JOHNSTON v. KENNER (2026)

This appeal, filed by the mother of a child who is the subject of a custody case, seeks the reversal of a protective order granted in favor of the father. The case includes numerous allegations of wrongful behavior made by both parties. This decision will not address the custody of the child. It will only address the allegations of the parties to the extent that they relate to the protective order granted in favor of the appellee on October 9, 2025.

Relevant facts and prior proceedings

Appellee, Jamaan Kenner (“Kenner”), is the father of a minor child, “JK”. Jaime Johnston (“Johnston”) is the child's mother. The two were romantic partners but were never married. At some point after the child's birth, the relationship deteriorated and they parted company. On April 20, 2023, the 89th District Court in Wichita County, Texas, granted Kenner Texas's functional equivalent of primary domiciliary custody of JK. Johnston was granted visitation and custody rights as set forth in the detailed judgment from that court.

During a custodial visitation about one month after the custody decree was entered, Johnston took JK out of Texas and into Louisiana. Johnston did not tell Kenner where she was going with JK or how long she would be there. This was prohibited by the custody decree. About six months later, in October 2023, law enforcement agencies were able to locate and arrest Johnston and others on charges relating to kidnapping the child. In a subsequent proceeding in Texas, and prior to the trial of the protective order, Johnston's parental rights were terminated.

While in Louisiana, Johnston filed a petition for a protective order on behalf of JK. In that petition, Johnston alleged that Kenner abused the child in a number of ways. Those allegations are refuted in the record and do not merit discussion here.

Later, in that same proceeding, Kenner also sought a protective order that would prevent harassment, threats and cyberstalking by Johnston.

The Sheriff was unable to serve the petition for protective order on Johnston and he ultimately obtained orders appointing a special process server and a curator ad hoc. The curator was served with the required pleadings. The curator requested and obtained a continuance of the trial date ¹ in order to provide additional time for him to fulfill the duties required by his appointment and to allow time for Johnston to participate in the proceedings.

The curator filed exceptions and an answer on behalf of Johnston. The curator also filed a note of evidence cataloging his communications with Johnston in which she understood that the matter had been set for trial and acknowledged her availability for the trial date.

Thereafter, Johnston obtained counsel who filed a motion to continue the trial date yet again based on his upcoming shoulder surgery. That motion was denied.²

On the day of trial neither Johnston nor her counsel appeared. The court made every effort to accommodate their absence by contacting the attorney by phone and allowing him to participate via telephonic appearance. The trial judge also instructed Johnston's counsel to contact Johnston by phone and advise her of her need to be present in court. After a delay, during which counsel spoke to Johnston by phone, he reported to the court that Johnston could not appear because she was “on bed rest” due to complications of pregnancy. When called upon to produce any proof of Johnston's medical condition, her erstwhile counsel was unable to do so. Johnston's father, who was in the court room was also given an opportunity to provide proof of her medical instruction for bed rest. Johnston's father was unable to do so. The record reflects that the court also instructed counsel to offer Johnston the opportunity to appear by telephone video appearance. Johnston did not take advantage of that offer.

After making the efforts to permit Johnston to participate in the trial of the petition for protective order, the trial judge proceeded to hear the case. First, she heard argument on an exception of no cause of action filed and argued by the court-appointed curator. The trial judge denied the exceptions and proceeded to a trial on the merits.

The trial record is replete with proof of abuse, harassment, stalking, and electronic stalking and abuse by Johnston. She engaged in a campaign of online and in-person false accusations against Kenner and encouraged others to join in the abuse. This encouragement was proven by texts, emails, and social media posts initiated by Johnston. In those communications, Johnston repeated the false allegations that Kenner sexually abused JK “hundreds of times.” She also accused him (and members of law enforcement and the court) of public bribery and obstruction of justice. Johnston also set up a web page seeking donations to assist her in her “fight for justice” against Kenner. Johnston held a gathering and made a speech on the steps of the Orleans Parish Criminal Court building. The gathering was attended by supporters holding signs supporting her attacks on Kenner and law enforcement officials. She distributed Kenner's personal contact information to others and solicited them to call and harass him. She also encouraged others to take actions to attack Kenner's license to practice medicine. In particular, Kenner testified that Johnston had contacted his patients and encouraged them to make complaints to the medical licensing authorities in Texas and Louisiana. That same patient was also instructed to contact JK directly by video teleconference on the child's electronic tablet. Texts between the patient and Johnston proved Johnston's efforts to involve the patient in her harassment of Kenner. Finally, Johnston engaged in written communications that could be reasonably understood to make and encourage others to make threats on Kenner's life.

At the close of Kenner's case, the trial judge rendered judgment in Kenner's favor issuing an 18-month protective order forbidding Johnston from contact with Kenner, going within 100 yards of Kenner, his home, place of employment and the child's school. The trial court prohibited Johnston from interfering with Kenner's employment, JK's schooling or otherwise harassing or abusing Kenner directly, electronically, and/or through third parties. Johnston was ordered to complete a court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program. The trial court also prohibited Johnston from possessing firearms for the duration of the protective order. Finally, the judgment cast Johnston for costs of the proceeding and Kenner's attorney's fees. From this judgment, dated October 9, 2025, Johnston has taken this appeal.

Assignments of error

Johnston's sole formal assignment of error is the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance of the trial.³ However, in brief, she also argues that the protective order (1) violates her constitutional “First Amendment Rights” and “Fundamental Parental Rights”; and (2) is an abuse of process and a retaliatory use of the judicial system. These assignments are addressed below.

Denial of continuance

At the outset, it must be noted that Johnston did not file a motion to continue the trial based on her physical condition.⁴ She had notice of the trial date at least by September 24, 2026, and indicated her availability for trial on October 9, 2025. The case was originally set for trial on July 14, 2025. When the sheriff was unable to effect service of the petition, the case was continued to July 22, 2025. Upon appointment of the curator, the case was again continued to September 24, 2026, to permit time for service on the curator and for the curator to contact Johnston. The curator, acting on Johnston's behalf, negotiated another continuance to October 9, 2026.

“A continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor.” La. C.C.P. art. 1601. “A trial judge has wide discretion in determining whether a motion for continuance should be granted; thus, the standard of review in such cases is abuse of discretion.” Coastal Fire Prot., L.L.C. v. Custom Drywall & Painting, L.L.C., 2025-0081, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/25), 421 So. 3d 267, 273. (Quoting Doe v. Lewis, 2020-0320, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/20), 312 So.3d 1165, 1169 (citing Jordan v. Cmty. Care Hosp., 2019-0039, 2019-0040, pp. 22-23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/24/19), 276 So.3d 564, 582)).

Only two days before the trial date, Johnston's counsel filed a motion to continue based solely on the allegation that he had a scheduled shoulder surgery. If Johnston, herself, also had a medical reason for a continuance, it seems likely that her condition would have been included in that motion. That likelihood, coupled with Johnston's inability to provide any details or written medical directive for bed rest or any medical necessity for her absence from the court appears to have led the trial judge to conclude that the medical excuse was fabricated. The trial judge commented that, “Tomfoolery, that's what's going on here,” after learning that Johnston was not appearing for trial and that the attorney who had filed the motion to continue based on his shoulder surgery stated that he was withdrawing from the case.

Considering the great discretion of the trial court to control its docket and the number of continuances already granted in this volatile case, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the continuance.

First amendment rights and parental rights

The simpler of these two arguments is the second. As of the date of trial, Johnston had no parental rights. She lost those rights by judgment granted on April 5, 2024, in the matter entitled In the Interest of [JK], a Child, Docket No. DC89-FM2021-0387.6 in the 30th Judicial District of Texas. It was never appealed. The Texas court expressly found that termination of Johnston's parental rights was in the child's best interest. The judgment was made executory in Louisiana in this same proceeding in the court below.

The constitutional argument regarding free speech requires more consideration and balancing of interests. At trial, the curator argued that Kenner's allegations in support of the protective order amounted to mere defamation that is not actionable under La. R.S. 46:2131, et seq. The trial court correctly recognized that the writings and speeches made by Johnston were not only false and defamatory but were, in fact, so derogatory to his character that they arose to a call to action against him. Johnston accused Kenner of child rape, child trafficking, bribery and other crimes. She called upon others to join her fight against him. She gave actual instructions to at least one of Kenner's patients to interfere with Kenner's parental rights in a manner that would put his livelihood in jeopardy.

Certain forms of speech are not now and never have been protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. In particular, speech designed to lead to violence is prohibited. For example, incitement to riot is unlawful under La. R.S. 14:329.2. Speech advancing a conspiracy to commit murder subjects the speaker to the same criminal penalties as the person who pulls the trigger. La. R.S. 14:26. The speech that is prohibited by the trial court's protective order is likewise prohibited by law under La. R.S. 46:2132(3) and La. R.S. 15:1503(2).⁵

The First Amendment argument advanced by Johnston is without merit as the words spoken and written by Johnston are reasonably understood to inflict mental injury on Kenner and to invite physical injury on him.

Abuse of process and retaliatory use of the judicial system

Johnston's abuse of process claim is best summed up in her brief in her argument that, “When a protective order is sought not for safety, but to gain litigation advantage or suppress opposing speech, it constitutes an abuse of the judicial process.”

“There are two essential elements of a cause of action for abuse of process: (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.” Guillory v. City of New Orleans, 2016-0638 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So. 3d 1035, 1042.

As is shown above, this court finds that Kenner's request for a protective order is well-founded based on Johnston's campaign against him and the earlier willful violation of the Texas court's order. Therefore, the first element does not exist because the motive is not ulterior, but is that which is presented in Kenner's pleadings.

Johnston has not pointed to any act by Kenner or his counsel that is not in the regular prosecution of this proceeding. Therefore, the second element is absent as well.

This portion of Johnston's argument is without merit.

Conclusion

This opinion is strictly limited to Kenner's petition for a protective order. We hold that the order was providently granted and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

I respectfully concur in the result. I write separately to emphasize that before Ms. Johnston appeared in Orleans Parish Civil District Court, her parental rights were revoked in a prior proceeding by a Texas court after she violated the Texas court's custody decree when she absconded with the child to Louisiana. That issue, however, is not before this Court.

The principal issue here is whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a continuance of the trial on Mr. Kenner's petition for a protective order against Ms. Johnston. According to Ms. Johnston, the district court denied her continuance despite a “documented emergency hospitalization.” However, the record is devoid of any such documentation. Nevertheless, before the trial commenced, the district court went through great pains to allow Ms. Johnston to provide the medical documentation to the court, to no avail. Had she complied, it is more likely than not that the district court would have rescheduled the trial. As pointed out by the majority, the district court has great latitude in determining whether a motion for continuance should be granted. I find it was well within the district court's discretion to move forward with the trial.

Finally, I agree with the majority that the record is replete with evidence to show that Ms. Johnston engaged in verbal, written and electronic communication that rose to the level of abuse, harassment and cyberstalking.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial had been continued once before because of the sheriff's inability to serve Johnston.

2.   At trial, the attorney that Johnston consulted withdrew his motion to continue and advised the court that he would not be representing Johnston in this matter.

3.   Johnston filed her brief to this court in proper person. She is not an attorney and the court is granting some latitude in the failure to follow some of the formalities of pleading.

4.   Johnston's attorney filed a motion to continue the trial based his own shoulder surgery. That motion makes no mention of Johnston's pregnancy or any difficulties associated with it.

5.   La. R.S. 46:2132(3) provides in pertinent part:(3) “Domestic abuse” includes but is not limited to physical or sexual abuse and any offense against the person, physical or non-physical, as defined in the Criminal Code of Louisiana, except negligent injury and defamation, committed by one family member, household member, or dating partner against another. “Domestic abuse” also includes abuse of adults as defined in R.S. 15:1503 when committed by an adult child or adult grandchild.La. R.S. 15:1503(2) provides in pertinent part:(2) “Abuse” means the infliction of physical or mental injury, or actions which may reasonably be expected to inflict physical injury, on an adult by other parties, including but not limited to such means as sexual abuse, abandonment, isolation, exploitation, or extortion of funds or other things of value.

Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome