STATE v. JOHNWELL (2026)

Defendant, Xavier Levi Johnwell, was found guilty of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1, and illegal carrying of weapons—second offense, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95(C). Following an initial sentence that was vacated, Defendant was sentenced as a subsequent habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). He appeals his enhanced sentence and further alleges that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences as amended and remand to the trial court with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 2021, Detective Gary Benoit and another officer, members of the “Calcasieu Parish Combined Anti-Drug Task Force,” were patrolling an area due to complaints that homeless people were using and selling drugs in abandoned houses. Defendant was on a bicycle in front of one of the houses, and when the officers pulled into the driveway, he dropped his bicycle and attempted to flee from the deputies. After a brief chase, Defendant slipped and fell and gave up running. Detective Benoit noticed Defendant had a smoking device and a bag that contained marijuana. After advising Defendant of his Miranda ¹ rights, Defendant became incoherent. Concerned that Defendant may have ingested narcotics, Deputy Benoit notified Acadian Ambulance so they could assist and make sure Defendant was okay. When Detective Benoit helped place Defendant on a stretcher, he located and removed a .45 caliber handgun in Defendant's pantleg. Defendant did not threaten or use the firearm prior to its removal.

Acadian Ambulance proceeded to take Defendant to the hospital because he remained nonresponsive. After waiting for over an hour at the hospital for Defendant to become responsive, the officers released Defendant to the hospital's care because they did not know his condition or how long he would be there. Shortly after the officers left, Defendant pulled out his catheter and left the hospital while still in his gown.

Defendant was thereafter charged with possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1, and illegal carrying of weapons—second offense, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95(C).

Trial lasted two days in November 2023, and Defendant took the stand in his own defense. He claimed that he was not at the location the officers described and that this was a case of mistaken identity. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged after deliberating for approximately seventy-three minutes. Defense counsel requested polling of the jurors, and one juror, who was identified by name, dissented. The judge declared the verdict not unanimous and sent the jury back for further deliberations. Defense counsel made no objection. The jury returned nineteen minutes later, with a unanimous guilty verdict (as confirmed by polling).

Defendant filed a motion for new trial on January 12, 2024. On February 28, 2024, without having ruled on Defendant's motion for new trial, the trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years at hard labor, with the first five years served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for the first offense, and five years at hard labor for the second offense, with credit for time served for both sentences and with the sentences running concurrently. The State then submitted a habitual offender bill of information.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. On August 21, 2024, Defendant filed an appeal. Ultimately, this court vacated Defendant's sentence due to the trial court's failure to rule on the motion for new trial and resentencing and remanded to the trial court. See State v. Johnwell, 24-286 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/13/24), 402 So.3d 25. On remand, the trial court denied the motion for new trial and resentenced Defendant to the same sentences.

On March 7, 2025, the trial court adjudicated Defendant as a third and subsequent habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). Several weeks later, the trial court vacated Defendant's prior sentences and sentenced Defendant to forty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count one and ten years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count two, with both sentences to run concurrently. However, because Defendant voluntarily exited the courtroom prior to the trial court's full pronouncement of the sentence, the trial court vacated the sentences and reset the sentencing hearing. On May 28, 2025, Defendant was re-sentenced for the final time to twenty-five years without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence on count one and seven years without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence on count two, with both sentences to run concurrently.

Defendant now appeals.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, there is one error raised by the State and a correction needed to both the minutes of sentencing and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO).

The State contends the sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, third habitual offender (count one), is illegally lenient since the trial court failed to impose the sentence without benefit of parole. As noted by the State, the penalty provision for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon requires the entire sentence be imposed without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:95.1(B). Although the trial court stated the sentence for count one was to be served without benefit of suspension or probation, it failed to state that the sentence was to be served without benefit of parole. “[T]he restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La.R.S. 15:529.1 ‘are those called for in the reference statute.’ ” State v. Tate, 99-1483, pp. 1–2 (La. 11/24/99), 747 So.2d 519, 520 (per curiam) (quoting State v. Bruins, 407 So.2d 685, 687 (La.1981)). Since the reference statute, La.R.S. 14:95.1, requires the entire sentence to be imposed without parole, the habitual offender sentence imposed for count one likewise required the entire sentence to be imposed without benefit of parole.

Normally, no error would be recognized since the sentence is deemed to contain the denial of parole by operation of law. See La.R.S. 15:301.1(A); State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790. However, the State raised the error and requests the matter be remanded and the sentence on count one be corrected. In State v. Martin, 19-828 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/20/20) (unpublished opinion) (2020 WL 2553140), writ denied, 20-768 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So.3d 1192, the defendant argued his sentence for attempted armed robbery was illegally lenient because the trial court ordered only five years without benefit of parole. As the defendant asserted, the penalty provision for attempted armed robbery required the entirety of the sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:64; La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a). Rather than remand for correction of the error, this court found the requirement was non-discretionary, with the appellate court authorized to correct the error without remand.

The court in Martin discussed State v. Breaux, 18-771 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/13/19), 269 So.3d 1046, a case cited by the defendant in support of his argument for remand, noting that in Breaux, the state, rather than the defendant, requested the correction of the illegally lenient sentence. On appeal, this court noted that the trial court denied probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for only ten years of the defendant's sentences in Breaux for attempted first degree murder, while the penalty provision required the entirety of the sentences to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Breaux, 269 So.3d 1046; La.R.S. 14:30(C)(2); La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a). Noting that this court ordinarily chooses not to recognize an illegally lenient sentence when it is not raised, the court also observed that the state had raised the error. Breaux, 269 So.3d 1046. Thus, this court vacated the defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing in accordance with the applicable penalty provisions, specifically noting that the entirety of each sentence must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

In Breaux, 269 So.3d at 1050 n.4, this court noted the following in a footnote:

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:301.1(A) provides that when the trial court is silent as to the mandated term of parole ineligibility, there is no need for this court to remand the matter to the trial court. Nevertheless, this procedure is inapplicable when the trial court actually imposes an improper term of parole ineligibility. See State v. Rivers, 01-1251 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/10/02), 817 So.2d 216, writ denied, 02-1156 (La. 11/22/02), 829 So.2d 1035. Thus, remand is required in the present case.

Unlike the trial courts in Martin and Breaux, the trial court in the present case did not impose an improper term of parole ineligibility but was silent as to the mandated term of parole ineligibility. Although the self-activating provision in La.R.S. 15:301.1 makes correction of the sentence unnecessary, nevertheless we will correct the sentence since the State raised the issue. We also note that since the term of parole ineligibility is non-discretionary in this case, we will correct the sentence instead of remanding for such correction. Therefore, as in Martin, we amend the sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon to provide that it be served without benefit of parole. La.R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1).

As for correcting the minutes of sentencing and the USCO, both indicate the trial court imposed the sentences for counts one and two without benefit of parole. The transcript of the sentencing, however, indicates the trial court did not impose either sentence without benefit of parole. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. As previously discussed, the trial court's silence as to the denial of parole for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count one) is cured by La.R.S. 15:301.1’s self-activating provision. Thus, as will be reflected in this court's amendment, the sentence for count one is imposed without benefit of parole by operation of law. Consequently, neither the minutes nor the USCO need to be corrected with respect to count one.

However, with respect to count two, both the minutes of Defendant's May 28, 2025 sentencing and the USCO should be corrected. Despite Defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously imposed the sentence for illegal carrying of a weapon (count two) without benefit of parole, the transcript does not support this assertion. Thus, both the minutes of Defendant's May 28, 2025 sentencing and the USCO should be corrected to delete the statement that the sentence imposed on count two was imposed without benefit of parole.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendant alleges two assignments of error: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the “coercive” jury polling procedure; and (2) his enhanced sentences are excessive.

ANALYSIS

I. Ineffective Counsel

In his first assignment of error, Defendant argues that trial counsel “rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the coercive jury polling procedure.”

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); see also State v. Harris, 13-133 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 156 So.3d 694, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Harris v. State, 14-476 (La. 11/7/14), 152 So.3d 169. Claims of ineffective assistance generally are addressed in post-conviction proceedings unless the appellate record is sufficient to resolve the claim on direct appeal. State v. Miller, 99-192 (La. 9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1196 (2001). The relevant inquiry is “whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

As discussed above, the original verdict revealed one dissenting juror, and thus, the verdict was not unanimous. The trial court confirmed that the dissenting juror did not agree with the verdict and identified the juror by name. The trial court then sent the jury back for further deliberation without any supplemental instruction, stating to the jury: “Okay. So we do not have a unanimous verdict. So I'm going to send the jury back to the jury room to continue their deliberations.” The jury then returned a unanimous vote of guilty on both counts. The initial jury deliberation lasted seventy-three minutes, while the second lasted nineteen minutes.

By identifying the dissenting juror by name, Defendant claims that that the trial court imposed “unmistakable social pressure” on the juror and violated La.Code Crim.P. art. 812. The jury was sent back without a cautionary instruction and subsequently returned with a unanimous vote. Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective because he made no objection, sought no cautionary instruction, and filed no motion for mistrial. Defendant argues that the record discloses everything necessary to evaluate the claim, so his ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal is appropriate.

The State argues that Defendant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance, and the trial court's actions were not objectionable. The State argues that the trial court's request for the jury to go back and continue its deliberation after polling revealed a dissenting juror was the proper procedure under the circumstances.

We agree that the record is sufficient for us to review Defendant's ineffective assistance claim on appeal. However, we disagree with Defendant on the merits of this assignment of error.

We find that the trial court committed no error and complied with La.Code Crim.P. art. 812(B)(2), which states, in part, “If an insufficient number required to find a verdict answer “Yes,” the court may remand the jury for further deliberation, or the court may declare a mistrial in accordance with Article 775.” Here, there was no sign of a full deadlock, and the trial court did not imply to the jury that it must reach a decision because it would not accept a mistrial, as is prohibited by Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896) and its progeny.² In short, there was no coercion. See State v. Bracken, 24-375 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 429. The trial court merely observed that the verdict was not unanimous and sent the jury back to continue its deliberations. “When the substantive issue that an attorney has not raised has no merit, then the claim that the attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue also has no merit.” State v. Dressner, 18-828, p. 7 (La. 10/29/18), 255 So.3d 537, 544, cert. denied, 587 U.S. 1053, 139 S.Ct. 2691 (2019). Because the trial court's action was not objectionable, Defendant's claim that counsel's lack of an objection rendered his assistance ineffective is without merit.

II. Excessive Sentences

In his second assignment of error, Defendant asserts that his enhanced sentences of twenty-five years without benefits on count one and seven years without benefits on count two are constitutionally excessive.

A sentence is constitutionally excessive when it is “so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering.” State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331. The trial court has wide discretion in imposing sentences, and a sentence will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion. Id. On review, “the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes.” State v. Soileau, 13-770, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E):

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

At the sentencing hearing, Defendant's counsel made a general objection to the sentence. In his motion to reconsider sentence, Defendant alleged only “that the sentence imposed upon him on May 28, 2025 is excessive.” Furthermore, Defendant's motion to reconsider was filed untimely, as more than thirty days had passed between the imposition of the sentence and his filing. La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(A)(6).

Because Defendant only made a general objection and did not include any specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider would be based, this court is limited to considering “the bare claim of excessiveness”:

If the defendant does not allege any specific ground for excessiveness or present any argument or evidence not previously considered by the court at original sentencing, then the defendant does not lose the right to appeal the sentence; the defendant is simply relegated to having the appellate court consider the bare claim of excessiveness.

State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059, 1059–60 (La.1993). Additionally, our court in Barling, 779 So.2d at 1042, held:

To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering.

Defendant argues that the trial court acknowledged on the record that the offenses were non-violent and victimless, and the original sentencing judge twice determined that fifteen years was appropriate. Because the sentencing court recognized mitigating factors but did not give them sufficient weight, Defendant argues that the resulting sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion. Defendant argues that he showed he is exceptional by clear and convincing evidence.

Defendant further argues that the sentencing range for count one was ten to forty years, and his sentence of twenty-five years is sixty-two and a half percent of the maximum. The sentencing range for count two was two and a half to ten years, and his sentence of seven years is seventy percent of the maximum. Defendant argues that while the trial court referenced La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 generally, its analysis was cursory, and it failed to adequately weigh that Defendant's conduct did not cause or threaten serious harm, that Defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause serious harm, and that there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify Defendant's conduct. Lastly, Defendant argues that the gap between the original fifteen-year sentence and the enhanced sentence of twenty-five years reveals the disproportionate impact of the habitual offender enhancement.

The State argues that Defendant's sentences were only middling under the habitual offender enhancements, and the trial court acted well within its discretion. The trial court considered the La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 factors and was concerned about Defendant's criminal history and his continued gun crimes. The trial court also noted that Defendant's previous sentences did not deter his conduct. The State argues that Defendant has an exceptionally long criminal history, and individuals like him are the exact reason why the legislature enacted the habitual offender sentencing enhancements. As the State correctly points out, Defendant's initial fifteen-year sentences are misleading because they came prior to Defendant's third habitual offender sentencing enhancement.

At Defendant's final sentencing hearing, the State referenced Defendant's criminal history, which included convictions for conspiracy to possess marijuana with an intent to distribute, simple burglary, and felony theft over $1500, in addition to having been arrested on numerous occasions while possessing weapons. Though Defendant was billed as a third habitual offender, the State argued that Defendant's criminal history showed him as having at least four prior felony convictions. The court noted that Defendant had three weapons charges and had already been convicted of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The State requested maximum sentences, which would have been forty years on count one and ten years on count two.

Counsel for Defendant admitted that the State's recitation of Defendant's criminal history was correct but asserted that Defendant continued to maintain his innocence in this matter. Counsel requested a downward departure to fifteen and five years respectively. Counsel argued that Defendant's crimes were victimless. Defendant argued that he only had one gun charge prior to the current conviction and that someone else committed the crime for which he was ultimately convicted in this case.

In his reasons for sentencing, the trial court stated:

Okay. So here's what I'm left with, everyone. The Court is guided by the sentencing guidelines under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 984.1. I've had a lot of time to think about this one since what happened last time.

You know, [defense counsel] is correct. This was a gun possession charge -- illegal gun possession charge, no one was injured, there was -- there was no other criminal -- no other crimes committed, no crimes of violence, no one else was hurt. That's what gives me pause in ordering a maximum sentencing as requested by the State, and I don't think that's warranted.

[La.R.S. 15:529.1] requires the range of sentencing to be no less than one half the longest available sentence but no more than two times the longest sentence. [Defendant] was found to be a third subsequent and habitual offender in violation of 15:529.1 and the maximum sentence for violation of his underlying third felony offense under 14:95.1, the possession of a firearm or carrying of a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies, is 20 years. And the felony offense of R.S. 15 -- 14:95(c) being 5 years, [Defendant] was sentenced to 5 plus -- 15 plus 5 to run concurrent.

While his crimes are deserving of the sentences that were previously handed down, in reviewing the crimes, however, they are all felonies -- again, felony possession of firearms.

The reason it gives me pause is, yes, [Defendant] is not supposed to be carrying a weapon. He is a felon. It is illegal for him to do so. But it doesn't warrant the imposition of a maximum sentence as requested by the State.

On the other hand, the Court is troubled that [Defendant] continues to commit crimes with the possession of the firearms in violation of the laws and the lesser sentences did not deter his conduct.

[Defendant], although he was found guilty, still maintains his innocence, which is his right to do. But because he continues to commit crimes, he's been found to be a habitual offender.

The legislature has recognized the nature of habitual offenders, such as [Defendant], and that enhanced sentences may be given -- may be ordered given the nature of the crimes committed. Therefore, considering the findings of fact of being a third and subsequent habitual offender and considering the underlying criminal history and the requirements of the Habitual Offender Act and the sentencing guidelines, the prior sentence of 15 years, at hard labor, imposed by this Court in violation of 14:95.1 is hereby vacated, and [Defendant] is sentenced to 25 years, at hard labor, without the benefit of suspension of sentence or probation.

The sentence of 5 years on February 28th, 2024, for violation of 14:95(c) is hereby vacated pursuant to 15:529.1(d)(3), and [Defendant] is sentenced -- hereby sentenced to serve 7 years, at hard labor, Department of Corrections, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence in accordance with 15:529.1(a)(3)(a). The sentences are to run concurrent from February 28th, 2024, which was the date of his original sentencing, with credit for time served in the previous sentences of 15 years and 5 years respectively. That's the order of the Court.

Even though the trial court in the present case may not have considered all the possible factors at Defendant's final resentencing, it did consider mitigating factors such as the non-violent nature of Defendant's convictions, and aggravating factors such as Defendant's repeated commission of felonies. The trial court also obviously disbelieved Defendant's claims of innocence in this matter. In doing so, the trial court correctly considered the nature of the crime and the nature and background of the offender.

Regarding a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes, though the issue in State v. Johnson, 97-1906, pp. 7–8 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676, dealt with mandatory minimums under the habitual offender statute, the following passage is relevant to this matter:

A trial judge may not rely solely upon the non-violent nature of the instant crime or of past crimes as evidence which justifies rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. While the classification of a defendant's instant or prior offenses as non-violent should not be discounted, this factor has already been taken into account under the Habitual Offender Law for third and fourth offenders. LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 provides that persons adjudicated as third or fourth offenders may receive a longer sentence if their instant or prior offense is defined as a “crime of violence” under LSA-R.S. 14:2(13). Thus the Legislature, with its power to define crimes and punishments, has already made a distinction in sentences between those who commit crimes of violence and those who do not. Under the Habitual Offender Law those third and fourth offenders who have a history of violent crime get longer sentences, while those who do not are allowed lesser sentences. So while a defendant's record of non-violent offenses may play a role in a sentencing judge's determination that a minimum sentence is too long, it cannot be the only reason, or even the major reason, for declaring such a sentence excessive.

While Defendant did not provide a comparison of sentences for similar crimes, the State offered the following from State v. Bourgeois, 22-418, pp. 15–16 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/23), 361 So.3d 1138, 1150:

In State v. Martin, 17-1100 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/18), 243 So.3d 56, writ denied, 18-0568 (La. 3/6/19), 266 So.3d 901, the appellate court upheld the defendant's 40-year enhanced sentence as a second-felony offender with an underlying conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (prior to the revision by 2017 La. Acts No. 281, § 1), noting that the defendant had prior convictions for drug-related felonies and simple burglary). In State v. Brown, 42,188 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/07), 966 So.2d 727, 753-54, writ denied, 07-2199 (La. 4/18/08), 978 So.2d 347, the appellate court upheld the defendant's 30-year sentence as a second-felony offender within an underlying conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court found that the sentence was not constitutionally excessive considering the defendant's extensive criminal history, which involved crimes of violence and narcotics related offenses. Similarly, in State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So.3d 833, 840, writ denied, 09-310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.3d 297, the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and later sentenced as a second-felony offender to 20 years at hard labor. (At that time, the sentencing range provided for a maximum of 30 years.) The appellate court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion considering the defendant's criminal record, which revealed numerous instances involving violent crime, including convictions for felony-grade battery of a police officer.

Given the sentences noted above, particularly that in Martin, a twenty-five-year sentence for a felon's no less than fourth felony conviction, including multiple involving possession of a handgun, does not shock our sense of justice. Defendant's commission of “non-violent” crimes was repetitive, and lesser sentences have clearly had no effect. Second-felony offenders with similar backgrounds have received longer sentences that have been upheld. The habitual offender statute takes into account that Defendant was not convicted of crimes of violence, and his sentences are far less than the maximum the State requested.

Defendant faced a maximum of twenty years on a first conviction under La.R.S. 14:95.1. “Clearly, the major reasons the Legislature passed the Habitual Offender Law were to deter and punish recidivism․ He is subjected to a longer sentence because he continues to break the law.” Harris, 156 So.3d at 701 (quoting Johnson, 709 So.2d at 677). These particular sentences are individualized to this particular offender, and the trial court did not abuse its great discretion. This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

Defendant's convictions and his sentence for count two are affirmed. Since the State raised the issue of the trial court's silence regarding Defendant's ineligibility for parole on count one (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) and since Defendant's parole ineligibility occurred by operation of law in accordance with La.R.S. 15:301.1, we amend the sentence for count one to provide that it be served without benefit of parole. Defendant's sentence for count one is, therefore, affirmed as amended. The minutes of Defendant's May 28, 2025 sentencing and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order should be amended to delete the statement that the sentence imposed for count two (illegal carrying of weapons) was imposed without benefit of parole.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).

2.   In State v. Bracken, 24-375, p. 6 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 429, 433, the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed the use of the modern modified Allen charge, giving “Louisiana courts the benefit of encouraging deliberation and efficient judicial resolution[,]” abrogating State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639 (La.1975).

THIERRY, Judge.