STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ALFRED JONES (2026)

Defendant, Alfred Jones (“Mr. Jones”), appeals his second degree murder conviction and the life sentence imposed, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Mr. Jones contends his conviction and sentence should be vacated because the record is incomplete; and as a result, he has been deprived of his constitutional right to a meaningful appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Mr. Jones’ conviction and sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State indicted Mr. Jones on charges of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, on June 18, 1998, arising out of the shooting death of Kendrick Jackson (the “victim”). Mr. Jones pled not guilty. Subsequent thereto, the trial court denied Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress. Mr. Jones waived his right to a jury trial and elected a bench trial. On March 27, 2000, Mr. Jones was found guilty as charged. Mr. Jones filed a motion for a new trial on March 31, 2000, which the trial court denied. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Following imposition of the sentence, Mr. Jones filed a motion for appeal on March 31, 2000. The record does not reflect the trial court's action on the appeal motion.

On April 13, 2022, Mr. Jones filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal and appointment of counsel. The State lodged a procedural objection on the grounds that Mr. Jones had impermissibly delayed his request for an out-of-time appeal. The trial court denied the State's procedural objection and granted Mr. Jones an out-of-time appeal. Following the trial court's ruling, Mr. Jones moved for an appeal. The trial court signed Mr. Jones’ March 31, 2000 motion for appeal and set a return date.

After the appeal was lodged, the State supplemented the appellate record with the trial transcript. The Court Reporter certified that the trial audio had been damaged and placed asterisks in those portions of the transcripts which could not be adequately transcribed.¹ In response to this Court's order to supplement the record with the exhibits introduced into evidence at trial, the State submitted Exhibits 3, 6, and 12 from the Clerk of Criminal Court ² and averred it had obtained duplicates of Exhibits 2, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 24, and 25 from the trial file of the District Attorney.³

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Mr. Jones’ sole assignment of error contends he has been deprived of his constitutional right to a meaningful appeal based on an incomplete record.

DISCUSSION

Right to Complete Trial Record

In support of his assignment of error, Mr. Jones specifically argues the incomplete record prevents appellate counsel from reviewing the record for errors as it lacks a transcript of the pretrial suppression hearing; twenty-two of the twenty-five trial exhibits are missing; and the audio cassettes of the trial have been damaged and are inaudible in places.

Louisiana Constitution Art. I, § 19 delineates a party's right to a complete trial record as follows:

No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based. This right may be intelligently waived. The cost of transcribing the record shall be paid as provided by law.

Moreover, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 843 states that in felony cases, the clerk must record “all of the proceedings, including the examination of prospective jurors, the testimony of witnesses, statements, rulings, orders, and charges by the court, and objections, questions, statements, and arguments of counsel.”

The justification for a complete and comprehensive record is two-fold. First, a dependable record is necessary for appellate counsel to review, assign, and support the record for any errors by the trial court; and second, a complete record ensures the appellate court may review the transcripts for any errors committed during trial. See State v. Pernell, 2013-0180, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/13), 127 So.3d 18, 27.

This Court reiterated the applicable standard to review incomplete record claims in State v. Jones, as follows:

The Louisiana Supreme Court enunciated a three-part standard for reviewing incomplete record claims. State v. Frank, [19]99-0553, p. 20-21 (La. 1/17/01), 803 So.2d 1, 19–20. First, “[m]aterial omissions from the transcript of the proceedings at trial bearing on the merits of an appeal will require reversal.” Id., [19]99–0553, p. 20–21, 803 So.2d at 19–20 (citing State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d 1143 (La. 1980) (finding omissions material as substantial portions of the record were missing, including the testimony of four state witnesses, voir dire examination of prospective jurors, and the prosecutor's opening statements) ); See also State v. Diggs, [19]93-0324 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/95), 657 So.2d 1104 (finding unavailability of witness testimony required a new trial because it could not be determined whether the missing testimony was substantial or inconsequential).

Second, “inconsequential omissions or slight inaccuracies do not require reversal.” Frank, [19]99–0553, p. 21, 803 So.2d at 20 (citing State v. Goodbier, 367 So.2d 356, 357 (La. 1979) (declining to reverse when record did not include voir dire examination transcript and the court reporter's affidavit indicated that no objections were made by the attorneys during voir dire); See also State v. Lyons, 597 So.2d 593 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).

Third, “a defendant is not entitled to relief because of an incomplete record absent a showing of prejudice based on the missing portions of the transcripts. Frank, 99–0553, p. 21, 803 So.2d at 20 (citing State v. Castleberry, 98-1388, p. 29 (La. 4/13/99), 758 So.2d 749, 773)․

2016-0653, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 220 So.3d 128, 132-33.

Whether omitted portions of the trial record were material and substantially prejudiced the rights of the accused— was explained in Pernell:

Not every omission from a record on appeal, however, constitutes a violation of constitutional rights warranting reversal of a conviction and the ordering of a new trial. See [State v. Walker, [20]02–1350, p. 11 [La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/03], 844 So.2d [1060]at 1066. Sometimes “an incomplete record may be adequate for [full] appellate review.” State v. Hawkins, [19]96–0766, p. 8 (La. 1/14/97), 688 So.2d 473, 480. See also State v. Bright, [20]00–1255, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1112, 1116–1117. To justify reversal of a conviction and the ordering of a new trial, we must find that the omission from the trial record affects “substantial rights of the accused.” La. C.Cr.P. art 921. This imports the harmless error rule into this analysis. La.C.Cr.P. art. 921 cmt. c. Whether an omission constitutes harmless or reversible error depends on its materiality. State v. Deruise, [19]98–0541, pp. 10–11 (La.4/3/01), 802 So.2d 1224, 1234; [State v.] Landry, [19]97–0499, p. 2 (La. 6/29/99)], 751 So.2d [214] at 215. “[I]nconsequential omissions or slight inaccuracies do not require reversal.” State v. Hoffman, [19]98–3118, p. 49 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, 586. See also State v. Fortenberry, [20]11–0022, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/27/11), 73 So.3d 391, 397; State v. Allen, [19]95–1754, p. 11 (La. 9/5/96), 682 So.2d 713, 722. The materiality of a given omission is measured by the prejudicial effect of the omission on the defendant in accessing the full scope of appellate review as set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 921. See Deruise, [19]98–0541, p. 11, 802 So.2d at 1234; Fortenberry, [20]11–0022, p. 10, 73 So.3d at 397. In determining whether an omission has sufficiently prejudiced a defendant, we consider the importance of the omission along with the value, relevance, and nature of other evidence made available in the trial record in light of the specific assignments of error set forth by the defendant as well as the errors patent on the face of the record. See, e.g., Hawkins, [19]96–0766, p. 8, 688 So.2d at 480. If an omission is found to be material, the defendant's conviction should be reversed, Hoffman, [19]98–3118, p. 49, 768 So.2d at 586, and “the interests of justice require that a defendant be afforded a new, fully recorded trial.” Landry, [19]97–0499, p. 3, 751 So.2d at 215–216.

2013-0180, p. 12, 127 So.3d at 28.

These precepts also govern those matters, such as the present case, where the defendant has not assigned any specific errors to the lack of a complete record, other than the fact that his right to appellate review has been prejudiced by the record's omissions. See State v. Harry, 2001-2336 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/26/02), 823 So.2d 987.⁴ Accordingly, we now examine whether Mr. Jones has been materially prejudiced by: (1) the absence of the transcript of the pre-trial suppression hearing; 2) the absence of twenty-two of twenty-five trial exhibits; and 3) the deterioration of the audio of certain portions of the trial transcript.

Missing Motion to Suppress Transcript

As reflected in the July 23, 1999 minute entries, the trial court conducted a hearing on Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress identification. The minutes note that Detective Lawrence Green (“Det. Green”), the officer who responded to the dispatch of the shooting, and Damian Sylve, the eyewitness who identified Mr. Jones as the shooter, testified at the motion to suppress hearing. Each offered testimony regarding Mr. Jones’ identification from a photographic line-up.⁵ Moreover, these witnesses, along with Mr. Jones, also testified at the trial on the merits. As discussed, infra, Mr. Sylve identified Mr. Jones as the shooter at trial; and notably, Mr. Jones also admitted that he shot the victim, although he asserted the shooting was in self-defense. Thus, as Mr. Jones’ identification as the shooter was not disputed at trial, Mr. Jones does not show that the missing motion to suppress transcript is a material omission that has prejudiced his right to meaningful appellate review.

Missing Exhibits 6

Mr. Jones notes the following exhibits introduced at trial are not available for appellate review: (1) photographs of the crime scene and his vehicle; (2) the murder weapon; (3) the spent casings and live rounds recovered from the scene and Mr. Jones’ vehicle; (4) Mr. Sylve's sketch of Mr. Jones; (5) a diagram of the crime scene; (6) Mr. Jones’ clothing; (7) the bullets recovered from the victim's body; and (8) a map of the crime scene. However, Mr. Jones fails to demonstrate that the missing exhibits are material omissions.

The available trial transcript establishes witnesses identified the missing exhibits as they were introduced at trial. The trial transcript does not reveal any objections to the introduction of the trial exhibits. Further, Mr. Jones does not assign any specific error or demonstrate any prejudice attributable to the missing exhibits. Accordingly, we find the missing exhibits have not impeded meaningful appellate review.

Review of Trial Transcript

Mr. Jones argues persistent audio deficiencies limited the Court Reporter's ability to transcribe the complete content of each witness’ testimony and any interaction among the witnesses, the trial court, and the attorneys. Mr. Jones contends counsel is unable to ascertain the length of the missing portions or assess if significant objections were raised and ruled upon.

In State v. Boatner, 2003-0485 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 149, the Supreme Court considered whether numerous inaudible portions of the transcribed record denied the defendant his constitutional right to judicial review of his conviction and sentence. In determining whether the amount of the audio omissions were material, the Court espoused:

The crucial issue is not the amount or number of omissions but rather whether the omissions are material and caused prejudice to the defendant. The determination of whether the omissions are material must be made on a case by case basis. The critical inquiry is whether the defendant's right to judicial review guaranteed by La. Const. art. 1, § 19 can be performed or is the record so inadequate that the defendant's constitutional right to judicial review is prejudiced. Defendant must establish that he was prejudiced by the missing portions of the transcript.

Id., 2003-0485, pp. 5-6, 861 So.2d at 153. The Boatner Court found the inaudible portions of the transcript did not preclude a complete review. 2003-0485, p. 7, 861 So.2d at 154. In particular, the Court noted that testimony of all witnesses was identified and transcribed. Id., 2003-0485, p. 6, 861 So.2d at 153. In reversing the appellate court and affirming defendant's conviction and sentence, Boatner concluded “[t]he record in this matter is adequate for the court to examine and determine there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Defendant has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the missing portion of the testimony replaced by an ‘inaudible’ designation.” 2003-0485, p. 9, 861 So.2d at 155. Upon a thorough review of the present matter, we reach a similar result.

Similar to Boatner, in the case sub judice, the testimony of all the witnesses was transcribed and notwithstanding any omissions, the gist of their testimony can be ascertained by a review of the trial transcript.

We now review the testimony elicited at trial, in particular, the testimony of Dr. William Newman, the forensic pathologist, Mr. Sylve, the eyewitness, and Mr. Jones:⁷

Dr. William Newman

Dr. Newman, qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology, conducted the autopsy on the victim. He testified that the victim's cause of death was four gunshot wounds, three of which entered his “chest with lung and vascular injury,” and one “gunshot wound to the back of the head.” He said one bullet entered the victim's “left back” and traveled upward through his lung and lodged in his neck. Dr. Newman averred the bullet fired at the back of the victim's head fractured his skull.⁸

Damian Sylve/Eyewitness

Mr. Sylve testified that he and the victim intended to play video games at the victim's residence. He asserted:

We was walking to house and all of a sudden, I guess he turned the *** he was coming toward us **. He hopped out of the car, he was driving the car, he hopped out of the car, was **. Me and boy looked at each other and he come out **. Common sense say don't stay—don't stay there, you know; so, we both took off running․he had the gun under his shirt, he just hopped out. He hesitated; he say, “What's up **?” So, once he came out the gun me and my ** (inaudible). You know, we wasn't going to stay there, so, you know. He hesitated, he was like close enough to just bam, bam, bam both us. You know, he had—he had a **. You know, instincts something must have gave a chance to run, you know.

Mr. Sylve added that he ran to safety and turned back to see where the victim had gone. He stated, “I saw my buddy was hit․ I saw run across the street and I guess he figured he wanted to finish him off․” Mr. Sylve continued, “I saw run across the street and put his hands out and ** for his life, and that what I saw and I saw him shoot him.” Mr. Sylve stated he gave the police a description and sketch of the assailant. Later, he identified Mr. Jones in a photographic line-up. Mr. Sylve attested that the victim did not brandish or possess a firearm at anytime that evening.

Mr. Jones’ Testimony

In contrast to Mr. Sylve's testimony, Mr. Jones testified that he shot the victim in self defense.

Mr. Jones said he met the victim through the victim's sister and speculated that the victim held a grudge against him because he was from another neighborhood. Mr. Jones maintained the victim had pulled a weapon on him about a month before the shooting, as well as on the morning of the shooting. Mr. Jones described the encounter on the morning of the shooting as follows:

Q. Now on May 20th, there **, you encountered Mr. Jackson, about what time was that?

A. It was like early that morning, I went around my father house to see him, and ** so, I'm on may way going over there. That's when Mr. Jackson approach me, talking about – he showed me a gun in his back pocket and told me, “what you gonna do? I told him I don't want to do nothing cause he had that gun in his pocket, not about to fight him just killed me.

Q. And what did you do?

A. Nothing, backed up.

THE COURT:

What time was that, sir?

THE WITNESS:

That was early about 11 **.

Later that evening, around 6:00 p.m., Mr. Jones said he was walking on foot when he saw the victim and his friends approach. Upon that encounter, he said, “[I] got my first impression to put my hands on my gun.” ** he already showed me that gun that he had earlier. So no telling what might happen.”

Mr. Jones detailed the events immediately preceding the shooting:

Q. So Alfred, you walked down to the corner and you see Kendrick, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And he walking down towards his place?

A. No he walking toward the **

Q. (inaudible).

A. To the corner where I met him and his friend.

Q. Okay so, he walking in exactly the opposite direction of what was just testified to earlier.

A. Yes.

Q. He's walking towards St. Bernard and you're walking towards him.

A. Toward the corner. He walked **.

Q. So you'll get together on each corner of Buchanan Street and what? He starts reaching for his gun?

A. It's like, I see him coming so I already had my [h]and on my gun. So when he started crossing the street, he started saying, “what's happening now, “so he went to go up for his gun. ** I just hurry up and start shooting.

Mr. Jones averred the victim was about seven or eight feet from the corner when he began to discharge his weapon, explaining to the court, “[Y[eah, because he wanted to go for his. You know, I already had my hand on mine, Your Honor, so I just started shooting. And after I finish, after I just kept shooting.” When the trial court questioned as to how many shots were fired, Mr. Jones responded: “Can't really – can't really tell you, Your Honor. I was just shooting, cause I panic, I seen him earlier with that gun. I figured if I don't shoot now, he gonna book that gun again and kill me.”

The Law of Self-Defense

In State v. Harris, 2025-0858, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/7/26), ___ So.3d ___, 2026 WL 1959182, at *4, this Court explained the parameters and the burden of proof of a justifiable homicide.

A homicide is justifiable “[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). “In a homicide case in which the defendant asserts he acted in self-defense, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” State v. Kirk, 2011-1218, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So.3d 934, 939-40 (citing State v. Taylor, 2003-1834, p. 7 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 58, 63). A defendant who is the aggressor or who brings on the difficulty cannot claim self-defense unless he withdraws in good faith and in a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14:21.

In applying the Harris guidelines to the present matter, Mr. Jones testified that he shot the victim in self defense because the victim was walking towards him with a gun and had approached Mr. Jones with a gun earlier in the day. However, the testimony of Dr. Newman and Mr. Sylve shows Mr. Jones had no reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid danger. Dr. Newman, the forensics pathologist, testified that the victim was shot in back of the head. Additionally, Mr. Sylve, the eyewitness, testified that he and the victim were running away from Mr. Jones and refuted his claim that the victim had a gun or threatened Mr. Jones with a gun immediately prior to the shooting. Mr. Sylve's testimony was supported by the evidence which showed the only gun cartridges recovered from the scene were those from the gun used by Mr. Jones in the shooting.

Louisiana jurisprudence has rejected self-defense claims where the victim was shot in the back of the head and was fleeing. See State v. Daniels, 2018-0565 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/26/18), 262 So.3d 356. In finding no merit to the defendant's self-defense claim, the Daniels Court opined:

The forensic evidence offered at trial also shows that Mr. Johnson was shot in the back, not in the front, indicating that it was reasonable to conclude that Mr. Johnson was not approaching defendant when defendant fired shots in Mr. Johnson's direction. This Court rejected a similar self-defense claim in State v. Ventry, 1999-0302, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/14/00), 765 So.2d 1129, 1132, where the forensic evidence showed that the victim was shot in the back of the head. In addition, Detective Nicholas Williams, the lead detective in the present case, testified that the spent bullet casings formed a straight line from where the defendant said he was standing to Mr. Johnson's body, suggesting that Mr. Johnson was fleeing rather than approaching the defendant.

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the State proved that defendant acted with specific intent to kill and that defendant did not act in self-defense.

2018-0565, pp. 7-8, 262 So.3d at 362. Accordingly, in the present case, a rational factfinder could conclude Mr. Jones did not act in self-defense.

Credibility of Witnesses

The trial court's guilty verdict clearly accredited the testimony of Mr. Sylve, the eyewitness, and Dr. Newman, the forensic expert, and correspondingly, rejected Defendant's claim of self-defense. We cannot say this was error as “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” See State v. Richards, 2011-0349, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/11), 78 So.3d 864, 869. “A trier of fact's determination as to the credibility of a witness is a question of fact entitled to great weight, and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence.” State v. Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5 (La. App 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306 (citation omitted). Based on the available record in the present matter, the trial court's credibility determinations were not clearly adverse to the evidence.

CONCLUSION AND DECREE

As reflected in the trial court's findings, the State met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to defeat Mr. Jones’ self-defense claim. The trial court delineated its findings in determining Mr. Jones’ guilt, stating:

In particular, the cartridges that are—that were relieved from the gun and the position of those cartridges and the testimony of the eyewitness fit succinctly together. In showing a pattern that the victim in this case was retreating at the time that this event took place, and while he was retreating was being shot at․Four shots; I know one was to the back of the head and was to the mid-part of the back, so it's showing a pattern that he was retreating. I don't find that to be a manslaughter case. And I—the court did take into consideration the fact there may have been previous grudges or previous problems, but the previousness of that problem was at eleven o'clock in the daytime and this event happened several hours after that.

[ ] I believe that the facts are that this man rode by with a white colored car, turned around, stepped out of the car while two people were on the sidewalk there ** near not too far from the intersection and began shooting his gun. Both of them running in two different directions, one runs down the street, the other one runs in a diagonal across the street, being pursued by this man shooting a gun, putting a bullet in the back of his head and in the back of his body.

Hence, in its totality, the trial transcript is coherent and understandable for this Court to conduct a meaningful appellate review. See Harry, 2001-2336, p. 5, 823 So.2d at 992.

Upon review, we do not find merit to Mr. Jones’ argument that he suffered prejudice as a result of any material omission. Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Jones’ conviction and sentence.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court Reporter certified the following:This is to certify that the transcript was typed only by court reporter Allison Braxton. In the process of transcribing there were four audio cassette tapes provided. Three out of the four cassettes had audio on them. There are two sides A/B; however, only the A-side of the audio could be played. In addition, the Aside of the audio containing this bench trial had been severely damaged and/or distorted since March of 2000. Please note where there are * [asterisks] or – dashes I could not make out what names were actually said accurately on the record, or the audio tape cuts out and the audio was unavailable.

2.   The Clerk of Court's Exhibits included:Exhibit 3: Receipt of handgunExhibit 6: Brown paper bag, plastic bag, broken glassExhibit 12: Cassette tape interview of Mr. Jones

3.   Exhibits from the trial file of the District Attorney included:Exhibit 2: Lorcin .380 murder weapon with a magazine and 7 live roundsExhibit 11: Rights of arrestee formExhibit 12: Cassette tape interview of Mr. JonesExhibit 14: Photo line-upExhibit 15: Search warrant for Mr. Jones’ carExhibit 17: Paperwork from glove compartment of Mr. Jones’ carExhibit 20: Autopsy protocolExhibit 21: Diagram of wounds on victim's bodyExhibit 24: (Unknown from transcript) MapExhibit 25: (Unknown from transcript) ballistics

4.   In Harry, Defendant Harry's sole error alleged the unavailability of complete trial and sentencing transcripts had deprived him of his right to a meaningful appeal. 2001-2336, p. 3, 823 So.2d at 991. However, upon review, this Court determined that “inaudible” references did not distort the trial transcript; the omissions from the transcript were inconsequential; and the significant sentencing transcript was in the record. As such, the missing portions of the transcripts did not warrant a reversal of his conviction or require a remand for re-sentencing. See Harry, 2001-2336, pp. 4-5, 823 So.2d at 992.

5.   The photographic line-up was later introduced into evidence at trial and is contained in the present appellate record.

7.   Other parties who testified included:NOPD Officer Eric CarrOff. Carr testified he was on patrol near the intersection of St. Bernard and Milton, when he heard several gunshots. Someone flagged him down to report the shooting, and he arrived on the scene “a minute or two later.”NOPD Detective Andre GilesDet. Giles stated he interviewed witnesses upon his arrival and developed Defendant as a suspect. Det. Giles detained Mr. Jones at his address and spoke to Mr. Jones’ girlfriend. He testified the girlfriend admitted she owned a black semi-automatic handgun and authorized the detective to enter the residence and seize the gun from under her mattress. Det. Giles said that upon his transport of Mr. Jones to the police station, he observed Mr. Jones’ white Oldsmobile, which matched the description provided by eyewitnesses.NOPD Detective Lawrence GreenDet. Green testified that he directed the crime scene technician to collect evidence and take photographs. He identified photographs the State introduced into evidence and testified as to the location of the spent casings recovered. Det. Green said a witness, “Damien,” provided a hand drawing composite of the suspect and identified Mr. Jones from a photographic line-up. Det. Green also took a recorded statement from Mr. Jones, which was introduced into evidence.Debra JacksonMs. Jackson, the victim's mother, said she heard gunshots coming from outside her door. She ran outside and saw her son “running across the opposite side of the street and he fell.”

8.   Following Dr. Newman's testimony, the parties stipulated that the casings recovered from the scene came from the same “380” found in Mr. Jones’ residence and that the bullets recovered from the victim's body during the autopsy were fired from the same 380 firearm.

Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins