WAITERS v. DEVILLE (2026)

Appellant-Defendant, Renee E. deVille (“Ms. deVille”), appeals the trial court's July 22, 2025 judgment, which granted the motion in limine filed by Appellee-Plaintiff, Brittney and Jamar Waiters (“the Waiters”) that sought to exclude evidence of expenses paid by Villere Realty, LLC, regarding Ms. deVille's reimbursement claim; and which awarded Ms. deVille $979.69 in reimbursement. For the following reasons, we reverse the granting of the motion in limine, affirm the portion of the judgment to the extent that it allowed the recovery of reimbursement, but reverse the judgment as to the amount of Ms. deVille's reimbursement, and remand for a recalculation of reimbursement owed to Ms. deVille.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has a long and complicated procedural history. A summary of the legal proceedings is set forth in Waiters v. deVille, 2019-1048, (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/22/20), 299 So.3d 728 (“Waiters I”) and Waiters v. deVille, 2020-556, 20-324, (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/20) 365 So.3d 544 (“Waiters II”). See also Succession of Thompson, 2020-0536 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/14/21), 366 So.3d 307. However, for purposes of this opinion, we will only address the relevant facts to this proceeding.

The property located at 4609-11 Freret Street in New Orleans, Louisiana was declared blighted and a public nuisance on August 7, 2008.¹ In December 2009, Ms. deVille successfully purchased a 1% ownership interest in the property at a tax sale for unpaid ad valorem taxes. Ms. deVille recorded the tax sale deed and initiated a writ of possession. She then applied for and obtained permits to renovate the property. The property was again declared a public nuisance in September 2011.

On February 3, 2012, Ms. deVille filed an affidavit of intent to possess to obtain ownership of the property under La. R.S. 9:5633, the blight acquisitive prescription statute. Through a succession proceeding, the property was sold via cash sale with court approval to the Waiters in November 2018.

On December 28, 2018, the Waiters filed a petition to annul tax title, for declaratory judgment, and a petitory action, which commenced the instant lawsuit. The Waiters contended that the tax sale was an absolute nullity because the notice of tax sale was constitutionally and statutorily improper.

In May of 2019, Ms. deVille answered the petition and filed a reconventional demand seeking to be named the owner as she complied with the spirit of La. R.S. 9:5633. Ms. deVille alternatively sought reimbursement for expenses and costs in renovation and paid tax bills.

In response, the Waiters filed an answer and exception of no cause of action to the reconventional demand. The trial court granted the exception. In April 2020, this Court granted writs and reversed, recognizing that Ms. deVille had a claim for reimbursements. See Waiters I, 2019-1048, pp. 17-18, 299 So.3d at 740-41 (finding that while Ms. deVille did not comply with the twelve statutory steps to obtain ownership of the blighted property via acquisitive prescription, she stated “a cause of action under La. R.S. 9:5633(E) for reimbursement” against the Waiters).

The tax sale was ultimately declared a nullity by the trial court in September 22, 2020. This Court thereafter denied writs. See Waiters II, 2020-0556, p. 32, 365 So.3d at 564 (finding that the trial court did not err when it found “no genuine issue of material fact to conclude the tax sale null and void and granted summary judgment in favor of the Waiters as to this issue”).²

In October 2020, Ms. deVille filed a proof of costs in accordance with La. R.S. 47:2291.³ On August 25, 2023, Ms. deVille filed a motion to fix costs and value of improvements under La. R.S. 47:2291(B) and La. R.S. 9:5633(E). In December 2023, the Waiters filed a motion to determine status of Ms. deVille pursuant to La. R.S. 9:5633(E), arguing that she should not be recognized as a blight possessor.⁴

These motions came before the trial court on December 14, 2023. At the hearing, Ms. deVille offered several exhibits, including: Ms. deVille's affidavit, outlining costs and expenses incurred; a spreadsheet of taxes, penalties, and interest paid, totaling $81,314.51; tax bills for the property and receipts for payments from 2009 to 2018; the affidavit of Bush Benton, wherein he attested that on July 17, 2023, he appraised the property at $675,000.00 and included his written appraisal report; the affidavit of Geoffrey Lutz, who prepared a “Retrospective Summary Appraisal Report” on October 4, 2012, and appraised the market value of the property as of August 28, 2005 (pre-Hurricane Katrina) at $142,000.00; a spreadsheet summarizing the costs for materials and workmanship, totaling $301,723.36; the affidavit of Kyle Sclafani, the attorney for Ms. deVille, which provided his costs and expenses and attached invoices; the affidavit of Hartwig Moss Insurance Agency, which outlines the premiums charged for insurance policies on the property, totaling $18,834; and the affidavit of Jean Paul Villere, which attested that all renovation costs “paid by him or Villere Realty, LLC” were paid “on behalf of [Ms. deVille's] account and for her benefit.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated that there were “still some outstanding issues” and reset the matter.

The matter came before the trial court again on April 25, 2024. At this hearing, the parties primarily addressed the Waiters’ motion to determine status. In addition to the evidence already submitted on December 14, 2023, Ms. deVille offered the public records of the administrative proceeding, entitled CEHB 11-4994, related to the 2011 public nuisance judgment against the property. The trial court took the matter under advisement.

On October 30, 2024, the trial court issued a judgment, which denied the motion to determine the status ⁵ and set the matter for a “Reasonableness Hearing” to obtain additional information. The judgment stated in part:

In order to issue a judgment on the defendant's reimbursement claims, the Court requires the convening of a Reasonableness Hearing to gather additional information to quantify reasonable reimbursement. The Court requires the Plaintiff to quantify all projected losses, such as the loss acquired from the denial of property access as well as the projected loss of rentals. The Court requires the Defendant to provide a comprehensive accounting of all income derived with respect to the Property as well as any additional expenditures.

THEREFORE,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Court will hold a Reasonableness Hearing to obtain additional information from both parties, in order to grant a judgment on the reimbursement claims. Both parties are required to file a joint Motion for a Reasonableness Hearing, with submission of the additional information requested, not more than 45 days of this judgment.

On December 16, 2024, Ms. deVille filed an objection to the October 2024 judgment and proposed hearing as she deemed the matter fully submitted following the December 14, 2023 and April 25, 2024 hearings. Ms. deVille also filed the information requested in the trial court's judgment. Specifically, Ms. deVille submitted an updated spreadsheet of the taxes, penalties, and interest, which amounted to $91,070.35; updated insurance expenses of $28,704.58; documents showing the supplemental repair and maintenance expenses of $5,185.82; an updated calculation of interest under La. R.S. 9:5633 of $41,361.54; and documents providing the updated rental income of $90,090.66 derived from the property. The Waiters filed their submissions on May 14, 2025.⁶

On May 2, 2025, the Waiters filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court exclude the evidence of costs and reimbursement “reflecting payment by Villere Realty, LLC.” The motion also sought to exclude evidence related to expenses for unpermitted improvements.

Ms. deVille filed an opposition to the motion in limine, arguing that all exhibits supporting her claim to reimbursement under La. R.S. 47:2291 and La. R.S. 9:5633 have already been admitted and that the Waiters waived any objection to the admissibility.

The matter came before the trial court on May 16, 2023. At the hearing, Ms. deVille offered the transcripts of the April 25, 2024 and December 14, 2023 hearings.⁷ The trial court again took the matter under advisement.

On July 22, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment with reasons, which denied the motion in limine regarding the unpermitted improvements but granted the motion in limine as to the expenses paid by Villere. With regard to Ms. deVille's claim for reimbursement, the trial court awarded $979.69. The judgment stated, in relevant part:

The Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine sought to exclude the Defendant's reimbursement for 1) unpermitted improvements and 2) expenses by Villere Realty, LLC (“Villere”). Regarding unpermitted improvements, this issue is moot as a certificate of occupancy was issued by the City of New Orleans in 2013. ․ Consequently, the Motion in Limine regarding unpermitted improvements, filed by the Plaintiffs, Brittany and Jamar Waiters, is DENIED.

Regarding the Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine for expenses made by Villere, this company is not a party to the suit. Therefore, any expenses made by Villere cannot be reimbursed to the Defendant. Consequently, the Motion in Limine, regarding exclusion of Villere's expenses from the Defendant's reimbursement, filed by the Plaintiffs, Brittany and Jamar Waiters, is GRANTED.

Regarding the Motion to Strike Untimely Exception, the Court considers the balance between efficiency and completeness of the record. Given these considerations, the Court permits the Plaintiff to submit his calculations for completeness of the record. Consequently, the Motion to Strike Untimely Exception, filed by the Defendant Renee deVille, is DENIED.

․

Regarding the Reasonableness Hearing, according to the Fourth Circuit's ruling, this Court is under an order to allow the Defendant to seek reimbursement. The expenses submitted by the Defendant were paid by Villere. As stated above, Villere is not a party to the case and therefore reimbursement for these expenses is not warranted. Ms. deVille is entitled to reimbursement for the difference between the taxes paid ($91,070.35) and the amount profited in rental income ($90,090.66). Consequently, reimbursement in the amount of $979.69 to the Defendant Renee E. deVille is GRANTED.

Ms. deVille's appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ms. deVille contends that the trial court erred in granting the Waiters motion in limine; and that the trial court erred in the amount it awarded in reimbursement expenses to Ms. deVille under the blight remediation statute, La. R.S. 9:5633(E) and in redemptive costs under the tax sale laws, La. Const. art. 7, § 25, La. R.S. 47:2121 et seq., and La. C.C. art. 496.

However, prior to addressing the merits of the appeal, we first address the exception of no cause of action filed by the Waiters in this Court.

Exception of No Cause of Action

“The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on an exception of no right of action is de novo.” Abadie v. Arguelles, 2019-0749, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/19/20), 292 So.3d 961, 963 (quoting N. Clark, L.L.C. v. Chisesi, 2016-0599, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 1013, 1015). “The function of an exception of no right of action is to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit.” Lestelle & Lestelle v. Campo Music Shopping Ctr. Condo. Ass'n, 2021-0077, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/21), 315 So.3d 331 (quoting Hood v. Cotter, 2008-0215, p. 17 (La. 12/2/08), 5 So.3d 819, 829). “The burden of proof of establishing the exception of no right of action is on the defendant-exceptor.” Eichmann v. State Through Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 2024-0207, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/13/24), 390 So.3d 415, 419 (quoting Johnson v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 2022-0731, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/23), 359 So.3d 592, 600).

In the Waiters’ exception of no right of action, they challenge the standing of Ms. deVille to bring a claim under La. R.S. 9:5633 as a possessor/remediator of blighted property.

As noted above, on August 7, 2008, the City issued a judgment declaring the property “blighted” and a “public nuisance.” Specifically, the 2008 judgment stated that the owners of the property are “guilty” of violating New Orleans Municipal Code M.C.S. Ord. No. 23046, Section 28-37 by “[a]llowing a public nuisance” and Section 28-38 by “[a]llowing a public nuisance.” It also found that the property was “eligible for expropriation” by NORA. Later, on September 28, 2011, the City found that the property was a “public nuisance” under New Orleans Municipal Code M.C.S. Ord. No. 23046, Section 28-37. The 2011 judgment further stated that the property was eligible for “expropriation, foreclosure and demolition by the proper authorities.” In February 2012, Ms. deVille filed an affidavit of intent to possess pursuant to La. R.S. 9:5633, which included a copy of the 2008 judgment and a certificate stating that no appeal has been filed as to the declaration/judgment of blight.

The Waiters argue that Ms. deVille has no right of action under La. R.S. 9:5633, because she “personally attended the September 28, 2011 Code Enforcement hearing,” wherein the property was deemed public nuisance. Although the August 7, 2008 judgment declared the property blighted, the Waiters contend that the 2011 judgment finding the property to be a public nuisance superseded the 2008 judgment and, in their view, established that the property was “not blighted.” The Waiters claim that Ms. deVille's reliance on the 2008 judgment was fraudulent and that Ms. deVille lacks standing to pursue a claim under La. R.S. 9:5633.

We find nothing in the record to suggest the 2011 judgment altered the 2008 designation of the property as blighted. Blighted property, was defined at the time by La. R.S. 33:1373(B)(1), as commercial or residential premises or vacant lot that was “declared or certified blighted and declared a public nuisance” by a court or administrative hearing officer.⁸ Additionally, Article III M.C.S. Ord. No. 23046, Section 28-38, in effect at the time of the 2008 judgment, stated that “(a) [i]n determining whether an unoccupied property is blighted, ․ the following factors establish a rebuttable presumption: (1) [a]ny dwelling, structure or premise that is declared a public nuisance as defined in the Code of Ordinances for the City of New Orleans ․”⁹ As argued by Ms. deVille, because the 2008 judgment declared the property blighted and public nuisance, the property was presumed to be blighted in 2011.

Moreover, the record of the 2011 administrative hearing, introduced at the April 25, 2024 hearing, showed that the property remained in poor condition in 2011. An inspection of the property conducted on July 7, 2011, revealed deficiencies in the exterior conditions of the property. Specifically, the roof and exterior paint were marked “fail[ed]” on the inspection. The inspection also noted that the property was “unoccupied” and that there was “no work in progress.” As such, the Waiters have not shown that the finding of blight in the 2008 judgment was subsequently cured such that the property was deemed “unblighted” by the 2011 judgment.

The Waiters also assert in their exception that the property at issue was no longer blighted because it was “placed back into commerce” when Ms. Deville acquired 1% interest in the property in the tax sale certificate in 2009. The Waiters rely on In re Flag Boy Prop., LLC, 2021-0644 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/22), 366 So.3d 200, to support their position. At issue in Flag Boy was whether the three-year redemptive period (for property sold for nonpayment of taxes) or the eighteen-month redemptive period (for blighted property) applied.

In Flag Boy, the Majors purchased a property in 1992. The property was adjudicated blighted and a public nuisance in 2010. However, by 2014, the property was deemed “in compliance” with city ordinances. Id., p. 2, 366 So.3d at 202. The 2014 judgment noted that “the violations were deemed abated.” Id., p. 1, 366 So.3d at 202. After the Majors failed to pay property taxes from 2015 to 2017, Flag Boy purchased the property and obtained a tax sale certificate in 2018. The Majors redeemed the property in January 2020. Flag Boy thereafter challenged the redemption as untimely under the eighteen-month redemptive period via summary judgment. The trial court agreed and granted its motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, this Court found the three-year redemptive period applicable in part because the property was no longer blighted. This Court noted that while the property was “initially adjudicated blighted on July 21, 2010 ․ pursuant to the September 23, 2014 judgment certain violations were abated and the property deemed ‘in compliance.’ ” Id., p. 8, 366 So.3d at 205. The Court also noted that the property “was placed back into commerce when it was listed for sale [in 2018] as a result of the tax sale initiated by the City of New Orleans” Id., p. 8, 366 So.3d at 206.¹⁰ As a result, the Court found that the Majors had three years to redeem the property and reversed the trial court. On rehearing, this Court clarified the ruling further:

As stated in our original opinion, a property that is deemed blighted at the time of the tax sale is subject to the eighteen-month redemptive period. La. Const. art. VII, § 25(B)(2). The facts presented to this Court established that the property at issue was not blighted at the time of the 2018 tax sale. Specifically, that the September 23, 2014 judgment found the property “in compliance” as certain violations had been abated. We further clarify our original opinion to express that while the City of New Orleans did not issue a certificate of compliance, the September 23, 2014 judgment serves as sufficient proof of compliance by the homeowner. Therefore, as of September 23, 2014 the property was no longer adjudicated as blighted, as it was deemed “in compliance,” and the three-year redemptive period applies.

Id., 2021-0644, p. 9, 366 So.3d at 206 (on rehearing).

In the present case, however, contrary to Flag Boy, the property at issue was declared blighted and a public nuisance at the time of the 2009 tax sale. In Flag Boy, on the other hand, the second judgment indicated the blight conditions were abated and the property was deemed in compliance with applicable ordinances prior to the tax sale. Whereas, in the present case the 2011 judgment still found the property to be a public nuisance and noted that the property had failed inspections. As stated above, there is no evidence that the property at issue was rehabilitated or that the conditions of blight were addressed. The Waiters reliance on Flag Boy is therefore misplaced.¹¹

We thus find that the Waiters failed to establish that Ms. deVille has no right of action under La. R.S. 9:5633.

Motion in Limine

Ms. deVille argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine and excluding “relevant and probative evidence of reimbursement expenses previously admitted” without objection from the Waiters.

La. C.E. art. 402 states: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Louisiana, this Code of Evidence, or other legislation. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” However, if evidence may result in prejudice, confusion, or a waste of time, a trial court can exclude it. See La. C.E. art 403 (“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.”).

“In ruling on evidentiary matters, including motions in limine, a trial court is afforded broad discretion; and its determination is not to be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” Pierre v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 2024-0236, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/24), 400 So.3d 223, 232 (citing George v. Progressive Waste Sols. of La, Inc., 2022-1068, p. 5 (La. 12/9/22), 355 So.3d 583, 587).

As noted above, Ms. deVille offered evidence of payments made by Villere Realty at the December 14, 2023 hearing in connection with her motion to fix costs and in support of her claim of reimbursements. The trial court admitted this evidence, which included affidavits of Ms. deVille and Ms. deVille's husband, Jean Paul Villere, attesting to the renovation expenses incurred. Specifically, Ms. deVille stated “some of the costs incurred for materials and workmanship” used in the repair and remediation of the property “were paid by my husband Jean-Paul Villere, Villere Realty, LLC, ․ and all renovation costs paid by Jean-Paul Villere, Villere Realty ․ were paid on my account and for my benefit.” Mr. Villere, “the “sole owner of Villere Realty” similarly attested that between October 2011 and December 2013 Ms. deVille incurred costs in renovating the property and that “some of those costs were paid by me or Villere Realty, LLC.” He further stated “all renovation costs paid by me or Villere Realty were paid on Renee [deVille]’s account and for her benefit.”

After Mr. Villere's affidavit was offered into evidence, the Waiters's counsel stated “no objection to this affidavit” and the trial court admitted the evidence. The Waiters also did not object to any other evidence presented at the hearing.

Ms. deVille contends that because this evidence was admitted in December 2023 with the “express consent” of the Waiters’ counsel, the Waiters waived the right to thereafter object to the admissibility thereof. Accord Yokum v. Funky 544 Rhythm & Blues Cafe, 2016-1142, p. 29 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 723, 743-44 (“[i]t is well established that when a party fails to contemporaneously object to the introduction of objectionable evidence, that party waives the right to complain of the issue on appeal”); La. C.E. art. 103 (A)(1) (providing that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits ․ evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected” and “a timely objection ․appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection”).

The Waiters, on the other hand, claim that the trial court correctly found expenses paid by Villere Realty cannot be reimbursed to Ms. deVille because Villere Realty is not a party to the lawsuit. They also argue the trial court did not actually “strike” the Villere Realty documents. They insist that the trial court examined the evidence, observed the expenses were paid by a separate entity and then determined that those payments were not recoverable by Ms. deVille.

However, a review of the trial court's July 22, 2025 judgment shows that evidence was in fact excluded. The judgment states that “the Motion in Limine, regarding exclusion of Villere's expenses from the Defendant's reimbursement ․ is GRANTED.” Thus, the trial court did not consider the payments made by Villere Realty in calculating Ms. deVille's claim for reimbursement.

Additionally, while we do not find the Waiters waived their right to object to the admissibility of Villere Realty documents,¹² we find that the trial court did abuse its discretion in granting the motion in limine.

Ms. deVille seeks reimbursement under La. R.S. 9:5633(E) and La. R.S. 47:2291(B)(2).¹³ As noted above, this Court has recognized that Ms. deVille has a cause of action for reimbursement against the Waiters. See Waiters I, 2019-1048, pp. 17-18, 299 So.3d at 740-41 (finding that while Ms. deVille had no ownership claim to the property, Ms. deVille had not forfeited her right to seek reimbursement under La. R.S. 9:5633(E)); Waiters II, 2020-0556, p. 7. 365 So.3d at 565 (indicating Ms. deVille as the tax sale purchaser may recover redemptive costs).

La. R.S. 9:5633(E) provides for reimbursement of expenses advanced by the possessor in connection with remediating the property when the property owner has successfully brought a petitory action. La. R.S. 9:5633(E).

La. R.S. 9:5633(E) states in part:

(1) In the event that the owner is successful in bringing a real action against the possessor pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 3651 et seq., the owner shall reimburse the possessor for all monies advanced by the possessor for attorney fees and costs, tax statements or researches, mortgage or conveyance certificates, title abstracts, filing fees, postage, copies, printing, the payment or satisfaction of mortgages, judgments, liens, and other encumbrances, plus costs and expenses for cancellation thereof, and for all ad valorem taxes, interest, and penalties paid by the possessor on the immovable, the value of the improvements made or done on the immovable by the possessor after the date that corporeal possession was taken, and the cost or value of any repairs, rehabilitation, maintenance, removal, or demolition to the extent not otherwise included in the value of the improvements and for any other reasonable costs incurred or work done by the possessor in connection with the acquisitive prescription provided for in this Section.

․

(3) To prove the cost or value of repairs, rehabilitation, maintenance, removal, or demolition made or done on the immovable, the possessor shall provide written receipts for the payments of said costs from the persons who performed the work or from whom the materials were purchased or afffidavits establishing the hourly rate generally charged for such work in the parish in which the immovable subject to possession pursuant to this Section is located and the number of hours spent on such work.

This Court has consistently found that a blight remediation possessor who is unsuccessful in establishing ownership by acquisitive prescription has a claim for reimbursement against the property owner. See Barrie v. City of New Orleans, 2020-0469, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/24/21), 365 So.3d 596 (citing Waiters I, 2019-1048, p.17, 299 So.3d at 740; Ferrari v. NOLA Renewal Grp., LLC, 2015- 1020 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/1/16), 194 So.3d 1246; and Mouledoux v. Skipper, 2012-0212 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/7/12), 104 So.3d 585). Additionally, “[t]his Court recognized that ‘La. R.S. 9:5633 E(1) clearly and unambiguously states that the possessor shall be reimbursed for a litany of items expended.’ ” Barrie, 2020-0469, p. 10, 365 So.3d at 602 (quoting Mouledoux, 2012-0212, p. 10, 104 So.3d at 590). “If an expenditure falls outside of the list of mandatory reimbursable items, only then may the court resort to a reasonableness interpretation.” Mouledoux, 2012-0212, p. 10, 104 So.3d at 590.

Louisiana tax sale laws also provide for repayment of costs upon the annulment of a tax sale. La. Const. art. 7, § 25(C) states that “[n]o judgment annulling a tax sale shall have effect until the price and all taxes and costs are paid, and until ten percent per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid from date of respective payments are paid to the purchaser․” See Mooring Tax Asset Grp., L.L.C. v. James, 2014-0109, p. 7 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 1143, 1148 (providing that “[t]his constitutional provision specifically dictates that the judgment of nullity cannot be effective until the tax purchaser is reimbursed taxes, costs and interest.”); see also Deichmann v. Moeller, 2018-0358, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/28/18), 318 So.3d 833, 839 (“[i]n order for the nullity to be effected through a cancellation of the tax sale deed, the tax sale purchaser must be restored to the situation that existed before the tax sale”).

La. R.S. 47:2291 provides the procedure to be followed in nullity actions, including the setting costs. La. R.S. 47:2291(B)(2) states:

Costs pursuant to Article VII, Section 25 of the Louisiana Constitution and R.S. 47:2290 shall include costs of sending notice, costs of publication, and costs of determining tax sale parties. Costs shall also include amounts set forth in Civil Code Articles 496 and 497, if applicable.14

La. C.C.P. art. 496, in turn, states: the owner of an immovable is bound to keep constructions or works “made by a possessor in good faith”¹⁵ and “at his option to pay to the possessor either the cost of the materials and of the workmanship, or their current value, or the enhanced value of the immovable.”

As discussed above, Ms. deVille submitted evidence, via affidavits and invoices, demonstrating the hundreds of thousands of dollars ¹⁶ in costs for repair, remediation, and improvement of the property were paid by Ms. deVille or by Villere Realty, her husband's company, solely for her benefit. We find that expenses in remediating the property are relevant and probative of the costs, value, or enhanced value of improvements deVille is owed under La. R.S. 9:5633(E) for blight remediation or under La. R.S. 47:2291 for tax sale reimbursement and thus substantially affects her claims thereunder. As such, the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine and excluding the expenses Villere Realty paid on behalf of Ms. deVille.

Reimbursements/Redemptive Costs

Ms. deVille claims that the trial court erred in the amount of its award of reimbursement expenses under La. R.S. 9:5633 because it failed to consider the cost or value of the improvements or “other mandatory reimbursable items.” Ms. deVille likewise contends that the trial court erred in the award of costs under the tax sale laws, La. Const. art. 7, § 25, La. R.S. 47:2121, et seq., and La. C.C. art. 496, because it did not include any costs, value, or the enhanced value of the improvements Ms. deVille made on the property.

However, because we find that the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine and thus excluded evidence relevant to the costs expended for repairing the property, we remand the matter to the trial court to consider the monies advanced by Villere Realty as well the other documentary evidence of expenditures submitted by Ms. deVille in the determination of the reimbursements she is due.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment granting the motion in limine, affirm the portion of the judgment to the extent that it allowed the recovery of reimbursement, but reverse the judgment as to the amount of Ms. deVille's reimbursement claims, and remand for a recalculation of reimbursement owed to Ms. deVille.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REMANDED

I concur in the result. I write separately to emphasize that the remand does not establish that every expense paid by Villere Realty, LLC, is reimbursable to Ms. deVille. The evidence of those payments should not have been excluded solely because Villere Realty is not a party. Whether Ms. deVille incurred or is entitled to recover each expense, and whether she proved it is reimbursable under the applicable law, remain questions for the district court. That determination should include application of any statutory requirements for proving repair, rehabilitation, or maintenance costs under La. R.S. 9:5633(E)(3).

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time, Ruth Thompson and Beulah Mae Jefferson owned the property.

2.   While ruling in favor of the Waiters on the issue of nullity, this Court recognized that Ms. deVille had a claim to recover redemptive costs. The Waiters II Court stated:Thus, even though the trial court was correct in granting the motion for partial summary judgment [and declaring the tax sale null], it had no authority to cancel the tax sale deed, without first fixing the redemptive costs, via a contradictory hearing, owed to Ms. deVille as asserted in her reconventional demand. Therefore, based upon this failure, we grant the writ to stay the execution of the judgment of the trial court, which ordered the tax sale null and void, until redemptive costs are fixed and paid.Waiters II, 2020-0556, p. 7. 365 So.3d at 565; see also Succession of Thompson, 2020-0536, p. 11, 366 So.3d at 315 (noting in Waiters II held that “Ms. deVille should maintain possession of the Property, pending the fixing and reimbursement of costs by the Waiters to Ms. deVille.”).

3.   La. R.S. 47:2291(B)(3) requires that the “party claiming costs” submit proof of costs after an order declaring a tax sale a nullity.

4.   This is similar to the argument asserted in the exception of no right of action on appeal, discussed below.

5.   With regard to the motion to determine status, the judgment noted that the Fourth Circuit had previously found that Ms. deVille has a right to reimbursement and stated:Due to the Fourth Circuit's ruling, this Court is under an order to allow the Defendant to seek reimbursement. However, it is important to note that neither this Court nor the Fourth Circuit were aware that the Defendant attended a September 28, 2011 code enforcement hearing, in which the officer determined the property as not blighted. If this Court and the Appellate Court had knowledge of this matter, the ruling on reimbursement may have differed. However, as a result of the Appellate Court's ruling, this Court now has to consider the Defendant's reimbursement claims.

6.   The record also provides that on March 14, 2025, the Waiters filed a “Second Supplemental and Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Annulment of Judgment, Damages, Special Damages, Fraud, Civil Conspiracy, Trespass and for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction” against Ms. deVille. On June 16, 2025, the trial court granted the motion for leave with respect to fraud but denied it will all other respects. Ms. deVille sought writs but was denied by this Court. See, Waiters v. deVille, unpub., 2025-429, (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/28/26).

7.   Ms. deVille also requested the trial court refer to the evidence submitted and supplemented pursuant to the trial court's October 30, 2024 order. Ms. deVille further noted that value of the property pre-Katrina was $142,000.00 and $675,000.00 in 2023 and that enhanced value is the difference of $533,000.00. At the hearing, Ms. deVille also objected to the submissions filed by the Waiters as untimely. She further argued the Waiters’ claim of loss of rental income of $6,800 per month is not supported by evidence.

8.   On August 7, 2008, blighted property was defined in La. R.S.33:1373(B)(1), which addressed enforcement of health, safety, and welfare ordinances in Jefferson Parish and Orleans Parish, as follows:(1) “Blighted property” means commercial or residential premises, including lots, which are vacant, uninhabitable, and hazardous and because of their physical condition, are considered hazardous to persons or property, or have been declared or certified blighted, and have been declared to be a public nuisance by a court of competent jurisdiction or by an administrative hearing officer acting pursuant to competent jurisdiction or by an administrative hearing officer acting pursuant to R.S. 13:2575 et seq., or any other applicable law.La. R.S. 33:1374, effective January 2009, specifically provides for “[e]nforcement of health, safety, and welfare ordinances in Orleans Parish.” The statute, currently defines blighted property as “any vacant or occupied immovable property that has been declared or certified blighted, and has been declared to be a public nuisance by a court of competent jurisdiction, an administrative hearing officer acting pursuant to competent jurisdiction, or an administrative hearing officer acting pursuant to R.S. 13:2575 et seq., or any other applicable law.” See La. R.S. 33:1374(B)(1).

9.   Blight and public nuisance are currently addressed in MCS Ord. No. 29391, Section 26-236.

10.   The Court also noted that “the sale of the property occurred under the statutory authority governing sales of property for failure to pay property taxes, not under the governing authority for blighted property.” See In re Flag Boy Props., LLC, 2021-0644, pp. 8-9, 366 So.3d at 206.

11.   Further, as noted by Ms. deVille in her opposition to the exception, the tax sale of the property was declared an absolute nullity by the trial court. This Court also recognized the tax sale was null and void in Waiters II, 2020-0556, p. 31, 365 So.3d at 564. Thus, the 2009 tax sale is deemed to have never happened as a matter of law and arguably cannot be relied upon to establish that the property was placed back into commerce.

12.   Notably, the cases Ms. deVille relies upon to establish that Waiters waived their objection involved the failure to object at trial and raising an objection on appeal. See Brown v. Chategnier, 2016-0373, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/14/16), 208 So.3d 410, 413 (holding that the wife in child custody dispute did not preserve for appeal her claim that trial court made comments during trial that demonstrated a bias against wife and in favor of husband, because wife did not contemporaneously object when the trial court made the statement). Here, it is apparent from the record the trial court did not consider Ms. deVille reimbursement claims fully submitted at the December 14, 2023 hearing and continued to hold hearings and consider the issue.

13.   While Ms. deVille is eligible to recover under either statute, the record provides Ms. deVille is “not asking ․ for both.”

14.   See also La. R.S 47:2290(B)(1) (providing a judgment annulling a tax sale based on redemption nullity “shall not have effect until all the following are paid: (a) [a]ll statutory impositions forming the basis of the initial tax sale[;] (b) [a]ll subsequent statutory impositions have been paid and all governmental liens[;] (c) [a]ll costs[; and;] (d) [a] five percent penalty and twelve percent per annum on all statutory impositions.”).

15.   A tax sale purchaser is “presumed to be a good faith possessor of the property.” La. R.S. 47:2291(B)(1)

16.   For example, the spreadsheet offered in support of the motion to fix costs, provided Ms. deVille spent $301,723.36 for materials and workmanship in repairing the property.

Judge Karen K. Herman