STATE v. WILLIAMS (2026)

Defendant, Kevin Earl Williams, Jr., appeals his convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was indicted on March 30, 2023, and charged with the January 31, 2023, second degree murder of Da'Marcus Anthony Ardoin, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. The indictment also charged him with obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding in which a sentence of death or life imprisonment may be imposed, in violation of La.R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) and La.R.S. 14:130.1(B)(1). The original indictment was amended two different times. The last amendment was filed on June 22, 2023, adding two co-defendants, William Drakkar Dennis and Justin Joseph Ned, to the indictment as to each count but not otherwise altering or amending the charges filed against Defendant.

The indictment was based on the State's allegations that Defendant, along with Dennis and Ned, agreed to commit an armed robbery of the victim on January 31, 2023, at the victim's residence in Westlake, Louisiana. Dennis had known the victim for some time and had purchased marijuana from him in the past. While with Defendant and Ned, Dennis called the victim to arrange a meeting for the transaction. The three drove to the victim's home in a white SUV, which was owned by Defendant's girlfriend, Autoria Lachney. Dennis went into the residence first and was sampling the marijuana when Defendant and Ned entered, causing the victim to panic and attempt to flee. He was shot multiple times and killed, and Ned was hit by a stray bullet and wounded. Dennis was the last of the three to exit the residence, and as he left, he took a bag of marijuana from the floor, later splitting it with the other two. The three fled in the white SUV to Texas. After Ned was taken to a hospital, the other two took the SUV to a road in Houston, where they used gasoline to set it on fire in an attempt to destroy any evidence it might contain. As a result of the investigation by the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Office (“CPSO”), Defendant, Dennis, and Ned were all arrested and charged. Lachney, who was charged with being an accessory after the fact, was also indicted.

Defendant appeared in open court and pled not guilty on April 10, 2023. His case proceeded to a jury trial on February 25, 2025, and on February 28, 2025, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. A motion for a post-judgment verdict of acquittal or, alternatively, for a new trial, was heard and denied on April 7, 2025. On June 6, 2025, Defendant was sentenced to serve life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on the second degree murder conviction, and twenty-five years in prison on the obstruction of justice conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Defendant asserts five assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in admitting the State's expert testimony from Captain Travis Lavergne where the State failed to provide adequate and timely notice of the substance of his opinions in violation of La. Code Crim. P. art. 719 and the principles of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579[, 113 S.Ct. 2786] (1993).

2. The trial court violated Mr. Williams's rights under the Confrontation Clause by admitting testimonial hearsay, including text message communications from non-testifying individuals and allowing a witness to narrate the contents of those communications.

3. The evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support the conviction for second-degree murder, as it was based almost entirely on the uncorroborated and incredible testimony of an accomplice, William Dennis, in violation of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307[, 99 S.Ct. 2781] (1979).

4. The State's persistent discovery violations, including late disclosures and failure to produce exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83[, 83 S.Ct. 1194] (1963), and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, deprived Mr. Williams of a fair trial.

5. The district court erred in denying a mistrial and instead merely removing [Juror 171] and seating an alternate after it was revealed mid-trial that the only African-American juror on the panel was the step-grandmother of key State witness Mecca Watley (the victim's girlfriend), where (1) earlier Batson-contested strikes had removed all other African-American venire members, and (2) this late disclosure fundamentally tainted the jury-selection process and the defense's exercise of peremptory challenges.

OPINION

Sufficiency of Evidence

In his third assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the evidence presented by the State at trial was legally insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction as it was based almost entirely on Dennis's uncorroborated and incredible testimony, in violation of Jackson, 443 U.S. 307.

When the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be discharged as to that crime, and any discussion by the court of the trial error issues as to that crime would be pure dicta since those issues are moot.

On the other hand, when the entirety of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the assignments of trial error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. If the reviewing court determines there has been trial error (which was not harmless) in cases in which the entirety of the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, then the accused must receive a new trial, but is not entitled to an acquittal even though the admissible evidence, considered alone, was insufficient. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988).

State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).

Thus, we will review Defendant's sufficiency claim first.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being with the “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[,]” or “[w]hen the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of’ certain enumerated felonies, specifically including armed robbery or attempted armed robbery. La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), (2). According to one theory of the State's case, Defendant was engaged in an armed robbery or attempted armed robbery at the time of the killing. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:64(A) defines armed robbery as “the taking of anything of value” “from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” La.R.S. 14:24.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the obstruction of justice conviction. Accordingly, we only review the evidence presented at trial as to the second degree murder conviction, finding it more than sufficient to support the finding of all of the elements necessary to establish the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt as per the Jackson standard of review.¹ The Jackson standard applies not only to federal convictions but also to “state direct review of criminal convictions[.]” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La. 1988).

We first review the testimony of co-defendant Dennis,² who testified as a result of the testimonial immunity granted to him by the State.³ The jury was made fully aware of this agreement, and Dennis testified that he was doing so in the hope of leniency in connection with his own charges but that nothing was promised, and the State's only requirement was that he testify truthfully.⁴ At the outset of his testimony, he admitted to having been a drug dealer since the age of eighteen.⁵ He also admitted to having robbed another drug dealer before, though he was never charged or convicted for such. He further testified that he had an extensive criminal history.

Dennis testified that earlier on the day of the murder, he and Defendant, along with his cousin Ned, passed by the victim's residence in the white SUV belonging to Defendant's girlfriend, Lachney. He stated that Defendant wanted to rob the victim, and on the night of the murder, he was with Defendant and Ned. Before going to the victim's residence, they discussed robbing him. Dennis called the victim and told him that he was coming over to buy some “weed.” He testified that he had previously been to the victim's residence to buy marijuana.

Upon their arrival, Dennis went into the victim's residence first on the pretense of buying “weed.” He was armed but put his gun on the table to show the victim that everything was okay, and he told the victim that he wanted to smoke some “weed” first to test it, which he commonly did when buying from the victim. The victim pulled out two bags of marijuana. At that time, Ned entered the residence, and Defendant made it into the doorway. The victim became startled and started running towards the doorway and Defendant. Defendant then shot and killed the victim, while Ned, who was accidentally shot, also shot the victim.⁶ Defendant and Ned got back to the SUV first, and Dennis, who grabbed some marijuana off the floor, was the last to arrive at the SUV.

The three perpetrators fled in the SUV on I-10 from Lake Charles to Texas, where they stopped for gas in Orange and then drove to Baytown, where they switched drivers. They then drove to Defendant's mother's house in Houston. Ned was dropped off at a hospital since he had been shot, and Defendant and Dennis sold the guns used to commit the crime and burned the SUV, using gasoline they had purchased earlier. This took place on a road not too far from a motel, the South Park Inn, where a room had been rented by the boyfriend of Defendant's mother, where they went to regroup and hole up.

Mecca Whatley, the victim's long-time girlfriend, testified that she was staying with the victim in the mobile home where he lived. She corroborated Dennis's testimony concerning him previously buying “weed” from the victim as she stated that the victim routinely sold marijuana from his home to make money. It was common for people to come to the mobile home to buy marijuana and to pay cash. She stated that the victim usually kept about $1,000.00 in the mobile home, and he also took payments by the cell phone app, Cash App. She was not present in the mobile home on the night of the murder.

Lieutenant Julie Fontenot, the supervisor of the CPSO's Real Time Crime Center (“the Center”), testified that the Center assists the CPSO by gathering intelligence information from sources such as Automated License Plate Readers (“ALPRs”)⁷ and video footage from security or surveillance cameras. She testified that shortly after the February 1, 2023 murder, she and her fellow deputies pulled ALPR information for any vehicles in the area of the crime within a span of twenty minutes before and after the 911 call reporting the crime and compiled a list of those vehicles. At that point, she learned from deputies on scene that witnesses had reported a white SUV in the area. Looking through the ALPR information available, she found four similar vehicles within the designated timeframe:

Detective Michelle Robinson was the one to actually review the footage. I was standing right behind her, so as she's watching it for the first time I was reviewing the four vehicles to see if any of the four looked like the vehicle in the surveillance footage and once we saw the surveillance footage of the white SUV there was only one that matched that footage. So I showed it to Detective Michelle Robinson to verify that she agreed with me that it looked to be the same and then at that point went outside to let the rest of the investigators know that I was going to contact the Crime Center to get information on that vehicle. The license plate on it was 706 Frank Victor King ․ It's FVK.

The SUV was discovered to be registered to Lachney. Detectives put out a be-on-the-lookout alert (“BOLD”) for the SUV, and ALPR cameras ultimately hit on its location in Baytown, Texas roughly one to two hours after the murder. She then received confirmation that the vehicle was later discovered in Houston after having been set on fire.

Sergeant Barrett Savoie, with the CPSO Special Operations Group, testified that as part of the investigation, he was dispatched to an address on Westwood Road, Dove Creek Estates in Westlake at around midnight on January 31, 2023. Video surveillance footage recovered from the area displayed the residence, a small mobile home, and captured a white hatchback SUV arriving and then departing from the residence. That vehicle was later determined to be owned by Lachney.

Sergeant Savoie testified that “[w]hile the vehicle was present at the residence there was what appeared to be a rapid succession of gun fire and I believe, from what I recall, it was difficult to distinguish exactly how many because all the structures in the area happen to -- will make that noise, just reverberate.” The SUV fled the scene after the gunfire. ALPR data recovered from street cameras in the area showed the SUV leaving Lake Charles, and it was then successively tracked in Baytown, Beaumont, and Houston, Texas. Sergeant Savoie was able to review cell phone location data for Ned's, Defendant's, and Dennis's phones, and these records coincided with the ALPR data during the same time frames. He stated that the location data maps tracking the cell phones’ locations at various times were prepared by CPSO Captain Travis Lavergne.

Based on the recovered surveillance camera footage showing the exterior of the murder scene, Sergeant Savoie stated that three men arrived and left in the SUV. Lachney was not present in the SUV at the time of the murder as other evidence established that she was at her apartment on West Sallier Street in Lake Charles. Blood evidence from the crime scene was linked to Ned, whose cell phone location data showed that his cell phone was in the area of the crime scene at the time of the murder.

Sergeant Savoie testified that the white SUV was recovered after it was set on fire and burned in Houston. Lachney, who was driving a vehicle owned by Tia Bertrand, was stopped in the Vinton, Louisiana area for a traffic violation at about 5:30 a.m. on the morning after the murder. At the time of the stop, she was speaking on her cell phone to Defendant. A later search of that vehicle returned a driver's license belonging to Ned, who was determined to be Bertrand's boyfriend at the time of the murder. Lachney's residence was also later searched and items belonging to Defendant were located there, including a prescription pill bottled linked to him and Hornady 9mm ammunition that was consistent with the Hornady shell casings found at the scene of the murder.⁸

Sergeant Savoie went on to testify that cell phone location data and ALPR records indicated that Lachney and her white SUV, along with Defendant, had been in the area of the victim's residence prior to the murder, as late as January 28, 2023. Surveillance video from the neighborhood corroborated the phone and ALPR data. Video footage from the Studio Six Motel in Sulphur, Louisiana on January 28, also showed Lachney's white SUV present that day at around 12:15 p.m. Lachney, Ned, Dennis, and Defendant were all identified in the video as having been present together at the motel that day.

Cell phone records and cell phone location data showed that Dennis contacted the victim by phone on the night of the murder, that the phone traveled to the location of the murder, and then traveled to the location where the white SUV was burned. Ned's cell phone location data showed it to be traveling consistently with those of Dennis and Defendant from DeQuincy, to the murder scene, and then to Houston. However, the records show that Ned's cell phone did not travel with the others to the location where the SUV was burned.

Sergeant Savoie reviewed the video surveillance footage from the South Park Inn in Houston, which was taken at about 4:30 a.m. on February 1, 2023, four hours after the initial 911 call regarding the murder. In the footage, Sergeant Savoie points out two individuals walking towards the motel shortly after the white SUV was found on fire down the road. Thereafter, the same two individuals are seen entering a room at the motel, which was determined to have been rented by the boyfriend of Defendant's mother. Video from later that morning showed Bertrand's vehicle, which Lachney was driving at the time she was pulled over in Vinton, arriving at the motel at around 9:30 a.m. Sergeant Savoie identified Lachney, who was wearing the same clothes she had on when involved in the earlier traffic stop, exiting the vehicle and entering the same room the two men had entered earlier. Sergeant Savoie also identified Bertrand in the motel's surveillance video as well as Ned, who was then on crutches.

Investigator John LeVassuer, with the Houston Fire Department's Arson Division, testified that he and others located the burned SUV sought in the CPSO BOLO in Houston. “[O]n-scene investigators had determined that the vehicle that was on fire was determined to be an incendiary fire, which meant that it was set on purpose[ ]” and that “some sort of ignitable liquid was used to set the fire.” He reviewed video footage from a street utility-pole camera of the SUV prior to it being burned:

Through my follow-up investigation I was contacted by the Harris County Constable Bruce Sequan [spelled phonetically] in our Environmental Crime Division, which monitors popular dumps, illegal dumpsites throughout the city, and they happened to have a camera on a pole that has a view of the street where the vehicle was burned and I obtained that video from them and I viewed the video. It shows the car pulling up on that street to a stop. Two individuals get out of the vehicle and through their actions you could see a fire was ignited. It's not perfectly clear exactly what they're doing in the vehicle, but as they're manipulating something all of a sudden you see a bright flash of fire and then they run away from the vehicle.

(Alteration in original.)

He stated that the location where the SUV was set on fire was only a “handful of blocks” from the South Park Inn.

CPSO Captain Adrian Jude Sonnier, who was the lieutenant over the CPSO's Forensic Investigative Unit at the time of the murder, photographed and collected evidence from the murder scene. He testified that when he arrived at the scene, he observed the victim's body lying “halfway in and halfway out of the door[ ]” to the mobile home and that he had been shot multiple times. He and others recovered shell casings and blood evidence. Captain Sonnier also recovered a bag of what appeared to be marijuana, which was spilled about the floor of the mobile home adjacent to the location of the victim's body.

Dr. Terry Welke, Calcasieu Parish Coroner, an expert in forensic pathology, performed the autopsy on the victim and testified that he determined that the victim had suffered four gunshot wounds. He listed the cause of death on the victim's death certificate as multiple gunshot wounds to the head, trunk, and right upper extremity and the manner of death as a homicide. He also discovered another wound that appeared to be a grazing gunshot wound. He opined that from the nature of the wounds, the gun was fired from a distance of greater than two feet from the victim.

Lieutenant Jerod Abshire, with the CPSO Digital Forensic Unit (“the Unit”), testified that the Unit conducts “extractions on a wide range of digital evidence ranging from computers, cell phones, DVRs, vehicle extractions, anything that really contains data.” He testified regarding the Dove Creek surveillance video, which was introduced into evidence without objection. On January 31, 2023, at 11:41 p.m., the video depicts the white SUV backing into the mobile home's driveway, where the victim was shot. Lieutenant Abshire states that the video and its audio reflect two gunshots being fired before the SUV pulls out of the driveway, and the rear driver-side door opening and closing before the SUV exits down the roadway.

Lieutenant Abshire also identified State Exhibits 111 and 111(A), (B), and (C), the printouts of the text-message threads from Bertrand's cell phone. He further identified State Exhibits 113 and 113(A), the printouts of the text-message threads from the victim's cell phone. These were admitted into evidence without objection. The printouts of the text-message threads from Defendant's cell phone were also admitted into evidence as State Exhibits 114, 114(A), 114(B), 114(C), and 114(D). Defendant objected to these exhibits on the basis of other crimes evidence concerning other discussed robberies, and the State countered that Defendant had previously opened the door to this testimony. Defendant's objection was noted and overruled.

Much later, after the text messages between Lachney and Defendant had been admitted into evidence and while they were being extensively discussed and read to the jury on direct examination, counsel for Defendant lodged an objection based on a Confrontation Clause violation as well as hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection based on hearsay, though noting, “You objected when I called y'all up because I didn't hear no objection before I called y'all up here.”

Captain Lavergne was called as the last witness before co-defendant Dennis and was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic cellular location mapping. Through his testimony, the State introduced cell phone tracking records and a PowerPoint presentation showing the locations of Dennis's, Ned's, and Defendant's cell phones leading up to the time of the murder and thereafter. He testified that the phones were all in the area of the murder at the time it occurred, and thereafter, the phones were tracked leaving the Lake Charles area and heading into Texas, through Orange, Baytown, and then Houston. He testified that this was also consistent with ALPR data and surveillance footage as to the location of the SUV the three men were using. He testified that Defendant's phone was tracked in the same general location where the SUV was set on fire and the area of the South Park Inn, which was down the road from the burned SUV. He verified a picture from video surveillance at the South Park Inn showing Defendant, Lachney, and Ned in the frame, which was taken several hours after the murder.

We find the evidence presented to be more than sufficient, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, to establish all of the elements of second degree murder. According to Dennis's testimony, the victim was shot and killed during a planned and, at least, attempted armed robbery, a plan that was devised by Defendant. As a participant in the armed robbery, it matters not if Defendant fired the fatal shot, as he is guilty as a principal to the murder. “[U]nder general principles of accessorial liability, see La.R.S. 14:24, ‘all parties [to a crime] are guilty for deviations from the common plan which are the foreseeable consequences of carrying out the plan.’ ” State v. Smith, 98-2078, p. 7 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1139, 1143 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.5, p. 212 (1986)). However, Dennis testified that it was Defendant who shot and killed the victim. Additionally, the victim was shot in the head, which is evidence of intent to kill or, at the very least, to inflict great bodily harm. The act of “ ‘[d]eliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range are circumstances which will support a finding of specific intent to kill.’ ” State v. Romero, 21-173, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/21), 331 So.3d 444, 456 (quoting State v. Broaden, 99-2124, p. 18 (La. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 362, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122 S.Ct. 192 (2001)).⁹ We find the testimony of Dennis, by itself, was sufficient to support the conviction.

It is well-settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, absent internal contradictions or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, is sufficient to support a conviction. The credibility of the witness is a matter of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency, and determination of the credibility is left to the trier-of-fact's sound discretion and will not be re-weighed on appeal.

State v. Jeter, 09-1004, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 33 So.3d 1041, 1043-44.

Dennis's testimony was not contradicted by the physical or other evidence presented at trial but, rather, was consistent therewith. The extensive cell-phone location tracking data was consistent with his testimony that he and Lachney cased the location of the murder on January 28, that he did so again prior to the murder, that he, Dennis, and Ned were together at the location at the time of the murder, and that they fled the area by ultimately going to Houston, where he and Defendant burned the SUV used to commit the crime. The significant and extensive ALPR data recovered was consistent with Dennis's testimony, including the arson investigators’ discovery of surveillance camera footage of two men burning the SUV just down the road from the Houston motel where all of the parties were later identified on video footage.

While Defendant contests Dennis's credibility, that conclusion was made by the jury, and it is not our role to reweigh or reevaluate that decision. “It is the role of the fact-finder to weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will not second-guess the credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond our sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review.” State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559, 563 (La. 1983). Dennis was examined and cross examined extensively about his reasons for testifying, his hope for leniency, his previous untrue statements or misstatements to detectives, and his extensive criminal history, and yet the jury accepted his account of the facts leading up to and after the murder. Given the extensive corroborating evidence, the result of a thorough and highly professional investigation, we find no error in that decision. Accordingly, Defendant's conviction for second degree murder is affirmed. As Defendant did not contest the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction of obstruction of justice, that conviction is also affirmed.

Admission of Expert Testimony

In his first assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Captain Lavergne as the State failed to provide adequate and timely notice of the substance of his opinions in violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 719 and Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.¹⁰

Defendant does not set forth any Daubert rationale as reason for exclusion but rather argues that “the State failed to meet its obligations under Article 719 with respect to its cell site location mapping expert, Captain Travis Lavergne[ ]” and that “[t]he defense was consequently deprived of a fair opportunity to prepare for Captain Lavergne's testimony, and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it over the defense's objections.”

On appeal, a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion review. “The trial court is accorded vast discretion concerning the admission of evidence, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” O'Neill v. Thibodeaux, 97-1065, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98), 709 So.2d 962, 969, writ denied, 98-0741 (La.5/1/98); 718 So.2d 416, writ denied, 98-0870 (La.5/1/98); 718 So.2d 420, citing Maddox v. Omni Drilling Corp., 96-1673 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/6/97); 698 So.2d 1022, writ denied, 97-2766 (La. 1/30/98); 709 So.2d 706.

Libersat v. J & K Trucking, Inc., 00-192, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/00), 772 So.2d 173, 179, writ denied, 01-458 (La. 4/12/01), 789 So.2d 598.

The abuse of discretion standard also applies to the admission or exclusion of expert testimony in criminal trials. State v. Friday, 10-2309 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/17/11), 73 So.3d 913, writ denied, 11-1456 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So.3d 1258.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 719(A) provides the basis for Defendant's challenge to the admissibility of Captain Lavergne's testimony and opinions:

Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect and copy, photograph, or otherwise reproduce any results or reports, or copies thereof, of a physical or mental examination, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in connection with or material to the particular case, that are in the possession, custody, control, or knowledge of the district attorney and intended for use at trial. If the witness preparing the report will be called as an expert, the report shall contain the witness's area of expertise, his qualifications, a list of materials upon which his conclusion is based, and his opinion and the reason therefor. If the expert witness has not reduced his results to writing, or if the expert witness's written report does not contain the information required of an expert as provided in this Article, the state must produce for the defendant a written summary containing any information required to be produced pursuant to this Article but absent from a written report, if any, including the name of the expert witness, his qualifications, a list of materials upon which his conclusion is based and his opinion and the reason therefor.

As noted by both Defendant and the State, this issue was heard pursuant to a Daubert motion filed by Defendant's trial counsel and disposed of on February 24, 2025, with the trial court ruling that the testimony and opinions of Captain Lavergne were admissible, and specifically, that the State had complied with the requirements of La.Code Crim.P. art. 719(A). We find no error in that ruling.

At the hearing, the State provided all materials reviewed and produced by Captain Lavergne and indicated that he had not produced a written opinion report. However, an email response from the State to Defendant's counsel was introduced, setting forth a summary of Captain Lavergne's expected testimony as well as his background, experience, and the materials relied upon:

Captain Travis Lavergne may be called as an expert witness in the State's case in chief at trial. Captain Lavergne has significant experience and training in the field of cellular record data and mapping analysis. A copy of his CV is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

Captain Lavergne is relying upon the phone records provided in discovery which are associated with Kevin Williams, Jr., William Dennis, Justin Ned, and Autoria Lachney before, during, and after the crimes charged in this case.

Anticipated conclusions from Captain Lavergne are the following:

The phones of Kevin Williams, Jr., William Dennis, and Justin Ned were in consistent locations prior to the murder in DeQuincy, LA. The individuals’ phones then traveled consistently with each other to an area consistent with the scene of the murder. Each phone, with varying degrees of specificity and across two different carriers, places it in an area consistent with the crime scene.

Furthermore, video surveillance from the trailer park corroborates the phone records at the scene of the murder. The vehicle seen on the surveillance is consistent with the type of vehicle owned by Autoria Lachney and in use by Kevin Williams. Even further, Justin Ned's DNA was found through his blood at the scene of the murder. This is consistent with cell phone communications referencing Justin being shot.

The three phones at issue then travel consistently with each other to Houston, TX. At no time do the various phones show a location inconsistent with various license plate readers during their travel to Texas.

During the time of the crime, Autoria Lachney's phone shows a location consistent with her apartment in Lake Charles. Early the next morning, Autoria Lachney was stopped by CPSO in Vinton, LA driving a vehicle belonging to Justin Ned's girlfriend. Ms. Lachney had belongings of Mr. Williams with her when stopped. Her phone's general estimated location during this stop was confirmed by the location in which she was pulled over. Ms. Lachney was on the phone with Kevin Williams, Jr. during this traffic stop.

The same cell phone location technology and expertise was utilized to pinpoint a [sic] the location of a photograph of Autoria Lachney in a vehicle at a Circle K in Houston, TX.

Furthermore, the same technology was used to show Ms. Lachney's phone at a location consistent with a motel in Houston, TX, where Mr. Williams, Mr. Dennis, Mr. Ned, and Ms. Lachney are shown on surveillance video after the murder.

The same technology that was used to show the phones of the three murder defendants at a location consistent with being at the scene of the crime was used to track Ms. Lachney and Mr. Williams when they were fugitives. This technology led detectives to a home in Lake Charles where Mr. Williams, Ms. Lachney, and the cell phone being tracked where [sic] all located.

In addition, the PowerPoint presentation sought to be utilized at trial by the State through Captain Lavergne's testimony was also introduced at the hearing.¹¹ This further contained the conclusions and opinions of the witness. Clearly, the summary required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 719(A) was provided. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Defendant's motion to exclude Captain Lavergne's opinions, which were drawn from the evidence tendered to Defendant during discovery concerning cellular record data and mapping.

Confrontation Clause

In his next assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by admitting testimonial hearsay, including text-message communications from non-testifying individuals, and by allowing a witness to narrate the contents of those communications. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the substance of the text messages from Lachney to Defendant and from Bertrand to Ned, asserting that such was hearsay and a violation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).

In Crawford, 541 U.S. at 1374 (footnote omitted), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits “testimonial statements” by out-of-court declarants unless they were unavailable for trial and had been subjected to prior cross examination, stating as follows:

Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial.” Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.

Other than the examples of testimonial statements to which the holding applies, the Court left open the issue of other specific types of testimonial evidence covered thereby. In a later opinion in Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245-46, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (quoting from Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011)), the Supreme Court, in discussing its “primary purpose” test for determining whether a statement is testimonial, stated, “Thus, under our precedents, a statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose was testimonial. ‘Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.’ ”

Here, the State argues that the evidence of the text messages is not testimonial, and thus, not subject to exclusion by the Confrontation Clause. We agree. In State v. Lang, 13-21, pp. 15-18 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/9/13), 128 So.3d 330, 338-40 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted), writ denied, 13-2614 (La. 5/2/14), 138 So.3d 1244, the fifth circuit considered a similar argument regarding text messages, finding them to be non-testimonial:

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee an accused in a criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnesses against him. State v. Jackson, 03-883, p. 17 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/27/04), 880 So.2d 841, 852, writ denied, 04-1399 (La. 11/8/04), 885 So.2d 1118. In Crawford, supra, the Supreme Court restricted the admissibility of testimonial statements as evidence at a criminal trial in situations when the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

The Crawford Court, however, determined that for a statement to be “testimonial,” the statement at a minimum must include: “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and police interrogations.” State v. Leonard, 05-42, p. 19 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/26/05), 910 So.2d 977, 989, writ denied, 06-2241 (La.6/1/07), 957 So.2d 165 (citing Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at 1374). The Crawford Court stated that “testimony” is “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” State v. Leonard, 05-42 at 19-20, 910 So.2d at 989 (citing Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at 1364).

The Sixth Amendment bestows a right of confrontation to confront witnesses who “bear testimony” against him; according to the Supreme Court, an accuser making a formal statement to government officials bears testimony in a sense that a person making a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. Leonard, supra. As examples of testimonial statements, the Crawford Court lists affidavits, custodial examinations, depositions, prior testimony, confessions, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used in a prosecution. The Crawford Court also refers to statements as testimonial that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. State v. Leonard, 05-42 at 20, 910 So.2d at 989-90 (citing Crawford, supra, 124 S.Ct. at 1364).

No published Louisiana cases address the issue of whether text messages are testimonial or non-testimonial under Crawford. However, cases in other jurisdictions have addressed that issue and found that the text messages in those cases were non-testimonial. Louisiana cases have addressed the issue of non-testimonial communication being admissible.

In State v. Damper, 223 Ariz. 572, 225 P.3d 1148 (Ariz.Ct.App.2010), the Arizona appellate court concluded that because the content and circumstances of the text at issue demonstrated that the individual did not send it for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact, the message was non-testimonial. In Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.3d 845 (Nev.2012), Rodriguez suggested that the admission of the text messages raised a confrontation issue; however, the Nevada Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the text messages were neither hearsay nor testimonial.

Similarly, this Court has found that statements to a friend or family member in a private conversation are non-testimonial under Crawford. In State v. Leonard, supra, the trial court permitted the murder victim's girlfriend to testify that the victim told her he was going to Memphis with defendant to buy marijuana. This Court found that the victim's statements to his girlfriend were non-testimonial, because the statements, which were made in a private conversation, did not come within the purview of any of the classes of testimonial statements mentioned in Crawford, and were not made under circumstances in which an objective person would reasonably think that the statements would be available for use at a later trial. Id., 05-42 at 21, 910 So.2d at 990.

Likewise, in State v. Parks, 08-423 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 470, writ denied, 09-142 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 101, this Court found that the admission of statements the murder victim made to her niece over the telephone on the night of her death were non-testimonial and did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation. This Court found that the statements did not come within the purview of any of the classes of testimonial statements mentioned in Crawford. This Court noted that the victim was speaking to a friend, and not the police, and that the victim had no expectation that her statement would be of later use to help establish that defendant committed a crime, as she spoke informally and without coercion. Id., 08-423 at 16, 2 So.3d at 479. See also State v. Short, 06-1451, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/16/07), 958 So.2d 93, 97, writ denied, 07-1646 (La.2/1/08), 976 So.2d 715 (statements made were non-testimonial and their admission did not violate the ruling in Crawford, citing State v. Miller, 95 Conn.App. 362, 896 A.2d 844 (2006), “the statements at issue are the sort of remarks to an acquaintance that the Crawford [C]ourt proclaimed to be non-testimonial,” and “[t]he courts of this land, both federal and state, are in agreement that statements made to friends in unofficial settings do not constitute testimonial hearsay.”)

In the instant case, we find that the text messages are not testimonial under Crawford and do not violate defendant's right of confrontation. The statements contained within the text messages were made in casual, private conversations and did not come within the purview of any of the classes of testimonial statements mentioned in Crawford. Leonard, supra; Parks, supra. Additionally, defendant Lang, Henry, and the other participants, “Reginald” and Arzia Harris, had no expectation that their statements would be of later use to help establish that defendant committed a crime, as they spoke informally and without coercion. Id. The text messages of the co-conspirators, “Reginald” and Harris, are admissible as the other non-testifying co-conspirator, Henry. The trial court correctly concluded that a prima facie case of conspiracy was established, when she determined that the co-conspirators’ statements were made during the conspiracy and in furtherance thereof. See State v. Tsolainos, 2007-2443, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/10/08), 997 So.2d 46, 49, writ denied, 2008-2653 (La. 10/9/09), 19 So.3d 6 (admission of recorded conversation between non-testifying co-conspirators and confidential informant was “non-testimonial” and did not violate Confrontation Clause).

We agree with the fifth circuit's rationale in Lang and find that the text messages complained of are not testimonial evidence and, thus, are not violative of the Confrontation Clause as per Crawford. For this reason, there was no error in the admission of the text messages.

Defendant also argues that the text messages should have been excluded as hearsay. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” However, a statement offered against a party that is “[a] statement by a declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy, provided that a prima facie case of conspiracy is established[,]” is not hearsay. La.Code Evid. art. 801(D)(3)(b).

Leaving aside that analysis for the moment, we must consider whether the assigned error is cognizable on appeal. During Lieutenant Abshire's testimony, the State offered text-thread printouts of all text messages between Bertrand and Ned and between Lachney and Defendant. We note, as pointed out by the State in brief, that Defendant did not lodge any objection to the admissibility of Bertrand's or Lachney's text messages at the time they were admitted. The only objection from Defendant related to the discussion of a potential robbery, and the objection was based upon the admission of “other crimes” evidence pursuant to La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)(a):

Judge, we have a cell phone extraction from Mr. Williams that they plan on introducing. I don't have a problem with the communications with Ms. Lachney, which is pretty much what the police got in this matter. There's some other crime evidence in it that I'm objecting to introducing that.

Only later, after the voluminous messages had been admitted into evidence, did Defendant lodge the objection urging hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues as grounds for the objection. Indeed, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, counsel for Defendant admitted that there was no initial objection to the text messages and that they had already been admitted before any objection was lodged.

“An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 841(A). “The purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to allow the trial court the opportunity to rule on the objection and thereby prevent or cure an error.” State v. Bias, 95-541, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 674 So.2d 265, 267 (citing Herrod, 412 So.2d 564). The evidence complained of here had already been admitted without objection. Thus, absent a contemporaneous objection, Defendant cannot avail himself of the argument regarding the admissibility of the text messages as the assignment of error was not preserved for appellate review. As Defendant's hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections were made after the text messages were introduced into evidence and after many of the messages had been read into the record, any objection at that point was too late.

Further, we note that much of the text-message evidence was not highly relevant, as noted by the trial court on at least one occasion, and was further cumulative of other evidence that was already admitted. Such evidence, although arguably inadmissible, is harmless as it “is merely cumulative or corroborative of other testimony introduced at trial[.]” State v. Durisseau, 25-192, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/25), 423 So.3d 1192, 1201, writ denied, 25-1537 (La. 5/12/26), 430 So.3d 1088.

Discovery Abuses and Systemic Errors

In this error, Defendant argues that systematic discovery-related flaws arose at trial and that the cumulative effect of such should result in a new trial. He raises three sub-errors in this assignment. The first focuses on La.Code Crim.P. art. 719(A), and Defendant's assertion that he did not receive sufficient pretrial information regarding Captain Lavergne's anticipated trial testimony. As this argument has already been found to be without merit, it bears no consideration in his “cumulative error” argument.

In his second sub-error, Defendant argues that improper other crimes evidence entered the record via Defendant's text messages, which suggested his connection to an unrelated robbery. The particular messages are contained in the extraction records for the cell phone attributed to Defendant, which is found in State Exhibit 114(D). The messages were sent to and from a cell phone identified by the number (337) 301-1330, beginning on January 29, 2023, and ending on January 31, 2023, the same day as the robbery and murder of the victim. The first message related to this argument was sent by Defendant to the (337) 301-1330 number on January 29, saying, “I needa [sic] nice lick[.]” A few minutes later, Defendant responded to the number, stating, “You aint [sic] got no lick[,]” to which the (337) 301-1330 number replied, “Nah[.]” Approximately one hour later, the (337) 301-1330 number sent a message to Defendant, stating, “Ima [sic] link up with my ppl tomorrow and see if I can get a lick[.]” A January 31, 2023 message, with a time stamp of 7:12:02 p.m., sent from Defendant to that number states, “He gone [sic] sell it to him with no bullets and you can jack him and have a gun and get whatever money he has on him[.]” A message sent to Defendant from that number a few minutes later, with a time stamp of 7:14:11 p.m., states, “Like pick me up around the corner after I jack him[.]”

Defendant objected to these messages being introduced as part of the overall extracted text messages from his cell phone during Lieutenant Abshire's testimony, as noted above. The State answered the objection by arguing that counsel for Defendant had opened the door to the introduction of that evidence by asking Sergeant Savoie if he had any evidence that showed that Defendant intended to hit a “lick,” meaning commit a robbery. We agree.

The following colloquy occurred earlier in the trial during defense counsel's cross examination of Sergeant Savoie:

Q. Okay. You reviewed the cell phones of just about everybody in this case, right?

A. Yes.

Q. There were no text messages in there about we're going to rob Mr. Ardoin?

A. No.

Q. There were no text messages in there about we're going to shoot Mr. Ardoin?

A. No.

Q. Were there even any text messages in there that would give you some inkling about a group of people wanted [sic] to go rob someone?

A. Someone -- yes, Mr. Williams is speaking to someone in the text records and I believe it mentioned something about hitting a lick or something to that effect, which I'm familiar with that term or phrase in my line of work.

Q. I think what you're talking about is a mission, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is to purchase marijuana?

A. Ordinarily hitting a lick is more of -- something where it's more like a robbery.

Q. Right, but the -- and I'll show you the language, but the language is not hitting a lick.

A. Okay.

Q. So it was not hitting lick.

A. Okay.

During the bench conference on the issue during Lieutenant Abshire's testimony, the trial court admitted Defendant's text messages in full:

I'm going to allow the entirety of the text messages and cell phone extractions involving Kevin Williams because we've had dates throughout this trial that go back as far as the 28th through February 1st, I think the 2nd, and some other dates, and everyone is asking everyone about what others are doing and participating in. I'm going to allow it as part of the time frame at issue in this litigation, so the full packet comes in.

Some of these messages appear to represent a discussion of the very crime planned, the robbery of the victim, which took place just before midnight on January 31. They are consistent with other evidence establishing that Defendant and his cohorts began planning the robbery some time earlier, they cased the victim's mobile home by driving past it, and they called him on the night of the murder to set up the drug deal. This is not other crimes evidence but evidence of the crime itself and is certainly admissible as evidence against Defendant. As to any messages that may be referring to Defendant's planning of other robberies, or “licks,” counsel for Defendant indeed opened the door to the introduction of the messages in his earlier attempt to discredit Sergeant Savoie by trying to obtain an admission that Defendant had not made any such statements. “Once the defense opens the door in cross examination on a subject, it becomes a proper subject for redirect.” State v. Jordan, 13-807, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/23/14), 145 So.3d 388, 397, writ denied, 14-1095 (La. 2/13/15), 159 So.3d 459. There was no error in its admission.

Further, we find that any error in the admission of these particular messages was, at worst, harmless error. Even if, arguendo, the messages relate to some other planned crime, they are far too cryptic and unspecific to provide any real context and could be interpreted as involving the very crime committed here. “[I]nadmissible other-crimes evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis.” State v. Barnes, 13-576, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 127 So.3d 1070, 1073, writ denied, 14-43 (La. 6/13/14), 140 So.3d 1188. In this instance, any such error complained of surely did not contribute to the verdict as it is minor in relation to “the amount of evidence demonstrating Defendant's guilt” that “far outweighs any prejudice caused by the brief mention of the fact that Defendant” may have discussed another potential robbery. State v. Guidry, 18-867, p. 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/19), 271 So.3d 275, 289, writ denied, 19-1363 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So.3d 66.

Defendant's argument under his third sub-error is that the State failed to properly inform him of inculpatory information obtained from Dennis, which amounted to a due process violation as per Brady, 373 U.S. 83. As previously mentioned under the Jackson review, Dennis admitted on the witness stand that he had taken a half pound of marijuana from the scene. Defendant argues that the State failed to disclose this information before trial, and thus, he was unable to properly prepare for cross-examination or adjust his trial strategy. However, the State argues that as Defendant's trial counsel failed to enter a contemporaneous objection to this statement, this issue is barred from review on appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841. We agree.

We also note that Defendant's trial counsel acknowledged that he learned of the evidence in a timely manner, as it was disclosed immediately after the State learned of it through Dennis's admission. Further, it was disclosed before Dennis took the stand to testify and was, in fact, the subject of extensive cross examination by defense counsel. Thus, there was no Brady violation, which is the post-conviction discovery of evidence intentionally or negligently withheld by the State. “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. This argument lacks merit as the evidence was disclosed as soon as it was learned, it was disclosed before the witness testified, and it was used during both direct and cross-examination. As there was no error, it is not a basis for Defendant's multiple errors argument.

In State v. Holliday, 17-1921, pp. 87-88 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So.3d 648, 714 (alteration in original), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1271 (2021), the supreme court found that cumulative harmless errors do not equate to a substantive error warranting a reversal of a defendant's conviction:

This Court has noted that, “the combined effect of the incidences complained of, none of which amounts to reversible error [does] not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.” State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 544-45 (La. 1988), quoting State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123, 137 (La. 1982), appeal dismissed, 461 U.S. 950, 103 S.Ct. 2419, 77 L.Ed.2d 1309 (1983). Although the Court has often reviewed cumulative error arguments, it has continually rejected them. Instead, the Court has consistently found that harmless errors, however numerous, do not aggregate to reach the level of reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Strickland, 93-0001, pp. 51-52 (La. 11/1/96), 683 So.2d 218, 239; State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364 (unpub'd app'x.); State v. Tart, 94-0025, p. 55 (La. 2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116, 164; State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 544-45 (La. 1988) (citing State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123, 13 7 (La. 1982)); State v. Sheppard, 350 So.2d 615, 651 (La. 1977)). Other courts have reached the same conclusion in addressing this issue. See, e.g., Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (court rejects cumulative error claim and finds that “twenty times zero equals zero”); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1303 (Miss. 1994) (finding no “near errors” and rejecting cumulative error analysis). This Court did not find any substantive error in the lower court proceedings and therefore no cumulative error warranting reversal exists.

Defendant has not established the existence of multiple cumulative errors, much less any substantive errors. Accordingly, this argument has no merit.

Denial of Mistrial and Removal of Juror

In his final assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial, and then by removing a juror and seating an alternate juror when it was revealed mid-trial that the removed juror was the step-grandmother of the victim's girlfriend, Whatley. Defendant argues that the juror in question, Juror 171, was the only African American juror on the jury as earlier Batson-contested strikes had removed all other African American venire members.¹² He claims that the late disclosure of Juror 171's relationship to the witness during trial fundamentally tainted the jury-selection process and defense counsel's exercise of his peremptory challenges.

On February 26, 2025, after trial had commenced and evidence had been introduced, the trial court was made aware of the fact that Juror 171 was related to Whatley. In his appellate brief, Defendant argued that he moved for a mistrial on February 27, for the following reasons:

(1) the process of removing all four African-American jurors may have taken a different course had [Juror 171] truthfully disclosed her close relationship to the State's witness during voir dire; (2) the court might also have evaluated the earlier Batson back-strikes of Dangerfield and Chretien differently; and (3) the late revelation that the only African-American juror was the step-grandmother of the victim's girlfriend fundamentally tainted the jury-selection process.” Counsel also noted that this was a “high-profile” case in the local community, particularly in the African American community.

Following the trial court's denial of the motion, counsel for Defendant assented to strike Juror 171 from the jury panel and to replace her with the first alternate juror, resulting in an all-white jury. Insofar as Defendant complains that the trial court erred in replacing Juror 171 rather than granting a mistrial, leading to her replacement with the first alternate juror, he cannot now complain of any error as to such on appeal. Defendant requested and moved for this very result after the mistrial was denied. Our brethren on the fourth circuit dealt with a near identical issue in State v. Henderson, 25-97, pp. 19-20 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/30/25) ––– So.3d ––––, –––– (alterations in original), holding as follows:

On appeal, Defendant further challenges the trial court's decision to replace Principal Juror 11 with an alternate juror on the fourth day of trial. Our review of the record reflects that this issue is not preserved for appeal. The record reflects that an issue concerning Juror 11 arose toward the end of the trial wherein it became apparent that the juror was not engaged or was struggling with being present at trial. After the trial court questioned Juror 11 on the fourth day of trial, the trial court indicated that Juror 11 would be dismissed as he could not handle the “long days” and that he may have “other issues” going on. Defense counsel did not object to Juror H's removal. Conversely, when discussing Juror 11's replacement, defense counsel agreed and stated, “I think he needs to be gone ․ he's shaking․”

Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A), “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” One purpose of this rule is so that “the trial judge can cure the error.” State v. Lanclos, 07-0082, p. 6 (La. 4/8/08), 980 So.2d 643, 648. Upon review of the record, we find Defendant did not timely object to the removal of Juror 11 but rather agreed with his removal at trial. This issue was not preserved for appeal.

Here, Defendant acquiesced in the removal of Juror 171, necessitating her replacement with the first alternate juror. Thus, he cannot now complain of the very result he himself precipitated.

Insofar as the denial of Defendant's mistrial motion, we find no error in the trial court's ruling. “A mistrial may be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when[ ]” “[t]here is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law[.]” La.Code Crim.P. art. 775(3). “A mistrial may also be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when[ ]” “[f]alse statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 775(6). None of the other grounds for mistrial are applicable here.

The decision to grant or deny a mistrial “rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the denial of a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Green, 98-1388, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/31/99), 735 So.2d 723, 729, writ denied, 00-2904 (La. 8/24/01), 795 So.2d 323. “Mistrial should be ordered only where prejudice suffered by the defendant has deprived him of any reasonable expectation of a fair trial.” Id. “[A] mistrial is a drastic remedy that should only be declared upon a clear showing of prejudice by the defendant[,]” and “[t]he mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient to warrant a mistrial.” State v. Johnson, 09-706, p. 22 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/26/10), 41 So.3d 1188, 1203.

Despite his argument, we note that Defendant failed to challenge the make-up of the jury venire prior to jury selection. Only now does he complain that the panel did not contain a cross-section of the community. He argues that the venire contained only four prospective African American jurors: Juror 34, Juror 171, Juror 64, and Juror 341. He concedes that potential Juror 341 was excused for cause based on difficulty seeing and retaining information, and the record reflects no objection to that ruling. Jurors 34 and 64 were initially accepted but later back struck by the State, prompting Batson challenges, which the trial court overruled, and which rulings are not at issue here. Juror 171 was the only remaining African American juror, and she was selected and sworn in, serving until the disclosure and her removal, to which Defendant agreed.

Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. arts. 532(9) and 533(1), any claim that “the petit jury venire was improperly drawn, selected, or constituted[ ]” or that “[t]he manner of selection of the general venire ․ was illegal[,]” must be raised via written general or special motion to quash filed before the commencement of trial. Our supreme court has previously noted that an oral objection is insufficient to raise the claim. State v. Francis, 285 So.2d 191 (La. 1973). This court has stated that “[t]he failure of a defendant to timely file a motion to quash, contesting the petite jury venire, constitutes a waiver of that objection.” State v. Williams, 617 So.2d 557, 560-61 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1331 (La. 1993). Having failed, at the very least, to properly challenge the makeup of the jury venire at the time of jury selection, Defendant cannot do so now.

Further, Defendant's argument that the trial court might have ruled differently on his Batson challenges of the other two back-struck African-American jurors had Juror 171 been released for cause during jury selection, is mere speculation, without supporting facts or substantive reasoning. Accordingly, we find Defendant's allegation of error in this regard lacks merit and is rejected.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error patent.

The trial court gave Defendant incomplete advice as to the time period for filing post-conviction relief. The trial court advised Defendant the he had “two years from the date your conviction is final to file an application for post-conviction relief[.]” Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8(A) (emphasis added) states, “No application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922[.]” Because the trial court failed to advise Defendant that the two-year period for filing post-conviction relief begins when his judgment of conviction and sentence become final, Defendant is notified by this opinion that the time period for filing post-conviction relief shall be within two years after his judgment of conviction and sentence has become final. See State v. Lewis, 25-398, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/11/26), 433 So.3d 122, 128 (“Because the trial court improperly advised [the defendant], this opinion can and will serve as notice of the correct time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief”).

DECREE

Defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree murder are affirmed, as are his conviction and sentence for obstruction of justice. Defendant is, hereby, notified that he has two years from the finality of his convictions and sentences to file for post-conviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

2.   Dennis was the last witness to testify for the State. We review his testimony first as it provides context for the other evidence presented.

3.   Dennis's attorney was present in court during his testimony.

4.   The State advised the court and counsel for Defendant earlier in the trial and prior to him testifying that Dennis initially failed to disclose that he actually took marijuana from the scene of the crime after the victim was murdered, and that he disclosed such for the first time just before trial. Defendant's trial counsel acknowledged on the record when this was disclosed and offered no objection.

5.   Defendant was twenty-six years old at the time of trial.

6.   Ned's blood was recovered at the scene, and DNA testing matched it to known samples drawn from him, as per DNA expert Monica Quaal with the Southwest Louisiana Crime Lab.

7.   “Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) have been part of law enforcement's toolkit for well over two decades[ ]” and “use cameras and software to automatically capture, analyze, and store vehicle license plate information[ ]” before matching “license plate numbers against databases to generate alerts and create records of vehicle activity.” Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/saver/automatic-license-plate-readers (visited Aug. 17, 2026).

8.   Hornady is a registered trademark and brand name for Hornady Manufacturing Company, “a world leader in bullet, ammunition, reloading tool, and accessory design and manufacturing[.]” University of Nebraska at Omaha, Nebraska Business Development Center, https://www.unomaha.edu/nebraska-business-development-center/about/success-stories/hornady-manufacturing.php (last visited on Aug. 17, 2026).

9.   Pursuant to 2026 La. Acts No. 120 § 1, effective August 1, 2026, the legislature enacted La.R.S. 14:30.1(C) to provide the following presumption: “For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(1) of this Section, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the act of pointing and firing a firearm at another human being constitutes specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.”

10.   Under Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, a trial court performs “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”

11.   The PowerPoint presentation was actually utilized and introduced into evidence at trial during the witness's testimony.

12.   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).

KYZAR, Judge.