NICHOLS INTERVIVOS TRUST AND ROBERT NICHOLS JR v. DENNIS SUMPTER BRENDA WAITE SUMPTER AND ROSS STEVENS (2026)

The plaintiffs appeal two judgments issued by the trial court that hold the plaintiffs settled their claims against the defendants at the conclusion of court-ordered mediation, as documented by the terms of a Settlement Agreement completed by the attending parties and their counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

FACTS

The Nichols Inter Vivos Trust owns property adjacent to property owned by Dennis R. and Brenda W. Sumpter. The Trust and Robert B. Nichols, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiffs) filed suit against the Sumpters alleging they constructed a fence on Trust property and refused to remove it. The plaintiff's first amended and supplemental petition identified Mr. Nichols as a plaintiff individually, an administrative trustee, a current Trust beneficiary, a Trust representative, and an attorney for the Trust. The plaintiffs acknowledged the fence was installed with their knowledge and consent but asserted they withdrew their consent when the Sumpters refused to move the fence off their property when requested to do so. The plaintiffs also asserted a claim for the trial court to set the legal boundary between the parties’ properties.¹ The plaintiffs added Ross Stevens as a defendant alleging that the Sumpters hired him to install the fence and that he damaged their property when installing the fence.

The parties could not resolve their differences over these issues, and the trial court ordered them to participate in mediation, which was conducted on December 30, 2024. Mr. Nichols represented himself and the Trust. Mrs. Sumpter attended and participated in the mediation, but Mr. Sumpter and Mr. Stevens were represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the mediation, a Settlement Agreement form (hereinafter “the Settlement”) was executed by Mrs. Sumpter; the attorney representing her, her husband, and Mr. Stevens; and Mr. Nichols. Pursuant to the handwritten terms of the Settlement, the parties agreed that the northern boundary of the Trust property was as depicted on a survey dated November 27, 2020, and that the Trust would purchase that portion of the Sumpters’ property lying between the Trust's eastern boundary and the Sumpters’ fence which is situated east of the Trust property. The parties further agreed that “All parties” would “dismiss all claims” asserted in the lawsuit against “all defendants.” Mr. Nichols reviewed the Settlement and inserted the handwritten phrase “along the northern boundary” to a sentence in the first paragraph of the Settlement before he signed it.

On January 21, 2025, Mr. Nichols notified the defendants’ attorneys that the settlement “is neither a binding agreement nor a valid offer by anyone” and “[t]he documents I sent are my only offer, intended to be accepted or rejected in toto.” Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to enforce the Settlement executed at the conclusion of the mediation.

On April 7, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to enforce the Settlement. The parties introduced documentary evidence. No testimony was presented. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held that the Settlement terms constituted a binding agreement and were to be “enforced as written.” The trial court further determined, however, that because the Settlement involved the transfer of immovable property, the motion to enforce it was premature “until the supporting documents have been submitted and made an order of the court.” Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment on April 17, 2025, in favor of the defendants and ordered the parties to “execute any and all documents necessary to complete” the terms of the Settlement. The trial court also set forth dates for the plaintiffs’ attorney to submit a draft of the Settlement documents and a date for the defendants to submit their proposed edits to those documents. In the event the parties could not agree on the provisions of the Settlement documents, each party was to submit their proposed documents to the court.

The parties could not agree on the terms of the documents necessary to confect the Settlement as intended, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of interlocutory judgment, new trial of final judgment, and reasons for judgment. At the hearing on that motion, the plaintiffs argued the Settlement was not a valid contract as determined by the trial court, the trial court's judgment should be recalled, and a new hearing should be held to resolve the pending issues. After the hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and ordered the plaintiffs to sign a non-warranty deed prepared by defense counsel. The court further specified that the plaintiffs’ refusal to follow the order “will result in contempt of court[ ]” and noted the plaintiffs acknowledged that they received the deed. The plaintiffs filed this appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

The plaintiffs assign the following errors with the trial court's judgment enforcing the Settlement as outlined therein:

1) Holding The Term Sheet Enforceable as Written Against All Parties.

2) Imposing a Dismissal with Prejudice and a Non[-]warranty Deed.

3) Imposing an Invalid Settlement and Judgment Process.

4) Awarding Costs to Appellees and Failing to Award Sanctions, Penalties, and Costs to Appellants.

DISCUSSION

Compromise

A compromise is defined by La.Civ.Code art. 3071 as “a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.” A compromise must be made “in writing or recited in open court” so that it can be transcribed from the record. La.Civ.Code art. 3072. “A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary consequences of what they express.” La.Civ.Code art. 3076.

Parties to a contract must perform their contractual obligations in good faith. La.Civ.Code art. 1983. “Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by law.” Id. “Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties.” La.Civ.Code art. 2045. “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La.Civ.Code art. 2046.

A settlement agreement is “the law between the parties, absent a conflict with legislation or public policy.” Breaux v. Worrell, 25-856, p. 11 (La. 4/10/26), 431 So.3d 375, 383. “The meaning and intent of the parties to a written instrument, including a compromise, is ordinarily determined from the four corners of the instrument. Extrinsic (parol) evidence is inadmissible to explain or to contradict the terms of the instrument.” Howard v. Louisiana Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 10-1302, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/27/11), 65 So.3d 697, 702 (citations omitted).

Louisiana has had a strong public policy in favor of settlements for many years. Joseph v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 18-2061 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 579. The supreme court explained in Joseph:

The law in its wisdom, and out of a solicitude to end or avert threatened litigation, encourages settlement of disputes by compromise, and does not sanction the solemn acts of contending parties settling their disagreements being lightly brushed aside, unless there be present evidence of bad faith, error, fraud, etc. If such were not the law, there would be little incentive to any one to part with anything of value in the desire to escape the harassments of litigation. A compromise agreement, when freely entered into, is intended to have the binding effect of the thing adjudged. The law has ordained that such transactions have the dignity and force of a definitive judgment, in so far as definitely and irrevocably fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto, as relates to the subject-matter dealt with. It is simply the act of the parties determining their own liabilities and obligations, instead of the court.

Id. at 593 (emphasis added) (quoting Beck v. Continental Cas. Co., 145 So. 810, 811 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1933)). Because compromises are favored by law, a trial court should “not declare a settlement void without a clear showing that it violates good morals or the public interest.” In re Succession of Cole, 12-802, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/12), 108 So.3d 240, 246, writ denied, 13-257 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 384. A party challenging the validity and enforcement of a settlement agreement has the burden of proving the agreement is invalid. Millet v. Millet, 04-406 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 888 So.2d 291.

Standard of Review

As a contract, the interpretation of the language of a compromise or settlement agreement is a question of law subject to de novo review, whereas factual determinations, such as intent, regarding a contract are reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., L.L.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 25-67 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/24/25), 420 So.3d 858, writ denied, 25-1356 (La. 1/21/26), 425 So.3d 106. A trial court's ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement involves factual determinations as to whether a contract exists between the parties, and appellate courts review a trial court's finding on that issue under a manifest error or clearly wrong standard. Porche v. Porche, 23-471 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/24/24), 386 So.3d 695; Howard, 65 So.3d 697. The determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law, which is reviewed pursuant to the de novo standard of review. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571, 09-584 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507.

Is the Term Sheet Enforceable as Written?

The plaintiffs urge numerous arguments in support of their complaint that the trial court erred in holding the Settlement is enforceable. Plaintiff Nichols is an attorney and signed the Settlement, yet he argues the Settlement is invalid because he signed it without knowing what documents would be involved and what the specific terms of those documents would be. The record establishes that Mr. Nichols and defense counsel had been unable to resolve the issues herein before the trial court ordered them to mediate their differences. Accordingly, Mr. Nichols, as an attorney and a party, should have known he needed to understand the mediation process including the documentation that would likely be used to finalize any agreement before signing the Settlement. More importantly, Mr. Nichols’ arguments fail to acknowledge that his signature on the Settlement “establishes the presumption that he saw and understood the terms of the contract.” Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 98-193, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 372, 374.

To address the plaintiffs’ complaints, the trial court had to consider what the parties intended when they agreed to and signed the Settlement.

In determining the intent of the parties to a written agreement, the court must construe the disputed provision together with the rest of the contract, giving the entire document a practical, reasonable and fair construction. La. C.C. arts.2045–2052[.]

When intent cannot be clearly ascertained from the face of the agreement, the court may consider the written provisions in light of other pertinent evidence, including the nature of the contract, the circumstances surrounding its formation, the understanding of the parties as to what was intended, the conduct of the parties before and after the agreement was executed, prior dealings between the parties, if any, and the equities and regular business practices pertaining to contracts of a similar nature. La. C.C. arts.2053–2055[.]

Lamson Petroleum Co. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 99-1937, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/10/00), 763 So.2d 40, 43–44, writ denied, 00-2305 (La. 11/27/00), 775 So.2d 446 (quoting Noel v. Discus Oil Corp., 30,561, p. 17 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/13/98), 714 So.2d 105, 114) (citations omitted)).

We have reviewed the trial court's reasons for ruling in light of the record including the hearings held on the defendants’ motion to enforce the Settlement and the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of interlocutory judgment and new trial of final judgment and find no manifest error in the trial court's conclusions on the enforcement of the Settlement.

Mr. Nichols urges he acted on information provided to him by the mediator when he signed the Agreement; therefore, his defenses to the Settlement are justified. We have not considered this argument as any such comments are confidential and inadmissible in court as per the Louisiana Mediation Act. La.R.S. 9:4101, and those comments are hearsay and inadmissible. See La.Evid. art. 801(C).

Dismissal with Prejudice and a Non-warranty Deed

The plaintiffs complain the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered them to execute a non-warranty deed and dismissed this matter with prejudice. They first argue the trial court erred in accepting the signature of the defendants’ attorney on the Settlement on behalf of Mr. Sumpter and Mr. Ross in place of their original signature. They cite Pace v. McManus, 463 So.2d 85 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985), in support of this complaint. In Pace, this court determined:

The proposed settlement constitutes a transfer of immovable property, and as such, must meet the requirements for a sale of immovable property. Such a contract must be in writing, must be signed by the buyer and seller, and if an agent executes the contract on behalf of one of the parties, his authority must be express and in writing. Rebman v. Reed, 335 So.2d 37 (La.App. 4th Cir.1976), writ denied, 338 So.2d 699 (La.1976); see also LSA–C.C. arts. 2275, 2276, 2992 and 2997. There is no evidence before us of any written authority given either of the attorneys in this case, nor does the exchange of correspondence amount to a written contract signed by the buyer and the seller. The trial court correctly refused to enforce the proposed settlement.

Id. at 87.

In Pace, the court determined that one of the plaintiffs had not authorized her attorney to enter into the settlement at issue, and therefore, correspondence signed by her attorney did not constitute an enforceable written offer and acceptance. Unlike Pace, the defendants do not contend their attorney did not have their authority to accept the terms of the Settlement and sign it on their behalf. Accordingly, Pace does not apply to the facts here.

The plaintiffs next argue that the Sumpters’ transfer of their interests in Parcel 2 should be with warranty, as provided in La.Civ.Code art. 2500, not without warranty. The Settlement terms do not provide that the defendants’ transfer of Parcel 2 to the plaintiffs would be without warranty. The effect of a deed without warranty is addressed in La.Civ.Code art. 2502 which states, in pertinent part: “A person may transfer to another whatever rights to a thing he may then have, without warranting the existence of any such rights.” Accordingly, the defendants would transfer whatever rights they have in Parcel 2. The plaintiffs assert in their original and three amended petitions that they own Parcel 2. Thus, by their own admission, a non-warranty deed has no impact on the plaintiffs’ ownership interests in Parcel 2.

The plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred in ordering the dismissal executed by the parties be with prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice does not prevent the plaintiffs from suing the defendants on the same claims asserted herein, La.Code Civ.P. art. 1637. As a result, the Settlement would not have “the binding effect of the thing adjudged” and would not “definitely and irrevocably fix[ ] the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto[.]” Joseph, 347 So.3d at 593 (quoting Beck, 145 So. at 811). To the contrary, the plaintiffs could bring another suit asserting the same claims they assert herein which would render the Settlement meaningless. We find no error with the trial court ordering the Sumpters to transfer their interest in Parcel 2 to the plaintiffs by non-warranty deed and dismissing the Plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice.

Invalid Settlement and Judgment Process

In this assignment of error, the plaintiffs focus on the trial court's selection of the documents to effectuate the Settlement. They assert the inclusion of the provision regarding the completion of documents necessary to finalize the Settlement is a suspensive condition that renders the Settlement invalid. In Cureton v. Cureton, 20-520, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/21), 362 So.3d 461, 469–470, this court addressed a similar situation, explaining:

“A conditional obligation is one dependent on an uncertain event.” La.Civ. Code art. 1767. “If the obligation may not be enforced until the uncertain event occurs, the condition is suspensive.” Id. Contractual provisions should not be construed to be suspensive conditions when possible. S. States Masonry, Inc. v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 507 So.2d 198 (La.1987); Burgess v. Shi Gang Zheng, 17-665 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/10/18), 257 So.3d 764. The party who asserts a suspensive condition as a defense bears the burden of establishing that there is a suspensive condition which has not been satisfied. Abraham v. Sperandeo, 423 So.2d 65 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1982); Northshore Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Farris, 634 So.2d 867 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993).

In Burgess, 257 So.3d 764, the court considered a provision in an agreement to purchase property which required proof of funding for an all-cash sale. We noted that “there was no provision in the Agreement which conditioned the sale on [defendant's] ability to obtain financing.” Id. at 774. This court went on to say that “[w]hile the Agreement did require [defendant] to supply ‘proof of funds’ within 48 hours, we find this to be merely a term of sale, and not a suspensive condition as contemplated by our case law.” Id. This court concluded that the term was not an uncertain event. Id.

As recognized by the trial court, the Settlement cannot be finalized without documents required by law to complete the transfer of the immovable property and delineate the agreements set forth therein. This is a legal requirement, not an uncertain event. Accordingly, the documents required to finalize the Settlement are not a suspensive condition. This assigned error lacks merit.

Costs

Having affirmed the trial court's determination that the Settlement is valid and enforceable, we find no error with the trial court's assessment of all costs to the plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, Nichols Inter Vivos Trust and Robert B. Nichols, Jr. failed to establish the Settlement is invalid. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed in all respects. All costs are assessed to the Nichols Inter Vivos Trust and Robert B. Nichols, Jr.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The plaintiffs also alleged claims for timber piracy under La.R.S. 3:4278.1, negligence claims under La.Civ.Code arts. 2315–16, claims for drainage interference under La.Civ.Code art. 655, and misrepresentations to a third party but later dismissed them.

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT CHIEF JUDGE