JON ANDERSEN v. WWL TV INC DAVID HAMMER TEGINA INC LOUISIANA STATE LICENSING BOARD FOR CONTRACTORS CHARLES CJ BROWN STEPHANIE BELANGER JOSEPH ANDERSON RANDY FARRELL JR CITY OF NEW ORLEANS THROUGH ITS DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND PERMITS ONE STOP SHOP PAIGE MARIE KIMBALL AND DOE DEFENDANTS 10 (2026)

This civil matter concerns allegations of defamation, conspiracy, interference with business relations, trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress asserted by an individual after a news entity reported on the public hearing and decision by which he lost his professional contractor license. Appellant, Jon Andersen (“Mr. Andersen”), appeals the trial court's December 30, 2025 judgment, which, in pertinent part, granted the Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action filed by Appellees, WWL-TV, Inc. (“WWL-TV”), and David Hammer (“Mr. Hammer”). Additionally, the trial court dismissed Mr. Andersen's claims against WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer and awarded attorney fees and costs to them in light of having granted their Special Motion to Strike. For the following reasons, we amend the judgment and affirm as amended. Specifically, we amend the judgment to state that the dismissal of Mr. Andersen's claims was with prejudice. In that regard, we grant one of WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer's two requests in their Answer to Mr. Andersen's appeal. We deny the other request in their Answer for appellate attorney fees and costs.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Original Petition for Damages and First and Second Amended Petitions

On October 1, 2025, Mr. Andersen filed his Petition for Damages (“Original Petition”) and, in pertinent part, named WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer as defendants. In his Original Petition, Mr. Andersen described himself as “a reputable contractor and master plumber” in New Orleans who “complied with all permitting requirements, including uploading updated drawings by mid-November 2024” on a residential project—the “Pierce Project.” Information elsewhere in the record establishes that the project in question actually involved Mr. Andersen's own house. As explained by Mr. Andersen, a third-party inspector, Randy Farrell, Jr. (“Mr. Farrell”), performed an initial inspection of the project; but, when Mr. Andersen asked him to perform the final inspection, the inspector then began “ghosting” him and “lost photos” from the initial inspection in an attempt to distract from his own family's problems. According to Mr. Andersen, he relayed this information to someone at the City of New Orleans’ “One Stop Shop” (the City's permitting and licensing entity) and received a directive, which he “reasonably interpreted ․ as a signal to submit documentation to make it appear official and resolve the bureaucratic impasse, leading [him] to take an action he had never done before—submitting photos to simulate an official submission, believing it was the implied workaround.” Ultimately, the Louisiana State Licensing Board for Contractors (“LSLBC”) held a hearing regarding Mr. Andersen's “workaround” and revoked Mr. Andersen's professional contractor's license.

As asserted in Mr. Andersen's Original Petition, around August 6, 2025, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer thereafter “published a defamatory article and broadcast titled something to the effect of ‘City permit office catches contractor “photoshopping” inspections,’ falsely accusing [him] of falsifying photos, admitting to forgery, evading inspectors, and engaging in fraudulent conduct.” Mr. Andersen alleged the publication by WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer “relied on biased ․ testimony and records” from the LSLBC and “omitt[ed] the full context of bureaucratic failures, ignored approvals, ghosting, engineer rejection, [the One Stop Shop employee's] misleading directive, and [Mr.] Farrell[’s] family motives.” As alleged by Mr. Andersen, the “publication incited further defamatory posts on social media.” Further, Mr. Andersen alleged that WWL-TV crew members trespassed on the Pierce Project property during production and therefore exposed his residence to the public. Mr. Andersen argued in his Original Petition that “[t]he publication and its fallout ․ were false, misleading, and made with actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth” because WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer “failed to investigate [his] side; contact him for comment, or verify exculpatory facts, and proceeded with trespassory filming.”

A transcript of the audio of the on-air broadcast (“Video Broadcast”) is in the record before this Court:

MS. GIBSON [news anchor]: So [we have] been investigating problems in the New Orleans Safety and Permits Office for years, including a massive federal bribery probe and months-long delays getting building permits. Thanks for joining us, everyone. [I am] Charisse Gibson.

MS. MOORE [news anchor]: And [I am] Katie Moore. As the City tries to crack down on abuses, David Hammer and his investigation found some new ways the City is catching contractors who try to bypass the safety process.

MR. HAMMER: The New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board blames longtime contractor James Jones [(“Mr. Jones”)] for causing hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage to water and sewer lines all across town. Last month, the State Licensing Board for Contractors held [Mr.] Jones responsible for causing a water main break and boil water advisory in New Orleans East last December. But [Mr.] Jones told us he was just trying to fix mistakes made by a different contractor on that same job.

MR. JONES: [Mr.] Andersen was there first and broke all the lines. When he broke all the lines, then they going [sic] to call me in ․ to come help them.

MR. HAMMER: And he was here earlier.

MR. JONES: Yeah, he was here.

MR. HAMMER: But where did he go?

MR. JONES: He left. He left. [Mr.] Andersen went broke [sic] all that, and I come out there and straighten [it] out. And this the appreciation I get.

MR. HAMMER: As it turns out, [Mr.] Andersen was at the same licensing board meeting last month facing totally separate civil charges. After we shot this video of him he got up and left. And when the Board prosecutor called [Mr.] Andersen's case, he was nowhere to be found.

MALE SPEAKER: Was he here?

MALE SPEAKER: Yes, he was here. I shook his hand outside.

MR. HAMMER: State investigator Stephanie Belanger [(“Investigator Belanger)”] presented her case against [Mr.] Andersen anyway for this house he built in Mid-City earlier this year.

[INVESTIGATOR] BELANGER: It started off as a single[- ]family residence. However, he added on a mother-in-law suite to the back end of it but he never got the plans re-approved.

MR. HAMMER: She said [Mr.] Farrell ․, a private third-party inspector, hired by [Mr.] Andersen to inspect his work, did exactly what he was supposed to do. [Mr.] Farrell refused to inspect the extra unit [Mr.] Andersen had built because it [was not] in the construction plans approved by the City. And that, [Investigator] Belanger alleged, is when [Mr.] Andersen took matters into his own hands.

[INVESTIGATOR] BELANGER: He falsified the inspection reports using Photoshop as well as pictures. [There is] a picture of the inspector, [Mr.] Farrell, ․ with the building or the residence behind it and [Mr. Andersen] admitted to photoshopping those pictures as well.

MR. HAMMER: These city e-mails describe how safety and permit[s] staff discovered the alleged ruse. They noticed that a photo of [Mr.] Farrell in front of the completed house looked doctored. Look how the edges of his hair and shirt are smudged so they [do not] look so obviously pasted onto the photo of the house behind him. The City's in-house inspectors also noticed something was off about [Mr.] Farrell's e-mail address. The photos and reports were sent from nolainspection.com, but [Mr.] Farrell's business domain name is actually nolainspect.com. And [there is] more. The state investigation alleged [Mr.] Andersen faked [Mr.] Farrell's final inspection report by altering a report [he had] done earlier.

MALE SPEAKER: So [Mr.] Farrell ․ has indicated that he inspected actually on 1/1/25, but the date of inspection is 4/1/25, right?

[INVESTIGATOR] BELANGER: Yes.

MALE SPEAKER: So I guess in the Photoshop he fail [sic] to make those corrections?

[INVESTIGATOR] BELANGER: Correct.

MR. HAMMER: Even hardened members of the state licensing board [could not] contain their laughter.

MALE SPEAKER: I thought that was a ․ city holiday.

MR. HAMMER: Or their whispers at the absurdity of it all.

MALE SPEAKER: Aw, man. You [cannot] make it up.

MR. HAMMER: Investigators testified that [Mr.] Andersen admitted to them that he falsified the documents. So we asked licensing board director Brad Hassard [(“Mr. Hassard”)] about that. [That is] a public record. So is that a potential criminal violation of injuring public records?

MR. HASSARD: It is potentially that, yes, sir.

MR. HAMMER: Is that going to be recommended for prosecution?

MR. HASSARD: We send everything that we find to be criminal to the appropriate law enforcement agency. [It is] up to them how they choose to handle that.

MR. HAMMER: David Hammer, WWL Louisiana.

MS. MOORE: So [Mr.] Andersen [did not] respond to repeated requests for comment. He did however ask for another chance to defend himself at the licensing board's August meeting, and that request was granted.

(Video concluded.)

Additionally, the text of the online article (“Web Article”) is also in the record before this Court. It reads:

City permit office catches contractor ‘photoshopping’ inspections

_

State officials allege [Mr.] Andersen pasted an inspector into photos in ill-fated effort to skirt the city's permitting process

The New Orleans Safety and Permits Department and third-party safety inspectors are at the center of another investigation into alleged permitting fraud. Except this time, inspectors were the ones catching the abuse instead of participating in it.

[It is] a positive sign for a department [that has] been targeted by a decade-long federal corruption investigation. [It is] still severely understaffed and beset by months of backlogged building permits. But a new policy implemented in February, which dedicated the city's overburdened inspectors to reviewing the work submitted by third-party inspectors, now appears to be paying off. As WWL Louisiana first reported, the policy was criticized by some inspectors in a leaked audio recording, but now [it is] being hailed for exposing “falsified documents.”

“Had it not been for the implemented policy, the falsified reports would not have been discovered,” the city said in a statement.

City and state officials allege [Mr.] Andersen of Andersen Design + Build used Photoshop or similar image-editing programs to falsify inspection reports and photos in an ill-fated effort to skirt the city's permitting process. Last month, the [LSLBC] revoked [Mr.] Andersen and his company's licenses as a result of the investigation.

[Mr.] Andersen [did not] respond to multiple requests for comment, but he was granted a rehearing on the matter at the August licensing board meeting after skipping out on his chance to answer the charges last month.

[Mr.] Andersen left last month's board meeting in Baton Rouge after WWL Louisiana shot video of him waiting for his hearing to begin. In his absence, board investigators presented evidence that [Mr.] Andersen used “doctored” photos and inspection reports to pass off unapproved work on a home his company owns in Mid-City․ [I]nvestigator ․ Belanger testified that [Mr.] Andersen built an unauthorized second unit on a project the city had approved as a single-family residence. According to [Investigator] Belanger, [Mr.] Andersen failed to get revised plans approved and submitted fake inspections to make the second unit on the property appear legitimate.

“It started off as a single-family residence,” [Investigator] Belanger said. “However, he added on a mother-in-law suite to the back end of it, but he never got the plans re-approved.”

The city granted [Mr.] Andersen a permit for new construction on September 29, 2024, shortly after a company [he] owns bought the vacant lot on North Pierce Street. That permit was for a single-family, three-bedroom house with one kitchen. City records show [Mr.] Andersen then submitted revised plans in October that divided the house with a central wall and added a second kitchen, but he never received a permit for that.

[Investigator] Belanger said the third-party inspector [Mr.] Andersen hired, [Mr.] Farrell ․ did exactly what he was supposed to: He refused to inspect the unapproved work. [That is] when [Mr.] Andersen allegedly took matters into his own hands.

“He falsified the inspection reports using Photoshop, as well as pictures,” [Investigator] Belanger testified. “[There is] a picture of the inspector, [Mr.] F[a]rell ․ with the building, or the residence behind it, and he admitted to photoshopping those pictures as well.”

[Investigator] Belanger's fellow investigator, Joe Anderson, said they interviewed [Mr.] Andersen, and the contractor not only admitted it, but he also explained how he did it.

“We showed him the pictures, and he specifically stated that he took those, photoshopped them,” [Joe] Anderson, the investigator, testified at the board meeting. “He went through the New Orleans permit process, permitting program and found pictures (of [Mr.] Farrell at other job sites), and actually photoshopped them in.”

Inspection photos filed in the public record appear to show [Mr.] Farrell in front of the new house, which the city requires to prove that he was there both for an inspection of the framing and later for a final inspection of the finished house, with the electrical, plumbing and HVAC systems installed and the walls closed in.

But a close look at the photos shows smudges at the edges of [Mr.] Farrell's hair and shirt and patches of grass over his shoulder where there should only be sidewalk in front of the house.

Emails from city staff noted how the doctored photos raised red flags. The city said in a statement that Rudy Knoll [(“Mr. Knoll”)], a building inspector, was reviewing third-party inspections when he noticed discrepancies. [Mr.] Knoll called [Mr.] Farrell and verified he had not performed the inspection, then reported the findings to the city's building inspection manager, Mollie McInnis, the city said.

“She then checked the email and noticed, the report was submitted from a different email than the one usually used by Mr. Farrell's company, NOLA Inspections & Consulting Service LLC,” the city said.

The city's chief mechanical inspector, Peter Emery, also wrote to state officials that the city had received the inspection documents from an email domain — “nolainspection.com” — that closely mimicked but didn't match [Mr.] Farrell's actual business email domain, “nolainspect.com.”

In another email from city Safety and Permits Director Tammie Jackson [(“Ms. Jackson”)] to two state investigators, [Ms.] Jackson wrote, “We confirmed with [Mr.] Farrell ․ that he did not submit final photos for” the permit, adding that Andersen “also did not build based on the approved plans which is why [Mr. Farrell] said he would not inspect any further.”

[Mr.] Farrell's company took over a lot of third-party inspections once handled by his father, Randy Farrell Sr.’s company, IECI & Associates. [Randy] Farrell Sr. was indicted last year by a federal grand jury and charged with falsifying permits and inspections. But now, [Mr.] Farrell is being credited with helping the city root out a similar issue.

[Mr.] Farrell ․ [did not] respond to requests for comment.

The [LSLBC] also heard testimony that [Mr.] Andersen altered the date on an inspection report to make it appear as if [Mr.] Farrell ․ had approved and signed it, even though he [had not].

“So, [Mr.] Farrell ․ has indicated that he inspected actually on 1-1-25, but the date of inspection is 4-1-25, right?” the board prosecutor, Kevin Landreneau [(“Mr. Landreneau”)], asked [Investigator] Belanger ․

“Yes,” [Investigator] Belanger replied.

“So, I guess in the Photoshop he failed to make those corrections?” [Mr.] Landreneau said, prompting laughter from the board.

Even the normally staid board vice chairman, William Clouatre, joined in: “Yeah, I thought that was a state, city holiday.”

Board members were overheard whispering, “Aw man,” and “You [could not] make it up,” as the details were revealed.

In an interview with WWL Louisiana, licensing board director [Mr.] Hass[ard] acknowledged that falsifying public inspection records is potentially a crime.

“We send everything that we find to be criminal to the appropriate law enforcement agency. [It is] up to them how they choose to handle that,” [Mr.] Hass[ard] said.

Separately at the same board hearing, contractor [Mr.] Jones was found responsible for a water main break in New Orleans East last December that led to a boil water advisory. Public records show [Mr.] Andersen held the contract for that work with the Sewerage and Water Board. [Mr.] Jones denied responsibility for the break, claiming it had been [Mr.] Andersen's fault.

“[Mr.] Andersen was there first and broke our line. When he broke our lines then he gonna [sic] call me in to come help him,” [Mr.] Jones told WWL[-TV]. “[Mr.] Andersen was the one who broke all that, and I come out there and straighten it out, and this is the appreciation I get.”

In his Original Petition Mr. Andersen listed his causes of action against WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer as defamation (libel per se); false light invasion of privacy; civil conspiracy; tortious interference with business relations and prospective advantage; trespass; invasion of privacy; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, Mr. Andersen filed a First Amended Petition for Damages on October 2, 2025, and then filed a Second Amended Petition for Damages on October 10, 2025.

Third Amended Petition for Damages

In addition to filing his Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction on October 15, 2026, Mr. Andersen also filed a Third Amended Petition for Damages (“Third Amended Petition”), in which he again listed WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer as defendants (among others). As stated in his Original Petition, Mr. Andersen again explained that Mr. Farrell conducted an initial inspection of the Pierce Project, thereby allowing Mr. Andersen to proceed with the project, but then “claimed [months later that] he lacked the pictures [necessary] for final approvals.” In pertinent part, Mr. Andersen alleged in his Third Amended Petition that after he received initial permits from the City for the Pierce Project, he “realiz[ed] a mother-in-law suite layout better suited [his] needs,” submitted revised plans that incorporated same, and received approval of the revised plans from the City in October 2024. Thereafter, according to the Third Amended Petition, an employee of the One Stop Shop provided Mr. Andersen “with his email ․ for direct submission [of the photos]—a deviation from standard procedure where inspectors submit” the necessary photos. Mr. Andersen alleged that he “believed [the employee's] directive aligned with a workaround to relieve administrative headaches” and deemed this “unusual but practical.”

Mr. Andersen stated that in June 2025 he submitted the photos directly to the employee's email address, “altering them to reflect [a final] inspection in line with [the One Stop Shop employee's] implied authorization” of such action. Thereafter, as Mr. Andersen explained in his Third Amended Petition, he “sent the reports to the relevant divisions and uploaded them to the website portal,” whereupon the One Stop Shop flagged it and reported it to the LSLBC, which led to a cease and desist order on the Pierce Project. According to Mr. Andersen, the LSLBC subsequently suspended his licenses because of his “alleged efforts to deceive or defraud the public.” Relevant to WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer, Mr. Andersen reiterated his allegations from his Original Petition that they “published and disseminated the defamatory broadcast/video” about the foregoing situation and did so “absent basic inquiry” and “recklessly.” Mr. Andersen alleged “[t]he publication caused harassment” and “prevent[ed] [him] from doing work anywhere.” Mr. Andersen listed his causes of action against WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer as defamation; conspiracy; tortious interference with business relations and prospective advantage; trespass; intrusion upon seclusion (invasion of privacy); and intentional infliction of emotional distress

Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action

On November 21, 2025, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer filed a “Special Motion to Strike” and a “Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action,” with the latter concerning Mr. Andersen's Third Amended Petition. Regarding the Special Motion to Strike, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer asserted Mr. Andersen's claims were subject to a special motion to strike because their broadcast—about a State public board governing and enforcing the licensing of contractors—constituted a matter of public interest under La. C.C.P. art. 971. Further, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued the trial court should award attorney fees and costs to them as incurred by bringing the special motion to strike per La. C.C.P. art. 971(B). Regarding both the Special Motion to Strike and the Exception of No Cause of Action, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued the trial court should grant them because Mr. Andersen could not show a probability of success on his claims for defamation; conspiracy; tortious interference with business relations; trespass; intrusion upon seclusion (invasion of privacy); and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Beginning with Mr. Andersen's defamation claim, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer explained that defamation jurisprudence requires a plaintiff to prove four elements (1. A false and defamatory statement concerning another; 2. An unprivileged communication to a third party; 3. Fault—negligence or greater—on the part of the publisher; and 4. Resulting injury), such that Mr. Andersen's inability to prove the first element meant he did not demonstrate a probability of success on his defamation claim (to defeat their Special Motion to Strike) and could not prove his cause of action (to defeat their Exception of No Cause of Action). WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer focused on the first element of Mr. Andersen's defamation claim, namely a false statement, countering their report was a true and accurate depiction of the LSLBC hearing and decision. In other words, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer asserted that “[t]ruthfully reporting on allegations made by others is not defamatory.” Moreover, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer observed that some of the statements in their broadcast that Mr. Andersen complained about were ones to which he actually admitted, e.g., Mr. Andersen admitted in his Third Amended Petition that he used photoshop to falsify the inspection report. Further, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer asserted Mr. Andersen could not succeed on a “defamation by implication” claim because this situation involved a matter of public interest, and such a claim is actionable only if it concerns a private individual and private affairs. Finally, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued that Mr. Andersen could not succeed in proving fault on their part even if the statements of the public officials heard in the broadcast were ultimately wrong. In this regard, they argued jurisprudence holds that reports by news organizations of defamatory allegations made in public proceedings by public officials are not actionable.

Turning to Mr. Andersen's conspiracy claims, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued he could not show a probability of success because a defamation conspiracy cannot exist absent defamation on the part of the defendants. Further, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer asserted that Mr. Andersen had not alleged material facts to demonstrate that they had an agreement with others to defame him.

Next, addressing Mr. Andersen's tortious interference with business relations claim, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued this claim failed because Mr. Andersen did not allege—let alone plead facts to support—actual malice on their part, which is a requirement for succeeding on such a claim. Further, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued that because Mr. Andersen did not dispute the accuracy of their reporting of the LSLBC hearing and decision, he had not shown they “knew any statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth,” i.e., actions constituting actual malice. Moreover, they noted that Louisiana courts disfavor this cause of action.

Turning to Mr. Andersen's trespass claim, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued that Mr. Andersen failed to plead specific facts regarding who entered his property, when, or how to support this claim. Further, they pointed to Mr. Hammer's affidavit, which they attached in support and which explained neither he nor anyone else entered Mr. Andersen's property on WWL-TV's behalf. Rather, as explained by Mr. Hammer in his affidavit, the news crew shot footage from the public street (of the front of Mr. Andersen's house) and used a photograph (of the back of Mr. Andersen's house) that was an exhibit at the LSLBC hearing.

Next, countering Mr. Andersen's intrusion upon seclusion (invasion of privacy) claim, WWL-TV and Mr. Andersen explained this cause of action requires a showing of conduct that was unreasonable and seriously interfered with the plaintiff's privacy interest. As argued by WWL-TV and Mr. Andersen, an invasion of privacy does not occur if the defendant took a picture of a public sight which anyone else was free to independently view, which is what occurred in this matter. Further, they reiterated that the public has a right to information about subjects of public interest.

Finally, addressing Mr. Andersen's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer explained that success on such a claim requires proof of three elements: 1. The defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; 2. The emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and 3. The defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that it would result from his conduct. Insofar as Mr. Andersen alleged WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer's outrageous conduct was their trespass, unauthorized filming, and public exposure, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer reiterated they did not trespass; again asserted Mr. Andersen did not prove his invasion of privacy claim; and countered their reporting of the LSLBC's public hearing could not constitute “public exposure,” a legal theory they described as “non-existent.” Essentially, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued Mr. Andersen's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress relied on success in his other causes of action, which they had already combatted. Discussing the elements themselves, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer argued Mr. Andersen did not show their conduct (a news report on a public issue) was extreme or outrageous or that they desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew it would likely result from their conduct.

December 30, 2025 Judgment

On December 30, 2025, the trial court issued the subject judgment. It stated, in pertinent part:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action is hereby SUSTAINED. All claims in Plaintiff's Petition, First Amended Petition, Second Amended Petition, and Third Amended Petition against Defendants, David Hammer and WWL-TV, Inc. are hereby DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Special Motion to Strike by David Hammer and WWL-TV, Inc. is hereby GRANTED. All claims in Plaintiff's Petition, First Amended Petition, Second Amended Petition, and Third Amended Petition against Defendants, David Hammer and WWL-TV, Inc. are hereby DISMISSED. It is further ordered that pursuant to [La. C.C.P.] art. 971(B), David Hammer and WWL-TV, Inc. are awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that after review of the affidavits detailing costs and attorneys’ fees attributable to the time spent working on the Special Motion to Strike by counsel for David Hammer and WWL-TV, Inc., the Court finds court costs and attorneys’ fees of $22,368.07 ($22,000.00 in attorney's fees and $368.07 in court costs) to be reasonable. Said fees shall be paid by plaintiff, Jon Andersen.

Mr. Andersen's timely appeal to this Court followed.

ANSWER TO APPEAL

After the lodging of the record, WWL-TV and Mr. Hammer (hereinafter collectively “Appellees”) filed an Answer to Mr. Andersen's appeal, wherein they contend the trial court erred in not dismissing Mr. Andersen's claims with prejudice pursuant to granting their Special Motion to Strike and ask this court to dismiss the claims with prejudice. As quoted above, the judgment was silent as to whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Also, Appellees ask for appellate attorney fees and costs incurred in defending Mr. Andersen's appeal. Appellees do not state what amount of attorney fees and costs they are requesting nor do they provide an accounting of fees and costs incurred on appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his brief to this Court, Mr. Andersen asserts seven assignments of error (two of which are responsive to Appellees’ Answer, which is summarized below):

1. The [trial] court erred in granting the Article 971 special motion to strike by resolving disputed issues of accuracy, falsity, meaning, omission, and defamatory implication at the threshold stage rather than determining whether Plaintiff made the required threshold showing.

2. The [trial] court erred in finding that Plaintiff “never disputed” WWL-TV's depiction of the events leading to the Louisiana State Licensing Board for Contractors hearing, what occurred at the hearing, and the result of the hearing, where Plaintiff's pleadings, opposition memoranda, exhibits, supporting affidavit, and hearing argument disputed the publication's accuracy, framing, omissions, and defamatory implication. See, e.g., R. p. 1975 (court's “never disputed” finding); R. pp. 972, 1176-1177, 1186 (Defendants’ filings identifying the contested statements).

3. The [trial] court erred in treating the broadcast as “accurately reported” when the record disclosed disputed facts on the City of New Orleans's October 3, 2024 plan approval, the characterization of Plaintiff's Photoshop use, and the headline framing – the broadcast titled “City permit office catches contractor ‘photoshopping inspections” and the wwltv.com article “New policy uncovers fraud in New Orleans permitting” – both of which implied criminal guilt without conviction or adjudication.

4. The [trial] court erred in sustaining the peremptory exception of no cause of action on the same evidence-based grounds it used to grant the Article 971 motion. An exception of no cause of action under La. C.C.P. art. 927 is decided on the face of the petition, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; outside evidence may not be considered.

5. The [trial] court erred in awarding Defendants $22,368.07 in attorney[ ] fees and costs under La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) because the award depends on Defendants’ prevailing-party status on the special motion to strike and cannot survive reversal of the underlying Article 971 dismissal.

In addition, Plaintiff opposes Appellees[’] ․ Answer to Appeal under La. C.C.P. art. 2133, and respectfully submits that:

6. The trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's claims without prejudice rather than with prejudice. That disposition reflects the trial court's discretion under La. C.C.P. art. 934 and is not an abuse of discretion warranting modification.

7. Appellate attorney[ ] fees and costs are not warranted under La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) because, on [de novo] review, Appellees should not prevail on the special motion to strike.

For purposes of discussion, however, we will address Mr. Andersen's assignments of error by resolving the following four issues: (1) whether this matter was properly subject to the special motion to strike procedure; (2) whether the trial court correctly granted Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action; (3) whether the trial court correctly awarded attorney fees and costs to Appellees and whether Appellees are entitled to appellate attorney fees and costs; and (4) the trial court's failure to designate whether the dismissal of Mr. Andersen's claims was with or without prejudice.

DISCUSSION

Issue One: Whether this Matter was Properly Subject to a Special Motion to Strike

Before reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments, we address a preliminary issue: whether this case was properly subject to the special motion to strike procedure. Special Motions to Strike are governed by La. C.C.P. art. 971, which provides, in pertinent part:

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the claim.

La. C.C.P. art. 971(A)(1). This is also known as the anti-SLAPP statute, with “SLAPP” standing for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.” Muller v. Fort Pike Volunteer Fire Dep't, 2019-0156, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/26/19), 275 So.3d 927, 933 n.8 (quoting Yount v. Handshoe, 2014-919, p. 9 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/15), 171 So.3d 381, 387). The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has provided the following helpful summary of the purpose of La. C.C.P. art. 971:

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure [A]rticle 971 was enacted by the legislature as a procedural device to be used in the early stages of litigation to screen out meritless claims brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances. The intent of Article 971 is to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance and to prevent this participation from being chilled through an abuse of judicial process. To this end, it is the intention of the legislature that Article 971 shall be construed broadly.

Gaudet v. Lalonde, 2022-0819, 0820, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/4/23), 364 So.3d 551, 555 (internal citations omitted).

The mover on a special motion to strike must “first establish[ ] that the cause of action against [him or] her arises from an act by [him or] her in the exercise of [his or] her right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitutions in connection with a public issue.” Id. at p. 6, 364 So.3d at 555 (citing Thinkstream, Inc. v. Rubin, 2006-1595, p. 9 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/07), 971 So.2d 1092, 1100). Stated differently, the mover must make a prima facie showing of constitutionally-protected speech involving a public issue. Jones v. St. Augustine High Sch., Inc., 2021-0474, 475, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/22), 336 So.3d 470, 477 (quoting Wainwright v. Tyler, 52,083, p. 17 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 253 So.3d 203, 217). “[A] matter of public interest or public concern” constitutes a public issue for purposes of a special motion to strike. Gaudet, 2022-0819, 0820, p. 6, 364 So.3d at 556 (citing Breen v. Holmes, 2016-1591, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/7/17), 236 So.3d 632, 636). Speech pertaining “to a matter of public concern is speech” that “relat[es] to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” Id. at pp. 6-7, 364 So.3d at 556 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). In determining whether speech relates to a public issue, courts “consider the content, form, and context of the statements as revealed by the entire record.” Id. at p. 7, 364 So.3d at 556 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148, 103 S.Ct. at 1690). Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 971(F)(1)(b) includes “[a]ny written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official body authorized by law” as an “[a]ct in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue.”

In light of that provision, this Court has confirmed that statements made by a neighborhood group on their website about a bar owner's attempt to receive approval of a new and expanded version of his bar from the City Planning Commission and the City Council constituted a matter of public interest. See generally Melius v. Keiffer, 2007-0189 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/12/08), 980 So.2d 167. By contrast, statements made to private individuals or boards are not a matter of public interest. See Savoie v. Page, 2009-0415, p. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 23 So.3d 1013, 1016-17 (holding that a “report of threats of physical confrontation ․ made only to individual members of and the board of a private hunting club” is not a public issue but would be a public issue if made to law enforcement or another governmental agency). The United States Supreme Court has held that something constitutes a matter of public issue when it presents “a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1216, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011) (citations omitted). In that latter regard, in Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “a report to law enforcement regarding the suspected distribution of counterfeit currency in the community” was “clearly ․ a matter of public concern” because “it is an issue about which information is appropriate and needed, and in which the public, and particularly the business community, may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest.” 2005-1418, p. 9 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So.3d 669, 677 n.6.

We find the case most directly on point is this Court's Opinion in Alexander v. Louisiana State Board of Private Investigator Examiners, 2019-0778 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/20), 293 So.3d 1243. Like Mr. Andersen, the plaintiff in that matter asserted a defamation claim after losing his professional license; and, in pertinent part, one of the defendants—the Louisiana State Board of Private Investigator Examiners who took away the plaintiff's license—responded with a special motion to strike pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 971. Alexander, 2019-0778, pp. 1-6, 293 So.3d at 1246-49. On appeal, the plaintiff contended La. C.C.P. art. 971 did not apply to his case. Id. at p. 14, 293 So.3d at 1253. This Court ruled that because the Louisiana State Board of Private Investigator Examiners “is a public state board, the communications at issue in the suit wherein [the plaintiff] alleges improper activities, are a matter of public concern.” Id. at p. 15, 293 So.3d at 1254.

Likewise, the matter sub judice concerns a public board and its actions. Considering La. C.C.P. art. 971(F)(1)(b), Melius, Kennedy, Snyder, and Alexander, we find this case was subject to a special motion to strike. Appellees’ reporting on the fact that the LSLBC, a public licensing board, held a hearing in consideration of potentially fraudulent conduct by Mr. Andersen is a matter of public concern—it is a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public. It is analogous to the neighborhood group's reporting of the plaintiff's attempts to receive permits from the City Planning Commission and City Council at issue in Melius. Moreover, as in Alexander and unlike in Savoie, this reporting involved the official actions of a public entity (the LSLBC) rather than a private board. Like in Snyder and Kennedy, it is an issue about which those in the community, particularly those seeking to hire a contractor or those who previously hired Mr. Andersen, would reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest. Having determined that Appellees overcame their threshold, prima facie burden of demonstrating a public issue, we move onto the merits of their pleadings.

Issue Two: Whether the Trial Court Correctly Granted Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action

Next, we consider whether the trial court properly granted Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action. Before doing so, we delineate the standard of review applicable to this issue and the pertinent principles for each of these types of pleadings.

Standard of Review

As this Court has previously explained, appellate courts review both an exception of no cause of action and a special motion to strike under the de novo standard of review. Cantrell v. Breaud, 2024-0716, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/9/25), 421 So.3d 192, 195-96 (citations omitted). The reason appellate courts review these pleadings de novo is because they involve questions and issues of law. Id. In this regard, a “lower court's decision [on an exception of no cause of action] is based only on the sufficiency of the petition.” Id. at p. 4, 421 So.3d at 195-96 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690, p. 28 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 254). And, for a special motion to strike, “the issue on review is ․whether the trial court was legally correct.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Times-Picayune, L.L.C., 2016-1134, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/31/17), 221 So.3d 198, 201).

Applicable Principles

Beginning with the exception of no cause of action procedure, La. C.C.P. art. 921 defines “exception” as “a means of defense, other than a denial or avoidance of the demand, used by the defendant, whether in the principal or an incidental action, to retard, dismiss, or defeat the demand brought against him.” The purpose of a peremptory exception, including an exception of no cause of action, “is to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La. C.C.P. art. 923. A peremptory exception of no cause of action “tests the legal sufficiency of the petition” and “questions whether the law extends a remedy against [the] defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of [the] petition.” Cunningham v. City of New Orleans, 2021-0532, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/22), 336 So.3d 977, 986 (quoting Fertitta v. Regions Bank, 2020-0300, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/9/20), 311 So.3d 445, 450).

The party pleading the exception of no cause of action “bears the burden of demonstrating that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” Id. at p. 10, 336 So.3d at 986 (citing Zeigler v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 2012-1168, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/24/13), 118 So.3d 442, 449). In terms of the parties meeting or defeating that burden, respectively, La. C.C.P. art. 931 provides that “[n]o evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” Rather, “a court can consider only the petition, any amendments to the petition, and any documents attached to the petition.” Ross v. State through Univ. of La. Sys., 2022-0382, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/18/22), 352 So.3d 90, 94 (quoting Green v. Garcia-Victor, 2017-0695, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/18), 248 So.3d 449, 453). A court properly grants an exception of no cause of action “when, assuming all well pleaded factual allegations of the petition and any annexed documents are true, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks as a matter of law.” Cunningham, 2021-0532, p. 11, 336 So.3d at 986 (citations omitted). This occurs “when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at p. 11, 336 So.3d at 987 (quoting Williams v. Wood, 2017-1049, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/18), 258 So.3d 834, 838). If the plaintiff's petition contains “[m]ere [legal and factual] conclusions ․ which are unsupported by facts,” then this is insufficient to beat an exception of no cause of action. Id. at pp. 12, 336 So.3d at 987 (quoting Fertitta, 2020-0300, p. 7, 311 So.3d at 451).

Turning to the special motion to strike procedure, as discussed previously, La. C.C.P. art. 971(A) requires the mover to first demonstrate that the “cause of action” arose against him or her “from an[ ] act ․ in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Once the mover so demonstrates, the matter is “subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the claim.” La. C.C.P. art. 971(A). In other words, La. C.C.P. art. 971(A) delineates a burden-shifting mechanism, whereby the burden shifts from the mover to the plaintiff once the mover meets the aforementioned prima facie showing of speech connected to a public issue. Gaudet, 2022-0819, 0820, p. 6, 364 So.3d at 555 (citing Thinkstream, Inc., 2006-1595, p. 9, 971 So.2d at 1100). Thereafter, the plaintiff must “demonstrate a probability of success on the claim.” Id. The previous section of this Opinion details how Appellees’ actions were free speech connected to a public issue. Thus, the question remains whether Mr. Andersen met his burden of proving a probability of success on his claims.

As this Court has explained, if the plaintiff alleged more than one claim in his petition, then the courts must “examine the probability of success of each claim individually” when ruling on a special motion to strike. Jones, 2021-0474, 0475, p. 9, 336 So.3d at 477-78 (quoting Shelton v. Pavon, 2017-0482, p. 6 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1233, 1237). In instances involving multiple claims, “[i]f the plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of success on any of his claims, then the special motion to strike must fail.” Payne v. Lawrence, 56,416, p. 13 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 419 So.3d 851, 860 (citing Shelton, 2017-0482, p. 6, 236 So.3d at 1237). In Stern v. Doe, this Court described the phrase “probability of success” as “a legally ambiguous term.” 2001-0914, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/01), 806 So.2d 98, 100. Nonetheless, this Court went on to state that because “the legal standards for success or failure for” the plaintiff's particular cause of action were “well established” and the facts were undisputed, the Court could use those standards to determine the plaintiff's probability of success in the context of the special motion to strike procedure. Id. at p. 3, 806 So.2d at 100-01. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the “ ‘probability of success’ standard ‘does not permit courts to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve disputed issues of material fact.’ ” Cantrell, 2024-0716, p. 3, 421 So.3d at 199 (Lobrano, J., dissenting) (quoting Lozovyy v. Kurtz, 813 F.3d 576, 586 (5th Cir. 2015)).

Accordingly, to resolve the propriety of the trial court's grant of Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action, we must review each of the causes of action—and their legal standards for success or failure—as asserted by Mr. Andersen against Appellees in his Third Amended Petition. These were (1) defamation; (2) conspiracy; (3) tortious interference with business relations and prospective advantage; (4) trespass; (5) intrusion upon seclusion (invasion of privacy); and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. In so doing, we must consider whether Mr. Andersen established a probability of success on each claim and whether he is legally entitled to the relief he seeks.¹

(1) Defamation

The first cause of action Mr. Andersen asserted against Appellees was for defamation. Because Mr. Andersen's second and third assignments of error fall under the ambit of his defamation claim, we will discuss those in this section too. Taking these out of turn, in his third assignment of error, Mr. Andersen asserts that “[t]he [trial] court erred in treating the broadcast as ‘accurately reported’ when the record disclosed disputed facts on the City of New Orleans’[ ] October 3, 2024 plan approval, the characterization of [his] Photoshop use, and the headline framing — the broadcast titled “City permit office catches contractor ‘photoshopping’ inspections” and the wwltv.com article “New policy uncovers fraud in New Orleans permitting” — both of which implied criminal guilt without conviction or adjudication.” (Emphasis removed.) In his second assignment of error, Mr. Andersen asserts the trial court erred in finding he never disputed Appellees’ depiction of the events. In this regard, Mr. Andersen contends that he disputed Appellees’ depiction of events in four ways:

(a) whether the City of New Orleans had approved the revised plans on October 3, 2024 (Plaintiff said yes, with documentary support, R. p. 215);

(b) whether Plaintiffs [sic] Photoshop use constituted “falsification” of inspection reports;

(c) whether the publication's titles — the article and YouTube headline “City permit office catches contractor ‘photoshopping’ inspections,” and the same article's HTML meta-title “New policy uncovers fraud in New Orleans permitting,” ․ implied criminal guilt absent conviction or adjudication; and

(d) whether the broadcast omitted material exculpatory facts that would have changed its gist.

Before considering the merits of these arguments, we delineate the elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed on a defamation claim.

Elements of Defamation

The tort of defamation arises from La. C.C. art. 2315, which provides that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” Starr v. Boudreaux, 2007-0652, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/07), 978 So.2d 384, 389. To succeed with a defamation cause of action, “a plaintiff must prove: (1) defamatory words; (2) publication; (3) falsity; (4) malice, actual or implied; and (5) resulting injury.” Id. (citing Lamz v. Wells, 2005-1497, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 792, 797). We find resolution of this issue requires us to focus on the third and fourth elements, falsity and malice, respectively.

In terms of falsity, this Court recently explained that, “[g]enerally, ․ if the statements are true, the action must be dismissed.” Jones v. St. Augustine High Sch., Inc., 2025-0594, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/6/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1242951, at *5 (citing Mbarika v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State Univ., 2007-1136, p. 19 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 992 So.2d 551, 563). Stated more directly, “Falsity is an indispensable element of any defamation claim.” Wood v. Del Giorno, 2006-1612, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/19/07), 974 So.3d 95, 100 (citing Cooksey v. Stewart, 41,336, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1206, 1211). If, however, “a truthful statement carries a defamatory innuendo,” then the “truth is not a defense unless the innuendo is true.” Jones, 2025-0594, p. 9, ___ So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1242951, at *5 (quoting Fourcade v. City of Gretna, 598 So.2d 415, 422 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992)). This occurrence “is referred to as defamation by implication.” Id. As this Court recently explained in Jones, “[h]owever, [defamation by implication] is actionable only if the statements regard a private individual and private affairs.” Id. at p. 10, ___ So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1242951, at *5. If, by contrast, “public affairs are concerned,” then “the publication of true statements is encouraged, and there can be no civil or criminal liability for such, regardless of ill-will or improper motive on the part of the speaker.” Id.

For the fourth element of a defamation cause of action, actual malice exists when “the defendant either knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.” Starr, 2007-0652, p. 6, 978 So.2d at 390 (citing Costello v. Hardy, 2003-1146, p. 14 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129, 140-141). For a plaintiff “[t]o establish a reckless disregard for the truth,” he “must show that the false publication was made with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, or that the defendant entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his publication.” Id. (citing Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle, 1994-2919, p. 2 (La. 2/17/95), 650 So.2d 738, 740). This “typically” occurs when “a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put it in circulation.” Id. (citing Kennedy, 2005-1418, p. 30, 935 So.2d at 689). A plaintiff cannot establish actual malice “merely through showing ill will or ‘malice’ in the ordinary sense of the word,” and “actual malice may not be inferred from evidence of personal spite, an intention to injure, or a bad motive.” Tarpley, 1994-2919, p. 2, 650 So.2d at 740 (citing Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2686, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989)).

Regarding both the falsity and malice elements, if the “plaintiff proves publication of words that are defamatory per se, the elements of falsity and malice are presumed, but may be rebutted by the defendant.” Starr, 2007-0652, p. 6, 978 So.2d at 389 (citing Kennedy, 2005-1418, p. 5, 935 So.2d at 675). Words that are defamatory per se are those that “expressly or implicitly accuse another of criminal conduct, or which, by their very nature tend to injure one's personal or professional reputation, even without considering extrinsic facts or surrounding circumstances.” Id. at pp. 6-7, 978 So.2d at 389. However, “in actions against a media defendant involving an issue of public concern,” there are no “presumptions of falsity, malice, and injury.” Id. at p. 7, 978 So.2d at 390 (citing Kennedy, 2005-1418, pp. 8-9, 935 So.2d at 677).

October 2024 Revised Plans

Beginning with the purported approval of Mr. Andersen's revised plans in October 2024 and Appellees’ failure to report on this during the video broadcast, Mr. Andersen states in his Third Amended Petition that “the agency's investigative process resulted in the omission of [his] statement about [allegedly] approved plans.” Mr. Andersen's complaint lies with the LSLBC, not Appellees. It is axiomatic that Appellees’ broadcast on the hearing would not include information about purportedly approved plans if that information did not come up during the aforesaid hearing. Further, Mr. Andersen admitted in his Third Amended Petition that he left the LSLBC hearing early and did not respond to Mr. Hammer's attempts to reach him for comment. Accordingly, if Mr. Andersen wanted to tell his side of the story during the broadcast, including about the purportedly approved plans, he should have provided it to Appellees for potential dissemination.

Mr. Andersen asserts in his reply brief to this Court that “[b]ecause the revised plans bearing the two-kitchen configuration received the City's stamped approval on October 3, 2024, the Web Article's statement that [he] ‘never received a permit for that’ can reasonably be read to misstate the City's own approval record as documented in the appellate record.” The lead up and follow-up to the web article's statement excerpted by Mr. Andersen was as follows:

“It started off as a single-family residence,” [Investigator] Belanger said. “However, he added on a mother-in-law suite to the back end of it, but he never got the plans re-approved.”

The city granted [Mr.] Andersen a permit for new construction on September 29, 2024, shortly after a company [Mr.] Andersen owns bought the vacant lot on North Pierce Street. That permit was for a single-family, three-bedroom house with one kitchen. City records show [Mr.] Andersen then submitted revised plans in October that divided the house with a central wall and added a second kitchen, but he never received a permit for that.

[Investigator] Belanger said the third-party inspector [Mr.] Andersen hired, [Mr.] Farrell[ ], did exactly what he was supposed to: He refused to inspect the unapproved work. That's when [Mr.] Andersen allegedly took matters into his own hands.

Even if we were to assume, for argument's sake, that the last sentence of the second paragraph of the above-quoted part of the Web Article was false because the City approved his revised plans and was defamatory per se because it concerned Mr. Andersen's professional reputation, there exists no presumption of actual malice because this case concerns media defendants reporting on a public issue. Starr, 2007-0652, p. 7, 978 So.2d at 390 (citing Kennedy, 2005-1418, pp. 8-9, 935 So.2d at 677).² Accordingly, Mr. Andersen had to establish actual malice on the part of Appellees to defeat their Exception of No Cause of Action and Special Motion to Strike. He failed to do so. Rather, Mr. Andersen's Petitions contain mere conclusory allegations that Appellees published “false statements ․ with actual malice or reckless disregard.” Regarding the particular statement about the revised plans in the Web Article, Mr. Andersen included no facts or proof in his Petitions to support a finding that, at the time of publication, Appellees “either knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth”; published the statement “with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity” or with “serious doubt as to the truth”; “fabricated” the information, produced it from their “imagination,” or included information that was “so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put it in circulation.” Starr, 2007-0652, p. 6, 978 So.2d at 390 (citations omitted). In fact, Mr. Andersen admitted in his reply brief to this Court that it was when he contacted Appellees via email after their publication of the Video Broadcast and Web Article that he questioned the veracity of the statement about his purportedly-approved revised plans.

Insofar as we can consider other documents in reviewing the trial court's grant of Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike,³ we note Appellees attached an affidavit executed by Mr. Hammer to their Motion. In pertinent part, Mr. Hammer attested in his affidavit that he reviewed the LSLBC's exhibits for Mr. Andersen's case and, among those, was an email from City Safety and Permits Director Ms. Jackson to State investigators. According to Mr. Hammer, that email stated, in relevant part, that Mr. Andersen's company “did not build based on the approved [revised] plans which his [sic] why [Mr. Farrell] ․ said he would not inspect any further.” Reading the statement pinpointed by Mr. Andersen in the larger context, Appellees’ Web Article simply reported what Investigator Belanger said during the LSLBC hearing and the statement made by Ms. Jackson in her email: Mr. Andersen did not receive approval for what he actually built. Even if we were to assume that Mr. Andersen is correct that the City approved his revised plans in October 2024, he did “not demonstrate that [Appellees] were highly aware at the time the statement[ ]” about the revised plans was “made that [it was] false or that they entertained serious doubt at that time as to the statement[’s] truth.” Starr, 2007-0652, p. 10, 978 So.2d at 392. To the contrary, considering Investigator Belanger's statement during the hearing and Ms. Jackson's statement in her email, “the totality of the evidence shows that at the time the articles were published, [Appellees] had a reasonable basis for believing the statements were true.” Id. (citing Trentecosta v. Beck, 1996-2388, p. 16 (La. 10/21/97), 703 So.2d 552, 562). As such, Mr. Andersen failed to prove a probability of success on the actual malice element of his defamation claim to defeat Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike.

Characterization of Mr. Andersen's Use of Photoshop

In his brief to this Court, Mr. Andersen questions “whether [his] Photoshop use constituted ‘falsification’ of inspection reports.” Having reviewed the Video Broadcast and Web Article, we find Appellees merely reported a statement made by Investigator Belanger during the hearing. Specifically, Investigator Belanger testified that Mr. Andersen “falsified the inspection reports using Photoshop, as well as pictures.” Appellees’ Video Broadcast and Web Article included Investigator Belanger's statement. In fact, the Video Broadcast contains the audio and some video of Ms. Belanger's testimony, and the Web Article contains a direct quote from her. Mr. Andersen has placed blame on the wrong party: Appellees truthfully and accurately reported what happened at the hearing insofar as what Investigator Belanger stated, but Mr. Andersen disagrees with her characterization of his use of photoshop as equating to falsification of reports. This was not defamation on the part of Appellees.

The Publications’ Titles

Mr. Andersen also takes issue with the titles used by Appellees for the Video Broadcast and Web Article. One of the titles was “City permit office catches contractor ‘photoshopping’ inspections.” Mr. Andersen admitted in his Third Petition for Damages that he submitted altered photographs to reflect (inaccurately) that the project had been inspected as a “workaround” to avoid the official process, i.e., Mr. Andersen used photoshop. Based on Mr. Andersen's own words, that title was accurate. Regarding the second title—“New policy uncovers fraud in New Orleans permitting”—Mr. Andersen contends it “implied criminal guilt absent conviction or adjudication.” However, Appellees’ title and reporting was accurate: the LSLBC conducted a hearing and ruled Mr. Andersen was guilty of fraudulent behavior by falsifying inspection reports to obtain a permit and avoid the official method for doing so. Fraud is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “an act of deceiving or misrepresenting,” and Mr. Andersen's use of Photoshop to create reports that falsely indicated that Mr. Farrell inspected the Pierce Project certainly falls within the ambit of that definition.

Moreover, the Video Broadcast and Web Article both include Mr. Hassard's acknowledgment that falsifying public inspection records is potentially a crime and his explanation that the LSLBC would send the matter to the appropriate law enforcement agencies for their handling and determination, i.e., establishing Mr. Andersen had not been found criminally guilty but that his action fell within a layperson's definition of “fraud” rather than the legal one. As stated previously, Mr. Andersen's blame is misplaced: he disagrees with the LSLBC's finding that he attempted to deceive the City by (admittedly) falsifying inspection reports and conflates that disagreement with the LSLBC's finding with Appellees’ reporting of same. Appellees’ titles did not constitute defamation.

Material Exculpatory Facts

Turning to Mr. Andersen's contention that Appellees’ broadcast omitted material exculpatory facts that would have changed its gist, he fails to specifically delineate what other “material exculpatory facts” Appellees could have included to change the “gist” of the broadcast and whether Appellees even had these facts at their disposal so as to include them in the broadcast. In his Third Amended Petition, Mr. Andersen explains he left the LSLBC hearing early because he had to tend to a payroll deadline “yet this exculpatory detail was omitted in testimony/video, implying evasion”; so perhaps this is one of the facts to which he refers. This amounts to a “defamation by implication” argument. However, the broadcast merely explained that Mr. Andersen was initially present at the hearing but departed before the LSLBC opened the case against him. It did not imply “evasion” on the part of Mr. Andersen. The record does not even establish that Appellees knew why Mr. Andersen left the hearing early so as to be able to include it in the broadcast. In fact, Mr. Andersen admitted that he did not respond to Mr. Hammer's requests for comment ahead of the release of the Video Broadcast and Web Article, despite Mr. Hammer having reached out to him. Further, as previously stated, this case concerns a public issue, not a private one, so defamation by implication is inapplicable to this matter. Jones, 2025-0594, p. 10, ___ So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1242951, at *5. Because Mr. Andersen did not plead any other material exculpatory facts that Appellees knew about and failed to include so as to prove their publications were defamatory and published with actual malice, we find no merit to this assertion.

Summary

Considering the other aspects of the Video Broadcast and Web Article, Mr. Andersen's defamation claim fails on the falsity element. In his Third Amended Petition, Mr. Andersen made the conclusory allegation that Appellees “published false statements imputing criminality (forgery/fraud) to [him], with actual malice or reckless disregard, causing damages,” but he fails to delineate what statements by Appellees were actually false. Rather, Appellees truthfully reported that the LSLBC alleged and found Mr. Andersen had falsified an inspection report by photoshopping images onto it; and Mr. Andersen does not dispute that the LSLBC asserted such an allegation against him and found him guilty. Instead, Mr. Andersen questions the veracity of the LSLBC allegation and finding, and he conflates that with Appellees’ reporting of same. Moreover, Mr. Andersen actually admitted that he did in fact do exactly what the LSLBC alleged. That is, in his Third Amended Petition, Mr. Andersen stated that he submitted altered photographs to reflect that the Pierce Project had been inspected (even though it had not been) and subsequently admitted to investigators that he took this action as a “workaround” to the official inspection process.

Essentially, Mr. Andersen's Petitions are simply filled with allegations of defamation but no facts to back up that claim. Mr. Andersen was displeased that the LSLBC revoked his license after finding he falsified an inspection report. Appellees accurately reported that the LSLBC revoked Mr. Andersen's license after finding he falsified an inspection report. Mr. Andersen's misguided stance is that the LSLBC's finding was wrong, ergo Appellees’ reporting of the finding was wrong. Even if the LSLBC had come to the wrong conclusion about this situation (speaking hypothetically, of course), that would not render Appellees’ reporting of the LSLBC hearing and finding to be false. This Court has advised that “[t]he purpose of [La. C.C.P. art. 971] is to review frivolous and meritless claims against the media at a very early stage in the legal proceedings,” and Mr. Andersen's defamation claim is of that ilk. Stern, 2001-0914, p. 3, 806 So.2d at 100. We need not discuss the remaining defamation elements: because a plaintiff must prove all of them to succeed, Mr. Andersen's failure to prove falsity and actual malice means his claim fails. In sum, Mr. Andersen did not establish a probability of success on his defamation claim to defeat Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike nor did his Petitions establish that he is entitled to the relief he seeks so as to defeat Appellees’ Exception of No Cause of Action. Based on the record, it appears beyond doubt that Mr. Andersen can prove no set of facts in support of his defamation claim which would entitle him to relief.

(2) Conspiracy

Mr. Andersen's second claim against Appellees was for conspiracy. In his Third Amended Petition, Mr. Andersen asserts: “Based on information and belief, some or all named Defendants conspired to commit the torts herein by agreeing (expressly or tacitly) to disseminate false information, manufacture accusations, and interfere with Plaintiff's business, causing foreseeable harm, with LSLBC's leadership directing investigative pressures.” As this Court has previously held, “To establish a conspiracy, a plaintiff is required to provide evidence of the requisite agreement between the parties.” Prime Ins. Co. v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2014-0323, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/14), 151 So.3d 670, 677 (quoting Thomas v. North 40 Land Dev., Inc., 2004-0610, p. 22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/26/05), 894 So.2d 1160, 1174). In other words, the plaintiff must “establish a meeting of the minds or collusion between the parties for the purpose of committing wrongdoing.” Id. Mr. Andersen has provided no evidence of such an agreement, a meeting of the minds, or collusion. As it is, Mr. Andersen's Third Amended Petition is vague about which defendants purportedly conspired against him, using the phrasing “some or all named Defendants conspired.” Mr. Andersen did not establish a probability of success on his conspiracy claim to defeat Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike nor did his Petitions establish that he is entitled to the relief he seeks so as to defeat Appellees’ Exception of No Cause of Action. Rather, Mr. Andersen put forth a blanket accusation of conspiracy that is unsupported by facts and thus insufficient to defeat Appellees’ pleadings.

(3) Tortious Interference with Business Relations and Prospective Advantage

Mr. Andersen's third claim against Appellees was for “tortious interference with business relations and prospective advantage.” With regard to this claim, Mr. Andersen asserted in his Third Amended Petition: “Defendants intentionally and improperly interfered with [his] existing and prospective contractual relations by the acts described, causing damages.” This Court has described tortious interference with business relations as follows:

The cause of action for tortious interference with business derives from La. C.C. art. 2315. Tortious interference is based on the principle that the right to influence others not to enter into business relationships with others is not absolute. Louisiana law protects the businessman from “malicious and wanton interference,” though it permits interferences designed to protect legitimate interests of the actor. A plaintiff bringing a claim for tortious interference with business must ultimately show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant improperly influenced others not to deal with the plaintiff.” Significantly, it is not enough to allege that a defendant's actions affected plaintiff's business interests; the plaintiff must allege that the defendant actually prevented the plaintiff from dealing with a third party.

Taxicab Ins. Store, LLC v. Am. Serv. Ins. Co., 2017-0004, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/12/17), 224 So.3d 451, 460-61 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bogues v. La. Energy Consultants, Inc., 46,434, p. 11 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 71 So.3d 1128, 1134-35). Additionally, this Court has explained:

Although this cause of action has an ancient vintage, Louisiana jurisprudence has viewed it with disfavor. Louisiana courts have limited this cause of action by imposing a malice element, which requires that the plaintiff show the defendant acted with actual malice. “Although its meaning is not perfectly clear, the malice element seems to require a showing of spite or ill will, which is difficult (if not impossible) to prove ․ In fact, there appear to be no reported cases in which anyone actually has been held liable for the tort.”

Id. at p. 10, 224 So.3d at 460 (quoting JCD Mktg. Co. v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 2001-1096, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/6/02), 812 So.2d 834, 841). The jurisprudence has further held that “[i]n order to sustain a claim for tortious interference with business relations, actual malice must be [pled] in the complaint.” Bogues, 46,434, p. 12, 71 So.3d at 1135 (citation omitted).

Critically, though Mr. Andersen pled that Appellees acted with actual malice in terms of his defamation claim, Mr. Andersen did not even plead—let alone prove—actual malice on Appellees’ part concerning his tortious interference with business relations claim. Thus, we need not consider the cause of action further. In sum, Mr. Andersen supplied no facts or evidence to establish a probability of success on his tortious interference with business dealings claim to defeat Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike nor did his Petitions establish that he is entitled to the relief he seeks so as to defeat Appellees’ Exception of No Cause of Action. Rather, Mr. Andersen put forth a mere conclusion that is unsupported by facts.

(4) Trespass

The next claim Mr. Andersen asserted against Appellees was for trespass. Mr. Andersen contended Appellees “intentionally entered [his] property ․ without permission, causing harm including exposure and subsequent harassment.” As this Court has previously described, “A trespass occurs when there is an unlawful physical invasion of the property or possession of another. A trespasser is one who goes upon the property of another without the other's consent.” Spanish Lake Restoration, L.L.C. v. Petrodome St. Gabriel II, LLC, 2015-0451, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/13/16), 186 So.3d 230, 233 (quoting Bourquard v. L.O. Ausauma Enters., Inc., 2010-0323, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/10), 52 So.3d 248, 251).

With regard to Appellees’ Exception of No Cause of Action, Mr. Andersen's bare bones accusation that Appellees trespassed was insufficient. That is, Mr. Andersen provided no facts or evidence in his Petitions to support his claim that Appellees actually entered his property to defeat their Exception of No Cause of Action. Turning to Appellees’ Motion to Strike, Appellees’ countered Mr. Andersen's trespass allegation with Mr. Hammer's affidavit. Therein, Mr. Hammer attested that he and WWL-TV filmed the video of the front of Mr. Andersen's home (included in the Video Broadcast) from the public street and obtained the photograph of the back of Mr. Andersen's home (included in the Video Broadcast) from the LSLBC hearing, at which investigators presented it as an exhibit and provided copies to the press. Mr. Andersen did not establish a probability of success on his trespass claim so as to defeat Appellees’ Motion to Strike because he did not overcome Mr. Hammer's affidavit attesting Appellees did not go onto his property, a required element for the claim of trespass. Further, we note that in his reply brief to this Court, Mr. Andersen admitted that he withdrew his trespass claim in open court in December 2025.

(5) Intrusion upon Seclusion (Invasion of Privacy)

Next, Mr. Andersen asserted a claim of intrusion upon seclusion or invasion of privacy. With regard to this claim, Mr. Andersen contended Appellees “intruded upon [his] private space by trespassing.” As stated in the previous section, Mr. Andersen did not adequately support his trespass claim and withdrew it before the trial court. Insofar as Appellees’ Video Broadcast included a picture of the front of Mr. Andersen's home, the Pierce Project, this Court has held that “[t]he right to privacy is not absolute,” and “it is ․ limited by society's right to be informed about legitimate subjects of public interest.” Beckett v. Serpas, 2012-1349, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/20/13), 112 So.3d 348, 352 (citing Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Metro. Council, 1996-1979, p. 9 (La. 7/1/97), 696 So.2d 562, 566). Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “an invasion [of privacy] does not occur when an individual makes a photograph of a public sight which any one is free to see.” Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979). See also Batts v. Capital City Press, 479 So.2d 534, 536 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985). This is logical “[b]ecause the situation or activity which is intruded upon must” in fact “be private” for there to be an invasion of privacy. Jaubert, 375 So.2d at 1388.

We have already established this case presented a matter of public interest. Appellees included footage of the front of the property for which the LSLBC found Mr. Andersen falsified inspection reports during their Video Broadcast, and it just so happened to be his own house. The LSLBC documents included the address of the property for which the LSLBC found Mr. Andersen falsified the reports, i.e., his own house; and, with that address in hand from the public hearing, Mr. Andersen's house is a public sight which any one is free to see. Mr. Andersen did not establish a probability of success on his intrusion upon seclusion/right to privacy claim to defeat Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike nor did his Petitions establish that he is entitled to the relief he seeks so as to defeat Appellees’ Exception of No Cause of Action.

(6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Finally, Mr. Andersen's last cause of action against Appellees was for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In his Third Amended Petition, Mr. Andersen asserted that Appellants’ “extreme and outrageous conduct (trespass, unauthorized filming, and public exposure leading to harassment) was intended to or recklessly caused [him] severe emotional distress, including fear, anxiety, and humiliation.”

In previously discussing the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, this Court explained:

Under Louisiana jurisprudence, to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that it would be certain or substantially certain to result from the conduct. The nature of the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree” that it goes “beyond all possible bounds of decency, and [is] regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” “[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities” do not result in liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Cunningham, 2021-0532, pp. 19-20, 336 So.3d at 991 (internal citations omitted). This Court has further explained that “Louisiana courts, like courts in other states, have set a very high threshold on conduct sufficient to sustain an emotional distress claim, and the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that courts require truly outrageous conduct before allowing a claim even to be presented to a jury.” Favret v. Favret, 2022-0820, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/23), 371 So.3d 511, 526 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Sullivan v. Malta Park, 2014-0478, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/10/14), 156 So.3d 751, 757).

For example, in Favret, this Court described the conduct sufficient to satisfy an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as follows from Dietz v. Dietz, 2014-1164 (La. App. 3 Cir 5/6/15), 165 So.3d 342:

[I]n Dietz, the [Louisiana] Third Circuit [Court of Appeal (“Third Circuit”)] determined that a sister and brother, during a custody battle with the sister's ex-husband, made death threats and authorized their attorney to use extreme tactics such as a drive-by shooting and theft of confidential documents to get their desired custody and divorce outcome, among other severe misconduct. The Third Circuit found that this conduct rose to the level of extreme and outrageous and went beyond all possible bounds of decency, caused the plaintiff to suffer extreme emotional distress, and the defendants desired to inflict severe emotional distress.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

In comparison to Dietz, Appellees’ conduct of accurately reporting the content and result of a public licensing board's hearing comes nowhere close to constituting outrageous and extreme behavior. Rather, what Appellees did is the point of the news profession—to report on matters of public interest. Moreover, Mr. Andersen offered nothing other than his own self-serving statement for the proposition that he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Appellees’ reporting. Further, Mr. Andersen offered nothing to support a finding that Appellees desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that it would be certain or substantially certain to result from the conduct. Mr. Andersen failed to prove any of the elements of this claim. Instead, as with his other claims, Mr. Andersen merely provided conclusory allegations with no support for them. Mr. Andersen did not establish a probability of success on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to defeat Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike nor did his Petitions establish that he is entitled to the relief he seeks so as to defeat Appellees’ Exception of No Cause of Action.

Conclusion

In light of our findings in the six prior subsections, we conclude the trial court correctly granted Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action. Mr. Andersen failed to establish a probability of success on all of the claims he lodged against Appellees. And, he “threw the kitchen sink” at Appellees, so to speak, by asserting mere legal and factual conclusions unsupported by facts, a tactic which was insufficient to beat their Exception of No Cause of Action.

Issue Three: Whether the Trial Court Correctly Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs to Appellees and Whether Appellees are Entitled to Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

Next, Mr. Andersen asserts in his fifth assignment of error that “[t]he [trial] court erred in awarding ․ attorney's fees and costs under La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) because the award depends on [Appellees’] prevailing-party status on the special motion to strike and cannot survive reversal of the underlying Article 971 dismissal.” Essentially, Mr. Andersen argues that because the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike, this Court must reverse not only that part of the judgment but also the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to Appellees (as the prevailing party). In fact, in the argument section of his brief, Mr. Andersen rephrases this assignment of error to read that “the attorney-fee and cost award must be vacated if the Article 971 dismissal is reversed.” (Emphasis added.) Further, Appellees have filed an Answer in which they request additional attorney fees and costs for work done on this appeal. In response, Mr. Andersen argues in his seventh assignment of error that because Appellees should not prevail on their Special Motion to Strike, an appellate award of appellate attorney fees and costs is not warranted.

Regarding the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs, the “general rule,” is that “attorney[ ] fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or contract.” Rosenblat Props., LLC v. Kohsmann, 2024-0216, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/26/24), 408 So.3d 985, 994 (quoting Robin v. Wong, 2007-0547, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/24/07), 971 So.2d 386, 388). This issue is governed by La. C.C.P. art. 971, which concerns special motions to strike. That Article states, in pertinent part, that “[i]n any action subject to Paragraph A of this Article, a prevailing party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.” La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) (emphasis added). An appellate court reviews a trial court's award of attorney fees pursuant to a special motion to strike under “the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review.” Quinlan v. Sugar-Gold, 53,348, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/11/20), 293 So.3d 722, 727 (citing Davis v. Benton, 2003-0851, p. 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/04), 874 So.2d 185, 191).

If a statute provides for attorney fees, it is “penal in nature and must be strictly construed.” Rosenblat Props., LLC, 2024-0216, p. 13, 408 So.3d at 994 (citing Delta Chem. Corp. v. Lynch, 2007-0431, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/27/08), 979 So.2d 579, 588). Moreover, as this Court recently explained in Angelloz v. Taylor-Seidenbach, “the word shall ․ ‘is mandatory.’ ” 2026-0301, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/28/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1145829, at *3 (quoting Feingerts v. Feingerts, 2025-0397, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 420 So.3d 264, 270). The “well-established rules of [statutory] interpretation” provide that “the word shall excludes the possibility of being optional or even subject to discretion, but instead means imperative, of similar effect and import with the word must.” Id. at pp. 4-5, ___ So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1145829, at *3 (quoting Bankers Ins. Co. v. EMIII Holdings, LLC, 2024-0386, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/24), 407 So.3d 681, 693). Discussing La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) specifically, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has explained that because it “unambiguously” requires the trial court to award attorney[ ] fees and costs to the prevailing party via use of the word “shall,” then the trial court does not abuse its discretion in so doing. Roper v. Loupe, 2017-1239, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/18/18), 250 So.3d 1000, 1002-03. In the matter sub judice, because the trial court ruled in Appellees’ favor on their Special Motion to Strike, the trial court correctly followed the mandatory language of La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) by awarding them attorney fees and costs. Having concluded the trial court correctly granted Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike, we correspondingly affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs.

Notably, Mr. Andersen did not question the amount awarded by the trial court in his briefs to this Court. We briefly note that based on the affidavits of counsel for Appellees, the attorneys only requested—and the trial court only awarded—attorney fees and costs associated with their Special Motion to Strike, which was proper.⁴ That is, as stated previously, “attorney fees are penal in nature and must be strictly construed,” such that “courts interpret La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) as limiting recovery to those attorney fees and costs specifically associated with the special motion to strike.” Quinlan, 53,348, p. 5, 293 So.3d at 727 (citations omitted). In other words, Appellees properly requested and received attorney fees and costs connected solely with their Special Motion to Strike and did not ask for and receive same regarding their Exception of No Cause of Action.

Turning to Appellees’ request for appellate attorney fees and costs, “the general rule regarding additional attorney fees for work done on appeal is that an increase in attorney fees is usually allowed where a party was awarded attorney fees by the trial court and is forced to and successfully defends an appeal.” Hatfield v. Herring, 54,048, p. 19 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/21), 326 So.3d 944, 959. However, in considering whether the award appellate attorney fees in Quinlan, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal explained that “the issues and arguments on appeal had already been fleshed out and thoroughly addressed throughout the pleadings and proceedings in the trial court.” 53,348, p. 9, 293 So.3d at 729-30. And, in Stern, this Court declined to award appellate attorney fees, explaining that because “the plaintiff is in forma pauperis, ․ it is likely that he is not capable of paying any attorney fees to the defendant.” 2001-0914, p. 7, 806 So.2d at 102.

As in Quinlan, in the matter sub judice, Appellees’ arguments on appeal mimic those made before the trial court. Further, Mr. Andersen has pauper status and has already been assessed more than $22,000 in fees and costs and is thus unlikely to be financially able to pay an additional award of appellate fees and costs. Accordingly, we deny Appellees’ request in their Answer for appellate attorney fees and costs.

Issue Four: The Trial Court's Failure to Designate Whether Dismissal of Mr. Andersen's Claims was With or Without Prejudice

Finally, while the trial court dismissed Mr. Andersen's claims against Appellees pursuant to granting their Exception of No Cause of Action and Special Motion to Strike, the judgment did not state whether that dismissal was with or without prejudice. Accordingly, in their Answer, Appellees assert the trial court erred in not dismissing Mr. Andersen's claims against them with prejudice and asks this Court to do so.

As this Court has explained, “[g]enerally, a judgment that is silent as to a dismissal with or without prejudice must be construed as a dismissal ‘without prejudice.’ ” Doe v. Jesuit High Sch. of New Orleans, 2021-0284, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/10/21), 331 So.3d 426, 433 (citing Allen v. Allen, 2016-0407, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16), 210 So.3d 477, 480). Regarding the effect of sustaining a peremptory exception, such as an exception of no cause of action, La. C.C.P. art. 934 provides:

When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court. If the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.

Despite the above language found in La. C.C.P. art. 934, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has held that if the trial court did not specify whether dismissal pursuant to an exception of no cause of action was with or without prejudice and there exists “no set of facts that [the plaintiff] may allege to state a valid cause of action,” then the appellate court can “decline to afford [him or] her the opportunity to amend her petition to so state” one. Benoist v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2022-0878, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 364 So.3d 1162, 1167 (citing Herigodt v. Town of Golden Meadow, 2020-0752, p. 15 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/22/21), 321 So.3d 1004, 1015). See also Johnfroe v. Child. Hosp., 537 So.2d 383, 385 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (raising the issue of whether the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice without allowing them the opportunity to amend their petition and affirming the trial court in this regard because the “[p]laintiffs’ brief on appeal [gave] ․ no indication that the petition could be amended to state a lawful cause of action”).

This appeal also concerns the trial court's grant of Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike, and La. C.C.P. art. 971 does not specify whether a dismissal pursuant to a special motion to strike must be with or without prejudice. However, in Green v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC, the trial court granted a special motion to strike and exception of no cause of action and dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. 55,717, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/17/24), 399 So.3d 499, 504. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment because the plaintiff's “claims could not withstand the exception[ ] of no cause of action.” Id. at p. 14, 399 So.3d at 509.

Likewise, in the matter sub judice, we find the trial court should have dismissed Mr. Andersen's claims against Appellees’ with prejudice because—as the foregoing analysis demonstrates—his claims could not withstand their Exception of No Cause of Action. Further, Mr. Andersen's brief on appeal gives this Court no indication that he could amend his Petitions (once again) to state a lawful cause of action. Moreover, because the Legislature enacted La. C.C.P. art. 971 “as a procedural device to be used early in legal proceedings to screen meritless claims pursued to chill one's constitutional rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to freedom of speech and press,” a dismissal with prejudice based on the facts and circumstances presented herein furthers this legislative intent. Cantrell, 2024-0716, p. 5, 421 So.3d at 196. Accordingly, we grant Appellees’ Answer insofar as they have asked us to amend the trial court's judgment to state that it dismisses Mr. Andersen's claims with prejudice pursuant to the grant of their Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action. As amended, we affirm the judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we amend the trial court's December 30, 2025 judgment in part (to state the dismissal of Mr. Andersen's claims was with prejudice). As amended, we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted Appellees’ Special Motion to Strike and Exception of No Cause of Action. We deny Appellees’ request for appellate attorney fees and costs.

JUDGMENT AMENDED IN PART; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   As correctly observed by Appellees, Mr. Andersen did not address his ancillary claims in his appellant brief, namely those for conspiracy; tortious interference with business relations and prospective advantage; trespass; intrusion upon seclusion (invasion of privacy); and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rather, Mr. Andersen's appellant brief focused on his defamation claim. Accordingly, Appellees assert Mr. Andersen has waived these claims on appeal per Rule 2-12.4(B) of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal. In his appellant reply brief, Mr. Andersen conceded that he “did not separately brief the conspiracy, intentional-infliction of emotional-distress, and invasion-of-privacy claims as independent assignments of error” and admitted he waived his trespass claim in open court before the trial court in December 2025.Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal provides that “[a]ll assignments of error and issues for review shall be briefed. The court may deem as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed.” (Emphasis added.) As the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained, a “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation [is] that the word may is permissive.” Pierce Founds., Inc. v. Jaroy Constr., Inc., 2015-0785, p. 8 (La. 5/3/16), 190 So.3d 298, 304 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2014-1921, p. 12 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d 328, 336). Because Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) uses the permissive word “may” and considering Mr. Andersen's pro se status, we will nevertheless address his ancillary claims.

2.   In Starr, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal clarified that even if the plaintiff is not a public figure, if “the articles [and statements] at issue, published by the media defendants, involve a matter of public concern,” then the plaintiff “must prove actual malice, as well as the other elements of his defamation claim, in order to prevail.” 2007-0652, p. 9, 978 So.2d at 391. In the matter sub judice, we have already discussed why this case pertained to a matter of public concern; therefore, it is of no merit that Mr. Andersen is not a public figure.

3.   By contrast, and as stated previously, the parties cannot introduce evidence “to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La. C.C.P. art. 931. Thus, in ruling on an exception of no cause of action, “a court can consider only the petition, any amendments to the petition, and any documents attached to the petition.” Ross, 2022-0382, p. 7, 352 So.3d at 94 (quoting Green, 2017-0695, p. 4, 248 So.3d at 453).

4.   In fact, the trial court did not even grant Appellees the full amount they requested in attorney fees.

Judge Dale N. Atkins

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT