STATE v. KEYS (2026)

Defendant, Al Jerome Keys, pled guilty to three counts of second degree rape in violation of La.R.S. 14:42.1. The trial court sentenced Mr. Keys to twenty years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for each count, to run consecutively. Mr. Keys now seeks review of his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

ISSUES

In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court's imposition of three consecutive twenty-year sentences without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence is excessive.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 28, 2023, Mr. Keys was charged in an indictment with two counts of first degree rape in violation of La.R.S. 14:42. The charges stem from incidents occurring from April 1, 2022, until July 31, 2022, each involving acts of sexual assault against the victim, Z.K ¹ . Mr. Keys had sexual intercourse with the victim, his niece, numerous times during this period. The victim had not yet turned twelve years old when she found out she was pregnant by Mr. Keys. As a result of the pregnancy, the victim traveled out of state to obtain an abortion. On May 19, 2025, Mr. Keys pled guilty to three counts of second degree rape in violation of La.R.S. 14:42.1. On June 30, 2025, Mr. Keys was sentenced to twenty years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for each count, to run consecutively. Mr. Keys then filed a motion to reconsider sentence on August 20, 2025, arguing that the consecutive terms were excessive. The trial court denied the motion on September 8, 2025. A Pro Se Notice of Intent was filed on August 25, 2025. Counsel for Mr. Keys filed a Notice of Appeal with Designation of Record and Motion to Appoint Appellate Counsel on October 28, 2025. Another Pro Se Notice of Intent to Appeal Sentence was filed on October 30, 2025. Mr. Keys is now before this court asserting a single assignment of error.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors patent.

CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Keys asserts the trial court sentenced him to a combined sentence of sixty years for three counts of second degree rape although he was approximately sixty years old, suffering from diabetes, had no prior history of sex offenses, and had been arrest free for seven to eight years prior to his arrest on the instant charges. He also argues the trial court failed to consider any mitigating factors and failed to set forth reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. Thus, his sentences are excessive.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005–06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

At the sentencing hearing, Kimberly Keys, the victim's grandmother, stated that Mr. Keys was her uncle and detailed the impact the offense had on her and her granddaughter. She also stated she had forgiven Mr. Keys.

The State read the victim's statement to the judge:

[H]ow I feel about the whole situation is mad and sad. I'm strong but you can't bring me down but I will remember it for the rest of my life. I might sit and cry but I'm strong at the age of fourteen, not letting no one bring me down or show I'm weak. I hope in life you learn how nasty and disgusting you make me think of you. This whole situation is depressing. I will never show but time to time I feel that not only did you ruin my life with this but also opened my eyes that I am forever going to be strong no matter what the situation is. I think about how I looked. I can't even recognize myself because of you but I will never ever let a person like you make me lose my confidence. I am hurt that my own blood would hurt me like this and say lies which made me feel people didn't believe me, but that's not true, I had these strong people on my side who did not let me down. I wish this never happened.

Defense counsel pointed out that Mr. Keys had not committed any criminal acts in the seven or eight years prior to the offenses at issue. He claimed Mr. Keys's drug use probably led to the events and noted that Mr. Keys took responsibility for his actions by entering a guilty plea. Defense counsel also asked the trial court to take the following into consideration: Mr. Keys's age of sixty-one, his diabetes, the fact that he was abandoned by his father who had abused his mother, his concern that the man he thought was his father may not be, his history of work as a cook, and the fact that he committed no other sex offenses. Mr. Keys then stated that he was guilty of the charges and was sorry.

The trial court noted the following after hearing from the parties:

So you pled guilty to three counts of Second Degree Rape which the law requires that whoever commits that shall be imprisoned at hard labor with or without probation, parole or suspension of sentence for a period from five years to forty years. So that's the range that I'm supposed to look at today. So when looking at that range there is some statute guidance under the Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 so that when a defendant has been convicted of a felony the court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if any of the following occur. There is an undue risk that during the period of suspended, that if you should put a suspended sentence the defendant would commit another crime. Your criminal history indicates that you, you've been in and out of trouble for a long time. And no doubt this is a serious case and I do have concerns about it that what, this is what happened to a family member of yours, a niece, would you commit it again. So I think incarceration is the only answer there. And that you're in need of correctional treatment or custodial environment that could be most effectively done within an institution and sadly that's where our sex offenders have gotten to get their most ability to have any correctional treatment is within our facilities. Any lesser a sentence of any of this would certainly indicate to the family, as well as the victim, that this wasn't a serious crime. So incarceration, I don't see anything other than incarceration for you, Mr. Keys, based on that alone.

So some of the other factors that I have to look at would be some of the aggravating factors and that your conduct during the commission of this offense was deliberately cruel to the victim and I would say that it was. This was not, and I'm not making light of anybody who is under the age but this was not an event of someone who was sixteen that you would say, oh, but they knew better. This was somebody who was still very tender and young at the age of eleven and that adds to it for me as someone you've watched grow up. You saw them from birth to that age. Well aware of how tender and young and how manipulative, you could manipulate that child. So it was a trusted family member, one that you saw on a regular basis and that you presented such a face that please let me watch the children for them on a frequent basis. So it added to that deception. You took advantage of all of your family's trust and you've already saw that, you've already admitted to that, and then forced yourself, manipulated yourself, whatever way it happened, even with the victim asked you to stop. But a victim at this age should never, never have to ask an uncle to stop such behavior. You knew, kind of being repetitive but it's one of the other actions that you knew or should have known that the victim was particularly vulnerable. No doubt her age alone let you know that and that it's a family member. And that these actions all occurred over several months the way the victim described it in the CASA interview. She had not yet turned twelve years old when she found out she was pregnant.

Use of threats or violence. There were comments made, the child felt like you were going to tell on her or that it was her fault. That's equally devastating. That would be the threats that would be made to a child to say, oh, don't tell. Your size difference of you being a grown man of six feet something, I'm not sure, but your size alone would be a threat to a child. And being the adult. The presence they had to, the ability that they had to listen to an adult. We're all raised listen to the adults in your family and taking advantage of that. That it would, the offense resulting in a significant, permanent injury or economic loss. I see the tears of people in the audience, I don't want to cry myself. This child should not ever have to be known to be a scorned woman. You heard it already the scars that you carry and you're not even the one who is the victim today. There is such permanent injury, because I do drug court is what I'm going to say, the untold numbers of women who end up being, have drug problems or other problems in their life as a result of sexual abuse. So there will be permanent injury.

I have to also look at any mitigating factors and Mr. Lacour argued very well on your behalf to say, well, there has been a history of drugs. I got lost. Where that bothers me hearing it today and as well as in his submission was something I also do in my drug court to say you have to be accountable. At some moment in time you became sober. Meaning the next morning, if you were drunk or whatever you were that caused the event, the next day you were sober or the next day after that or the next day after that. I don't find substance use one of those mitigating factors in this because it went over such a long length of time. This was not a one-off event, this was months and months and months of events. So, yeah, you may have had some substance use and maybe that's what added to your substance use because you couldn't face up to what you've been doing with your niece, and that's terribly sad.

When we talk about mitigating factors is why would the system need to take care of Mr. Keys because he's going to have to be incarcerated and he may have some hard conditions, there's not an option for him in the community to exist and that the prison system will address those concerns he has got. I feel certain the prison system has addressed those concerns while he has been in there, that's what they're supposed to do. I don't find that his current conditions would be any reason to do anything less because I can't fix what's going to happen to this child over her next years of life either. Can't fix either one of those. Because the child is forever going to be a victim of a horrible circumstance and I hope the family takes care of her.

So looked also at what some other cases were out there and what's an appropriate sentence for Mr. Keys. So I did explore all those options, me and my law clerk, looked at different options. I know there was an offer made to you but you chose to go in the blind. And I don't know what the offer was. No doubt I can hear conversations because they're in front of me and I don't know what the other ones but you chose to go in the blind.

The trial court further stated:

To make it less than anything significant, to say that it's at the minimum is ridiculous to think it's a five year sentence, it is not, because this is a child who, for the record, I say had to have her first flight is my understanding and ever to make a trip was to California was so she could have an abortion. Not how you're supposed to do it.

So to the three counts, they will go consecutive, I'm not going to do concurrent because if the child could have identified how many times those events occurred you would be doing more than three counts.

In the case before us, we find that Mr. Keys's sentences are not so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice. We also do not find that the sentences make no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and are, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. As noted by the trial court, second degree rape is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for not less than five nor more than forty years. La.R.S. 14:42.1(B). For each count, Mr. Keys was sentenced to serve twenty years. Twenty years is a midrange sentence.

In State v. Cooper, 34,312 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/00), 774 So.2d 1153, the defendant raped his five-year-old daughter on several occasions. The second circuit described the crime as “heinous” and an “abomination.” The same can be said for Mr. Keys's offenses as he raped and impregnated his eleven-year-old niece and took her to terminate her pregnancy.

The second circuit further noted:

When the crime of forcible rape is allowed in an aggravated rape situation, based solely on the nature of the offense and the benefit the defendant received through a plea bargain which reduced his sentencing exposure from death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits to the sentence permitted for forcible rape, a maximum sentence for that offense or conviction can be appropriately imposed, even for a first offender. State v. Phillips, 29,020 (La.App.2d Cir.12/11/96), 685 So.2d 565; State v. Childs, 466 So.2d 1363 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985).

Id. at 1154. Like the defendant in Cooper, Mr. Keys was originally charged with first degree rape, which is punishable by life imprisonment.² Thus, he received a substantial benefit as a result of his plea.

It is clear from the trial court's very thorough reasons for imposition of sentence that it considered Mr. Keys's personal history, his prior record, the seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of reoffending in particularizing the sentences imposed.

Our review of comparable cases indicates this court has routinely affirmed higher sentences in cases involving similar offenses. In State v. Malloy, 01-1118 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/02), 815 So.2d 940, the defendant sexually assaulted his seven-year-old stepdaughter and was charged with aggravated rape and aggravated oral sexual battery. He entered a guilty plea to forcible rape and was sentenced to thirty-five years, twenty years of which was to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.³ This court found the trial court granted the defendant a great concession by permitting him to plead to forcible rape, and the sentence was “not even slightly out of proportion to the seriousness of his offense.” Id. at 943.

In State v. Breaux, 17-406 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/17), 232 So.3d 675, writ denied, 17-1967 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1309, the defendant was charged with aggravated rape for having sexual intercourse with a twelve-year-old girl. He entered a plea of no contest to the lesser charge of second degree rape and was sentenced to thirty-five years at hard labor, with the first ten years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. In affirming the sentence, this court held the defendant received a substantial benefit in accepting a plea agreement that reduced his exposure from life imprisonment to a maximum of forty years. The court further found the defendant's sentence was not excessive when compared to the following:

In State v. Vallery, 04-1589 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So.2d 836, this court upheld a thirty-five year sentence without benefits for a first time felony offender convicted of forcible rape of his eleven year old stepdaughter. In support of their opinion, a panel of this court determined that Vallery's crime was terrible enough to be a “crime of passion,” he had been sentenced within the guidelines, and his sentence was less than the maximum he could have been given. Comparatively, Defendant in the instant case has been convicted of two felonies, the rape was a crime of passion, Defendant's sentence was within the guidelines, and it is less than the maximum the trial court could have ordered.

Importantly, the court in Vallery addressed the distinction set forth by the supreme court in State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982), addressing whether a maximum sentence was appropriate following a plea agreement. In Lanclos, the court distinguished between the crime that the defendant had committed from the crime to which the defendant pled guilty. The Lanclos court held that because the defendant committed a crime with greater penalties than the one to which he pled, sentencing him to the maximum under the pled crime was not an abuse of discretion. Vallery, 899 So.2d at 839–840.

Id. at 680.

Based on the facts of the case, the benefit from the plea, and the sentences upheld in both Malloy and Breaux, we find that Mr. Keys's three twenty-year sentences are not excessive.

Mr. Keys also argues that the trial court gave no basis for imposition of consecutive sentences. In State v. Lemay, 23-369 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/20/23) (unpublished opinion) (2023 WL 8797499), writ denied, 24-23 (La. 6/19/24), 386 So.3d 673, the defendant did not object to the sentence or file a motion to reconsider sentence. On appeal, he argued there was no basis for consecutive sentences because the victim did not know precisely when the offenses happened or whether the offenses occurred on the same date. This court addressed the issue stating:

According to the bill of information, however, the offenses occurred within a three-month period. The imposition of consecutive sentences is within the discretion of the trial court under La.Code Crim.P. art. 883. Additionally, as discussed above, consecutive sentences are not uncommon in cases involving sexual offenses against a single victim which occur over an extended period by persons in the same household. State v. Mickens, 31,737, pp. 16−17 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/31/99), 731 So.2d 463, 473, writ denied, 99-1078 (La. 9/24/99), 747 So.2d 1118. To the extent that Mr. Lemay alleges the trial court failed to state particular justification for the imposition of consecutive sentences and failed to adequately comply with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, he is precluded from making that specific argument on appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E).

Id.at 25–26.

Mr. Keys filed a motion to reconsider sentence but did not include his claim that the trial court failed to provide specific reasons for imposition of consecutive sentences therein. Following Lemay, we find that his claim is precluded from review.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the sentences of Defendant, Al Jerome Keys, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The victim's initials are used in accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W).

2.   “[A]ny reference to the crime of aggravated rape is the same as a reference to the crime of first degree rape.” La.R.S. 14:42(E).

3.   “[A]ny reference to the crime of forcible rape is the same as a reference to the crime of second degree rape.” La.R.S.14:42.1(C).

WILSON, Judge.