IN RE:J.M.W. AND J.T.W. APPLYING FOR INTRAFAMILY ADOPTION OF B.L.B (2026)

J.M.W. and J.T.W.¹ appeal the trial court's denial of their Petitions for Intrafamily Adoption, in which J.T.W. seeks to adopt J.M.W.’s minor sons. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

J.M.W. is the mother of two sons, B.C.B. and B.L.B., born respectively in 2016 and 2018, during her relationship with the boys’ father, A.B. The couple never married.

In 2020, J.M.W. began a relationship with J.T.W. The two married in 2024. The minor children lived with J.M.W. and J.T.W. during that time, with J.T.W. acting as a father figure and financially supporting the family. At some point, A.B.’s relationship with the children became sporadic and irregular, a situation the parties attribute at least in part to A.B.’s substance abuse. Although not commemorated in the record on appeal, the parties litigated custody, visitation, and support issues in the trial court. As referenced in the parties’ briefs, the trial court's interim rulings as to custody and support issues were never finalized.

J.M.W. and J.T.W. instituted this matter, filing Petitions for Intrafamily Adoption in May 2025 by which they sought J.T.W.’s adoption of the boys. Relying on La.Ch.Code art. 1015, J.M.W. and J.T.W. alleged that A.B. demonstrated an intent to permanently avoid parental responsibility by failing to maintain significant contact with the children or by failing to provide significant contributions to the children's care and support, each period being in excess of six months. Given those circumstances, J.M.W. and J.T.W. asserted that adoption was in the best interest and welfare of the children. They sought hearings on the petitions pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1253 and final judgments of adoption pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1255. The trial court consolidated the separate adoption proceedings.

A.B. opposed the adoptions, denying that the adoptions were in the best interest of the children. A.B. stated that although he “desired to visit” the children, he was unable to do so because of J.M.W.’s “inability to communicate” and her “attitude toward him and his family.” A.B. also claimed that he was unemployed during the previous year and had thus been unable to financially support the children.

The trial court conducted an August 7, 2025 hearing, where J.T.W. testified regarding his relationship with the children and explained to the court that he wanted to regularize the family dynamic as the boys need a father figure and a stable household. J.M.W. likewise testified regarding J.T.W.’s relationship with the boys, explaining that he provides for the family financially and acts as a role model for their sporting pursuits. He also guides them in their outdoor activities such as hunting and fishing. Both expressed an intent for B.C.B. and B.L.B. to maintain relationships with A.B.’s family.

Opposing the adoptions, A.B. repeated his allegations regarding his fraught communication with J.M.W. and the difficulties it posed in visiting the children. Although he was doing much better with his substance abuse issues, he continued to be unable to financially support the children. He confirmed that he wanted to be a regular part of the children's life. A.B.’s grandfather, B.B., explained that he raised A.B. from the age of three, when A.B.’s father died. B.B. considers A.B. a son and continues to allow him to “rent” the upstairs of his home. B.B. agreed that A.B. had been “straight” for nine months. B.B. explained that he supervised A.B.’s visitation with the children. Like A.B., B.B. remarked that the visitations were hampered by difficult interactions with J.M.W. and always resulted in a “fight.” Those difficulties made visitation “almost impossible.”

In reasons for ruling, the trial court took judicial notice of a number of criminal and civil filings instituted by the parties in 2018 and 2019 in the Twelfth Judicial District. The court recognized that “[t]here are pending matters in the custody proceeding which was instituted in 2018 and in the State support proceeding which was instituted in 2019.” Referencing the “civil litigation between [J.M.W. and A.B.], along with the criminal filings involving them,” the trial court observed that “their relationship was very unusual; volatile; and dangerous.”

The trial court determined that adoption was not in the children's best interest, remarking as a preliminary matter that A.B.’s actions as a father have “been irregular, to say the least.” Finding that A.B.’s long-standing issue with drug abuse was “obvious,” the court noted that there was undisputed evidence that A.B. had been sober for nine months. Yet, A.B. had pursued “no aggressive action in attempting to visit with his children.” Further, although the parties testified that A.B.’s visitation had been suspended due to his failure to take a court ordered hair follicle test, the trial court noted the lack of judgment reflecting the suspension of those visits. The trial court also found “overwhelming” evidence that A.B. had not provided adequate financial support for the children. While A.B. made “a large lump sum payment in 2024 at the time that he sold his home[,]” he had not provided support since that time.

In contrast, J.M.W. and J.T.W. were “providing a happy and loving family lifestyle” for the children. The trial court found it undisputed that J.T.W. and the children have a strong bond; J.T.W.’s “activities with the children confirm this fact.” Notwithstanding that relationship, however, the trial court found that nothing would change between J.T.W. and the children “whether or not formal adoption is granted[.]” The trial court noted that J.T.W. had an older child to whom he had surrendered his parental rights and remarked that J.T.W. “is taking advantage of this second chance in a positive way and is a good stepdad with the children.” The trial court expressed confidence that J.T.W. would continue to do so regardless of its ruling. Significantly, the trial court explained that it was concerned by J.T.W.’s statement to the children that he would “ ‘do whatever I have to do so you don't have to go back.’ ” The trial court found the remark to be a “clear indication” that J.T.W. does not want the children to have “any relation” with A.B. and/or A.B.’s family. Regarding the discontinuation of the boys’ relationship with their paternal family, the trial court stated:

This is adverse to the testimony of [J.M.W.] wherein she clearly indicated that it would be her intent, if the adoption were to be granted, to continue to allow the children to visit with the members of [A.B's] family. The evidence confirms that the children clearly know the members of [A.B.’s] family and are comfortable with the members of [A.B.’s] family. [J.T.W.] testified that the visits with [A.B.’s] family should not be terminated, only the visits with [A.B.]. The granting of adoption of the children cannot be fashioned in that manner. Also, considering the strained relations of these families, this Court seriously doubts [J.M.W.’s] sincerity in her plans to continue relations with the kids and the [B.] Family.

Toward the conclusion of the testimony of [J.T.W.] and after consideration of all evidence and applicable law, it appears to this Court that this adoption proceeding may be an attempt to get a result wherein the children no longer go to “poppa's” house since this was not achieved in the civil proceedings. These children clearly know and love members of [A.B.’s] family.

The trial court found it “[a]bundantly clear that allowing an adoption of the children, would be, as stated in the law, a death sentence insofar as [A.B.] and the children are concerned.” The trial court went “a step further in stating that a grant of adoption in this proceeding would be a death sentence for the children as to the entire [B.] family. This clearly is not in the best interests of these children.”

The trial court referenced the testimony of A.B.’s grandfather, B.B., extensively, finding the testimony “very revealing concerning the issues between [A.B.] and [J.M.W.], and also issues on occasion with [B.B.] and [J.M.W.] concerning visits with the children. [B.B.] indicated that there was a “ ‘fight every time.’ ” The trial court also noted B.B.’s testimony regarding:

the frustration that [A.B.] has displayed over his lack of visits with the children; issues with [J.M.W.] when attempting to visit the children; and an overall frustration. [B.B.] testified that the visits were always controlled, with ‘hell to pay’ if [J.M.W.’s] rules weren't followed. A statement by [B.B.] was, “[J.M.W.] would rather fight than eat,” with testimony indicating that [J.M.W.] dictated time, place and terms for visits. [B.B.] credibly testified as to the love and close connection between the children and the [B.] family, and his hard work in developing the [family] name. It is obvious that [B.B.] feels that allowing the adoption of these children and a change of their name would cheat them from the benefits of being a [B.]. It is obvious that [B.B.] worked long and hard ․ to establish a good name and he desires that his grandchildren benefit from same.

The testimony of [K.B.B.,] who is legally the aunt of [A.B.,] but raised as sister, was also pertinent to confirm that there is a strong relationship between the children and the [B.B.] family. A recent incident was described in detail which confirms this Court's doubting of [J.M.W.’s] testimony indicating that she would continue relations with the [B.] family even if the adoption was granted may not be correct.

The trial court formally denied the proposed adoption by an October 9, 2025 judgment.

J.M.W. and J.T.W. appeal, asserting in a single assignment of error that “[J.M.W.] and [J.T.W.] aver that the Honorable Trial Court was manifestly erroneous in denying their request for adoption.”

DISCUSSION

The Louisiana Children's Code provides the applicable framework in adoption cases, with Article 1193 requiring that a father's consent to the adoption of his child is required unless his parental rights have been terminated earlier. Significantly, the party seeking the adoption bears the burden of proving a parent's consent is not required. C.D.J. v. B.C.A., 11-378 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 74 So.3d 300.

J.M.W. and J.T.W. contend that A.B.’s consent was not required as La.Ch.Code art. 1245 provides:

A. The consent of the parent as required by Article 1193 may be dispensed with upon proof by clear and convincing evidence of the required elements of either Paragraph B or C of this Article at the hearing on the opposition and petition.

B. When a petitioner authorized by Article 1243 has been granted custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction and any one of the following condition exists:

(1) The parent has refused or failed to comply with a court order of support without just cause for a period of at least six months.

(2) The parent has refused or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt to communicate with the child without just cause for a period of at least six months.

C. When the spouse of a stepparent petitioner has been granted sole or joint custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction or is otherwise exercising lawful custody of the child and anyone of the following conditions exists:

(1) The other parent has refused or failed to comply with a court order of support without just cause for a period of at least six months.

(2) The other parent has refused or failed to visit, communicate, or attempt to communicate with the child without just cause for a period of at least six months.

J.M.W. and J.T.W. maintain in their appellants’ brief that they presented “uncontroverted evidence that [A.B.] ‘has refused or failed to comply with a court order of support without just cause for a period of at least six months’ ․” Thus, they argue, his consent was not necessary to consummate the adoption.

We note that, in its reasons for ruling, the trial court did not specifically analyze J.M.W. and J.T.W.’s initial burden of proving consent. It instead moved immediately into the best interest analysis addressed further below. Neither does A.B., for his part, specifically challenge the application of Article 1245 to this case in his brief.

We point out, however, that the ongoing nature of the parties’ custody dispute as well as deficiencies in J.M.W. and J.T.W.’s evidentiary showing undermine their position on appeal that they necessarily satisfied the requirements of La.Ch.Code art. 1245. Significantly, the record is devoid of documentary evidence of awards of custody and/or support as required by La.Ch.Code art. 1245. As observed by the trial court, custody issues remained pending at the time of the hearing. This procedural point is significant as this court has previously determined that Article 1245 does not apply to a “case where there is on-going litigation relating to custody.” See C.D.J., 74 So.3d at 302. See also In re: A.A., 23-45 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/24/23), 366 So.3d 811, writ denied, 23-884 (La. 9/6/23), 369 So.3d 1272.

We are mindful of this court's opinion in In re: J.D.P. and A.N.P., 22-828 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/23) (unpublished opinion) (2023 WL 3221971), wherein this court found that a stepparent's petition satisfied the requirements of La.Ch.Code art. 1245 despite the fact that there was no court order granting the child's mother—and petitioner's spouse—custody of the child. While the panel remarked that there was no dispute that the mother had always exercised lawful custody of the child pursuant to La.Ch.Code art. 1245(C), it pointed out that the petition for adoption focused on the biological father's refusal to comply with a court order of support pursuant to Article 1245(C)(1). The panel identified both a judgment of support and a consent judgment reducing the monthly support obligation that had been rendered in that case. The panel likewise pointed to an abundance of documentary evidence regarding the father's failure to supply support without just cause for a period in excess of six months. In contrast, J.M.W. and J.T.W. ask this court to apply Article 1245 in the midst of pending custody proceedings. That circumstance was remarked upon by the trial court and found fatal to application of Article 1245 in the jurisprudence. Moreover, the appellate record simply lacks documentation of any custody and support proceedings, ongoing or otherwise.

More substantially, however, we find no merit in J.M.W. and J.T.W.’s contention that the trial court erred in finding that adoption was not in the best interests of the children in this situation. On this portion of the adoption framework, La.Ch.Code art. 1255, provides, in pertinent part:

B. The court, after hearing and after taking into consideration information from all sources concerning the intrafamily adoption, may enter a final decree of adoption, or it may deny the adoption. The basic consideration shall be the best interests of the child.

C. When a court has granted custody to either the child's grandparents or his parent married to the stepparent petitioner, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that this adoption is in the best interests of the child.

J.M.W. and J.T.W. seek application of the rebuttable presumption of Paragraph (C), suggesting that “custody” must exclude “a scenario where the defendant biological parent was awarded joint custody.” Relying on In re C.B., 94-755 (La. 10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1251, J.M.W. and J.T.W. represent that, in this case, A.B. was not awarded joint custody “and the thrust of the previous judgments concerning custody ․ have been aimed at protecting the children from [him], i.e., supervision, drug testing, and suspension of visitation.” Thus, they maintain that the trial court and, in turn, this court should view J.M.W. as the children's “custodian,” rendering the presumption of Paragraph (C) applicable.

J.M.W. and J.T.W. further suggest that it is of no moment that the underlying custody judgments were interim in nature as A.B. did not attempt to modify or finalize the ruling. Thus, J.M.W. and J.T.W. argue that “no ongoing custody litigation existed at the time at trial.” They cite In re R.P.D., 14-1539 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/22/15) (unpublished opinion) (2015 WL 1880489) in support of their argument, noting that the first circuit panel granted an intrafamily adoption where the mother was granted custody only by interim order. As there had been no filings in the custody case for a number of years, the panel determined that there was no on-going custody litigation that would prohibit the filing for intrafamily adoption.

Both of these arguments are problematic, however, as they again rely on evidence that is not present in the appellate record. In reaching its determination that no final custody order had been entered, the trial court took judicial notice of a breadth of judicial proceedings between the parties regarding filiation, custody, visitation, and support over a six year period.² The court specifically noted that:

On February 23, 2024, a Hearing was held in Division A wherein witnesses were sworn and testified.

*** A review of Docket No. 2018-5910-A reflects that neither party has been awarded custody. [J.M.W.] has been designated primary custodial parent on multiple occasions. A designation of sole custody or joint custody has never actually been included in a Judgment.

Outstanding proceedings remain to be heard in Docket No. 2018-5910-A concerning the Motion to Review Provisions of Interim Judgment filed by [A.B.] on August 14, 2023, together with the Rule for Ex Parte Order of Custody and Modification Custody filed by [J.M.W.] on January 19, 20234 [sic]. It does appear that a Hearing was conducted February 23, 2024, however, no Judgment has resulted.

Those district court filings and rulings are not contained within the appellate record. Certainly, a trial court is allowed to take notice of its own proceedings pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 202. State in the Interest of P.G., 25-494 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/21/26), 433 So.3d 68. An appellate court, however, may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record, nor may it receive new evidence. See Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84. See also La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164 (“appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.”); La.Code Civ.P. art. 2128.³ As appellants, J.M.W. and J.T.W. are responsible for the completeness of the record for appellate review. See Grantt Guillory Enter., Inc. v. Quebedeaux, 12-931 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 110 So.3d 182. Inadequacy of the record is thus imputable to the appellant and “cannot operate to the detriment of an appellee.” Id. at 188. “Thus, ‘when the record does not contain an adequate transcript, narrative of fact or other satisfactory evidence, an appellate court can apply the presumption that the trial court's judgment is correct and affirm.’ ” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Parish of St. John the Baptist, 09-840, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/23/10), 33 So.3d 999, 1005, writ denied, 10-1289 (La. 9/17/10), 45 So.3d 1056). As J.M.W. and J.T.W.’s arguments regarding application of the presumption of La.Ch.Code art. 1255(C) are dependent on evidence not contained within the record, we likewise find that their argument fails here.

Finally, we find no merit in J.M.W. and J.T.W.’s alternative argument that, absent the presumption in their favor, they have adequately demonstrated that adoption is in the best interests of the children. They again point to the distant relationship between A.B. and the children, along with A.B.’s infrequent communication with them. In contrast, the children have a close parental relationship with J.T.W. They also cite A.B.’s substance abuse struggles, suggesting that he may not avail himself of the visitation schedule due to the court's earlier ruling that he submit to a prerequisite drug test. While the nature of the court's purported order regarding drug testing is contested in the record, the fact that A.B.’s substance abuse could have required such an order remains noteworthy.

This court has previously explained that the best interests of the children remain the paramount concern in all custody cases, including stepparent adoptions. W.P.H. Applying for Adoption of A.A.B., 22-141 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/12/22), 349 So.3d 1120. While a parent may lose the right to consent to the adoption of his or her child, the adoption may only be granted when it is in the best interests of the child. In re K.L.H., 99-1995 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/20/00), 771 So.2d 706. “Whether an adoption is in the best interest of the child must be decided on the facts of each case, and the trial judge is vested with great discretion in making that determination.” Id. at 709 (citing In re Farrar, 93-1347 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/94), 635 So.2d 674). This discretion is not absolute, however, but is instead reviewed for manifest error. In re K.L.H., 771 So.2d 706. In this case, we find that the record supports the trial court's determination that adoption is not in the best interests of the children.

The record plainly establishes that the children are secure in their familial setting with J.M.W. and J.T.W. As remarked upon by the trial court, J.T.W. acts as a father figure, offering financial stability and guidance. Clearly, a stepparent's ability to provide for the needs of the child is a factor in considering the best interest of the children. See In re Billeaud, 600 So.2d 863 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992). However, the love and home environment provided by a stepparent is not sufficient, alone, to warrant the granting of an adoption. W.P.H., 349 So.3d 1120. Rather,

[i]t is necessary as well to examine the depth of closeness of the child's ties with the non-custodial natural parent, and the effect which the loss of this relationship would have on the child. In Re JGG v. JLF, 566 So.2d 236 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990). The court must also consider the seriousness and finality of the severing of the relationship between the parent and child, as well as the importance and benefit to the child of a continued relationship with the parent. Id.

Id. at 1128 (quoting Knapp v. Adoption of Cotten, 577 So.2d 241, 246 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 580 So.2d 364 (La.1991)). Moreover, the analysis calls for consideration of the importance of the natural parent-child relationship as well as consideration that granting the requested adoption is “ ‘tantamount to a pronouncement of death’ ” between the parent and child. W.P.H., 349 So.3d at 1129 (quoting Adoption of Latoilais, 376 So.2d 555, 560 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1979)). Of significance in this case, the “death in the natural parent-child relationship would extend to the entire family of the natural parent. Latoilais, supra. In an adoption, a child's family name changes and he becomes a new legal person with no legal ties to his natural family.” W.P.H., 349 So.3d at 1129.

The trial court remarked on this latter consideration extensively, explaining that A.B.’s family members testified regarding the children's relationship with the extended paternal family and their comfort with them. Given that relationship, the trial court expressed concern that J.T.W. had expressed ambivalence, if not reluctance, to maintain contact with the paternal grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. The trial court likewise expressed skepticism in J.M.W.’s statement that she would ensure that the relationship with A.B.’s family would continue. The trial court instead pointed to the parties’ “strained” relationship. Those concerns have a solid basis in the record. We find no manifest error in the trial court's determination and, therefore, leave the trial court's ruling undisturbed.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this proceeding are assessed to Appellants, J.M.W. and J.T.W.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use the parties’ and minor children's initials for confidentiality purposes. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 5—2.

2.   J.M.W. and J.T.W. likewise provide a “general summation of the procedural history within the parties’ custody matter in Docket No. 2018-5910-A in Avoyelles Parish and child support proceeding in Docket No. 2019-404111-A preceding the adoption trial.” None of the delineated filings and rulings are included in the appellate record.

3.   Article 2128 pertaining to the contents of the appellate record provides:The form and content of the record on appeal shall be in accordance with the rules of the appellate court, except as provided in the Constitution of Louisiana and as provided in Article 2128.1. Within ten days after transmission of the notices of estimated costs by the clerk of court as provided in Article 2126, however, the appellant may designate by written notice filed with the trial court the portions of the record that the appellant desires to constitute the record on appeal. Within fourteen days after service of a copy of this designation on the other party, that party may also designate by written notice filed with the trial court other portions of the record as the party considers necessary. In those cases, the clerk shall prepare the record on appeal as so directed, but a party or the trial court may cause to be filed thereafter any omitted portion of the record as a supplemental record. When no designation is made, the record shall be a transcript of all the proceedings as well as all documents filed in the trial court.

WILBUR L. STILES JUDGE