinent part:

A. Domestic abuse battery is the intentional use of force or violence committed by one household member or family member upon the person of another household member or family member.

B. For purposes of this Section:

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(5) “Household member” means any person presently or formerly living in the same residence with the offender and who is involved or has been involved in a sexual or intimate relationship with the offender, or any child presently or formerly living in the same residence with the offender, or any child of the offender regardless of where the child resides.

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I. This Subsection shall be cited as the “Domestic Abuse Child Endangerment Law.” Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, when the state proves, in addition to the elements of the crime as set forth in Subsection A of this Section, that a minor child thirteen years of age or younger was present at the residence or any other scene at the time of the commission of the offense, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than three years.

Evidence, Testimony, and the Trial Court's Ruling

On March 26, 2023, Defendant and Ashley Carter fought in the living room of an apartment in Lafayette, Louisiana. The apartment belonged to Ms. Carter, and she lived there with her twelve-year-old son and seven-year-old daughter. Elsewhere in the city, Defendant lived on his own. Ms. Carter knew Defendant because they were childhood friends. They dated periodically. No children came from their relationship, however. At the time of the incident, their relationship, as Ms. Carter testified, was “tricky.” Seeing him in the parking lot of her apartment complex, she assumed Defendant was there to try to work things out. She invited him in. In the living room, they talked about living together as they once did. Defendant said they should split the bills; Ms. Carter said Defendant should pay them. From there, they yelled at each other in front of Ms. Carter's children and her security camera. The videos from the camera were introduced at trial and played for the trial judge.

The videos show Defendant and Ms. Carter were arguing about who should pay the bills. That changed when Defendant lunged as if he was going to hit Ms. Carter. Ms. Carter flinched and guarded her face. The video then showed Ms. Carter lightly pressing Defendant's arm as she turned him towards the front door. She yelled, “Get out of my house.” She crossed the living room and placed her hand on the front door. Defendant had turned and was blocking the camera, but the front door was likely then opened. “Get out,” Ms. Carter said, “Get out.” Defendant was standing at the other side of the room at that time. “Call the police,” he said. For about a minute this went on; Ms. Carter would say, “Get out,” and Defendant would say, “Call the police.” Ms. Carter then walked away from the open door. Pointing at it, she approached Defendant and told him to get out of the house. Defendant walked towards the exit and looked like he was going to leave. Then, Ms. Carter rushed to the door once she saw Defendant was closing it. As the two struggled to gain control of the door, Defendant pushed Ms. Carter's arm away. Ms. Carter tried again to gain control of the door, but Defendant slammed it shut. She pushed against Defendant's chest, saying “Get out. Get out of my house.” Defendant shoved her down onto the nearby ottoman. Ms. Carter stood and swung her arms at Defendant's face, and Defendant grabbed Ms. Carter's legs and brought her to the ground. He opened the apartment door, grabbed Ms. Carter's keys, and went outside, with Ms. Carter following close behind him. From then on, Ms. Carter and Defendant can no longer be seen, but their yelling can be heard.

As the video was played and Ms. Carter gave her testimony, Ms. Carter explained she was reaching for the door to get out of her apartment. Before that, she thought Defendant was going to leave, and she was going to close the door behind him. After Defendant closed the door, her arms went “flying” because she was trying to grab the door and leave her apartment. She started pushing him, but Defendant got the best of her and pushed her down on the ottoman. Ms. Carter acknowledged she started hitting Defendant. Then Defendant pulled her down like a “rag doll or puppet,” pulled her hair, choked her, and flipped her over by using her legs. Ms. Carter testified that Defendant grabbed her keys, opened the door, and tried to throw her keys in the dumpster outside. The keys missed the dumpster, and Defendant grabbed Ms. Carter by the hair again. Regarding her injuries, Ms. Carter testified her feelings were hurt and her hair was tender. Additionally, Ms. Carter said the initial contact, which began the struggle, was when Defendant “hit [her] arm to move [her] out of the way or to make [her] move from the door or ungrab the door so it didn't close me in.”

Giving his version of events, Defendant testified he was trying to close Ms. Carter's door to make sure she would not be evicted for being so loud. He did not want people outside to hear the argument, and he wanted to have a “decent conversation.” He explained that after he closed the door, he flung his arms up to get Ms. Carter off him. Defendant said Ms. Carter had “closed the distance” and became the aggressor. Ms. Carter was grabbing his clothes when Defendant pushed her into the ottoman. Defendant said he restrained Ms. Carter because she was punching him. He also denied choking her or grabbing her hair and testified he never hit her. Additionally, Defendant said he flipped Ms. Carter to get her out of the way of the door, and as he left the apartment, Ms. Carter followed and hit him. Defendant said he did not leave the apartment when asked to do so because he and Ms. Carter did that all the time; they fought and then reconciled. Also, Defendant testified that when he said, “Call the police,” he meant it as “Like come on, you serious?” Defendant admitted he had a 2003 conviction for aggravated burglary and was sentenced to ten years on that charge. His probation and parole were reversed. He also had a conviction for illegal carrying of a weapon.

After hearing Ms. Carter and Defendant's testimony and viewing the video, the trial court provided the following reasons for finding Defendant guilty of domestic abuse battery:

All right. Having reviewed all of the evidence I find that the State has proven that [Defendant] is a household member as defined by the statute, and that minor children under the age of 13 were present during the course of this incident.

As for the incident itself, Mr. -- Ms. Carter clearly tells [Defendant] repeatedly to leave. She even opens the door for him to leave as she continues to tell him to get out. [Defendant]’s response is to just sit there and then repeatedly tell her call the police. When [Defendant] finally does get up to leave or to walk towards the door he does not leave, he actually tries to close the door. Ms. Carter grabs the door and tries to stop him from closing it. [Defendant] pushes her arm away, forcing her to release the door so that he can close it. This is the first battery.

The second battery occurs when [Defendant] violently pushes Ms. Carter down on the chair. I do not find [Defendant] credible in his explanation as to why he closes the door, or tries to close the door. If he did not want Ms. Carter to be evicted the appropriate response would have been to do what she was asking you to do, which was to leave. Ms. Carter could not have made her wishes more clear. I find Ms. Carter to be incredibly -- credible. Her testimony is supported by the video. Therefore, I'm going to find you guilty as charged.

Defendant and the State's Arguments

Defendant notes the trial court found he committed two batteries. The first was when Defendant pushed Ms. Carter's arms away from the door. The second was when he pushed her onto the ottoman. To Defendant, however, these batteries were in response to Ms. Carter's aggressive behavior and the batteries she committed. Defendant says his actions were made in self-defense and as he was also attempting to leave the residence. Defendant notes Ms. Carter invited him into her apartment. True, he did not immediately leave when asked to do so, but Defendant says this alone did not justify Ms. Carter's actions. Though a person may use force against another person to prevent an offense against themselves, the force must be reasonable and necessary to prevent such offense. The other person must be attempting to unlawfully and forcibly enter the property or must have done so already. “The law does not authorize one to use physical violence to remove an invitee from one's residence,” says Defendant. Here, however, Defendant was lawfully in the residence when the conflict began, and though the trial court found Ms. Carter's testimony to be credible, he contends the video contradicted her testimony. For instance, the video did not show that Ms. Carter tried to open the door to leave. Instead, it showed her shoving Defendant. Also, Ms. Carter opened the door earlier while Defendant was still across the living room. She could have left if she wanted. The video also showed Ms. Carter was upset, and she screamed as Defendant calmly walked towards her. In all, Defendant contends his actions did not rise to the level of domestic abuse battery. Defendant suggests a person is deemed to have consented to a physical encounter when he starts it. “Consent is defined as the ‘[a]greement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose,’ ” and it may be expressed or implied. See State in Interest of C.J., 14-241, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/14), 153 So.3d 467, 469 (first alteration in original) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 323 (8th ed. 2004)). Defendant states the surveillance footage established Ms. Carter as the aggressor. She grabbed Defendant's arm, she closed the distance, and she grabbed at Defendant as he tried to turn from the door. “One can infer from these actions that Carter impliedly consented to what followed,” says Defendant. “Defendant's actions were committed to open the area so he could open the door and leave.”

As for the State, it notes the trial court had the benefit of seeing and hearing the incident on camera. What was captured on camera corroborated Ms. Carter's testimony. Thus, the trial court's findings were based on sufficient evidence.

Analysis

In State v. Edwards, 24-252 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/25), 408 So.3d 555, writ denied, 25-524 (La. 10/1/25), 417 So.3d 577, this court upheld the defendant's domestic abuse battery conviction. In doing so, this court noted “the resolution of conflicting trial testimony requires the factfinder to determine witness credibility.” Id. at 560. This “is a matter of weight of the evidence and not sufficiency” and the factfinder may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part. State v. Green, 96-208, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/96), 683 So.2d 1292, 1297, writ denied, 96-2892 (La. 6/13/97), 695 So.2d 963. Since it is the role of the factfinder to weigh witness credibility, the appellate court should not second-guess that credibility determination beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. State v. Fontenot, 616 So.2d 1353 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1334 (La.1993). Thus, a verdict will not be disturbed “when it is supported by the testimony of a witness, whether in whole or in part.” Edwards, 408 So.3d at 560.

The use of force or violence in defense is set forth in La.R.S. 14:19. On the date of the offense, La.R.S. 14:19(A)(1)(a) stated in pertinent part:

The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable ․

When committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person's lawful possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense.

However, as La.R.S. 14:21 provides, “A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.”

Here, as factfinder, the trial court viewed the domestic dispute that was captured on video. After viewing the video, the court rejected Defendant's version of events and accepted Ms. Carter's. This was warranted. The video shows Defendant was the aggressor. He refused to leave Ms. Carter's residence. Before slamming Ms. Carter's door, he pushed Ms. Carter's arms away. He shoved Ms. Carter onto her ottoman and then pinned her to the ground once she stood up and struck back. Defendant claims in his brief that he acted so that he could leave the apartment, but, if anything, the video indicates Defendant tried to prevent Ms. Carter from leaving, and the claim is in direct conflict with his testimony that he closed the door because they were being loud. Ms. Carter took active steps to disengage, but Defendant refused to let the disagreement go and to leave Ms. Carter's residence. See State v. Specht, 25-284 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/20/26), ___ So.3d ___ (2026 WL 787568). Moreover, the evidence is clear that Ms. Carter did not consent to the battery. Cf. State v. Daigle, 439 So.2d 595 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983). Because the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, supports Defendant's conviction, this court finds this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE

Defendant's remaining assignments of error concern his sentence. Not only was his sentence excessive, he says, but it was also indeterminate. Defendant's third assignment of error on the sentence's indeterminacy has merit. For that reason, it will be addressed before the second assignment.

In his third assignment of error, Defendant notes the trial court ordered him to pay Ms. Carter an unspecified amount of restitution, and it did so without determining whether Ms. Carter needed restitution in the first place. Specifically, the trial court told defendant:

Additionally, you are to pay restitution to Ms. Carter, and I don't know if there is any, but if there is any for her phone damages, as well as for any therapy she's had to undergo as a result of this action. You'll be given credit for all time served under this docket number, and you have two years from the date the sentence becomes final within which to file for post-conviction relief. You are also to pay a Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($150.00) for the PSI report.

This court has stated the following regarding the imposition of restitution without specifying the amount of restitution to be paid:

Whether the restitution was ordered as a condition of probation or as part of the principal sentence, the restitution order must be a certain amount determined by the trial court:

If restitution is ordered as a condition of probation, it is to be “a reasonable sum not to exceed the actual pecuniary loss to the victim in an amount certain” [La C. Cr. P. art. 895.1(A)(1)] and “in an amount to be determined by the court” [La. C. Cr. P art. 895(A)(7)]. When the trial court fails to set a specific amount to be paid in restitution as a special condition of probation, the defendant's sentence is defective. State v. Wilson, 613 So.2d 234 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 93-0533 (La. 3/25/94), 635 So. 2d 238. The court may also order restitution as part of the principal sentence under La. C. Cr. P. art. 883.2, in which case a nonspecific restitution order will render the sentence indeterminate and thus invalid. State v. Fussell, 06-2595 (La. 1/16/08), 974 So.2d 1223.

State v. Hampton, 52,430, p. 2 n. 2 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 261 So.3d 993, 998, n, 2, writ denied, 19-287 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So.3d 1029 (alterations in original).

In the present case, the trial court stated the following regarding restitution:

In addition to that, the restitution, the Court's gonna order that there be, if there's any, that there be restitution and at the request of your Court appointed attorney you are ․ you are reserved unto you the restitution hearing if there's a debate between him and ․ and the other department [sic] ․

In a recent case, this court addressed the trial court's failure to set an amount of restitution and found the error required the sentence to be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. State v. Loyd, 18-968 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/5/19), 274 So.3d 112. The restitution order found to be indeterminate in Loyd and in the case cited by Loyd is similar to the restitution order in the present case. Addressing the issue, Loyd stated:

We further find that in sentencing Defendant, the trial court failed to set the amount of restitution to be paid to the victim. Specifically, the trial court stated:

Order that you pay restitution to Ms. [Spotsville] for the monetary amount that she paid you, and as well as any out of pocket expenses that were not covered by insurance. Court will allow you to res -- reserve the right to a restitution hearing if you and your par -- probation or parole officer cannot agree on that amount.

In State v. Fussell, 06-324 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/06), 941 So.2d 109, restitution was imposed pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 883.2, as it was in the instant case. On error patent review, this court found the defendant's sentence was indeterminate due to the trial court's failure to set the amount of restitution. The trial court stated in pertinent part:

I'm also gonna [sic] order you to pay all restitution involved with respect to - - if there is any - - I order you to pay for any and all medical counseling and health expenses incurred by the victim or her family, as a consequence of your conviction for these offenses. That's also gonna [sic] be - - it's an indetermined amount, it's just gonna [sic] be generally made in the judgment. I don't know what it's gonna [sic] be. I don't even know if the State's gonna [sic] make an application for that.

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And I've already ordered you to pay for any and all medical counseling or other health expenses incurred by the victim or her family as a consequence of your commission of those particular offenses in that case.

Fussell, 941 So.2d at 139.

This court vacated the defendant's sentences and remanded the case for resentencing with the instruction that if restitution was imposed, the trial court must specify the amount.

The supreme court agreed, stating:

We agree with the Third Circuit Court of Appeal that, due to a nonspecific restitution order, the sentences imposed upon Defendant by the trial court were indeterminate and, thus, invalid. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 879 (stating that “[i]f a defendant who has been convicted of an offense is sentenced to imprisonment, the court shall impose a determinate sentence”); La.C.Cr.P. art. 883.2. Accordingly, this case must now be remanded for resentencing on all convicted counts.

State v. Fussell, 06-2595, p. 25 (La. 1/16/08), 974 So.2d 1223, 1238 (footnote omitted).

State v. Vidrine, 19-210, pp. 10–13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/19), 280 So.3d 664, 670–72 (alterations in original).

As in Vidrine and Fussell, the trial court in the present case failed to specify the amount of restitution imposed. Defendant's sentence is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. The trial court is instructed that if restitution is imposed, it must specify the amount of restitution. See also State v. Warren, 25-251 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/25), 423 So.3d 650, writ denied, 25-1499 (La. 5/19/26), 431 So.3d 1196.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

Defendant's remaining claim concerns whether his sentence was excessive. However, with the above assignment of error requiring Defendant's sentence to be vacated, the assigned error is moot.

CONCLUSION

Defendant's conviction is affirmed, but his sentence is vacated. His case is remanded for resentencing with instructions for the trial court to specify the amount of restitution Defendant is to pay, if restitution is imposed.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

GUY E. BRADBERRY JUDGE