STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOSHUA JOHNSON (2026)

Joshua M. Johnson (“Appellant”) was charged by bill of information with flight from an officer, a misdemeanor violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1. In the same bill of information, he was charged with two felony counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. After trial, a jury convicted Appellant on the two firearm counts. The court found Appellant guilty of the misdemeanor flight charge ¹ based on the trial evidence. From these convictions, Appellant seeks relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm all three convictions but remand to correct an error in sentencing.

Proceedings below

Appellant pled not guilty to all charges in the bill of information on March 31, 2025. An “Omnibus Motion for Discovery; Motion to Preserve Evidence; Motion for Suppression of Statements, Evidence and Identifications; and Motion for a Preliminary Examination” were filed on his behalf. The motions were heard on May 29, 2025. In the first few seconds of the hearing, the trial judge asked, “Defense, what motions lie?” Appellant's counsel responded only, “Probable cause, Your Honor.”

When the hearing concluded, the trial court found probable cause to move to trial without ever addressing the motion to suppress.

On September 23, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to quash the bill of information under La. C. Cr. P. art. 495, which provides that, “The objections of misjoinder of defendants or misjoinder of offenses may be urged only by a motion to quash the indictment.” Appellant argued that the misdemeanor charge, flight from an officer, was misjoined with the felony charges. After oral argument on the morning of trial, the district court denied the misjoinder motion. Her oral reasoning was encapsulated as follows:

All right, I'm going to deny the motion to quash. I think for completeness, the jury should be entitled to understand everything that happened and what led up to this case. Finding that the original stop was res gestae.

The trial court's comment was directed to the fact that the arresting officer's original interest in the Appellant was caused by a series of events that began six months before his arrest and included an incident that met the definition of flight from an officer.²

Appellant had argued to the trial court that so much time elapsed after the actions that led to the flight charge that those facts were not relevant to the weapons violation for which he was charged six months later.

On September 24, 2025, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the weapons charges. The court rendered a guilty verdict on the charge of flight from an officer based on the same evidence. On October 28, 2025, the court sentenced Appellant to seven years imprisonment at hard labor for each count of felon in possession of a firearm and six months for his misdemeanor conviction, all to be served concurrently.

Appellant filed a timely motion to appeal all the convictions.

Facts

In early June, 2024, Officer Jonathan Mykulak (“Mykulak”) saw a Dodge Charger with a dark plate cover that made it difficult to read the plate. It was parked in an area that Mykulak knew to be a high crime area for sale of narcotics. He drove his cruiser behind the Charger and was able to read the plate. He researched the plate and found that it actually belonged to a Gold Volkswagen that was owned by Appellant. He then researched other police databases and learned that Appellant had a history of arrest for possession of narcotics. As part of that history, Appellant had been put on parole until 2022. As a condition of the parole, Appellant was not permitted to own or possess any firearms.

Later in that same month, Mykulak saw the Charger again as it drove through a public parking area. It appeared that the car was being followed by another car—a white Mazda sports utility vehicle. The Mazda did not have a license plate on it. The two cars stopped on the side of Rampart Street in the same area where Mykulak had previously seen the Charger parked. The officer drove to a spot behind the two vehicles, flashed his blue lights and walked to the Charger. He was, at that time wearing his police uniform. He gave the occupant of the Charger verbal commands to exit the car. One of the car windows was rolled down as the officer walked around the vehicle. Through that opening, he could see what he recognized as the barrel of a handgun protruding from beneath an unidentified object.

According to Officer Mykulak's testimony, the driver rolled up his open window. Then, while the officer was radioing for assistance, the driver of the Charger quickly accelerated and left the area.

Appellant's counsel objected to the officer's testimony regarding the driver's rapid evacuation of the area on the basis of relevance. The objection was made after the question was answered and it was overruled.

After the events of the preceding paragraphs, Officer Mykulak researched police databases available to him and found Appellant's photograph. He recognized the person in the photograph as the driver of the Charger who had evaded his attempted investigatory stop.

Officer Mykulak prepared a report of the June incidents and attached the report to a request for an arrest warrant. It was ultimately presented to a magistrate judge who authorized an arrest warrant.

While off-duty, Officer Mykulak drove past an address, 10698 Hayne Boulevard, New Orleans, that was associated with Appellant according to the officer's research in police databases. Based on “old reports” in the databases, Officer Mykulak believed that Appellant lived at that address. On the occasions that the officer drove past the Hayne Boulevard address, he observed the same Charger parked there.

On January 16, 2025, Officer Mykulak drove past the Hayne Boulevard address and saw the Charger with the switched license plate again parked there. He checked to see if the arrest warrant was still active and that Appellant had not yet been arrested. Officer Mykulak and other members of the Gang Reduction Intervention Program (“GRIP”) coordinated an investigatory stop of the vehicle when Appellant was walking back to the car in the same area where Officer Mykulak had first observed the Charger in early June 2024. Appellant was arrested at the scene.

After the arrest, Officer Mykulak prepared a request for a warrant to search the home on Hayne Boulevard. The warrant was approved by the court. Based on the warrant, Officer Mykulak and others in the GRIP unit searched the home.

When police arrived at Hayne Boulevard to search the home, a woman opened the home to permit them to search. During the course of the search, the police found a loaded High Point .380 handgun, a SKS rifle, ammunition for both and loaded ammunition clips. In addition, the officers found photographs of Appellant on the walls and in other places and men's clothing in one of the closets.

The weapons-possession charge was based on the guns found in the Hayne Boulevard home.

Errors Patent

The record in the court below reveals two errors patent. (1) The trial court failed to declare whether Appellant's sentence for the felony convictions was to be served with or without benefit of parole or probation. (2) The trial court failed to impose a mandatory statutory fine as required by La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1).

The sentencing provisions of La. R.S. 14:95.1 are mandatory: B. (1) Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of this Section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.

La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1) (emphasis added).

In its sentencing, the trial court failed to declare that Appellant's sentence was to be served without benefit of probation or parole. The court also failed to impose the fine required by the statute.

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:301.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. When a criminal statute requires that all or a portion of a sentence imposed for a violation of that statute be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, each sentence which is imposed under the provisions of that statute shall be deemed to contain the provisions relating to the service of that sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The failure of a sentencing court to specifically state that all or a portion of the sentence is to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence shall not in any way affect the statutory requirement that all or a portion of the sentence be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 15:301.1(A)(emphasis added).

Our court has held that this statute automatically effectuates the missing portion of the sentence. State v. Dominick, 2013-0270, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 250, 252. The sentence is understood to be served without benefit of probation, parole or suspension. Therefore, no further action need be taken.

With respect to the mandatory fine required by La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1), this court's prior decisions require that the case be remanded to the trial court to impose a fine consistent with the statutory mandate. State v. Williams, 2024-0105, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/9/24), 400 So.3d 1194.

Appellant's assignments of error

1. The search of the Hayne Boulevard residence was unreasonable where the warrant was stale and lacked sufficient nexus to evidence of a crime.

2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to quash for misjoinder of offenses.

The search warrant

In this case, Appellant filed an omnibus motion, which included a vague motion to suppress that failed to allege facts specific to this case. A defendant's motion to suppress requires the allegation of specific facts that would require the granting of relief to comply with the pleading requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(E)(1). State v. Scott, 2024-0024, p.3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/22/24), 381 So. 3d 177, 180.

As noted in the “Proceedings below” section above, when offered the opportunity to expand upon or make Appellant's omnibus motion more specific, Appellant's counsel failed to do so. By responding that probable cause was the only “motion” for consideration, counsel waived the opportunity to get a ruling on the suppression of evidence from the trial court at that time. Similarly, at trial, Appellant's counsel failed to object to the presentation of the body camera footage shown to the jury at trial. That footage showed the execution of the search warrant in detail, including the discovery of the weapons in the Hayne Boulevard home.

“As a general rule, counsel's failure to obtain a ruling on the merits would constitute an abandonment of the motion.” State v. Walton, 2006-2553 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So. 2d 133, citing State v. Wagster, 361 So.2d 849, 856 (La. 1978). Our court has followed that rule consistently in State in the Interest of S.C., 2021-0468 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/29/21), 332 So. 3d 169, and In the Interest of Nunez, 94-2636 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/7/95), 657 So. 2d 506. In both of these cases, the court held that the defendants’ failures to file pretrial motions to suppress “show-up identifications” was an abandonment of the argument to exclude the identifications on appeal.

For these reasons, we hold that Appellant has waived the argument regarding the issuance of the search warrant and the evidence acquired in its execution.

The motion to quash

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash based upon the improper joinder of offenses. In a single bill of information, the defendant was charged with one misdemeanor violation, flight from an officer, and two felony violations, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The defendant asserts that the denial of the motion to quash was reversible error requiring, at minimum, a new trial on the felony counts.³

Before the trial court, Appellant challenged the misjoinder in the only manner permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court denied the motion. La. C.Cr.P. art. 493 provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan; provided that the offenses joined must be triable by the same mode of trial. (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the misdemeanor charge (flight from an officer) is not triable to a jury under La. C. Cr. P. art. 779:

A. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor in which the punishment, as set forth in the statute defining the offense, may be a fine in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars or imprisonment for more than six months must be tried by a jury of six jurors, all of whom shall concur to render a verdict.

B. The defendant charged with any other misdemeanor shall be tried by the court without a jury.

The statute under which Appellant was charged and convicted provides, in relevant part:

B. Whoever commits the crime of flight from an officer shall be fined not less than one hundred fifty dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.

La. R.S. 14:108.1

The maximum sentence allowed for violation of this statute does not permit trial of the offense by a jury. The language of art. 779 is mandatory in this regard. It follows that the trial court erred in failing to quash the bill of information for its failure to meet formal requirements.

Although the trial court erred in its failure to quash the bill, we must consider whether the error was harmless.

The argument on the motion to quash was heard on the morning of trial, before trial commenced. The crux of Appellant's argument was that the evidence relevant to the misdemeanor charge would be unduly prejudicial if heard by the jury. The State argued, conversely, that the evidence concerning the defendant's flight from an officer was admissible as res gestae. Specifically, the State argued that the police observation of Appellant's car and license plate and later attempt to make an investigative stop of Appellant in June 2024, were all part of an uninterrupted chain of events that led to the issuance of the arrest and search warrants.

At trial and before this court, the State has argued that the evidence of the early stages of the investigation is admissible under the rule of narrative completeness. This rule is incorporated in the res gestae doctrine. In State v. Taylor, 01-1638, p. 10 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So. 2d 729, 741–42, the court opined that:

The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana is broad and includes not only spontaneous utterances and declarations made before or after the commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers pertaining to what they heard or observed during or after the commission of the crime if a continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741, 748 (La.1982); State v. Kimble, 407 So.2d 693, 698 (La.1981). In addition, as this court recently observed, integral act (res gestae) evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule of narrative completeness without which the state's case would lose its “narrative momentum and cohesiveness, ‘with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest verdict.’ ” Colomb, 747 So.2d at 1076 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)).

We agree with the trial court that the evidence of the misdemeanor crime, along with the chain of events in which Mykulak participated, fall within the res gestae rule that permits evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts when necessary to accomplish narrative completeness. This meets the evidentiary issue raised as part of Appellant's motion to quash.

We next turn our attention to the issue of Appellant's entitlement to a separate trial of the misdemeanor charge. As we noted above, the court gave Appellant's counsel the opportunity to try the misdemeanor charge separately. After the jury verdict was announced, the trial judge entered into a discussion with all counsel present to select dates for sentencing deadlines. The colloquy follows:

THE COURT: ․ What are we doing about the misdemeanor, you all?

[STATE]: Judge, I—because the officer had the opportunity to talk about it factually, I'm gonna leave that up to the defense if they would like to have their separate bench trial, or if they want you to make that decision based on the testimony you've already heard.

[DEFENSE]: Your Honor, given—I would just request that we could base it on the testimony that you've heard so far in regards to the Judge Trial.

THE COURT: So you're asking me to adopt the testimony, the opening, closings, as it relates to the 95.1's and the simple— what is it? Simple flight?

[STATE]: Yes, Judge. Simple flight from an officer. 14:108. Give me just a second to consult with my co-counsel. Yes, Judge. So the State is going to be requesting that the Court adopt the testimony of Officer Mykulak, as well as the opening and closing statements that were provided to the Court as part of the trial on the 95.1 in this case.

As it relates to the Count 1 on the Bill of Information.

THE COURT: Are you agreeing with that, defense?

[DEFENSE]: Yes, Your Honor.

In effect, and by Appellant's agreement, the felony and misdemeanor counts were tried separately. There was no mention of the misdemeanor charge in opening statements, closing argument, or the jury charges. The evidence regarding the flight charge was admissible for the reasons shown above and did not unduly prejudice the jury. Finally, the trial court, sitting as trier of fact, found the evidence of flight from an officer sufficient to show that Appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We find no manifest error in that judgment.

Conclusion

Although we find that the trial court committed a technical error in denying Appellant's motion to quash the bill of information, we find that the error was harmless. Had the bill been quashed, Appellant would have been entitled to separate trials of the felony and misdemeanor counts of the bill. To the extent that the trial court erred in denying the motion, we hold that that error was corrected when the trial judge offered Appellant the opportunity to have a separate trial of the misdemeanor. At no point in the proceeding was the jury made aware of the misdemeanor charge nor was it asked to reach a verdict on that charge.

We also find that Appellant waived or abandoned the right to challenge the validity of the warrant to search Appellant's home on Hayne Boulevard. The omnibus motion filed in pretrial proceedings was too vague to require a ruling by the trial court and Appellant failed to object to the evidence obtained during the search.

For these reasons, the convictions and judgment of the trial court are affirmed. However, we must remand the case to the trial court for the sole purpose of imposing the mandatory fine required by La. R.S. 14:95.1.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Misdemeanor charges are not triable to a jury under La. C. Cr. P. art. 779(B).

2.   Notwithstanding its denial of the motion to quash, the trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to have a separate trial of the misdemeanor charge. That is discussed below.

3.   Relatedly, although not assigned as error, the defendant adds that the court erred in admitting the evidence of his flight from Officer Mykulak as res gestae evidence.

Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome