BUTTROSS III v. BUTTROSS (2026)

Defendant, Mia Angelle Mansour Buttross, appeals from the judgment of the trial court regarding the awards of child support and spousal support. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant and Plaintiff, David Buttross, III, were married on September 21, 2002. The couple are the parents of five children, Mary Buttross (born in 2003), Madelyn Buttross (born in 2005), Elizabeth Buttross (born in 2006), Layla Buttross (born in 2011), and David Buttross, IV (born in 2014). On November 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Divorce and Determination of Incidental Matters. On December 1, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer and Reconventional Demand asserting entitlement to interim and permanent spousal support as well as child support.

The parties participated in a hearing officer conference on May 25, 2023, and a hearing officer conference report containing recommendations/temporary orders was issued by the hearing officer on June 2, 2023. The hearing officer's report provided that the parties were to submit a joint stipulation for joint custody with a 60/40 percent access schedule during the school year and a 50/50 percent access schedule during the summer. The hearing officer noted that Plaintiff ¹ was the primary breadwinner with Defendant being unemployed throughout the marriage, but finding that she did receive $3,562.00 per month income from rental property. The parties’ total income over the past three years averaged $794,5 83.00 or $66,215.00 per month. Defendant estimated the parties’ combined monthly income to be $46,000.00 to $52,000.00 after deductions. Plaintiff argued that most of their income is reinvested and estimated the parties take home income to be $33,000.00 per month. The hearing officer's findings noted that the parties combined monthly income exceeded that listed on the child support schedule and, therefore, the court is granted discretion in setting the support with the requirement that the best interests of the children and the parties’ circumstances be considered. The basic monthly child support obligation for four minor children was calculated to be $5,684.00 (Plaintiff's share $5,178.00) and for three minor children to be $5,098.00 (Plaintiff's share $4,644.00).² The hearing officer noted the fact that “the children's accustomed lifestyles and expenses far exceed those amounts and FATHER has the ability to continue their standard of living.” Based on these considerations, the hearing officer issued the following recommendations:

[1] Plaintiff shall pay child support to Defendant in the amount of $4,257.00 per month, effective 12/1/22, with half payable on the 1st and 15th of each month, subject to a credit for payments made since the date of the filing of this request for child support.

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[2] Plaintiff shall maintain health and hospitalization insurance coverage for the child(ren) and shall provide the other party with a copy of the policy, health care providers and insurance card(s) necessary to allow him/her to secure treatment and/or medication for the child(ren) or shall provide the other party with the means to secure the information/documentation if the health insurance provider does not routinely provide the information/documentation to the insured.

[3] All medical expenses not covered by insurance, childcare expenses, reasonable and customary extracurricular activities, and private school tuition, registration, books, and supplies.

PLAINTIFF (100 %)

[4] All other extraordinary expenses, incurred by or on behalf of the child(ren) shall be shared in the following percentages:

PLAINTIFF (92%) DEFENDANT (8%)

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[5] Effective 12 /1/22 and so long as DEFENDANT remains in the marital home, PLAINTIFF shall pay the following debts enumerated below, in lieu of payment of interim spousal support directly to DEFENDANT, subject to a credit for payments made since the date of filing of this request for interim spousal support [ISS], and PLAINTIFF shall not receive reimbursement in the partitioning of community property of acquets and gains for the payment of the debts enumerated:

1. mortgage, homeowner's insurance, and utilities (water, electric, gas), Defendant's current car note and insurance.

[6] Should Defendant move out of the home during the period of ISS, PLAINTIFF shall pay interim spousal support to DEFENDANT in the amount of $8,500.00 per month, plus her current car note and insurance effective the 1st day of the following month she moves out of home (Ex if moving out in August, then first payment due 9/1) with half payable on the 1st and 15th of each month, subject to a credit for payments made since the date of filing of this request for interim spousal support [ISS].

The hearing officer's recommendations also provided that if Plaintiff has maintained the entire families’ expenses and paid Defendant $3,800.00 per month, since January 2023, then Plaintiff shall be considered current on both spousal and child support, and the support recommendations shall be applied prospectively with the first payment being due on June 1, 2023.

The parties executed the joint stipulation on May 30, 2023, granting each parent joint custody of the minor children with a 60/40 access schedule during the school year and 50/50 access schedule during summer/holidays. Defendant was named the domiciliary parent over educational and developmental issues and Plaintiff was named as domiciliary parent over medical issues. Defendant was granted exclusive use and occupancy of the family home until October 31, 2023, and Plaintiff was granted the right to live in the pool house. Upon Defendant moving out of the family home Plaintiff was to be granted exclusive occupancy of the family home.

On June 12, 2023, Defendant timely filed with the trial court an appeal of the hearing officer's recommendations, asserting error in both the child support and spousal support determinations.

The hearing on Defendant's appeal of the hearing officer's recommendations was held before the trial court on July 16, 2024, and January 16, 2025. The trial court issued an oral ruling concerning this matter on April 23, 2025, with the judgment being signed on June 17, 2025. Regarding child support and spousal support, the judgment provided:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that child support shall be payable to Mia by David and shall be payable 1/2 on the 1st day of each month and 1/2 on the 15th day of each month as set forth below:

A. Period 1: From December 1, 2022, through May 31, 2023 - child support shall be fixed in the sum of Seven Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Eight Dollars and No/100 ($7,178.00);

B. Period 2: From June 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023 - child support shall be fixed in the sum of Six Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars and No/100 ($6,435.00);

C. Period 3: From January 1, 2024, through May 31, 2025 - child support shall be fixed in the sum of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars and No/100 ($4,957.00);

D. Period 4: Beginning June 1, 2025, and continuing forward - child support shall be fixed in the sum of Three Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Three Dollars and No/100 ($3,973.00);

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that David shall maintain the minor children on health insurance and all medical expenses not covered by insurance shall be paid using the same percentages of the parties’ income with David being responsible for 95% and Mia responsible for 5%.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that David is responsible for 100% of all private school tuition, registration, and books for the minor children.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that David is entitled to claim all tax deductions for the minor children every year and Mia shall execute any documents necessary to allow David to claim the minor children. This shall include all deductions and tax credits available.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that David shall pay interim spousal support to Mia as follows:

A. Period 1: From December 1, 2022, through August 31, 2023 - Interim spousal support shall be fixed as set forth in the Hearing Officer Conference Report filed on June 14, 2023; specifically: David shall pay the full amount due on the mortgage, homeowner's insurance, utilities (water, electric, gas), and Mia's car note and insurance, all subject to a credit for payments made since the date of filing of the request for interim spousal support, and David shall not receive reimbursement in the partitioning of the community property of acquets and gains for the repayment of the debts enumerated;

B. Period 2: From September 1, 2023, through July 18, 2024 - Interim spousal support shall be fixed in the amount of $7,500.00 per month.

Defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court asserting the following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court committed legal error in its calculation of child support, which led to woefully inadequate child support awards for the needs of the children.

2. The amount of ISS awarded by the trial court was insufficient to provide for Mia's needs.

OPINION

Child Support

The hearing officer determined that the parties’ average gross income for the three year period of 2019 to 2021 was $794,583.00 a year or $66,215.00 per month. Based on these figures, the hearing officer recommended that Plaintiff pay Defendant child support in the amount of $4,257.00 effective December 1, 2022. Plaintiff was also to pay for all of the children's insurance, extraordinary medical expenses, all medical expenses not covered by insurance, childcare expenses, extracurricular expenses, and all school expenses.

The trial court, on appeal from the hearing officer determination, indicated in its oral ruling that it had reviewed the exhibits concerning the couple's income and testimony of Mr. Michael Terranova, the couple's certified public accountant, to determine the combined gross income for the parties. The court explained that La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(a) defines gross income as, “income from any source, including but not limited to salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, recurring monetary gifts, annuities, capital gains,” et cetera. The court utilized the five year period from 2018 to 2022 to arrive at a combined monthly average gross income of $64,149.00, of which Plaintiff's portion was $60,587.00 (94%) and Defendant's portion was $3,562.00 (6%).³

The trial court noted that since the combined adjusted gross income for the parties exceeded the highest level specified in La.R.S. 9:315.19, La.R.S. 9:315.13 was applicable. The applicable version of La.R.S. 9:315.13 ⁴ provided in pertinent part:

B. If the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeds the highest level specified in the schedule contained in R.S. 9:315.19, the court:

(1) Shall use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the child and the circumstances of each parent as provided in Civil Code Article 141, but in no event shall it be less than the highest amount set forth in the schedule[.]

Regarding his calculation of child support pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.13(B), the trial court in its reasons explained:

The jurisprudence is [sic] held that there is no universal mathematical formula for calculating the amount of child support to be paid when the parties’ combined adjusted income exceeds the child support guidelines.

The amount of child support in a specific matter is to be judged on a case-by-case basis. There is no mathematical formula. The primary factors are a parent's ability to pay and the lifestyle that the children would have enjoyed had the parents not separated but the overriding factor being the best interest of the children. A trial Court must consider the totality of circumstances present in each case and formulate an award of child support accordingly.

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The first time period that the Court is going to address for child support is from the date of the filing of child support, which is December the 1st, 2022 to May 31st of 2023. This period will cover a time when the child support obligation pertains to four children. That is Madelyn; Elizabeth; Layla; and David, IV.[5]

Based on the lifestyle of the parties and the lifestyle to which the children were accustomed, the circumstances of each parent, and in accordance with the best interest of the children, the Court finds that the basic child support obligation based on a combined gross income of the [$]64,149, again was $60,587 attributable to David or 94 percent and $3,562 per month attributable to Mia or 6 percent. The basic child support obligation will be $8,500 per month. With this, the Court considered the expenses of the children contained in Mia No. 10 and the extra payments made by David found in DB No. 10 to arrive at this amount.

The trial court noted that the support guidelines contained in La.R.S. 9:315.19 at the time of filing had a maximum combined adjusted income of $40,000.00 with the highest support amount for four children being $5,684.00 per month and $5,098.00 per month for three children. The trial court then adjusted the basic child support obligation by adding the children's health insurance premium cost of $349.00 ($87.26 per child x 4) pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.4.⁶ The trial court also added other extraordinary expenses pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.6 which totaled $2,325.00 per month for the four children. This increased the child support obligation to $11,174.00. From this figure the court then multiplied Plaintiff's percentage of the combined gross income (94%) to determine Plaintiff's support obligation of $10,504.00. The court then subtracted the direct payments made by Plaintiff for the children's tuition ($2,674.00) and health insurance ($349.00) to reduce Plaintiff's support obligation to $7,830.00. Finally, the trial court applied a visitation credit (11/12) pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.8(e) to reduce the support obligation to $7,178.00 for the period of December 1, 2022, to May 31, 2023, with Plaintiff to pay directly the children's tuition and health insurance.

The second period the trial court addressed was from June 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023. For this period there were only three children entitled to child support. The combined gross income was calculated to be $66,899.00 per month with $63,337.00 (95%) being attributable to Plaintiff and $3,562.00 (5%) being attributable to Defendant.⁷ The court noted that the highest child support amount for three children set forth in the schedule in effect for this period of time was $5,098.00 per month based on a maximum combined adjusted income of $40,000.00. The basic child support obligation was set by the court at $7,500.00 per month. For the three children, the court then added the insurance cost of $262.00 and the tuition and fees cost of $1,829.00 per month to arrive at $9,591.00 for the total monthly support obligation. The court then multiplied this amount by Plaintiff's percentage of the combined gross income (95%) to arrive at Plaintiff's monthly support obligation of $9,111.00. From this figure the court then subtracted the direct payments made by Plaintiff for insurance and tuition, $262.00 and $1,829.00 respectively, to reach a monthly support obligation of $7,020.00. The court then applied the visitation credit (11/12) to arrive at monthly support obligation for Plaintiff of $6,435.00. Plaintiff was to also pay directly the children's tuition and health insurance.

The next support period addressed was January 1, 2024, to May 31, 2025. Although this period still involved three children, the custody of the children had now changed to that of shared custody with the parties equally sharing custody time with the children on a week-to-week basis. The figures utilized for this support calculation period were the same as those utilized for the period of June 1, 2023, to December 31, 2023. Because of the shared custody arrangement, the trial court determined Plaintiff's monthly support obligation to be $4,957.00, with Plaintiff to pay directly the children's tuition and health insurance.

The final child support period addressed by the trial court was from June 1, 2025, onward. This period only involved the two youngest children. The same figures were once again utilized for the calculation for this period. The trial court noted that the new revised child support guidelines contained in La.R.S. 9:315.19 became effective as of January 1, 2025. Pursuant to these revised guidelines, the maximum combined adjusted monthly gross income is $50,000.00 and the highest amount set forth in the schedule for two children is $5,563.00 per month. Based on the lifestyle and the circumstances of the parents and the best interest of the children, the trial court set the basic child support obligation for the two children at $6,000.00 per month. The insurance for the two children was $174.00 per month, and the tuition and fees were $1,379.00 per month. Utilizing the revised support guidelines, the trial court determined that the total monthly child support Plaintiff owed to Defendant was $3,973.00. Plaintiff remained responsible for the payment of the health insurance and tuition and fees for the two children. The medical expenses not covered by insurance were to be paid using the same percentages of the parties income with Plaintiff being responsible for 95% of the expenses and Defendant being responsible for 5% of the expenses.

Therefore, the trial court set the following four periods of declining monthly child support obligation for Plaintiff in addition to the payment of health insurance and tuition/school cost:

It is Defendant's position that the trial court committed manifest error in its calculation of the child support awards. In Gary v. LeBlanc, 16-1054, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/17), 222 So.3d 784, 790-91, we stated:

Trial courts have great discretion in determining the amount of a child support award. Murphy v. Murphy, 894 So.2d 542 (La. 2/2/05). This court has clearly defined this standard of review by noting, “[w]e review child support determinations using the manifest error standard of review, and we will not disturb the trial court's support order unless it committed manifest error or an abuse of discretion in its determination.” Bergeron v. Bergeron, 11-130 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 75 So.3d 537, 540, writ denied, 11-2466 (La. 1/20/12), 78 So.3d 144; State, Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. L.T., Jr., 05-1965 (La. 7/6/06), 934 So.2d 687.

Defendant does acknowledge that the trial court was correct in recognizing that the combined adjusted gross income of the parties exceeded the highest level specified in the schedule contained in La.R.S. 9:315.19, and therefore, pursuant to La.R.S. 9:315.13, the trial court was to use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the child and the circumstances of each parent. Further, although Defendant concedes the trial court was correct in its legal analysis that these sort of cases must be judged on a case-by-case basis and that there is no mathematical formula for the calculation, Defendant argues the court nevertheless utilized a formula based incorrectly upon the procedures set forth in La.R.S. 9:315.8 and La.R.S. 9:315.9. Defendant asserts that this resulted in the trial court ignoring the factors set forth in La.R.S. 9:315.13, namely the parent's ability to pay and the best interest of the children.

Defendant avers that Louisiana jurisprudence provides that the trial court must look at the custodial parent's, Defendant here, reasonable expenses as an indicator of the children's lifestyle and best interest and that the jurisprudence does not support the reduction of child support obligation based on shared custody or direct payments for education and/or health insurance because these factors do not reduce the custodial parent's household expenses. In support of her position, Defendant references this court's decision in Allie v. Allie, 11-292, 11-293, pp. 4-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/30/11), 80 So.3d 644, 647-49, writ denied, 12-03 (La. 3/2/12), 84 So.3d 534, wherein we stated:

This court in Falterman v. Falterman, 97-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 702 So.2d 781, 783, writ not considered, 98-0076 (La. 3/13/98), 712 So.2d 863, addressed deviation from the child support guidelines in the instance of income exceeding the Louisiana Child Support Guidelines as follows:

La.R.S. 9:315.10(B) provides that, where the parties’ monthly combined adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000.00, “the court shall use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation, but in no event shall it be less than the highest amount set forth in the schedule.” And, attached to this statutorily guaranteed discretion, the trial court's judgment in such matters will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion. Krampe v. Krampe, 625 So.2d 383 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-2763 (La. 1/7/94), 630 So.2d 781. Furthermore, when setting the amount of child support to be paid by a parent, the court strives to maintain the lifestyle of the child, when possible, while considering the child's reasonably proven expenses and the parent's ability to provide. See Montet v. Montet, 629 So.2d 538 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993); Krampe, 625 So.2d 383 (Domengeaux, C.J., concurring); Hargett v. Hargett, 544 So.2d 705 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 548 So.2d 1235 (La. 1989).

The jurisprudence in our state consistently has recognized that there is “no universal mathematical formula” for calculating the amount of child support to be paid where the parties’ combined adjusted income exceeds the child support guidelines contained in La.R.S. 9:315.14. Serrate v. Serrate, 96-1545, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/96), 684 So.2d 1128, 1133. However, this court has held that simple extrapolation of the guidelines, without considering the child's needs, is not an acceptable method. Preis v. Preis, 93-569 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/94), 631 So.2d 1349 (rejecting Aguilar v. Wilson, 613 So.2d 228 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 66 (La. 1993)). In Preis, this court stated:

The support for a child or children of a more affluent lifestyle, as in this case, is a concern for the courts to address on a case by case method. We find by simply extrapolating from the guidelines without concern and discretion by the court in balancing the needs and lifestyle of the child or children, could lead to excessive child support awards.

Id. at 1356. A trial court must consider the totality of circumstances present in each case and formulate an award of child support accordingly. Rosenbloom v. Rosenbloom, 94-1762 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/26/95), 654 So.2d 877, writ denied, 95-1320 (La. 9/1/95), 658 So.2d 1266. While this court has recognized that some evidentiary proof of the children's needs is necessary, a trial court is not limited to an award of that amount. See Hector v. Raymond, 96-972 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/97), 692 So.2d 1284, writ denied, 97-1134 (La. 6/13/97), 695 So.2d 978; Preis, 93-569, 631 So.2d 1349. In Hector, this court affirmed a child support award where the mother did not present evidence of her child's needs in the amount of the support award. Hector, 96-972, 692 So.2d 1284. In support of that disposition, we stated:

[H]er support requirements were based on a situation which did not take into consideration the standard of living that Cody would be entitled to were he to reside with his father. See Hargett, 544 So.2d 705. We do not find that Cody should be denied the opportunity of a certain lifestyle that would be available to a minor child born to a legal union. We find that an award of $6,000.00 per month is just, legal, and proper based on our review of the record in these proceedings. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2164.

Id. at p. 7, 692 So.2d at 1288.

In Abbott v. Dunlap, 541 So.2d 995 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), this Court noted a father was not entitled to a reduction in child support where the mother's income was inconsequential in comparison to his. The mother's day-to-day care of the minor child was to be considered in reviewing her contribution to support. Id. “Moreover, it is well entrenched in Louisiana jurisprudence that children living with the mother are entitled to the same standard of living as if they resided with their father whenever the financial circumstances of the father permit.” Abbott, 541 So.2d at 998 (citing Howell v. Howell, 391 So.2d 1304 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1980); Davis v. Davis, 428 So.2d 1195 (La.App. 5 Cir.1983); Chaffee v. Chaffee, 398 So.2d 1169 (La.App. 2 Cir.1981); Hogan v. Hogan, 465 So.2d 73 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1985)).

In Sampognaro v. Sampognaro, 41,664, pp. 3-5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/14/07), 952 So.2d 775, 778-79, decision clarified on reh'g (4/11/07), writ denied, 07-937 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So.2d 500, the court explained:

The plaintiff contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay excessive child support of $5,500 per month. Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have applied LSA-R.S. 9:315.9 in calculating the child support obligation because each parent has physical custody of the children for an equal amount of time under their shared custody arrangement.

LSA-R.S. 9:315.19 provides a schedule to be used to determine basic child support. The highest level specified in the schedule is a combined adjusted gross monthly income of $20,000. At that level, for two children, the basic support amount is $2,647. However, LSA-R.S. 9:315.13(B) provides that if the parties’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest specified level, the court shall use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation in accordance with the best interest of the child and the circumstances of each parent as provided in LSA-C.C. art. 141, but in no event shall the payment be less than the highest amount stated in the schedule.

The overriding factor in determining the amount of support is the best interest of the children. The amount of support should be determined on a case-by-case basis. A parent's ability to pay and the lifestyle that the children would have enjoyed if the parents had not separated are important considerations. Jones v. Jones, 38,790 (La.App. 2d Cir. 6/25/04), 877 So.2d 1061; Reeves v. Reeves, 36,259 (La.App. 2d Cir. 7/24/02), 823 So.2d 1023. Pursuant to the express language of LSA-R.S. 9:315.13, the district court must use its discretion in setting the amount of the basic child support obligation when the parties’ monthly income exceeds the highest figure provided in the schedule, and its judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Jones, supra.

In the present case, the plaintiff submitted to the trial court a worksheet purportedly using the child support calculation provided in LSA-R.S. 9:315.9. In his brief, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have used the figures in his worksheet as the basis for setting his child support obligation because of the parties’ shared custody arrangement. Section 315.9 defines shared custody as the parents’ physical custody of the child for an approximately equal amount of time. The statute provides the mathematical calculation for determining the support obligation of each parent using “Obligation Worksheet B” provided in LSA-R.S. 9:315.20. Lea v. Sanders, 04-762 , 04-1122 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 12/22/04), 890 So.2d 764.

However, we note that even in a shared custody situation, the calculation of the child support obligation is based on the child support schedule set forth in Section 315.19, as reflected in line five of Worksheet B. As the trial court noted, because the parties’ combined monthly income of $37,361 exceeds the highest figure listed in the statutory schedule, the child support amounts in the schedule are not applicable in either a joint or shared custody situation. Rather, pursuant to Section 315.13, the trial court was required to use its discretion to determine the child support obligation based on the best interest of the children and the parents’ circumstances.

The district court heard the testimony of the parties concerning the mother's monthly living expenses, the children's standard of living during the marriage and the father's income. In its written reasons for judgment, the court declined to allocate to plaintiff the entire amount of the children's living expenses as sought by the defendant, noting each parent's obligation to support their children and defendant's income. Contrary to plaintiff's contention in his brief, the court specifically considered the shared custody arrangement of the parties in determining the child support award. Based upon this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay child support of $5,500 per month. The assignment of error lacks merit.

In Duffel v. Duffel, 10-274 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/9/10), 54 So.3d 675, the trial court deviated from the child support guidelines in a situation where the mother and father were given joint custody of twin boys with the mother being named the primary domiciliary parent of one of the twins and the father the primary domiciliary parent of the other. The appellate court in affirming the trial court's increased child support award above the child support guidelines stated:

In his reasons for judgment, the trial court stated

Mr. Duffel produced to this Court a work sheet which argues that the child support which should be owed to Ms. Duffel would be in the $685.00 a month range, given the revised living arrangements of the children.

However, implicit in this argument is the notion that each of the children would be having the same standard of living in the respective parent's house. The Court cannot agree with this. Given the relative income of the parties, the Court does not feel there is any way that the mother can satisfactorily raise the twin who is residing with her in the same fashion that the father is raising the twin who is residing with him on the amounts recommended by the submitted worksheets. In essence, the mother (and the child residing with her) would be penalized for circumstances that neither of them created and that benefit neither of them. This is an untenable result.

At a bench conference held on November 30, the Court felt that an adequate amount of child support was recommended—$850.00 a month. The Court feels that, given the extraordinary (and unfortunate) series of events in this case, a deviation from the guidelines to this amount would be the fair thing to do.

The overriding factor in determining the amount of support is the best interest of the children. Sampognaro v. Sampognaro, 41,664 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/14/07), 952 So.2d 775, 778. The children who reside with their mother are entitled to the same standard of living as if they reside with their father. Piccione v. Piccione, 2001-1086 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/02), 824 So.2d 427, 431; Hargett v. Hargett, 544 So.2d 705 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 548 So.2d 1235 (La. 1989). The trial court is required to consider the “totality of the circumstances” when determining the amount of child support. Falcon v. Falcon, 2005-0804, (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/29/06), 929 So.2d 219, 224; Barkemeyer v. Barkemeyer, 598 So.2d 550, 552, (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992).

In deviating from the guidelines, the trial court obviously took into account the detrimental effect that the reduction in support resulting from the application of the guidelines would have on the standard of living of Collin. The trial court did not elaborate on the “extraordinary (and unfortunate) series of events” that took place resulting in the boys having separate domiciliary parents, but in deviating from the support guidelines, the trial court clearly took into account the totality of the circumstances. Applying the above-cited jurisprudence and the reasons given by the trial court for its deviation from the child support guidelines, we find no manifest error in the amount of support awarded by the trial court.

Id. at 677-78.

Defendant points to the fact that the trial court determined the combined average gross monthly income was $64,149.00 and of this amount her percentage of income was inconsequential, being $3,562.00, or six percent of the total. Defendant's expense affidavit provides that her monthly expenses included her house note of $2,634.00, homeowner's insurance of $1,083.00, car note of $1,575.00, and car insurance of $231.70 for a total of $5,533.52. The other monthly household expenses for such things as pest control, pool service, lawn service, utilities, TV, computer, and internet cost an additional $2,265.00 for a total of $7,798.52 in household expenses. This figure does not include the children's expenses for food, clothing, grooming, dining out, birthdays, or entertainment. These household expenses are more than the $7,178.00 in child support awarded for period one, and the support award for period four of $3,973.00 is slightly more than one half of the household expense amount.

Defendant argues that the jurisprudence does not support the reduction of child support obligations based on shared custody or direct payments for schooling and health insurance as the ongoing expenses of the children are unaffected by the time that the children are with Plaintiff and that Defendant must still pay for her home mortgage, insurance, car note, utilities, and all the other expenses associated with maintaining a home for the children when they are with her. She further argues that these reductions just compound the disparity between the income of Plaintiff and Defendant and prevent the maintaining of the children's established lifestyle when they are with her.

In Falterman, 702 So.2d at 784-8 5, this court addressed whether child support should be reduced based on the time the children spent with the non-domiciliary parent, stating:

The record indicates that the children spend approximately 40% of the time with James and 60% of the time with Leesa. While it is true that the custody implementation plan provides for James to have the children 60% of the time during the summer months, it is equally true that, in accordance with the plan, the longest period of time either parent is to have the children is for an uninterrupted two-week visit during the summer months. Accordingly, the children's ongoing expenses provided by Leesa are unaffected during the time that the children are with James. The courts have consistently refused to grant a reduction where the expenses of a domiciliary parent remain constant. See, e.g., In re Burkenstock, 95-586 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/13/95), 666 So.2d 1168; Corley v. Corley, 600 So.2d 908 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992).

However, in Krueger v. Krueger, 96-684 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/30/96), 686 So.2d 1051, the trial court, in modifying a father's child support obligation, divided the figure submitted on the mother's child support worksheet in half to account for the fact that the child was now spending half the time with the father due to a change in the custody arrangement from joint custody to that of shared custody. The appellate court, in holding that the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in its calculations, stated:

In this case, the trial court accepted the child support calculation worksheet which was prepared by appellant, and then modified that calculation by reducing same 50% to reflect the fact that the minor spent 50% of the time with his father.

La. R.S. 9:315.8(E) provides;

In cases of joint custody, the court shall consider the period of time spent by the child with the nondomiciliary party as a basis for adjustment to the amount of child support to be paid during that period of time. The court shall include in such consideration the continuing expenses of the domiciliary party.

In Green v. Green, 95-307 [p. 6] (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 277, [280,] the court said that:

[La. R.S. 9:315.8(E)] mandates that the court is required to consider the period of time spent with the nondomiciliary party as a basis for adjustment of the child support obligation. It also, importantly, requires the court to make this consideration in light of the domiciliary party's continuing expenses. The statute does not mandate an adjustment for time spent, nor does it remove from the trial court the discretion to decide whether to make an adjustment.

See also Brazan v. Brazan, 93-2369 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/24/94), 638 So.2d 1176, in which the child support obligation was reduced by 50% where the father had the child 50% of the time and had agreed to pay the child care expenses.

In this case, the trial court considered the “fifty-fifty” custody arrangement and reduced the child support award accordingly. The trial court did not reduce the father's obligation for the private school expenses, and the father was ordered to pay his proportionate share.

Id. at 1053 (first and second alteration ours).

In Weinstein v. Weinstein, 10-1083 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/13/11), 62 So.3d 878, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of child support to the wife. There, the wife argued that the award was not consistent with the lifestyle the child enjoyed prior to the divorce as the trial court thoroughly considered the needs of the child as well as the lifestyle to which she was accustomed, the expenses involved in maintaining that lifestyle, and the ability of the parents to pay. We, however, held that the trial court did thoroughly consider the totality of the circumstances and set the amount of his award accordingly.

The trial court's oral ruling in this matter indicated it had reviewed the exhibits concerning the couple's income and expenses and reviewed the expert testimony of the parties’ certified public accountant, Mr. Terranova. As was the trial court in Weinstein, the trial court here was meticulous in the application of the law to the particular facts of this case. The court, utilizing its discretion in setting the basic child support obligation, considered the parent's ability to pay, the lifestyle the children would have enjoyed had the parents not divorced, and the best interest of the children. The court voiced concerns over the accuracy of Defendant's purported expenses and Plaintiff's actual income. The trial court was presented with conflicting testimony and evidence regarding the income and expenses of the parties.

In Hagan v. Hagan, 10-1432, pp. 2-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/27/11), 70 So.3d 1081, 1083-84, this court stated:

“The determination of the amount of [a parent's] gross monthly income is a finding of fact subject to manifest error review, and one which cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.” Murphy v. Murphy, 04-1332, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 894 So.2d 542, 545, writ denied, 05-983 (La. 11/28/05), 916 So.2d 144 (citing Piccione v. Piccione, 01-1086, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/02), 824 So.2d 427). Furthermore, “it is within a trial court's broad discretion to determine which figures are proper to calculate the amount of [ ] monthly gross income.” Id. (citing Templeton v. Templeton, 00-0536 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/00), 774 So.2d 1257).

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․ “[T]he standard of review in a child support case is manifest error. Generally, an appellate court will not disturb a child support order unless there is an abuse of discretion or manifest error.” State, Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. D.F. v. L.T., 05-1965, p. 4 (La. 7/6/06), 934 So.2d 687, 690.

Although we may have calculated the child support award differently had we been the trier of fact, based on the record before us, the trial court's findings were reasonable and we cannot say that the trial court committed manifest error in its calculation of the child support award. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's award of child support.

Interim Spousal Support

It is Defendant's position that the trial court's interim spousal support was inadequate because it failed to reflect the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage as mandated by La.Civ.Code. art. 113. In Loftin v. Loftin, 09-795, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/10), 28 So.3d 1274, 1279-80, this court explained interim spousal support, stating:

Louisiana Civil Code Article 113 provides that, during the pendency of a divorce action, a spouse may petition the trial court for an award of interim spousal support. This award, if granted, is based on the needs of the spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the standard of living the couple enjoyed during their marriage. Id. The intent of interim spousal support is to allow the spouse seeking such assistance to maintain a standard of living pending the outcome of the divorce status quo with that maintained during the marriage. Smoloski v. Smoloski, 01-485 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01), 799 So.2d 599.

A spouse's right to claim interim periodic support “is grounded in the statutorily imposed duty on spouses to support each other during marriage, and thus, provides for the spouse who does not have sufficient income for his or her maintenance during the period of separation.” Brar v. Brar, 01-370, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01), 796 So.2d 810, 813. Interim support preserves parity in the levels of maintenance and support, and avoids “unnecessary financial dislocation until a final determination of support can be made.” Jones v. Jones, 38,790, p. 15 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/25/04), 877 So.2d 1061, 1072.

․

A claimant demonstrates need for interim spousal support if she establishes that she lacks sufficient income or the ability to earn a sufficient income “to sustain the style or standard of living that [s]he enjoyed while [s]he resided with the other spouse.” January v. January, 94-882, 94-883, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95), 649 So.2d 1133, 1136; Jones, 877 So.2d 1061. The claimant spouse has the burden of proving his or her need. Jones, 877 So.2d 1061. The needs of the claimant spouse have been defined as “the total amount sufficient to maintain her in a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed by her prior to the separation, limited only by the husband's ability to pay.” Hitchens v. Hitchens, 38,339, p. 2 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/12/04), 873 So.2d 882, 884. For example, in Thomey v. Thomey, 33,000 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/7/00), 756 So.2d 698, the court determined that the claimant had demonstrated need by establishing that she had insufficient income to meet her monthly expenses, which exceeded her income by over $1,000.00 per month. Awarding support also requires finding that expenses were reasonable. Vassallo v. Vassallo, 540 So.2d 1300 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1989). Derouen v. Derouen, 04-1137, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So.2d 981, 984.

A trial court is granted vast discretion in deciding whether to award support in such instances, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id.

The trial court noted that an award of interim support shall terminate one hundred eighty days from the judgment of divorce. The hearing officer recommended that so long as Defendant occupied the family home, Plaintiff was to pay the mortgage on the marital home, the homeowner's insurance, utilities and Defendant's current note and car insurance in lieu of interim support from December 1, 2022 (the date Defendant filed her reconventional demand requesting interim support) until the date Defendant vacated the family home. The trial court accepted and adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer in this regard. The trial court noted that the judgment of divorce was granted on January 18, 2024, and therefore any award of interim spousal support was to begin September 1, 2023 ⁸ and terminate on July 18, 2024.

As to Defendant's need for ISS, the trial court expressed some concern as to the accuracy of the expenses Defendant presented. The trial court thus accepted some of the expenses, rejected some, and modified some of the expenses.⁹ Despite these concerns regarding the accuracy of Defendant's expenses, the trial court was convinced Defendant had a need for interim support.

As to the income for Defendant, the trial court assessed the $3,562.00 figure Defendant received as rental income prior to the sale of that property in November of 2023 as her income, whether actual or imputed. The trial court also took note that Defendant received “a substantial amount” for an advance on the community partition and also for the sale of her rental property for $247,000.00. The trial court in its oral ruling stated that although Defendant received the substantial amount from the advance on the community property, there was no evidence that this would include any dividends or interest from these assets. The evidence established that Defendant had a college degree in business but she was equivocal on whether she would return to work. The court stated that based on her educational background it felt the $3,562.00 income amount it assessed for Defendant was fair. A trial court's imputation of income is subject to the manifest error standard of review. See Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 41,851 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07), 948 So.2d 390.

Based on these considerations, the trial court set the amount of interim spousal at $7,500.00 per month which the court felt was sufficient to satisfy Defendant's needs and which Plaintiff was capable of paying. The period of interim spousal support was to be from September 2023 to July 18, 2024, with Plaintiff to receive a credit for any and all amounts already paid by to Defendant.

In Gordon v. Gordon, 07-272, p. 1-2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1216, 1217-18, this court explained:

The trial court enjoys considerable discretion in its decision to award interim support. Their decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Smoloski [v. Smoloski, 01-485 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01)], 799 So.2d 599; Brar [v. Brar, 01-370 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01)], 796 So.2d 810. An abuse of discretion will not be found if the record supports the trial court's conclusions about the means of the payor spouse and his or her ability to pay.

Derouen v. Derouen, 04-1137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 893 So.2d 981, 984.

․

Finally, when awarding interim spousal support it “is the ability of the trial court to examine a spouse's entire financial condition, which is not limited only to income, but also any resource from which the wants of life can be supplied, including a spouse's earning capacity.” Smoloski v. Smoloski, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/01), 799 So.2d 599, 602 (citing Goldberg v. Goldberg, 96-2145 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/97), 698 So.2d 63).

Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in its award of ISS, and we, therefore, affirm the trial court's interim spousal support award.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court regarding child support and interim spousal support is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Mia Angelle Mansour Buttross.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff is a psychiatrist.

2.   The decrease in the number of children was because another child turned eighteen years old.

3.   Defendant's income was from inherited rental property which was sold by Defendant for $247,000.00 in November 2023.

4.   The trial court referenced that La.R.S. 9:315.13 was revised by Acts 2024, No. 448, § 2, effective January 1, 2025, with the revision redesignating paragraph B to paragraph C. Of note, this revision also added paragraph D which provides, “Under no circumstances shall the court determine an award of child support that is not in the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties.” In that the request for child support was made in 2022, the trial court cited the version applicable at that time.

5.   The oldest child, Mary, had already reached the age of eighteen at the time the request for child support was made.

6.   This statute provides that the court may order one of the parties to provide a child with a health insurance policy, and if so, the insurance premiums incurred shall be added to the basic support obligation.

7.   The trial court noted that for this period of time the combined gross income had changed therefore the percentages changed to 95% for Plaintiff and 5% for Defendant.

8.   Pursuant to a May 30, 2023 Joint Stipulation, Defendant was to receive an advance on the community/separate property or reimbursement in the property partition in the amount of $800,000.00. In the event she is not due the full $800,000.00 in the property partition she will owe no refund on the advance. The payment was only to be made if she moved out of the family home by August 31, 2023. According to Defendant's testimony, she moved out of the family home on August 30, 2023.

9.   The trial court also had accuracy concerns with Plaintiff's affidavit as the court felt Plaintiff had more income than was listed.

KYZAR, Judge.