GYARFAS v. NGUYEN (2026)

This appeal stems from a petition for divorce and ancillary matters filed in the fifteenth judicial district court. The trial court signed a judgment dated April 4, 2025, and amended on October 22, 2025, to include the consolidated docket numbers involved. The judgment reflects a stipulation the parties made in court regarding custody of their minor children, child support, arrearages, and the assignment of a parenting coordinator. Defendant/Appellant appeals. After review, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part with instructions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties were married on July 15, 2013, in Vietnam and had three children, all minors during these proceedings. The parties physically separated on May 4, 2023, and Mr. Gyarfas filed for divorce under La.Civ.Code art. 102 on June 9, 2023 (docket 2023-3068). In that petition he sought joint custody of the children, child support, and interim spousal support. Mr. Gyarfas amended his petition to additionally request shared custodial time, a decree that attorney fees and costs are a community obligation, exclusive use of the family home or reimbursement, and a temporary and final restraining order to prevent the disposal of community property. The temporary restraining order was issued on October 2, 2023.

Ms. Nguyen filed an answer and reconventional demand seeking joint custody of the children with herself declared the domiciliary parent as well as child support. Ms. Nguyen also sought the use of the family home as well as a temporary restraining order preventing the disposal of community property and the alteration of any beneficiaries under any benefit plans. The temporary restraining order was granted.

On November 22, 2023, Ms. Nyugen filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse describing three incidents that occurred on November 17, 2023, September 23, 2023, and May 4, 2023. The petition further sought temporary custody of the parties’ children. The court granted and entered a temporary restraining order that day, which was to end on December 8, 2023, the date of the hearing of the matter. The hearing officer found that Ms. Nguyen proved domestic abuse occurred in September of 2023. Mr. Gyarfas objected to the finding and a hearing on the matter was set.

Prior to the next hearing, Ms. Nguyen filed a separate petition for divorce based on La.Civ.Code art. 103(4) on December 18, 2023.

Thereafter, on January 31, 2024, a Judgment of Dismissal was entered, dismissing the Petition for Protection from Abuse because “alternate relief [was] granted.” That same day, a reciprocal Preliminary Injunction was signed by the court, which also ordered the parties to share custody of their minor children on a seven and seven shared custody plan.

Regarding custody and visitation, a Hearing Officer conference occurred, and the Hearing Officer signed recommendations on May 13, 2024, and filed said recommendations into the record on May 15, 2024. Ultimately, the Hearing Officer found “no reason to opt out of a shared physical custody schedule” and recommended a seven and seven shared custody plan. He also suggested there was a possibility that no parent would need to be named as the domiciliary parent but recommended that Ms. Nguyen currently be named the domiciliary parent. As to child support, the Hearing Officer prepared two calculations, his calculation of the arrears was based on Schedule A for the period in which the protective order was in effect and the children were in Ms. Nguyen's care, and on Schedule B for support based on his shared custody recommendation. Ultimately, the Hearing Officer recommended that Ms. Nguyen be ordered to pay child support in the amount of $616.50 per month from August 25, 2023, through July 31, 2024, and in the amount of $663.91 per month commencing August 1, 2024. The Hearing Officer calculated the child support arrearages from August 25, 2023, through May 15, 2024, as $4,638.59. The worksheets and evidence considered were attached to the recommendations. Mr. Gyarfas objected to the recommendations.

On August 15, 2024, the two cases were consolidated. Mr. Gyarfas moved for a judgment of divorce pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 102, and Ms. Nguyen moved for a judgment of divorce based on La.Civ.Code art. 103(4). Trial was subsequently set for November 18, 2024. Also set for that day was Mr. Gyarfas’ Exception of Res Judicata, wherein he alleged the trial court previously dismissed Ms. Nguyen's allegations of abuse on January 31, 2024.

The parties, both represented, made several stipulations in court on November 18, 2024, regarding “custody, child support, and all other issues that are currently before the Court between these two parties.” The minutes for November 18, 2024 indicate that the court took up the divorce action first. The minutes then state “[e]vidence was offered filed and introduced including the entire court file.” After divorce was granted, the parties entered their stipulations regarding custody and child support.¹

The parties stipulated that “they will share custody of the three minor children[,] specifically, “[j]oint and shared custody of the minor children with the exchange dates based on seven-and-seven schedule[.]” “There will be no domiciliary parent chosen between the two parties” and “[t]hey will consult with a parenting coordinator to deal with any disputes between the two parties.” The parties proposed Laura Coleman as the parenting coordinator. The parties also agreed regarding new extra curricular activities and how extra curricular activities would be paid.

As to child support, the trial court noted that there are “two worksheets that are attached to the hearing officer's recommendation. I think there's a new worksheet effective ․ August 1.” Mr. Gyarfas’ attorney continued:

[A]s of August 1, 2024, the amount of child support will be $505.92. That would be going forward from this point forward. The arrearages through November 1, according to my calculations are $7,697.60. Those arrearages will be a credit, a hundred percent credit to my client in the community property partition, so we'll start off with just the $505.92, starting on November 1.

The stipulation continued to address the child tax credit as well.

The parties, who were previously sworn in, testified that they read the agreement that was read into the record, had the opportunity to discuss the agreement with their respective attorneys, and agreed with the terms. It was also stated for the record that “[t]he parties are stipulating to a consent judgment, and they both understand that this is an admission that there has been no finding by any court of domestic violence in this case.” Additionally, the court acknowledged that the judgment was in effect from that day, November 18, 2024, that it “is a contract between the parties[,]” though a written judgment would be drafted at a later date.

A Judgment of Divorce was signed on November 18, 2024, granting divorce and terminating the community of acquets and gains retroactive to June 9, 2023. The trial court also orally ruled on custody and child support on November 18, 2024.

Ms. Nguyen next filed an Objection to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation at the Trial Date and Request to Reset on February 4, 2025, which the trial court, instead, construed as a Motion for New Trial and denied as untimely.²

On April 4, 2025, the trial court signed two judgments: the Joint Custody Plan, which set forth the custodial schedule, including holiday schedule, details for travel and emergencies, medical, extracurricular activities, etc.; and the judgment now on appeal, which covers legal and physical custody of the children, the appointment of a parenting coordinator, child support, modification of the January 31, 2024 preliminary injunction, and court costs. Both the Joint Custody Plan and the judgment were to be mailed or served on both parties. While Mr. Gyarfas approved the judgment as to form and content, Ms. Nguyen did not sign.

Ms. Nguyen filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal Out of Time on May 12, 2025, asserting that she did not receive notice of the judgment until April 18, 2025. The trial court granted the appeal from the April 4, 2025 judgment. Ms. Nguyen assigns four assignments of error, namely:

1. The trial court erred in entering a judgment regarding child support and arrearages that references “Exhibit A”³ and “Exhibit B” when neither are attached to the judgment or found in the record; thus, there is no “completed calculation” showing the evidence inputted into the worksheets to reach those awards.

2. The trial court erred in relying on a hearing officer worksheet because the “income figures, child-care costs, health-insurance premiums, payments, credits, deductions, offsets, and arrearage amounts are not tied to verified, period-specific record evidence” pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.2, 9:315.3, 9:315.4, and 9:315.20, preventing meaningful review.

3. The trial court erred in not providing “separate, period-specific calculations” supported by evidence in rendering judgment.

4. The trial court erred in appointing a parenting coordinator without “showing statutory compliance under La.R.S. 9:358.1, 9:358.3, and 9:358.4[.]”

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review:

“An award of child support is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” State, Dep't of Social Services in Interest of P.B., 12-838 p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/24/13), 114 So.3d 1161, 1165, writ denied, 13-1193 (La. 9/13/13), 120 So.3d 698. The best interest of the child factor is the prime consideration in determining child support. Id.

Assignments of Error One, Two, and Three:

In assignments one, two, and three, Ms. Nguyen argues that the judgment lacks an explanation as to what evidence or exhibits were considered in reaching the child support and arrearage awards and, specifically, that the judgment references two exhibits that are not in the record. She then contests that the missing explanation prevents this court from reviewing the judgment. Ms. Nguyen has not requested that this court review those awards for error. In fact, she notes in her brief that “[t]he problem is not that Defendant-Appellant disagrees with the numbers. The problem is that the appellate record does not show a verified, traceable, period-specific calculation.” While Ms. Nguyen suggests that certain numbers used by the Hearing Officer in computing various child support worksheets may be incorrect, she does not argue that incorrect numbers were, in fact, used. Instead, she argues that it is indeterminable from the record which numbers, for example whether annual salary versus gross income, were used in the Hearing Officer's computation. Similarly, because the trial court did not appropriately attach Exhibit B, identified in the judgment as “[a] schedule B child support worksheet[,]” or explain the evidence relied on in reaching its awards, it is indeterminable how the trial court reached such awards and, thus, unreviewable. As relief on appeal, Ms. Nguyen asks that the child support and arrearage portions of the April 4, 2025 judgment be vacated and either amended by this court or remanded to the trial court for a new calculation.

Based on the above, it is this court's appreciation that Ms. Nguyen seeks to have the April 4, 2025 judgment vacated as it is unsupported by the evidence.

Mr. Gyarfas similarly interprets Ms. Nguyen's brief as arguing that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to form the basis for the judgment. Thus, he first asserts that the judgment is based on a compromise stipulated to by the parties on the record and is, therefore, not appealable by Ms. Nguyen. In doing so he cites La.Code Civ.P. art. 2085 and Mill Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Manuel, 04-1385 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/10/05) 916 So.2d 268.

Mr. Gyarfas also asserts that the awards are supported by evidence in the record. Specifically, evidence was presented by both parties to the Hearing Officer who made recommendations and prepared child support worksheets. He notes that the child support arrearages until July 31, 2024, are supported by the worksheets attached to the Hearing Officer's Recommendation. Regarding payments after that date, Mr. Gyarfas admits no child support worksheet supporting that calculation exists in the record, but argues that Ms. Nguyen's counsel prepared several worksheets, one of which reflected the $505.92 per month amount agreed upon. Again, this court notes, and Mr. Gyarfas admits, that worksheet is not in the record. Instead, the worksheet attached to the Hearing Officer Recommendation referenced supports a higher award than what was agreed to by the parties for payments occurring after July 31, 2024.

Mr. Gyarfas points out that the trial court reviewed the May 13, 2024 Hearing Officer Recommendations and attached worksheets as well as the assurances of the attorneys and the parties. Thus, the record supports the stipulation of the parties.

First, addressing Mr. Gyarfas assertion that the judgment is not appealable, La.Code Civ.P. art. 2085 prevents a party from appealing a judgment to which they confessed or by a party who “voluntarily and unconditionally acquiesced in a judgment rendered against him.” “The open court recitations, by which parents or former spouses agree to stipulations offered by their respective attorneys regarding issues of child support or community property, constitute a binding compromise.” Catalanotto v. Catalanotto, 14-708, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/10/14), 168 So.3d 463, 466. “A compromise may be rescinded for error, fraud, and other grounds for the annulment of contracts.” La.Civ.Code art. 3082.

However, La.R.S. 9:315.1(D) addresses child support stipulations specifically (emphasis added):

The court may review and approve a stipulation between the parties entered into after the effective date of this Part as to the amount of child support to be paid. If the court does review the stipulation, the court shall consider the guidelines set forth in this Part to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount and may require the parties to provide the court with the income statements and documentation required by R.S. 9:315.2.

The supreme court in Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044 (La. 7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, addressed the trial court's role in approving child support stipulations. Stogner involved a request for modification from the stipulated child support. The supreme court explained that La.R.S. 9:315.1(A) mandates the child support guidelines be used in any proceeding establishing child support. Thus, “if the trial court does not categorically reject the proposed stipulation, i.e., it chooses to entertain the stipulation, the trial court ‘shall consider the guidelines ․ to review the adequacy of the stipulated amount.’ ” Stogner, 739 So.2d at 767. Additionally, the supreme court explained, a trial court may approve an agreed upon child support that deviates from the guidelines, but must specify “for the record, either orally or in writing, the reasons for the deviation.” Id. at 768. As to the law regarding bilateral agreements, the court noted:

This analysis is not to be viewed as an abrogation of that body of law which has recognized that a consent (stipulated) judgment is by its nature a bilateral agreement between the parties wherein the parties adjust their differences by mutual consent and thereby put an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing the hope of gain against the fear of loss․ Notwithstanding the freedom of the parties to so agree, parties must remember that their agreements may not ‘derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public interest.’ La.Civ.Code art. 7.

In Thevenot v. Thevenot, 03-684, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/03), 864 So.2d 229, 233, this court also cited the supreme court's decision in Stogner v. Stogner, 98-3044 (La. 7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, in explaining the difference between a stipulation in court and an extrajudicial agreement:

Our consideration of this matter includes the case of Stogner ․, where the supreme court held that, when parties stipulate in open court regarding their child support obligation, the adequacy of the of [sic] amount of child support established by the stipulation must be reviewed and approved by the trial court in light of the child support guidelines. Michael and Christine [the parties in Thevenot] did not stipulate before the trial court regarding child support; therefore, Stogner, 739 So.2d 762, is inapplicable to our determination herein. See La.R.S. 9:315.1(A).

In Sharp v. Moore, 47,888 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/27/13), 110 So.3d 1232, a consent judgment reached with a hearing officer was approved and adopted by the court. In that judgment the father waived his prior demand for child support. Several months later, the father filed a reconventional demand for child support. The mother objected based on the consent judgment and no material change in circumstances, but the trial court ruled the father was not bound by the prior waiver. Citing La.R.S. 9:315.1, the appellate court concluded that “the parties and the trial court did not fix a child support award according to the guidelines ․ At the time of the 2010 consent judgment, no evidence of the parties’ incomes was presented nor was a child support worksheet completed.” Id. at 1235. The court continued, “In accepting the consent judgment, the trial court did not give any consideration to the guidelines.” Id. Citing Stogner, the appellate court found that there was no need to show a material change in circumstance as the prior consent judgment was flawed for its failure to consider the guidelines.

Although this appeal does not come from a modification for child support, applying the above, we find that this court may still consider whether the trial court erred in its adoption of the parties’ agreement in light of the child support guidelines and the evidence in the record. Thus, Ms. Nguyen's appeal, which argues that the child support awards were not based on evidence and the guidelines, may proceed.

Based on the above, it is clear that in accepting the parties’ agreement as to child support, the trial court was required to do so in light of the child support guidelines. Mr. Gyarfas argues that the trial court reviewed the May 13, 2024 Hearing Officer Recommendations and attached worksheets as well as the assurances of the attorneys and the parties “that they had reviewed the numbers and were in agreement that the child support amount was supported under the guidelines.” Thus, he argues, the trial court considered the child support guidelines and the child support worksheets in accepting the parties’ stipulations and compromise.

The November 18, 2024 transcript indicates the trial court made a reference to the Hearing Officer's Recommendations:

MR. MERE: As to the child support, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. We have two worksheets that are attached to the hearing officer's recommendation. I think there's a new worksheet effective, is it July 1 or August 1?

․

MR. MERE: August 1.

However, the trial court did not state that it considered those documents in determining whether the stipulated child support amounts were appropriate in light of the child support guidelines. Additionally, the transcript does not show any evaluation of the support beginning August 1, 2024, which was less than that supported by the Hearing Officer's worksheet.

The Hearing Officer's Recommendations and worksheets are in the appellate record, but the record does not indicate that any evidence was admitted at the November 18, 2024 hearing. The minutes do indicate that when the divorce was taken up first, “evidence was offered filed and introduced including the entire court file.” The transcript in the appellate record does not contain the divorce proceedings that occurred prior to the parties’ stipulation regarding custody and child support. Prior to the stipulations, the parties made new appearances for the record as well. However, this court notes that La.Dist.Ct.R. 32.0, App. 32.0(B), 15th JDC(D)(1) and (5) state:

1.․ The recommendation(s) of the Hearing Officer shall be filed into the record.

․

5. If a written objection to the Hearing Officer's recommendation is timely filed by either party, then the Hearing Officer recommendation shall be forwarded to the District Judge who may accept, reject, or modify it in whole or in part as a temporary order after the objection period has expired until a contradictory hearing can be had. Any such temporary order signed by the District Judge shall be considered interlocutory in nature.

An objection was filed regarding the Hearing Officer's Recommendations dated May 13, 2024. Additionally, the trial court made those recommendations a temporary order of the court on May 20, 2024, until a hearing on the matter could be held. Considering the above, we will review the Hearing Officer's Recommendations and worksheets and take note of the trial court's familiarity with those documents.

The Hearing Officer recommended that Ms. Nguyen pay child support of $616.50 per month from August 25, 2023, through July 31, 2024. The Hearing Officer calculated the child support arrearages from August 25, 2023, through May 15, 2024, as $4,638.59. Then, the parties agreed child support would be reduced to $505.92 from August 1, 2024 forward. The total arrearages on November 1, 2024, prior to this hearing, equaled $7,697.60, the amount stipulated to by the parties. The parties agreed Mr. Gyarfas would be entitled to a credit in this amount in the community property partition in “full satisfaction of” the child support arrearages. Ms. Nguyen would benefit from this agreement in that the judgment would not be a money judgment subject to accumulating interest. Additionally, since Ms. Nguyen would not “owe” any arrearages, she would be permitted to claim the children on her taxes.

Considering the trial court's reference to the Hearing Officer's Recommendations and worksheets and the fact that the stipulated amount until July 31, 2024, is calculated in those worksheets, we find no error in the trial court's acceptance of $616.50 per month from August 25, 2023, through July 31, 2024. However, the judgment only speaks to the total amount of arrearages through November 1, 2024, which includes several payments of $505.92. As will be discussed, this amount was not appropriately reviewed in light of the guidelines prior to the trial court's acceptance.

Regarding child support payments effective August 1, 2024, and forward, the Hearing Officer's findings of fact note that daycare would cease beginning August 1, 2024. Ms. Nguyen contested the daycare fees and no fee schedule was provided. According to the findings, after August 1, 2024, Mr. Gyarfas claimed daycare costs would cease but aftercare costs would increase. There is no indication of what aftercare costs would total after August 1, 2024. The worksheet prepared by the Hearing Officer for payments beginning August 1, 2024, indicated that Ms. Nguyen should owe $663.91 per month.

After reviewing the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact as well as the Hearing Officer Recommendations and attached supporting documents, it is unclear whether the stipulated amount of $505.92 from August 1, 2024, forward is supported by the scheduling guidelines. No worksheet in the record supports this amount. In fact, the only calculation provided in the record indicates the payments should have been $663.91. The trial court did not provide oral or written reasons evaluating the stipulated amount in light of the child support guidelines, and it certainly did not provide any reasons supporting a deviation from those guidelines.

Thus, considering the mandate in La.R.S. 9:315.1(D) and Stogner, we vacate and remand the portion of the judgment involving child support of $505.92 per month and the community property credit in the amount of $7,697.60.⁴ The trial court is instructed to consider the child support guidelines in its review of the adequacy of the stipulated amount and, if those amounts deviate from the guidelines, to provide oral or written reasons for the deviation.

Assignment of Error Four:

Lastly, Ms. Nguyen asserts that the trial court failed to justify the necessity of a parenting coordinator or examine the proposed coordinator pursuant to La.R.S. 9:358.1, La.R.S. 9:358.3, and La.R.S. 9:358.4. Mr. Gyarfas cites the mandatory language used in La.R.S. 9:358.1(A) when there is a joint motion of the parties regarding a parenting coordinator.

We find no merit to this assignment of error. A domiciliary parent was not named in these proceedings. While good cause is necessary pursuant to La.R.S. 9:358.1 when one party moves for the appointment or the court orders one on its own motion, “[t]he court shall make the appointment on joint motion of the parties.”⁵ Ms. Nguyen proposed Laura Coleman to serve. Ms. Nyugen's lawyer stated, “And it is my understanding that we were going to, as the parenting coordinator, start with the presumption if she's available, that Laura Gay Coleman would be the parenting coordinator, parties would share costs equally on that.” The parties jointly requested and agreed to a parenting coordinator and the trial court set the term for the requested appointment according to La.R.S. 9:358.1(e), as well as specified the cost sharing in the judgment as agreed to by the parties. Thus, we find no error.

DECREE

Accordingly, we vacate and remand the portion of the judgment involving child support of $505.92 per month and the community property credit in the amount of $7,697.60 with instructions to the trial court to consider the child support guidelines in its review of the adequacy of the stipulated amount and, if those amounts deviate from the guidelines, to provide oral or written reasons for the deviation. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed. The Appellant is pauper on appeal, and in finding partially in her favor, we will not assess court costs in this matter.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The stipulations detailing custody are not discussed because the issues on appeal stem from the support aspects of the judgment.

2.   On March 14, 2025, Ms. Nguyen filed a Rule for Modification of Custody + Child Support, asserting that, as of February 21, 2025, she is no longer employed and cannot afford to pay child support, and that Mr. Gyarfas’ income was calculated incorrectly at the prior trial. A Hearing Officer Conference was set for May 2, 2025, to resolve the issues. The Hearing Officer ultimately recommended that child support be modified and attached a worksheet with calculations. Both parties filed objections to the Hearing Officer's Recommendations, and a hearing was set for June 25, 2025, on the matter. The proceedings and filings pertinent to the motion for modification are not pertinent to this appeal, as the issues were not addressed by the April 4, 2025 judgment currently on appeal.

3.   Exhibit A referenced “[a] copy of the joint custody implementation plan[.]” This appeal does not attack the portion of the judgment dealing with custody. Additionally, a Joint Custody Plan was signed on April 4, 2025, by the trial court and ordered to be served along with the April 4, 2025 Judgment on appeal herein.

4.   In vacating and remanding the $7,697.60 amount, we reiterate that total includes several payments of $505.92, which were not appropriately reviewed in light of the guidelines prior to the trial court's acceptance.

5.   Comment (d) to La.R.S. 9:358.1 states, “This Section requires the court to appoint a parenting coordinator if both parties agree. No showing of good cause is required.”

PERRET, Judge.