STATE v. PEOPLES (2026)

The grand jurors in the Parish of Washington charged the defendant, Joseph A. Peoples, with second-degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count I); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count II); conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice (in a second-degree murder case) by tampering with evidence, a violation of La. R.S. 14:26, La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1), and La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(1) (count III); conspiracy to commit obstruction of justice (in a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon case) by tampering with evidence, a violation of La. R.S. 14:26, La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1), and La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(2) (count IV); obstruction of justice (in a second-degree murder case) by tampering with evidence, a violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) and La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(1) (count V); and obstruction of justice (in a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon case) by tampering with evidence, a violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1) and La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(2) (count VI). He pled not guilty on all counts.

Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged by unanimous verdicts on all counts. The defendant orally moved for a new trial and a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and the district court denied both motions in open court on January 26, 2024. The defendant then filed a written motion for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The district court signed judgments denying those motions on February 26, 2024, and sentenced the defendant on the same day. On count I, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On count II, he was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence on count I and was fined $5,000.00. On count III, he was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor to be served consecutively to all other counts. On count IV, he was sentenced to ten years at hard labor to be served consecutively to all other counts and was fined $2,500.00. On count V, he was sentenced to forty years at hard labor to be served consecutively to all other counts. On count VI, he was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor to be served consecutively to all other counts.

The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the second-degree murder conviction and to the denial of his post-trial motions. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions; affirm the sentences on counts I, III, V, and VI; affirm in part and vacate in part the sentences on counts II and IV; and remand to the district court in accordance herewith.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 22, 2020, at approximately 8:00 a.m., the body of the victim, Shawn Whiteside, was discovered on the side of the road on Highway 1072 near Franklinton. He had suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his left chest. Shortly thereafter, the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office (“WPSO”) received a tip that a silver SUV with Arkansas plates (“suspect vehicle”) was seen driving erratically in the area.

WPSO officers went to Whiteside's address where his roommate, Jessica Phelps, advised them Whiteside had recently separated from his wife, Haley Whiteside. Officers then traveled to Haley Whiteside's address on Patterson Drive and discovered a vehicle fitting the description of the suspect vehicle parked nearby. Someone at the Patterson Drive address identified the defendant as the owner of the suspect vehicle. The officers were advised the owner of the suspect vehicle resided “just up the hill” on Denham Avenue, where they first made contact with the defendant outside his mother's home and detained him.¹

Later that day, officers executed a search warrant at the defendant's mother's home. The defendant's live-in girlfriend, Allison Cook, was present at the home and was detained. The defendant's cell phone was in Cook's pocket at that time. Around the same time, officers learned the defendant resided next door and secured a search warrant for his home as well. Whiteside's cell phone was submerged in the tank of the toilet at the defendant's home. Police recovered the defendant's wallet, with his identification and $1,280.00 in cash, from the floor of the bathroom. The murder weapon, wrapped in a T-shirt, was recovered from underneath a shed behind the home.

Cook testified that her mother and the defendant's mother were best friends, and she first met the defendant when she was eight years old and he was eighteen years old. They began dating when she was eighteen years old and were living together at the time of the incident. Cook denied being romantic with Whiteside.

According to Cook, early on the day of the incident, Whiteside visited the defendant at the house she shared with the defendant. The defendant and Whiteside went into the back bedroom, and Cook fell asleep. After Cook woke up, she and the men went to get breakfast in the suspect vehicle. The defendant drove the vehicle, Whiteside was the front passenger, and Cook sat in the back. After picking up breakfast, they drove to a house on Patterson Avenue, where the men exited the vehicle and spoke to someone under the carport for a few minutes.

Cook, the defendant, and Whiteside then went to a gas station together. Whiteside went inside. The defendant asked Cook to see how much money was in Whiteside's wallet, but Whiteside was coming back outside before Cook could enter the store. At the stop sign in front of the gas station, the defendant and Whiteside began arguing after Whiteside turned to Cook and stated, “Out of respect[,] can we please go drop [Cook] off, Bro[.]” Cook testified that the defendant thought she and Whiteside had “something going on reaching around the passenger seat by the seatbelt touching [Cook].” Cook stated her position in the middle of the back seat made it impossible for Whiteside to touch her in that way. Cook also indicated that the defendant kept “eyes on [her]” in the rearview mirror during the entire car ride. After Whiteside “barely touched” the defendant on the shoulder three times, the defendant pulled out a handgun and shot Whiteside once in the chest. The shell casing hit Cook on her left kneecap. The defendant told Cook to retrieve the casing. Prior to the shooting, Whiteside attempted to jump from the vehicle, but the defendant locked the doors. Whiteside also pleaded with the defendant, stating, “I have two kids and a wife.” Cook stated Whiteside seemed scared. She testified Whiteside never “went for the gun.”

Whiteside began choking after being shot, but then went silent. Cook covered him with her hooded shirt. The defendant sped away from Bogalusa to Highway 1075. After the defendant stopped the vehicle, he told Cook to open the passenger door and remove Whiteside's body. While pointing the gun at Cook, the defendant stated that “[I]f he didn't love [Cook] so much[,] he would have [done Cook] too.” Cook opened the door, but she was unable to pull Whiteside out of his seat. The defendant kicked Whiteside's body out of the vehicle.

The defendant drove Cook back to their shared home. He took the gun from the vehicle and told Cook to remove all the paperwork from the glove compartment and to take a bath. Thereafter, the defendant handed Cook the gun wrapped in a shirt, stating, “Here, go put this somewhere.” Cook hid the weapon under the shed in the back yard. She denied shooting Whiteside.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the jury erred in failing to return a verdict of manslaughter on count I because the evidence showed he was provoked by the victim and shot him in the heat of passion. In assignment of error number two, the defendant contends the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. He combines the assignments of error for argument, stating that his second-degree murder conviction should be vacated, and as such, the district court should have granted the motion for new trial and/or for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to his convictions on counts II, III, IV, V, and VI.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979). When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of an offense, La. R.S. 15:438 mandates “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Brooks, 2023-1095 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/13/24), 405 So.3d 932, 935.

The Jackson standard, however, does not provide a defendant with a means of splitting alternative and inconsistent defenses in different forums, raising one defense before the jury and when that fails, a second defense presupposing a different set of facts in the appellate court conducting sufficiency review under Jackson and La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(E). State v. Juluke, 98-0341 (La. 1/8/99), 725 So.2d 1291, 1293 (per curiam). This is to prevent the defendant from urging a defense on appeal that the State had no reason to challenge at trial. See State v. Duvall, 97-2173 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/99), 747 So.2d 793, 799, writ denied, 2000-1362 (La. 2/16/01), 785 So.2d 838; see also State v. Logan, 2019-0590 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/20/20), 2020 WL 4048059, *3 (unpublished), overruled on other grounds, State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 797, writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177.

In a case involving circumstantial evidence in which the jury has reasonably rejected the defense offered at trial, the reviewing court “does not determine whether another possible hypothesis has been suggested by [the] defendant which could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984) (emphasis in original). Instead, the reviewing court must “evaluate[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine[ ] whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not ‘have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Captville, 448 So.2d at 680 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S.Ct. at 2792); Juluke, 725 So.2d at 1293.

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be formed in an instant. Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant's actions. State v. Magee, 2020-0096 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/20), 2020 WL 6538506, *2 (unpublished). Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. Brooks, 405 So.3d at 936.

Manslaughter is defined, in pertinent part, as:

A homicide which would be murder under ․ Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]

La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).

In his opening statement, defense counsel stated, “The question is going to be, ․ who shot Shawn Whiteside in that vehicle? Who possessed the weapon to shoot Shawn Whiteside in that vehicle? ․ Allison Cook possessed the gun. Allison Cook shot Shawn Whiteside.”

WPSO Captain Tom Anderson, retired, was supervisor of investigations at the time of the incident and assisted in the interview of the defendant. Captain Anderson testified that in the defendant's first interview with law enforcement, the defendant stated that he argued with Whiteside because he was selling drugs in front of the defendant's mother's house and Whiteside “pulled a gun and [the defendant] deflected the gun and it went off and shot [the victim].” The defendant refused to identify the female in the vehicle with the men. On cross-examination, Captain Anderson stated the defendant later admitted he did not identify Cook as the female in the vehicle with him and Whiteside because he was trying to protect her.

WPSO Captain Raymond Myers was the lead investigator in the killing of Whiteside. He testified that, in recorded jailhouse calls, the defendant gave two different versions of the incident: he stated Cook was the shooter but also claimed he slapped the gun away from Whiteside.

On cross-examination by the defense, Cook admitted the defendant and Whiteside went into a bedroom and shut the door at the house she shared with the defendant. Cook denied the men were having an affair. She also denied she was jealous of the relationship between the men. Cook agreed with defense counsel's suggestion that Whiteside felt comfortable enough to “pat” or “caress” the defendant on the shoulder. Cook denied the gun was in her hand rather than the defendant's hand during the incident. She agreed the police promised they would “go easier” on her if she told them what they wanted to hear and that she was never charged with the murder.

The State and the defense stipulated that Dr. Michael Defatta was an expert in the field of forensic pathology. Dr. Defatta conducted the autopsy of Whiteside. Dr. Defatta testified that he determined Whiteside's cause of death was a penetrating gunshot wound to his left chest, which traveled left-to-right, perforating his heart, both lungs, and his liver, and concluded Whiteside's manner of death was homicide. Dr. Defatta opined Whiteside was shot from a distance of two-and-one-half to forty-eight inches or further away. Dr. Defatta indicated if Whiteside were completely turned to the driver of the vehicle, the gunshot wound would have traveled front-to-back rather than left-to-right. On cross-examination by the defense, Dr. Defatta indicated that if the victim had turned around to talk to the backseat passenger, it was possible that the victim was shot from the back seat.

In closing, defense counsel argued the police gave Cook the opportunity to “point the finger” at the defendant but never considered that perhaps she “pulled the trigger and killed Shawn Whiteside, murdered Shawn Whiteside.” According to defense counsel, the evidence showed Cook shot Whiteside “[i]n a fit of jealousy” because he touched the defendant on the shoulder and spent the previous evening alone with him in a bedroom. Defense counsel cited Dr. Defatta's testimony noting the possibility that the fatal shot came from the back seat.

The defendant did not argue at trial that he shot the victim in the heat of passion immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Rather, he offered an alternative defense that Cook shot the victim in a fit of jealousy. He questioned the witnesses concerning the possibility that Cook, rather than he, was the gunman. The defense at trial was also inconsistent with the defendant's theory in this forum, i.e., that he was the shooter but acted in the heat of passion under “circumstances in which [the defendant] believed that [Whiteside] was having an affair with [Cook] and was touching her in the vehicle.”

In reaching its verdict, the jury not only implicitly rejected the defense on appeal, it expressly did so. The jury was charged on the responsive verdict of manslaughter, and manslaughter appeared as an option on the verdict sheet. Nevertheless, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. Allowing the defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of a defense urged for the first time on appeal would substitute this court for the factfinder at trial. See State v. Ware, 2006-1703 (La. 6/29/07), 959 So.2d 459, 463 n.1 (per curiam) (“[T]he evidence in the record of defendant's drinking at the time of the offense does not provide a reviewing court with a basis for speculating how a rational trier of fact might have responded if the defense of intoxication had been asserted at trial[.]” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the argument that the offense was manslaughter, rather than second-degree murder, is not properly before this court and will not be considered. See Juluke, 725 So.2d at 1293; Duvall, 747 So.2d at 799-800. For these same reasons, we find no error in the district court's denial of the defendant's post-trial motions as to his conviction on count I.

PATENT ERROR REVIEW

On appeal, this court routinely reviews the record for error patent. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), in conducting a patent error review, this court shall consider “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” Inasmuch as an illegal sentence is an error discoverable by a mere inspection of the proceedings without inspection of the evidence, La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2) authorizes consideration of such an error on appeal. Moreover, La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) authorizes the appellate court to correct an illegal sentence on review. State v. Augustine, 2024-0420 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/23/25), 417 So.3d 826, 845-46, writ denied, 2025-00799 (La. 11/12/25), 420 So.3d 706.

The defendant filed motions for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a new trial, which the district court denied on the day of the sentencing hearing. The district court erred by immediately sentencing the defendant without waiting 24 hours after the denial of the motion for new trial, as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 at the time of sentencing.² The record reflects no waiver of this time period by the defendant. Nevertheless, failure to observe the 24-hour delay provided in Article 873 will be considered harmless error where the defendant could not show that he suffered prejudice from the violation. See State v. Cyprian, 2021-0287 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 271, 287. The defendant is not prejudiced if the defendant did not challenge the sentence imposed and the violation of the 24-hour delay was merely noted on patent error review. In the instant case, the defendant did not assign error to the district court's failure to observe the 24-hour delay, nor has he contested the sentences imposed. Under these circumstances, this patent sentencing error is harmless. See Cyprian, 340 So.3d at 287-88.

We also note that prior to ordering the defendant to pay a $5,000.00 fine on count II and a $2,500.00 fine on count IV, the district court did not conduct a hearing under La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1(C)(1), to determine whether the financial obligation would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents. Further, neither the defendant nor the court waived judicial determination of such. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1(C)(2). Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1(C), in the absence of a waiver by the district court ³ or the defendant, it is clear that a district court must conduct a hearing prior to imposing any fine, fee, cost, restitution, or other monetary obligation as part of the defendant's sentence. Because the district court failed to comply with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1, we hereby vacate the fines imposed on counts II and IV. We vacate the sentences on counts II and IV only insofar as they included the imposition of fines without a hearing to determine if the financial obligations would impose a substantial hardship. We otherwise affirm the sentences on counts II and IV. We remand this matter to the district court for a hearing in compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1. See Augustine, 417 So.3d at 846.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions on all counts. The sentences on counts I, III, V, and VI are affirmed. The sentences on counts II and IV are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this matter is remanded for a hearing in compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON COUNTS I, III, V, AND VI AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON COUNTS II AND IV AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Patterson Drive and Denham Avenue intersect and are within walking distance from each other.

2.   We note that La. Acts 2026, No. 634, § 1 (effective August 1, 2026) amended Article 873 to delete the “at least twenty-four hours” mandatory delay (absent express waiver or guilty plea) between the overruling of motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment and sentencing. We also note that Article 873 does not require the same delay after the denial of a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. See State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 797, writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177.

3.   The district court may waive the judicial determination of a substantial financial hardship on its own motion. If it does so, it must provide reasons, entered upon the record, for its determination that the defendant is capable of paying the fines, fees, and penalties imposed without causing a substantial financial hardship. La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1(C)(2). The record before us on appeal does not reflect any reasons given by the district court that would comply with Article 875.1.

EDWARDS, J.