STATE v. WILSON (2026)

A grand jury indicted the defendant, Dalvin Montae Wilson, with two counts of first degree murder ¹ (counts one and two), violations of La. R.S. 14:30, and one count of attempted first degree murder (count three), a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.² The defendant pled not guilty to each count. Following a jury trial, the jury convicted him as charged on counts one and three and of the responsive verdict of second degree murder on count two. The trial court denied the defendant's combined motion for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each of counts one and two and to a consecutive term of twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count three. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence and additional motions for new trial.

The defendant now appeals, raising two counseled and eight pro se assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On the evening of January 13, 2021, officers with the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office (“TPSO”) responded to a shooting at 103 Montegut Street in Montegut, Louisiana. Inside the home, officers discovered Brittany Cormier and Hope Nettleton suffering from fatal gunshot wounds.³ Officers also located Brittany's daughter, C.B., unharmed.⁴

Pursuant to the investigation, TPSO detectives learned C.B. accused Beaux Cormier (Brittany's brother and C.B.’s uncle) of rape in 2016, when she was a minor, and that criminal charges for such were pending at the time of the shooting. TPSO detectives further discovered Beaux hired Andrew Eskine and the defendant to kill C.B. because Beaux did not want to go to trial on the rape allegations. TPSO detectives then arrested Beaux, Eskine, and the defendant for the attempted murder of C.B. and the murders of Brittany and Hope. The defendant ultimately provided three statements to police confessing to his involvement in the crimes.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first counseled and pro se assignments of error, the defendant argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 389, 394, writ denied, 2022-01777 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So.3d 982.

The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. Cabellero, 356 So.3d at 394. When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:438 mandates, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

The State must prove the elements of the offenses, as well as the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. State v. Reed, 2024-0368 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/13/25), 417 So.3d 710, 718. When, as in this case, the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crimes were committed, the State must negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Id.

As to count one, the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder of Brittany. Pertinent to this case, Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30(A) defines first degree murder as the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ․ aggravated burglary[.5]

* * *

(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.

(4) When the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and has offered, has been offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the killing.

* * *

(9) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who was a witness to a crime or was a member of the immediate family of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and:

(a) The killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been commenced; or

(b) The killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for the victim's prior testimony.

As to count two, the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder of Hope. Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).

As to count three, the jury found the defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder of C.B. An attempt to commit an offense occurs when any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object, and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. See La. R.S. 14:27(A). To be guilty of attempted murder, a defendant must have the specific intent to kill and not merely the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm. State v. Bishop, 2001-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437. Thus, a specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of attempted first degree murder. State v. Maten, 2004-1718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 716, writ denied, 2005-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544.

Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as a defendant's statement, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/19/24), 387 So.3d 641, 646, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So.3d 865.

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. La. R.S. 14:24. Under the law of principals, all persons involved in the commission of a crime are equally culpable; therefore, a person may be convicted as a principal to murder even if he did not personally inflict the fatal wound. Cabellero, 356 So.3d at 395. However, an individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. State v. Bridgewater, 2000-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 890, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003).

At trial, Donovan Martin, Brittany's husband, testified that on January 13, 2021, he lived at the 103 Montegut Street residence with Brittany, C.B., and C.B.’s then-girlfriend. Martin explained that at around 10:00 p.m., he and Brittany were cooking dinner when Hope, their neighbor, came over to discuss the sale of his truck, which was parked on a concrete slab near the home. Martin testified that at some point, a tall black male wearing dark clothes and a face mask, which partially concealed his face, knocked on the door and asked for a woman named “Crystal.” When Martin replied that no one by that name lived there, the man asked if there was a “Christie.” Before Martin could respond, the man pointed a firearm at Martin and shoved his way into the home. According to Martin, he yelled for assistance and then ran across the street to Hope's house, after which he heard screams and two gunshots. Martin testified that he saw a black male, who matched the appearance of the person who knocked on the door, run out of his house and get into the passenger side of a white truck that sped away. Martin recalled that he and Jerry Nettleton, Hope's husband, then entered his home and called 911 when they discovered Hope and Brittany bleeding from their wounds. Finally, Martin testified that he recognized the defendant as the person who knocked on his door that night, noting he could “see it in his eyes.”

Martin also testified about an incident that occurred approximately one month prior to the shooting. According to Martin, he woke up to a loud bang one night but did not investigate further. However, the next morning, he discovered that the Plexiglass on the front door had been kicked in, which broke the door's molding. Martin testified he repaired the Plexiglass prior to the shooting.

C.B. testified that around 10:20 p.m. on January 13, 2021, she and her then-girlfriend were in her bedroom while Brittany finished cooking dinner. C.B. recalled that Hope greeted her in her room before going to chat with Brittany. Soon after, C.B. heard Hope's and Brittany's screams and two gunshots, after which she and her then-girlfriend hid in the closet and called 911. According to C.B., she never saw the shooter. Additionally, C.B. testified that when she gave her statement to TPSO detectives on the night of the shooting, she informed them that her Uncle Beaux had raped her in 2016 when she was sixteen years old. C.B. further stated that at the time of the shooting, there was an open court case; however, a few months prior to the instant trial, a jury found Beaux not guilty of the rape.

Jerry testified at trial that on January 13, 2021, shortly after 10:00 p.m., he saw Martin running towards him while yelling that someone had a gun in his house. Jerry then heard two gunshots and saw a person shut the open driver's side door of a white GMC truck parked near Martin's home and drive away. Jerry stated that he then found Hope face down in a pool of blood on the floor of Martin's home.

Jerry further testified that on a night in November 2020, he saw a white Chrysler 300 slowly driving in the neighborhood before stopping behind a stop sign for a while. Suspicious of the vehicle, Jerry shined a flashlight at it a couple of times and, after getting no reaction, approached the vehicle and observed two occupants. The vehicle then sped away without lights onto the highway, and Jerry followed close behind in his truck. Jerry testified that he obtained the license plate number of the vehicle, which he provided to TPSO detectives during the instant investigation.

Eskine, one of the co-defendants, testified that he pled guilty to one count of manslaughter in exchange for testifying against the defendant at trial. Eskine explained that he was best friends with Beaux and had met him through work approximately one to two years prior to the shooting. Eskine testified that Beaux wanted to hire someone to kill his niece, C.B., who had an open rape case against him, because he did not want to go to trial. According to Eskine, in June or July of 2020, he met with Beaux and the defendant to discuss the plan to kill C.B. Eskine stated that in exchange for killing her, Beaux agreed to forgive a debt Eskine owed him and to pay the defendant. Thereafter, in July 2020, Eskine drove Beaux and the defendant to Montegut to scope out C.B.’s house and the surrounding area. Eskine testified that in November 2020, he and the defendant drove from Rayne to Montegut in his nephew Caeden Boudreaux's white Chrysler 300 so that the defendant could murder C.B. When they arrived at C.B.’s house and turned off the car's headlights, a neighbor shined a light at them. Eskine stated that they left, drove a mile down the road, and returned to the house. Eskine, armed with a taser, and the defendant, armed with a handgun, attempted to break into the home but were unsuccessful, as the Plexiglass on the front door would not break.

Eskine further testified that in December 2020, he went to work in Iowa and left his truck with a friend, Gregory Fleenor. On the day of the murders, Eskine was still working in Iowa but allowed the defendant to borrow his truck, knowing the defendant was likely going to Houma to commit the murder.⁶ Eskine testified that on the following day, Beaux called and told him the wrong people were killed; specifically, Brittany and Hope died instead of C.B. Eskine testified he then called the defendant, who “flipped out” and said, “Can't believe I f***ed up, can't believe I did this, killed the wrong people[.]” Eskine testified that the defendant admitted to him that he committed the murders.

Caeden Boudreaux, Eskine's nephew, testified that in November 2020, he had a white Chrysler 300 sedan, and Eskine had a GMC truck. Boudreaux recalled that Eskine asked to borrow his vehicle one day to drive to Baton Rouge “to buy some weed.” Boudreaux stated Eskine later called and asked him how to turn off the car's headlights. Eskine did not return the car until about 3:00 a.m. When Boudreaux later cleaned his vehicle, he found a taser and a beanie that did not belong to him. Boudreaux confirmed that only he and Eskine used the vehicle during that timeframe.

Laura Guise, a crime scene investigator and evidence custodian with TPSO, testified she responded to the scene at around 11:00 p.m. on January 13, 2021. Guise explained that she was initially advised that one victim was deceased and another was wounded; however, upon her arrival, she was advised that the second victim, Hope, had succumbed to her injuries. Guise then located Brittany in the “TV room,” where she was already deceased due to a single gunshot to her forehead. Guise noted C.B.’s bedroom was adjacent to the TV room.

Detective Ryan Trosclair with the TPSO testified he initially focused on tracking down a “Crystal” or “Christie” in his investigation. Detective Trosclair interviewed two Crystals associated with the Martin family but determined neither had any connection to the instant crimes.⁷ A few days after the murders, Detective Trosclair interviewed Jerry, Hope's husband, and learned of the attempted break-in at C.B.’s house and the suspicious vehicle Jerry followed in November 2020. With the license plate number Jerry provided, TPSO determined the vehicle was a Chrysler 300 registered to Eskine's sister, Miranda Thibodeaux, who lived in Carencro. Detective Trosclair stated that they then determined Eskine was the registered owner of a white GMC truck that matched the description of the getaway vehicle at the homicide scene.

Detective Trosclair testified that in late January 2021, they performed a traffic stop on Thibodeaux's vehicle, which was being driven by Caeden Boudreaux (Thibodeaux's son and Eskine's nephew), in Lafayette. Detective Trosclair advised Boudreaux provided a similar statement in his interview as his trial testimony; namely, he lent the Chrysler to Eskine in November 2020. Upon searching the Chrysler, Detective Trosclair recovered a taser, a black knit zip-up head and face hood, and a black beanie, none of which belonged to Boudreaux.

Moreover, Detective Trosclair testified about the License Plate Reading (“LPR”) camera data collected during the investigation. According to Detective Trosclair, the LPR data showed Boudreaux's Chrysler in Montegut in November 2020. For the date of the homicides, the LPR data showed Eskine's GMC truck traveling eastbound from the Lafayette area to Terrebonne Parish and again later traveling westbound back towards Lafayette, each time within an hour and thirty minutes of the shooting.

Detective Trosclair further testified he reviewed Eskine's phone records and discovered Eskine communicated with Beaux in November 2020 and on January 13, 2021. According to Detective Trosclair, the records also confirmed Eskine was in Iowa on the date of the homicides. Detective Trosclair stated that upon Eskine's return to Louisiana, they apprehended and interviewed him. As a result of the interview, Detective Trosclair learned that Eskine provided the transportation for the murders by leaving his truck behind in Louisiana.

Based on the investigation at that point, TPSO detectives interviewed and arrested the defendant for the instant offenses. In the defendant's three statements, he accused two other individuals, Chucky Wilson and Kameron Wilson, of shooting the victims. Detective Trosclair testified that TPSO investigated but could not verify the defendant's allegations.⁸

As noted supra, the defendant provided three statements to police, all of which were published to the jury. Prior to his first statement on January 29, 2021, the defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda ⁹ rights. He initially denied any involvement in the shooting or the November 2020 incident. The defendant later stated that he drove another person, the shooter, to the house on the night of the murders and that he backed the vehicle onto a concrete slab near the home. Eventually, the defendant admitted Beaux showed him a picture of a woman who accused him of rape and paid him $4,000 to kill her.¹⁰ When asked why he killed Hope, the defendant stated, “No reason․ She didn't deserve it.” Finally, the defendant claimed he was high on the night of the shooting.¹¹

The defendant's second statement occurred the following day on January 30, 2021. TPSO detectives again advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, which he waived. In this interview, the defendant claimed that on the night of the shooting, he drove his “baby brother” Kameron to Montegut, and Kameron subsequently shot Brittany and Hope. The defendant stated he remained in the truck until he heard a gunshot and saw a man run out of the house. The defendant then ran to the front door, heard a second gunshot, and saw Hope fall to the ground. According to the defendant, as they fled the scene, Kameron told him one woman identified herself as C.B., and the second woman reached for the gun.¹² The defendant insisted he did not enter the home or shoot the victims.

In his final interview on February 3, 2021, TPSO detectives again advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, which he waived. The defendant then admitted Beaux paid him $4,000 to kill C.B. According to the defendant, prior to November 2020, Beaux drove the defendant and Eskine in Eskine's truck to Montegut to show them C.B.’s house. Then, in November 2020, Eskine picked him up in the Chrysler to go back to C.B.’s house, where they were spooked by a man flashing a light at them. The defendant stated they left but returned shortly after and attempted to break into the house. The defendant explained that on the day of the shootings, Beaux and Eskine told him to get Eskine's truck from Gregory Fleenor, which he did. The defendant then went to Kameron's house in Eunice. The defendant admitted that he went to C.B.’s house in Montegut; however, he initially stated he went alone and could not remember what happened.

The defendant refused to provide further details of the crimes until TPSO detectives allowed him to speak with his girlfriend about halfway through the interview. While on the phone with his girlfriend, the defendant confessed, “I did it. I hurt those people.” Once the phone call ended, the defendant recalled that after he left Kameron's house in Eunice, he took eight pills and traveled to Montegut alone, where he parked outside C.B.’s house, knocked on the door, and asked for someone with a “C” name. The defendant then pushed the door open and walked into the home, as the man at the door ran outside. According to the defendant, he asked the two women inside for his intended victim, C.B., by name, and one woman identified herself as such.¹³ The defendant stated that he then shot the woman, after which the second woman struggled with him over the gun, resulting in her accidentally getting shot. The defendant then ran to Eskine's truck and drove off believing that he shot “the right person.” The defendant stated that on the following day, Beaux and Eskine told him he shot the wrong people. The defendant recalled that he had been wearing a camouflage face mask, a white hoodie, a black jacket, black jeans, and black shoes on the night of the shooting.

A little over three hours into the interview, the defendant changed his story again and insisted he was only the driver, again implicating Kameron as the shooter. The defendant first claimed Kameron went into the house alone. However, once he heard gunfire, the defendant ran to the door and saw a body on the floor. The defendant stated Kameron then pointed a gun at him. In his final version of events, the defendant stated he remained inside the truck while Kameron committed the murders alone. Once they fled the scene, Kameron told him about the house layout and what had happened inside.

On appeal, the defendant asserts that the State failed to present any physical evidence linking him to the shooting and instead relied on a vague eyewitness description, Eskine's self-serving testimony, and his own statements to police following his arrest.¹⁴ As it relates to C.B., the defendant contends the State failed to prove the shooter had specific intent to kill C.B., as he did not (1) know she was in the house, (2) search for her, (3) enter her bedroom, or (4) aim or shoot a firearm at her. Finally, the defendant complains the police failed to investigate any alternative theories, intended targets, or suspects.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Dorsey, 2010-0216 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So.3d 603, 634, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 930, 132 S.Ct. 1859, 182 L.Ed.2d 658 (2012). Further, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. State v. Jackson, 2023-0781 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/23/24), 384 So.3d 1029, 1035, writ denied, 2024-00383 (La. 2/28/25), 402 So.3d 486.

Upon review, we find the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the defendant of the first degree murder of Brittany, second degree murder of Hope, and attempted first degree murder of C.B. The jury's verdicts indicate the jury rejected the defendant's theory he was misidentified in this case. In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662.

The State published to the jury the defendant's three interviews wherein he confessed to killing Hope and Brittany, although he intended to kill C.B. In his final interview, the defendant thoroughly detailed his involvement in Beaux's murder-for-hire scheme, noting that he agreed to kill C.B. for money, surveilled C.B.’s home in the summer of 2020, and attempted to break into her home in November 2020. The defendant explained how on the night of the murders he asked for C.B. by name, shot the woman who identified herself as C.B. (Brittany), and accidentally shot the second woman (Hope) during a tussle. In the defendant's own words, he left the scene believing he shot the right person until Beaux and Eskine told him otherwise. Although the defendant later attempted to minimize his guilt by implicating Kameron as the shooter and insisting he never went into the home, he consistently provided key details about the shooting that contradicted that version of events. Therefore, the jury could have rationally concluded the defendant explained how the defendant lied and attempted to minimize his guilt by implicating Kameron in the murders. See State v. Frickey, 2015-0511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/18/15), 2015 WL 5516300, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2015-1966 (La. 11/18/16), 210 So.3d 283 (finding jury could have concluded defendant lied in police interviews, where he provided multiple conflicting stories about the victim's death); State v. Rault, 445 So.2d 1203, 1213 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 225, 83 L.Ed.2d 154 (1984) (rejecting hypothesis of innocence based on defendant's own statement accusing another person because “[t]he jury could have reasonably concluded that Rault concocted this version of the crime to hide his own guilt”).

The State also presented evidence corroborating the defendant's initial narrative and proving the defendant's identity as the shooter. First, Martin identified the defendant as the shooter in open court. Although Martin only remembered the gunman's eyes, such fact goes to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The jury made a credibility determination, and this court will not disturb such. See Cabellero, 356 So.3d at 402. Furthermore, the most persuasive proof of the defendant's identity as the shooter was the defendant's own confession. See State v. Washington, 50,424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 3/16/16), 188 So.3d 350, 358, writ denied, 2016-0718 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So.3d 119 (finding victim's identification of defendant as masked perpetrator sufficient, despite victim only seeing defendant's eyes during attack, when considered with corroborating evidence).

Moreover, Eskine's testimony was wholly consistent with the defendant's confession and further established the defendant's agreement and intent to kill C.B. so that she could not be a trial witness against Beaux. Eskine explained that he and the defendant scoped out C.B.’s home in July 2020 to prepare for the murder and, in November 2020, drove to Montegut in Boudreaux's vehicle to break into C.B.’s home but left when a neighbor scared them. Finally, Eskine let the defendant borrow his truck on the day of the murders, knowing it was likely the defendant intended to murder C.B. that day. Although the defendant complains Eskine's testimony was self-serving, the jury was well aware that the State bargained for his testimony. Such fact only bears on Eskine's credibility. See State v. Hughes, 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051. Furthermore, Eskine's testimony was supported by the defendant's statements, LPR camera data, cell phone records, and the testimony of Martin, Jerry, and Boudreaux. Thus, the jury could have reasonably accepted Eskine's testimony as credible and materially corroborated. See Id.

Additionally, the testimony of Martin and Jerry placed Eskine's truck at C.B.’s house at the time of the murders. The defendant's statements further established that he backed in Eskine's truck next to Martin's truck on the concrete slab. Although the defendant attempted to reduce his culpability, he was present, aware, and clearly involved in the murder-for-hire scheme and subsequent murders, whether he was the driver or the shooter. Thus, even if the jury believed the defendant was not the gunman, the jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant, at the very least, actively desired C.B.’s death and substantially participated in the murders as a principal. See La. R.S. 14:24; State v. Anthony, 98-0406 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 376, 386-87, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 320, 148 L.Ed.2d 258 (2000) (finding evidence sufficient for jury to conclude defendant was guilty of first degree murder, whether or not he was the shooter, where the defendant's participation in the crime was major and he clearly intended from the outset to kill the victims).

With respect to the attempted first degree murder of C.B., the defendant's arguments are meritless. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, when a person shoots at an intended victim with the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and accidentally kills or inflicts great bodily harm upon another person, if the killing or inflicting of great bodily harm would have been unlawful against the intended victim, then it would be unlawful against the person actually shot, even though that person was not the intended victim. Hollins, 387 So.3d at 646. Herein, the defendant exhibited a specific intent to kill by shooting Brittany in the center of her forehead, ensuring her death. See Hollins, 387 So.3d at 646 (“Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person.”). While Brittany was not the intended victim, the defendant believed she was, as he noted in his third interview. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to find that the defendant's specific intent to kill C.B. could be transferred from Brittany, as well as inferred from his actions in agreeing to kill C.B., asking about her upon entering the home, and shooting the first woman to unfortunately identify herself as C.B. See Hollins, 387 So.3d at 648; State v. Wright, 2019-0456 (La. App. 3d Cir. 12/18/19), 286 So.3d 1176, 1181-87, writ denied, 2020-00262 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So.3d 73 (finding defendant's specific intent to kill his intended victim transferred to two victims that he did not see standing in another room behind his intended victim).

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the trier of fact and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we find a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of first degree murder, second degree murder, and attempted first degree murder, as well as the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of the offenses. These assignments of error lack merit.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

In his second counseled and pro se assignments of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to police. Specifically, the defendant claims his statements should have been suppressed because he was under great stress and under the influence of marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamines when he made them.

For a confession to be admissible, the State must show that it was freely and voluntarily given without influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. La. R.S. 15:451; La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D); State v. Brown, 2016-0998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 789, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S.Ct. 886, 215 L.Ed.2d 404 (2023). This voluntariness determination is based on the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was given. Brown, 347 So.3d at 789. The State must establish that an accused who makes a statement or confession while in custody was first advised of his constitutional rights and executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Brown, 347 So.3d at 789; State v. Neese, 96-1371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 291, 293, writ denied, 97-1127 (La. 10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1331. Testimony of the interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove that a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Batiste, 2022-0437 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 2022 WL 16707991, *4 (unpublished). A trial court's conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. Id.

When a defendant challenges a confession on the ground it was not freely and voluntarily given because he was intoxicated at the time of the confession, the confession will be inadmissible only when the intoxication is of such a degree as to negate his comprehension and to make him unconscious of the consequences of what he is saying. Whether intoxication exists and is sufficient to vitiate the voluntariness of a confession are questions of fact. The trial court's ruling on this issue will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the evidence. Batiste, 2022 WL 16707991 at *4.

At the motion to suppress hearing, TPSO Lieutenant Travis Sanford testified that the defendant's first interview took place at the Eunice Police Department, as the defendant lived and was apprehended in Eunice. Lieutenant Sanford advised the defendant of his Miranda rights from a written form, which the defendant appeared to understand and initialed as such in acknowledgement.¹⁵ Lieutenant Sanford stated that the defendant was not coerced or threatened to make a statement. Similarly, TPSO Detective Ryan Trosclair testified that the defendant appeared to understand what was happening and did not seem to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. TPSO Major Kody Voisin, who did most of the questioning, testified that the defendant appeared to understand the process, the waiver of Miranda rights, and the questions asked of him.¹⁶ Major Voisin noted the defendant did not appear to be agitated or under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

After the defendant's first interview, he was transported to the Terrebonne Parish Criminal Justice Complex (“TPCJC”). The following evening, January 30, 2021, a TPCJC employee advised Detective Trosclair that the defendant requested to speak with TPSO detectives again. Detective Trosclair and Lieutenant Sanford then went to TPCJC to speak with the defendant, who was again advised of and waived his Miranda rights prior to questioning.¹⁷ According to Detective Trosclair, the defendant again appeared to understand what was happening. Lieutenant Sanford testified similarly, noting the defendant did not seem under the influence, confused, or disoriented.

On February 3, 2021, the defendant again requested to speak with TPSO detectives. Prior to the four-hour-long interview, Lieutenant Sanford again reviewed the Miranda rights form with the defendant, who initialed and signed it. Lieutenant Sanford testified that the defendant seemed to understand his rights and did not appear to be under the influence. Major Voisin, who was also present during the third interview, testified that he believed the defendant understood the process and the questions asked of him.

The defendant testified at the motion to suppress hearing that at the time of his first interview and arrest, he was under the influence of marijuana and “jiggers,” which he described as a mixture of drugs crushed into one pill. When asked if the drugs affected his ability to understand his rights during questioning, the defendant responded, “I mean, yeah, to a certain extent because my mind was altered.” The defendant stated he also took “jiggers” before his second and third statements, as he stored them in his body and was not strip-searched prior to entering TPCJC. On cross-examination, the defendant conceded he did not disclose to the TPSO detectives that he was under the influence during his interviews.

After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion, noting it was impressed by the defendant and the policework in this case.¹⁸ Specifically, the court stated the detectives properly Mirandized the defendant, smiled and laughed with the defendant at times, and did not rush or threaten the defendant into a confession. The court found the defendant intelligent, articulate, and well-spoken during his statements. Further, the court noted the defendant understood his rights, asked relevant questions, and spoke deliberately. Finally, the court found that the defendant was not intoxicated or high on drugs such that he did not know what he was doing when he confessed.

Our review of the defendant's statements shows the TPSO detectives thoroughly advised the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to each interview. As noted by the trial court, the detectives were friendly with the defendant and even allowed him to call and speak with several individuals, including his girlfriend and young son. Furthermore, the defendant was alert, rational, and responsive to questioning. In fact, in his second interview, the defendant acknowledged that he remembered portions of his statement from the day before. In his final interview, the defendant recalled the details of the shooting, including the murder-for-hire scheme leading up to it, and later attempted to mitigate his role in the crimes. Finally, the defendant did not disclose to detectives that he was intoxicated or high at any point during the interviews.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling, which is supported by the testimony, the recorded statements, and the Miranda waiver forms. As stated supra, the defendant was advised of and knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Lieutenant Sanford, Major Voisin, and Detective Trosclair each testified the defendant did not exhibit any signs of being intoxicated to the degree it would negate his ability to comprehend the consequences of his statements. Further, after the defendant fully confessed, he then backtracked and attempted to reduce his culpability in the crimes, indicating he was acutely aware of what he was doing. See State v. Posey, 2008-0746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/08), 2008 WL 4376811, *5 (unpublished) (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of motion to suppress confession based on intoxication, where defendant was cooperative, alert, responsive to questioning, and attempted to mitigate her role in commission of offense). After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements, we conclude the defendant's three statements were voluntary, and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. These assignments of error lack merit.

EXCLUSION OF TOXICOLOGY RESULTS

In his third pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court violated his right to present a complete defense by redacting the toxicology results from the victims’ autopsy reports. Specifically, he claims he was denied the opportunity to show an alternative motive for the crimes and rebut the State's theory that he was responsible for the victims’ deaths.

A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 16; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); State v. Gremillion, (La. 5/1/89), 542 So.2d 1074, 1078-79. Evidentiary rules may not supersede the fundamental right to present a defense. State v. Van Winkle, 94-0947 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198, 202. However, the trial court is not required to introduce evidence that is irrelevant or has so little probative value that it is substantially outweighed by other legitimate considerations in the administration of justice. See State v. Mosby, 595 So.2d 1135, 1138 (La. 1992).

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. La. Code Evid. art. 401. All relevant evidence is generally admissible. See La. Code Evid. art. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, risk of misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time. La. Code Evid. art. 403. Ultimately, the trial court has great discretion in determining the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and its determinations should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, 2023-0243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/23), 376 So.3d 880, 889.

On the third day of trial, the State made an oral motion in limine to exclude the toxicology results from the victims’ autopsy reports and any testimony in regards thereto.¹⁹ The State argued the positive findings were irrelevant and prejudicial, as they had no bearing on the victims’ causes of death. In response, the defendant argued he should be allowed to explore any alternative suspects or motives, such as a potential bad drug deal.²⁰ The trial court found the toxicology results would be overly prejudicial because there had been no suggestion the murders were the result of “a drug deal gone bad.” The defendant objected to the trial court's ruling. Subsequently, the State admitted into evidence the autopsy reports with the toxicology results redacted. The defense then proffered the full autopsy reports, which included the toxicology results.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of the victims’ toxicology results from the autopsy reports. As noted by the trial court, the toxicology results were not relevant to the murders or any legitimate defense theory. See State v. Verdin, 2022-1178 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/7/23), 2023 WL 5767592, *12 (unpublished), writ denied, 2023-01319 (La. 3/12/24), 381 So.3d 53. According to the defendant's statements, he shot Brittany point-blank and shot Hope accidentally during a struggle over the gun. There was no evidence presented to suggest the murders were committed as a result of a drug deal gone wrong. In fact, Detective Trosclair confirmed that they investigated both leads and found neither “Crystal” had any connection to the murders. Upon the discovery of the involved vehicles and their respective owners, the “Crystal” lead was altogether eliminated. Even assuming the trial court erred in redacting the victims’ toxicology results, such error was harmless considering the substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt in this case. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

IMPROPER EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

In his fourth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues the State violated his right to a fair trial by improperly influencing Martin's in-court identification of him. Although the defendant concedes he did not contemporaneously object, he contends the State's identification procedure was unduly suggestive and prejudicial such that it influenced the jury's verdicts.

The defendant herein did not file a motion to suppress identification, nor did he object before, during, or after Martin's in-court identification of him at trial. A defendant who fails to file a motion to suppress identification, and who fails to object at trial to the admission of the identification testimony, waives the right to assert the issue on appeal. State v. Robertson, 2020-0293 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/20), 2020 WL 6536930, *2 (unpublished); see La. Code Crim. P. arts. 703 and 841; State v. Naas, 409 So.2d 535, 547 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1119, 102 S.Ct. 2933, 73 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1982). Accordingly, this assignment of error is not reviewable on appeal.

DEFECTIVE INDICTMENT

In his fifth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues his rights to notice, due process, and a fair trial were violated due to a defective indictment and the State's failure to respond to his request for a bill of particulars. Specifically, he claims the indictment was vague because it failed to list any aggravating elements under the first degree murder statute. See La. R.S. 14:30(A).

In a criminal prosecution, an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. La. Const. art. I, § 13. This requirement is implemented by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 464, which provides:

The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.

The time for testing the sufficiency of an indictment or bill of information is before trial by means of a motion to quash or an application for a bill of particulars. After the verdict, the defendant ordinarily cannot complain of the insufficiency of an indictment unless it failed to give fair notice of the offense charged or failed to set forth any identifiable offense. State v. Manning, 2003-1982 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So.2d 1044, 1089, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 1745, 161 L.Ed.2d 612 (2005); State v. Marrero, 2011-1285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/12), 92 So.3d 21, 32, writ denied, 2012-0563 (La. 6/15/12), 90 So.3d 1060.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 465 authorizes the use of specific short form indictments in charging certain offenses, including first degree murder. When those forms are used, a defendant may procure details as to the statutory method by which he committed the offense through a bill of particulars. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 624, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007); State v. Breaux, 2011-0015 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/8/11), 2011 WL 6141636, *9-10 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-0447 (La. 10/8/12), 98 So.3d 867; La. Code Crim. P. art. 465, Official Revision Comment (a).

The indictment in this case followed the short form provided by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 465(A)(7) and (A)(31).²¹ At the defendant's arraignment, the State offered open file discovery to the defendant, who accepted same. The defendant also filed an application for a bill of particulars arguing the indictment failed to allege any aggravating factors and specifically requesting the State specify which factors were applicable to the instant offenses. See La. R.S. 14:30(A). The trial court granted the defendant's motion and ordered the State to provide a written response within thirty days or show cause why it should not be ordered on March 23, 2022. The minute entry for that date reflects the defendant requested a continuance to May 18, 2022, at which time he advised the trial court that the discovery motions were satisfied.

The record is void of any response by the State to the bill of particulars. However, the defendant did not object to the State's alleged failure to respond, nor did he argue he was unaware of the nature of the charges against him. After the defendant requested the bill of particulars, he later informed the trial court he was satisfied with the State's discovery. Thus, the discovery seemingly provided the answers to the questions in the bill of particulars, i.e., which aggravating factors the State sought to prove the murders under Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30(A). See State v. Brooks, 2013-0540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/18/13), 124 So.3d 1129, 1142. We find the defendant was aware of the State's evidence against him, as well as the nature and cause of the allegations against him. See Marrero, 92 So.3d at 32.

The defendant has failed to show he was unaware of the allegations against him, or how he was prejudiced by the lack of language or lack of specificity in the short form indictment. See Draughn, 950 So.2d at 624; Marrero, 92 So.3d at 32; Breaux, 2011 WL 6141636 at *9-10. This assignment of error lacks merit.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

In his sixth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues the State violated his right to a fair trial by making improper statements in its opening argument to the jury.²² Although the defendant concedes he did not object, he claims the statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct and, therefore, warrant reversal of his convictions.

As the defendant admits, he failed to object or move for a mistrial on the basis of the improper statements or prosecutorial misconduct claims alleged by him on appeal. Thus, the claims were not preserved for appellate review, and the defendant may not now raise them on appeal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 841(A); State v. Howard, 2018-0317 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/18), 258 So.3d 66, 83-84, writ denied, 2018-1650 (La. 5/6/19), 269 So.3d 692. Accordingly, this assignment of error is not reviewable on appeal.

INCOMPLETE APPELLATE RECORD

In his seventh pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues his right to a full and effective appeal was violated because the appellate record is incomplete. Specifically, he claims the trial transcript fails to include the audio and video evidence admitted at trial and merely notes “audio recording played” or “video recording played.”

A criminal defendant has a right of appeal based upon a complete record of all the evidence upon which the judgment is based. La. Const. art. I, § 19. In felony cases, the clerk or court stenographer shall record all of the proceedings, including the examination of prospective jurors, the testimony of witnesses, statements, rulings, orders, and charges by the court, and objections, questions, statements, and arguments of counsel. La. Code Crim. P. art. 843; see also La. R.S. 13:961(C)(1). Reversal of a conviction is required where there are material omissions from the trial transcript bearing on the merits of an appeal. However, inconsequential omissions or slight inaccuracies do not require reversal. State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 16, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460.

At trial, the State introduced and admitted into evidence the recordings of the defendant's three interviews and C.B.’s 911 call. The State subsequently published each recording to the jury. On appeal, the recordings are part of the appellate record, available for review, and serve as the best evidence of their contents, as opposed to transcription. See State v. Williams, 2017-0544 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/14/18), 240 So.3d 355, 369, writ denied, 2018-0584 (La. 3/18/19), 267 So.3d 83; State v. Ashley, 44,655 (La. App. 2d Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So.3d 1045, 1058, writ denied, 2009-2305 (La. 4/23/10), 34 So.3d 271. In rendering this decision, this court has reviewed each recording. Thus, the defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced by the failure of the court reporter to transcribe the audio and visual recordings. This assignment of error lacks merit.

FAILURE TO RULE ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

In his eighth pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court violated his right to due process by failing to rule on his motion to reconsider sentence and motion for new trial based on perjury. Specifically, he claims the trial court erroneously believed it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motions.

In the instant case, the trial court sentenced the defendant on December 7, 2023. On the same date, the defendant filed a motion for appeal, which was granted, and a motion to reconsider sentence, which was initially set for hearing in January 2024 but later continued to March 19, 2025.²³ On that date, the defendant filed a counseled motion for new trial based on perjury of a law enforcement officer.²⁴ Following a hearing, the trial court denied both motions on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, and the defendant objected to the trial court's ruling.²⁵ The trial court then granted two more motions for appeal.

On appeal, the defendant challenges only the trial court's alleged failure to rule on his motion to reconsider sentence and counseled motion for new trial. He does not challenge the denial of said motions. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the trial court ruled on both motions, although not on the merits. In its ruling, the trial court stated that it denied the motions based on lack of jurisdiction; however, it appears the defendant understood that to mean the trial court refused to rule on the motions at all. Nevertheless, the record reflects both motions were denied.²⁶ This assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. Our review has revealed one patent error.

The record reflects that the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief at sentencing. Though the transcript states that the trial court provided the defendant with a written copy of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.8 setting forth the post-conviction relief prescriptive period, the record does not contain a copy, if one was provided. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentences and is not grounds to reverse the sentences or remand for resentencing. State v. Bouvier, 2024-0892 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/25), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3761805, *9.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we instead advise the defendant that Article 930.8 generally provides no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of Articles 914 or 922. Bouvier, ––– So.3d at ––––, 2025 WL 3761805 at *9.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State did not seek a capital verdict in this case.

2.   A grand jury also indicted two co-defendants, Beaux Andrew Cormier and Andrew James Eskine, for the charges herein. Because Beaux Cormier shares a last name with one of the victims, we hereinafter refer to him by his first name to avoid confusion.The matters were severed prior to the defendant's trial. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Eskine pled guilty to one count of manslaughter and testified against the defendant at trial. At the time of the defendant's trial, Beaux had not proceeded to trial.

3.   Both Hope Nettleton and Brittany Cormier share a last name with other individuals referenced in this opinion. Hereinafter, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

4.   At the time of the shooting, C.B. was at least eighteen years old. However, we refer to her by her initials to protect her confidentiality because, as discussed infra, she alleged she was a minor victim of a sex offense. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

5.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:60(A) provides:Aggravated burglary is the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, or of any structure, water craft, or movable where a person is present, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, under any of the following circumstances:(1) If the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.(2) If, after entering, the offender arms himself with a dangerous weapon(3) If the offender commits a battery upon any person while in such place, or in entering or leaving such place.

6.   Eskine testified that the defendant asked to borrow his truck to bring his son to see the defendant's father in Houma, which is near Montegut. Eskine initially refused. However, when Beaux later asked if the defendant could use his truck, Eskine agreed.

7.   Martin provided TPSO detectives with the names Crystal Ledet and Crystal Matherne. According to Detective Trosclair, Ledet had an “extensive drug history” and visited the Martin home often.

8.   Kameron Wilson is the defendant's younger brother, and his name is spelled as both “Cameron” and “Kameron” throughout the record. According to the defendant's girlfriend, his name is properly spelled “Kameron.” Therefore, we use that spelling herein.

9.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

10.   The defendant explained that Beaux agreed to pay him $10,000 total, but he only received $4,000 prior to the shooting. The defendant stated that he did not receive the remaining amount after the murders.

11.   The defendant stated that he took “jiggers,” which he described as a “mixture of heroin, meth, and other drugs like fentanyl crushed into one pill.”

12.   In the recording, the defendant uses C.B.’s first name.

13.   In the recording, the defendant uses C.B.’s first name to explain who he asked for and who the woman identified herself as.

14.   Implicit in the defendant's arguments on appeal is that his statements to police were made while he was intoxicated and therefore should not have been admitted into evidence. However, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must consider the entirety of the evidence, including, if applicable, inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted. See State v. Figueroa, 2024-0739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/23/25), 417 So.3d 795, 798, writ denied, 2025-00809 (La. 12/9/25), 422 So.3d 301. Accordingly, we will consider the defendant's statements to police in determining the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.

15.   The Miranda rights form, which the defendant both initialed and signed, advised the defendant he had the right to remain silent, anything he said could be used against him in court, he had the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one.

16.   Major Voisin's first name is spelled as “Cody” in the transcript from the motion to suppress hearing. However, the minutes and trial transcript use the spelling “Kody.” We use the latter spelling herein.

17.   The interview occurred in an interview room at TPCJC because it was a Saturday evening and no transportation units were available.

18.   The trial court reviewed all three statements the evening before the hearing.

19.   The toxicology results showed that Brittany had THC (marijuana) in her blood and that Hope had traces of methamphetamines, amphetamines, and alprazolam in her blood, as well as benzodiazepines, amphetamines, and fentanyl metabolite in her urine.

20.   Specifically, he noted the gunman asked for “Crystal,” and detectives investigated and interviewed a Crystal Ledet, who lived in the area, allegedly frequented the Martin house, and had an extensive drug history.

21.   The indictment reads:“COUNT ONE: In violation of La R.S. 14:30, Dalvin Montae Wilson ․ on or about January 13, 2021, committed first degree murder of Brittany J. Cormier.COUNT TWO: In violation of La R.S. 14:30, Dalvin Montae Wilson ․ on or about January 13, 2021, committed first degree murder of Hope Danos Nettleton.COUNT THREE: In violation of La R.S. 14:27 & 14:30, Dalvin Montae Wilson ․ on or about January 13, 2021, attempted to commit first degree murder of [C.B.]”

22.   In his brief, the defendant does not cite to any specific comments in the record but cites generally to the State's entire opening argument. Specifically, he claims the State repeatedly referred to him as “guilty” and presented “unproven factual narratives about the crime[s,]” including his statements to police and the actions of Eskine and Beaux. While the defendant also claims the State made improper comments during its closing argument, he fails to provide any record references of such. This court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review that has not been briefed. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4); State v. Wetzel, 2024-0584 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/23/25), 417 So.3d 603, 613.

23.   The record does not contain a minute entry or transcript for the January 2024 hearing date, so it is unclear what happened that date. In September 2024, the defendant filed a motion to set the matter for a hearing. The hearing was initially scheduled for November 2024 and continued twice more to March 2025.

24.   The defendant first filed a pro se motion for new trial based on the same grounds on February 24, 2025, which the trial court denied because the defendant had an attorney.

25.   The trial court is divested of jurisdiction once it grants the defendant's motion for an appeal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 916.

26.   Because the defendant does not challenge the denial of the motions on appeal, we pretermit discussion as to whether the trial court's rulings were erroneous.

THERIOT, J.